Zhu Jiamu: Fully Recognize the Milestone Significance of the Great Changes in the Ten Years of the New Era in the History of the People's Republic of China

General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out in the report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC): "The great transformation of the ten years of the New Era is of milestone significance in the history of the Party, the history of New China, the history of reform and opening up, the history of the development of socialism, and the history of the development of the Chinese nation." This judgment is of profound significance for deeply understanding the historical changes of the ten years of the New Era and for clarifying the forward direction for upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics. It is also of great importance for fully recognizing the new period initiated since the 18th National Congress within the history of New China and the history of reform and opening up, further guiding the in-depth development of research into the history of New China. When demarcating historical periods within a social formation that remains fundamentally consistent, one must primarily look for the emergence of new stage-specific characteristics. By comparing the ten years of the New Era with the various historical stages already experienced during reform and opening up, it is not difficult to see that since the 18th National Congress, distinct and profound changes have indeed occurred—whether in the concepts of state governance, the practice of socialist modernization, the construction of the "Five-Sphere Integrated Plan" (economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological), or the principles and methods of institutional reform, national security, and the Party’s self-construction. These changes present clear stage-specific characteristics, marking the entry of the history of New China and the history of reform and opening up into a new period.

In the report to the 20th CPC National Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping noted that in the ten years since the 18th National Congress, our Party has adopted a series of strategic measures, promoted a series of transformative practices, achieved a series of breakthrough advancements, and obtained a series of landmark results. He systematically expounded upon these measures, practices, advancements, and results across sixteen aspects, and on this basis made the important judgment that the "great transformation of the ten years of the New Era is of milestone significance in the history of the Party, the history of New China, the history of reform and opening up, the history of the development of socialism, and the history of the development of the Chinese nation." This judgment is profoundly significant for helping people deeply understand the historical changes of the ten years of the New Era, further unifying thoughts and actions under Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, clarifying the forward direction for upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics, and strengthening firm convictions and the confidence in victory for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Moreover, it is of great importance for fully recognizing the new period initiated since the 18th National Congress within the history of New China and the history of reform and opening up, further guiding the in-depth development of research into the history of New China.

The periodization of history—referred to in historiography as duanxian ^[1]—depends on different criteria depending on the context. When dealing with societies of different social formations, one primarily looks at whether there have been major shifts in the productive forces and relations of production, or the economic base and the superstructure. When dealing with a society whose social formation remains fundamentally consistent, one primarily looks at whether history has manifested new stage-specific characteristics. Dialectical materialism teaches us that the reason everything in the world is diverse and distinct is that the internal contradictions within things possess particularity. Mao Zedong said that to study the form of motion of matter in a large system, one must "study the particular contradiction and the essence of each process in the long course of development of each form of motion of matter." He also said, "Only by comparison can one distinguish" ^[2] and "Scientific research must begin with an understanding of qualitative characteristics." If we compare the ten years of the New Era with the several historical stages already traversed by reform and opening up, it is not difficult to see that since the 18th National Congress, distinct and profound changes have occurred in governance concepts, socialist modernization practice, the spheres of economy, politics, culture, society, and ecology, as well as in institutional reform, national security, and Party-building. These present clear stage-specific characteristics, marking a new period for both the history of New China and the history of reform and opening up. Without such a comparison, it would be difficult to see how the ten years of the New Era differ from previous historical periods, and difficult to clarify exactly what is "new" about the New Era.

Regarding the stage-specific characteristics of the ten years of the New Era in the history of New China, there are seven aspects that I feel most deeply.

I. In the concepts of state governance, placing greater emphasis on the supremacy of the people and a people-centered approach

Since its birth, the Communist Party of China has regarded serving the people as its sacred purpose. After taking national power, our Party consistently maintained "serving the people" as its supreme governing concept. Since the 18th National Congress, the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has repeatedly emphasized upholding the supremacy of the people and a people-centered approach. This is both a direct continuation of the purpose of "serving the people" and a deepening and innovation of its connotation and focus based on changing circumstances; it is the concrete manifestation of the "serving the people" purpose under the conditions of the New Era.

When our Party spoke of serving the people during the revolutionary war years, it was primarily directed against individualism and "small-group mentality"—thoughts and behaviors that placed personal interest above the interests of the people. After the founding of New China, our Party became the national governing party, and Party members—especially cadres at all levels—held a certain amount of power. At this time, the emphasis on serving the people, beyond targeting general individualism, was primarily directed against bureaucratism and the abuse of power for personal gain. After the start of reform and opening up, China implemented a basic economic system in which public ownership is the mainstay and multiple forms of ownership develop together, alongside a distribution system where distribution according to work is the mainstay and multiple modes of distribution coexist. We established a socialist market economy, encouraged and supported the development of the non-public sector, and established opening up to the outside world as a basic state policy. Private capital, including foreign capital, became a factor of production allowed and encouraged to participate in distribution, leading to the emergence of capital markets, capital transactions, and individuals possessing hundreds of millions in wealth. Under these circumstances, some of our Party members and cadres—particularly a few leading cadres—could not withstand the tests of reform and opening up, the market economy, and the external environment; their abuse of power for personal gain turned into naked power-for-money trades. They accepted bribes from owners of private capital with one hand and opened doors for the illegal operation and profiting of private capital with the other. Their actions not only damaged the Party's image and seriously undermined the relationship between the Party and the masses ^[3] but also abetted the "disorderly expansion" and "wild growth" of capital, seriously damaging the normal order and healthy development of the socialist market economy, widening the wealth gap, and endangering the security of the socialist system. The report to the 20th National Congress stated that ten years ago, "many people within the Party and in society were deeply worried about the future of the Party and the country." Recalling what Deng Xiaoping said in the early stages of reform and opening up—"Some people now worry whether China will turn capitalist; this worry cannot be said to be without any reason"—I understand that the "deep worry" mentioned in the report primarily centered on this issue.

Since the 18th National Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized upholding the supremacy of the people and a people-centered approach. While this still targets individualism and the abuse of power for personal gain, it is directed to a greater extent against the "supremacy of capital" and a "capital-centered" approach. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out that we must both see and utilize the positive role of capital in promoting the development of productive forces, while also remaining vigilant against and preventing the disorderly expansion of capital. He emphasized: "Regulating and guiding the development of capital under the conditions of a socialist market economy is both a major economic issue and a major political issue; it is both a major practical issue and a major theoretical issue. It concerns the persistence of the basic socialist economic system, the basic state policy of reform and opening up, high-quality development and common prosperity, and national security and social stability." Once this logic is understood, returning to study General Secretary Xi Jinping's series of important speeches on the supremacy of the people and a people-centered approach allows for a more genuine and thorough comprehension. That is to say, whether it is our economic and social development or our institutional reform, we must adhere to the supremacy of the people and a people-centered approach; we absolutely cannot allow the supremacy of capital or a capital-centered approach, otherwise, we would become a capitalist party and a capitalist state.

After Comrade Xi Jinping was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee at the First Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, he clearly stated in his first public address: "The people’s aspiration for a better life is the goal we strive for." Since then, the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has centered on the people's aspiration for a better life, proposing a series of governing principles and implementing a series of policies and measures.

For example, the Party explicitly proposed the "people-centered development philosophy," coordinately advanced the "Five-Sphere Integrated Plan" (economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological construction), and coordinately advanced the "Four Comprehensives" strategic layout (comprehensively building a socially moderately prosperous society in all respects, comprehensively deepening reform, comprehensively governing the country according to law, and comprehensively and strictly governing the Party).

Furthermore, the Party demanded that improving the people's well-being be the fundamental purpose of development; that promoting social fairness and justice and improving the people's well-being be the starting point and endpoint of economic system reform; and that reform should seize upon the most direct and realistic interest issues that the people care about most, so that the people have a more direct and substantial sense of fulfillment, happiness, and security.

Additionally, the Party launched and organized the "battle against poverty" ^[4], resulting in the relocation of over 9.6 million impoverished people, the lifting of nearly 100 million rural poor out of poverty, the removal of 832 national-level poverty-stricken counties from the poverty list, and the emergence of nearly 130,000 impoverished villages from poverty. This completed the task of eliminating absolute poverty and fulfilled the CPC’s solemn promise of comprehensively building a moderately prosperous society by its centenary.

All these concepts and measures have greatly improved the relationship between the Party and the masses, and to a large extent restored and reshaped the trust of the masses in the Party and government. They have consolidated and strengthened the masses' belief in socialism with Chinese characteristics and their confidence in the country’s bright future. This is the greatest transformation among all the changes of the ten years of the New Era.

II. In political construction, placing greater emphasis on upholding the Party’s overall leadership

Since the start of reform and opening up, reform of the Party and state leadership system has been an important part of political structural reform. This reform was originally intended to maintain the vitality of the Party and state, overcome bureaucratism, improve efficiency, and mobilize the initiative of the grassroots and the masses—thereby benefiting the consolidation of CPC leadership and the development of productive forces under the socialist system. However, some took the opportunity to one-sidedly propose the slogan of "separating the Party from the government" (dangzheng fenkai). Under this influence, many government agencies and state-owned enterprises and institutions abolished the system of leadership by Party committees, causing the Party's leadership to become hollowed out and weakened. More extremely, some advocated for "Western-style democratization" and so-called "universal values," "constitutional" democracy, multi-party systems, the separation of powers, and bicameralism. They raised pseudo-propositions like "Which is greater: the Party or the law?", which for a time caused a certain degree of ideological confusion regarding the relationship between the Party's leadership and governing the country according to law.

In response to these tendencies, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "We must push the whole Party to implement the adherence to the correct political direction into the practice of planning major strategies, formulating major policies, deploying major tasks, and advancing major work. We must frequently 'align the watch and the yardstick' (duibiao duizhuo), promptly calibrate deviations, and resolutely correct any behavior that deviates from or violates the Party’s political direction, ensuring that all undertakings of the Party and state always develop along the correct political direction." Facts show that solving the problem of the hollowing out and weakening of the Party's leadership is a major achievement of "aligning the watch and calibrating deviations" according to the correct political direction in the New Era.

1. Emphasizing that the leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics

General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out that after the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the "main challenges we faced were the weakening of Party leadership, organizational fragmentation, and lax discipline. Failure to change this situation would weaken the Party’s governing capacity, shake the Party’s governing foundation, and even ruin the bright future of our Party and the people. This was precisely where the concerns of many comrades within the Party and the broad masses of the people lay before the 18th National Congress." Analyzing why this situation occurred, General Secretary Xi Jinping noted: "After the beginning of reform and opening up, we once discussed the issue of 'separating the Party from the government' ^[5] with the aim of addressing problems such as low efficiency, bloated institutions, overstaffing, and bureaucratic procrastination. It must be said that at that time, our theoretical understanding and practical experience regarding this issue were insufficient; our attempts to solve the problems of the national governance system and governance capacity were exploratory." In other words, due to a lack of theoretical understanding and practical experience, the process of exploring the relationship between the Party and the government was oversimplified into "separating the Party from the government." He pointed out: "The Party's leading position and its governing status are closely linked. The power of the Party’s centralized and unified leadership is indivisible. We cannot simply talk about 'separating the Party from the government' or 'merging the Party and the government'; rather, we must adapt to the characteristics and foundational conditions of different fields." Consequently, since the 18th National Congress, "we have taken a series of major measures to correct vague and erroneous understandings that persisted for a period, reversing the phenomena of weakened Party leadership and deficient Party building in certain localities and departments, thereby comprehensively strengthening the Party's leadership." Guided by this ideological understanding, the system of leadership by Party committees—which had previously been abolished in enterprises and public institutions—was gradually restored. Even primary and secondary schools re-established the system of the principal assuming responsibility under the leadership of the Party branch, and grassroots Party organizations have been universally established in private enterprises with a requisite number of Party members.

Regarding the question of why we must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party of China, General Secretary Xi Jinping has also provided a clear answer. He said: "'Governing a country is like planting a tree; if the roots are firm, the branches and leaves will flourish.' ^[6] The 'roots' of our governance are the leadership of the Communist Party of China and our country's socialist system. On this point, we must be self-assured and take a clear-cut stand." He emphasized that "the leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most defining feature of Chinese-path socialism," "China’s greatest national condition," "our greatest institutional advantage," "a prominent feature of the superiority of our country’s socialist political system," and "a great blessing for the Chinese people and the Chinese nation." He further stated: "Upholding and improving the Party's leadership is the very foundation and lifeblood of the Party and the state, and the crux of the interests and happiness of the people of all ethnic groups in the country." Based on the recommendations of the 19th National Congress of the CPC, the constitutional amendments adopted by the first session of the 13th National People's Congress in 2018 added the phrase "The leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most defining feature of Chinese-path socialism" to Article 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution. Explicitly writing the Party's leadership into the main text of the Constitution—as opposed to it previously appearing only in the Preamble—clearly carries greater political, practical, and institutional significance, and is a concrete manifestation of the deepened understanding of Chinese-path socialism.

2. Emphasizing that the leadership of the Communist Party of China is comprehensive and concrete

After the 18th National Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping addressed the phenomenon where Party leadership had been weakened and hollowed out, noting: "Strengthening the Party’s leadership over all work is not an empty or abstract requirement; it must be implemented and manifested in every aspect and every link." He emphasized: "Since the 18th National Congress, we have not only reached a new theoretical understanding of upholding Party leadership but have also conducted new practical explorations, improving the systems and mechanisms of the Party’s leadership over all work. We must implement and manifest the upholding of Party leadership in all fields and aspects, including reform, development, and stability; internal affairs, diplomacy, and national defense; and the governance of the Party, the state, and the military, ensuring that the Party always oversees the overall situation and coordinates all parties." From a series of relevant discourses, it is evident that in addition to the work of the National People's Congress, the government, the CPPCC ^[7], supervisory organs, judicial organs, procuratorial organs, people's organizations, enterprises, public institutions, social organizations, and the armed forces, the leadership of the Party must also be upheld and strengthened in sectors and departments such as national security, news media, internet information, higher education, agriculture and rural areas, institutional staffing, military-civilian integration, ethnic and religious affairs, finance, and Party schools. He emphasized: "Government, military, society and schools, north, south, east and west—the Party leads everything." "The power to decide major policies and principles of the Party and the state resides in the Party Central Committee. We must take practical actions to maintain the 'one-authority-to-final-word' (一锤定音) and 'sovereign' (定于一尊) authority ^[8] of the Party Central Committee. Any Party organization or member, regardless of the field, level, or unit, must submit to the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee." At the same time, he pointed out: "Emphasizing the maintenance of the Party Central Committee's authority and centralized, unified leadership does not mean doing away with democratic centralism or failing to promote intra-Party democracy; it is wrong to pit these two against each other." Party leadership "is about planning for, discussing, and grasping major matters," and "is not about handling every minute detail."

3. Emphasizing that the leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most fundamental guarantee for socialist rule of law

After the 18th National Congress, our Party attached more importance than ever before to the rule of law, convening a dedicated plenary session of the Central Committee to discuss the comprehensive advancement of the rule of law. It was noted that the "overall goal of the rule of law is to build a system of socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics and to build a socialist country under the rule of law." Simultaneously, the Party has emphasized strengthening Party leadership in the process of advancing the rule of law more than at any time in the past, stressing that Party leadership is the "fundamental requirement of socialist rule of law," its "most fundamental guarantee," and "an inherent part of comprehensively advancing the rule of law," and that the two "are consistent." Addressing the question raised by some regarding "Which is greater, the Party or the law?" ^[9], General Secretary Xi Jinping clearly pointed out on several occasions: "'Which is greater, the Party or the law' is a political trap and a pseudo-proposition. We cannot be vague or ambiguous on this issue; we must answer it clearly. Party leadership and the rule of law are not in opposition but are unified." He said: "The leadership of the Party is the soul of socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics and the biggest difference between our rule of law and the rule of law in Western capitalist countries. Without the leadership of the Communist Party of China, the system of socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics and a socialist country under the rule of law could not be built. Our comprehensive advancement of the rule of law is by no means intended to hollow out, weaken, or even shake or negate the Party's leadership." In short, the leadership of the Party, the people's status as masters of the country, and the rule of law are unified, and "the three are unified in the great practice of our country’s socialist democratic politics."

III. On economic construction, more prominently highlighting the balance, coordination, pragmatism, innovation, and sustainability of development

Since the 18th National Congress, significant changes have also occurred in the concepts and approaches to economic development. These changes are mainly manifested in the mode of economic growth, development strategies, and the guiding principles for opening up to the outside world.

1. Changes in the mode of economic growth

Since the beginning of reform and opening up, and even for a long time prior, the general tendency in economic development was to emphasize speed. Although there were occasional talks about quality, efficiency, and being "both good and fast" (又好又快), in practice, speed was often prioritized over quality and efficiency, and "fast" was placed before "good." Rarely was "stability" treated as the prerequisite for "progress." However, since the 18th National Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized that the Chinese economy has entered a "New Normal," shifting "from high-speed growth to medium-to-high-speed growth." He stated that this is "the fundamental logic of our country's economic development for the current and future period" and "an inevitable reflection of the stage-specific characteristics of our country’s economic development, which does not change according to human will." If we "continue thinking about the extensive high-speed development of the past, accustomed to expanding the scale, and launching [unnecessary] projects, we will fail to keep up with the situation." He proposed that "seeking progress while maintaining stability" (稳中求进) should become the general keynote of our work, and introduced the New Development Philosophy of "innovation, coordination, green development, openness, and sharing." He also integrated the construction of ecological civilization with the previously established economic, political, cultural, and social components to form the "Five-Sphere Integrated Plan."

Another issue linked to the "New Normal" of economic development is the strategic adjustment of the economic structure. Since the founding of the PRC, both the supply and demand sides were characterized by perpetual shortages of labor, capital, and materials; supply could not meet demand. Consequently, supply-side problems were often obscured by the fact that supply fell short of demand. However, through continuous construction and reforms of systems and mechanisms, the principal aspect of the contradiction ^[10] gradually shifted, and the phenomena of traditional overcapacity and insufficient demand began to emerge. Previously, there was insufficient understanding of this change, and the response measures were inadequate. Since the 18th National Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping has clearly pointed out that the nature of the contradiction between supply and demand has changed: the inability of supply to meet demand has shifted from a quantitative problem of the past to structural problems involving quality, variety, and service. Therefore, to adapt to and lead the New Normal, we must "while moderately expanding total demand, focus on strengthening supply-side structural reform" and "cut overcapacity, reduce inventory, de-leverage, lower costs, and bolster weak spots" to adapt to changes in the principal contradiction of society through the optimization and upgrading of industrial structures and high-quality development.

2. Changes in economic development strategy

Since the 18th National Congress, there have also been many major new changes in economic development strategies and arrangements compared to the past.

For example, regarding the goals of development strategy: since the proposal of the "Four Modernizations" (agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology) at the first session of the 3rd National People's Congress in 1964, striving for the "Four Modernizations" has been the slogan mobilizing the people of the whole country. After the 18th National Congress, considering the development of China and the world over the past half-century, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core further proposed the "New Four Modernizations" goals based on the original four: new-type industrialization, informatization, urbanization, and agricultural modernization.

Regarding the arrangement of various development strategies: after the beginning of reform and opening up, starting from actual conditions, the Party Central Committee changed the original proposal of achieving the "Four Modernizations" by the end of the 20th century to a "three-step" strategy: achieving "subsistence" (温饱) by the end of the 1980s, reaching a "moderately prosperous" (小康) level by the end of the 20th century, and reaching the level of a moderately developed country by the mid-21st century. After entering the 21st century, it was further proposed to comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society over two decades and basically achieve modernization by the mid-21st century. Standing at a new historical starting point for our country's development, the 19th National Congress of the CPC made a "two-step" strategic arrangement for the 30 years following the comprehensive building of a moderately prosperous society: the first step, from 2020 to 2035, is to basically achieve socialist modernization; the second step, from 2035 to the mid-21st century, is to comprehensively build a great modern socialist country.

Regarding the deployment of development strategies, the 19th National Congress proposed building a modern economic system. This includes building an industrial system led by innovation and coordinated development; a market system that is unified, open, and characterized by orderly competition; an income distribution system that reflects efficiency and promotes fairness; an urban-rural regional development system that highlights advantages and is coordinated and linked; a green development system that is resource-conserving and environment-friendly; a comprehensive opening-up system that is diverse, balanced, safe, and efficient; and an economic system that gives full play to the role of the market while better leveraging the role of the government.

In developing an industrial system led by innovation and coordinated development, since the 18th National Congress, emphasis has been placed on focusing on the real economy, technological innovation, modern finance, and human resources. In the real economy, the focus is on developing advanced manufacturing and its integration with the internet, big data, and artificial intelligence. In technological innovation, the focus is on establishing and improving the New Nationwide System (新型举国体制) ^[11] for tackling key core technologies, improving the national laboratory system, and implementing major scientific and technological projects that reflect national strategic intent. In terms of regional development, following the major strategies already implemented—such as the Western Development Strategy, the revitalization of old industrial bases in Northeast China, and promoting the rise of the Central Region—new regional development strategies have been successively launched: the coordinated development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, the development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt, the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, the integrated development of the Yangtze River Delta, the ecological protection and high-quality development of the Yellow River Basin, and the Chengdu-Chongqing twin-city economic circle. Simultaneously, efforts have begun to consolidate and expand the achievements of poverty alleviation and effectively link them with rural revitalization to accelerate the modernization of agriculture and rural areas.

Regarding the overall layout of development: faced with the changes unseen in a century in the world and the situation since the 2008 international financial crisis—characterized by weak global economic recovery, a receding tide of economic globalization, rising trade protectionism, the repeated intensification of the U.S. strategic pressure on China, and escalating economic and trade frictions—the Party Central Committee proposed in early 2021 the acceleration of a new development pattern centered on "dual circulation," with the domestic cycle as the mainstay and the domestic and international cycles reinforcing each other. This entails promoting high-quality development, with particular emphasis on creating more well-known brands, overcoming bottlenecks in core technologies, adjusting the domestic income distribution pattern, and ensuring that our country's economy remains invincible.

3. Changes in the guiding principles for opening up to the outside world

Based on the needs of the post-reform and opening up era regarding international markets and resources being "both located abroad" ^[12], and in light of the enhanced construction capabilities and abundant capital of recent years, General Secretary Xi Jinping proposed the Belt and Road international cooperation initiative for opening up to the outside world. In the eight years from 2013 to 2021, China signed Belt and Road cooperation agreements with 171 countries and international organizations, established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), opened 13 highways and land-sea intermodal transport corridors and 8 railways connecting Asia and even Europe, and implemented more than 3,000 projects including energy, transportation, minerals, agricultural machinery, agricultural product processing, medicine, biology, new materials, finance, and culture.

To expand the scope and upgrade the quality of opening up, China also successively decided to construct the Hainan Free Trade Port, established 21 pilot free trade zones, and signed 19 free trade agreements with 26 countries and regions. Among these is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which accounts for approximately 30% of global GDP and total foreign trade. This has formed a new opening-up pattern characterized by land-sea internal and external linkage and two-way interaction between the east and west. At the same time, we have transformed the growth model of foreign trade to improve its efficiency, utilized foreign capital actively and effectively, and placed greater emphasis on introducing advanced technology and high-quality talent. Currently, China's contribution to world economic growth has exceeded 30%, making it the main engine and stabilizer of global economic growth.

IV. In cultural construction, emphasizing more strongly the maintenance of the guiding position of Marxism in the ideological sphere and requiring struggle against various erroneous tendencies and social trends of thought.

1. Calling for the consolidation of the guiding position of Marxism with full confidence. Guidance by Marxism is explicitly stipulated in the Constitution of the Communist Party of China and the Constitution of the People's Republic of China; it is the fundamental guiding ideology for establishing and rejuvenating the Party and the country. However, after reform and opening up, some people spread the "theory of Marxist obsolescence" under the banner of "emancipating the mind," resulting in "Marxism being marginalized, hollowed out, and labeled in some fields; becoming 'speechless' in some disciplines, 'missing' from textbooks, and 'voiceless' at forums." Addressing this phenomenon, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out with clear-cut clarity: "Publicity and ideological work must consolidate the guiding position of Marxism in the ideological sphere." "Party schools, cadre academies, schools of social sciences, universities, and theoretical study center groups must all treat Marxism as a compulsory course and become important fronts for the study, research, and publicity of Marxism." He particularly emphasized that "the Party school's surname is Party" ^[13], stating that "Party schools, especially the Central Party School, must persist in being guided by Marxism." He also pointed out: "Persistence in Marxist guidance is the fundamental hallmark that distinguishes contemporary Chinese philosophy and social sciences from others; it must be maintained with clear-cut clarity." "An important task for our philosophy and social sciences is to continue promoting the Sinicization, modernization, and popularization of Marxism." Under the guidance of General Secretary Xi Jinping, Marxism colleges have been universally established in universities nationwide. He solemnly cautioned people: "Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought must never be lost; losing them means losing the foundation."

2. Requiring an unambiguous struggle against various erroneous trends of thought. For a long period before the 18th National Congress of the CPC, there was a dominant formulation in ideological work called "avoiding debate" (bu zhenglun), which was claimed to have been said by Deng Xiaoping. In reality, what Deng Xiaoping spoke of was not engaging in debate over the specific methods of reform and opening up, so as to avoid "arguing away the time and accomplishing nothing." He was not saying there should be no debate on the direction of reform and opening up, or on the question of whether to take the socialist road or the capitalist road. On these issues, he consistently emphasized the need to oppose bourgeois liberalization ^[14] and adhere to the socialist direction of reform. In his own words: "On the issue of opposing bourgeois liberalization, I have spoken the most, and I have been the most persistent." He also said: "The so-called reform of certain people should be renamed 'liberalization,' which is to say 'capitalization.' The core of their 'reform' is capitalization. The reform we speak of is different from theirs; this issue must still be debated." Clearly, "avoiding debate" is not and could not have been Deng Xiaoping's position on ideological work.

After the 18th National Congress of the CPC, targeting the phenomenon of abandoning ideological struggle under the guise of so-called "avoiding debate," "avoiding heating things up," or "letting people speak," General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "Persisting in the priority of positive publicity definitely does not mean abandoning the struggle in public opinion. Hostile forces are doing their utmost to propagate so-called 'universal values.' Do these people really want to talk about 'universal values'? Not at all. They are 'hanging a sheep’s head while selling dog meat' ^[15]; their goal is to compete with us for territory, for hearts, and for the masses, and ultimately to overthrow the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese socialist system. If these remarks are allowed to have their way—'calling a polecat a rabbit' ^[16] or 'three people making a tiger' ^[17]—it will inevitably throw the minds of the Party and the people into chaos, endangering the Party's leadership and the security of the socialist state power." He emphasized: "Our Party members and cadres must not be soft-eared toward political rumors and bizarre fallacies spread by people with ulterior motives, and must not 'believe the wind is rain' ^[18]. At the same time, we cannot remain silent; we must refute them in a timely manner so that the correct voice drowns them out. This is a different matter from 'hiding one's light and biding one's time' ^[19] or 'avoiding debate'." He required "daring to seize control and daring to draw the sword" against all erroneous words and deeds, and engaging in "targeted, frontal confrontation."

As history progressed, trends of thought derived from bourgeois liberalization—such as neoliberalism, social democracy, and historical nihilism ^[20]—gradually emerged, once running rampant and causing a great clamor. Against these erroneous trends, General Secretary Xi Jinping provided sharp critiques one by one. For example, regarding some people’s rhetoric advocating Western "constitutionalism," he pointed out: "Our people's democracy is essentially different from so-called Western 'constitutionalism'." "Promoting the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity is by no means Westernization or capitalization!" Regarding the rhetoric of those advocating Western values, he pointed out: "If we use the Western capitalist value system to tailor our practice, or use the Western capitalist evaluation system to measure our country's development—whereby what conforms to Western standards is fine, and what does not is backward or obsolete and must be criticized or attacked—the consequences would be unthinkable! In the end, we would either be following in others' footsteps or simply be subject to their abuse." He emphasized: "If we 'revere the foreign,' 'see only foreign as beautiful,' and 'obey only the foreign,' treating winning awards abroad as the highest pursuit, following others' footsteps like 'Dongshi imitating a knit' ^[21], and becoming obsessed with 'de-ideologization,' 'de-valorization,' 'de-historicization,' 'de-Sinicization,' and 'de-mainstreaming,' there is absolutely no future!" Regarding historical nihilism, he pointed out that the essence of this trend of thought "is to fundamentally negate the guiding position of Marxism and the historical necessity of China moving toward socialism, and to negate the leadership of the Communist Party of China." In his January 5, 2013 speech, he emphasized that an important reason for the fall of the Soviet Communist Party and the collapse of the Soviet Union was that problems arose in the ideological sphere: "Engaging in historical nihilism threw their thinking into chaos, and Party organizations at all levels became almost entirely useless." Connecting this to China's situation, he emphasized the need to correctly view the two historical periods before and after reform and opening up, pointing out: "The two are by no means severed from each other, much less fundamentally opposed. ... One cannot use the historical period after reform and opening up to negate the historical period before reform and opening up, nor can one use the historical period before reform and opening up to negate the historical period after reform and opening up." He also said: "Correctly handling the relationship between the socialist practical explorations before and after reform and opening up is not just a historical issue, but more importantly, a political one."

Since the 18th National Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping has attached great importance to the role of the publicity and ideological front. He pointed out: "If we do not occupy the publicity and ideological positions, others will." He criticized "some units and Party and government cadres for having weak political sensitivity and a low sense of responsibility, being vague and evasive on major ideological issues, which encouraged the spread of erroneous trends of thought." He required that "comrades on the publicity and ideological front should be warriors, not gentlemen; they must not be 'fence-sitters' or 'wind-watchers,' and cannot engage in the practice of 'cherishing one's own feathers' ^[22]," but should rather "actively plunge into the front lines of the struggle in the publicity and ideological field with a combative posture and the responsibility of a warrior." He emphasized: "The principle of Party spirit is the fundamental principle of the Party's news and public opinion work. The Party managing publicity, the Party managing ideology, and the Party managing the media are important aspects of persisting in the Party's leadership. The principle of Party spirit must not only be spoken of but must be spoken of with full confidence, not evasively or sheepishly." "The Party managing the media does not mean only managing the media directly controlled by the Party. The Party managing the media means placing all types and levels of media under the Party's leadership... the principle of the Party managing the media cannot be allowed to become a hollow shell."

3. Emphasizing the need to correct deviations in cultural circles with clear-cut clarity. Our Party has always valued the role of literature, art, and the construction of spiritual civilization in the revolutionary cause. The most representative statement in this regard is what Mao Zedong said in 1943: Our Party has "two fronts, the cultural and the military"; it has two armies, the "army with guns" and the "cultural army." Therefore, whenever deviations appear in cultural circles, the Party's leaders consistently step forward personally to perform the work of correction. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Yan'an ^[23] attracted a large number of intellectual youths from across the country, leading to a daily increase in Yan'an's literary organizations and cultural publications. On the one hand, this produced a vast number of revolutionary literary and artistic works; on the other hand, deviations appeared involving detachment from the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and detachment from real life. For instance, some people only focused on researching and portraying the thoughts and feelings of petty-bourgeois intellectuals while looking down on workers, peasants, and soldiers; they only focused on uncritically importing and imitating the works of ancients and foreigners while slighting or ignoring the work of popularization; they were only keen on "exposing the darkness" and unwilling to eulogize the merits and virtues of the revolutionary people, and so on. To rectify these phenomena, the Party Central Committee specially convened the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art. Mao Zedong attended in person and delivered a famous speech, requiring that literary and art workers must go deep among the masses and into the heat of the struggle, opposing abstract theories of human nature and abstract love, and advocating the unity of revolutionary political content with the best possible artistic form.

In the early stages of reform and opening up, influenced by the trend of bourgeois liberalization, cultural circles saw the emergence of "scar literature"represented by "Unrequited Love" (Kūliàn), trends of thought promoting abstract humanitarianism and advocating "modernism," as well as erroneous tendencies of spiritual pollution ^[24] characterized by an obsession with writing about the dark side and distorting revolutionary history and reality. In response, Deng Xiaoping delivered a speech titled "The Partitioning Tasks on the Party's Organizational and Ideological Fronts." While affirming the achievements of the literary and art circles, he seriously pointed out that "considerable confusion still exists" among them. He criticized some for being indifferent to the Party Central Committee’s slogan of literature and art serving the people and serving socialism, and for lacking enthusiasm in portraying and eulogizing the revolutionary history of the Party and the people or the heroic deeds of the struggle for socialist modernization. He also noted that some performers, influenced by the perverse wind of "looking toward money in everything," were raking in money through vulgar and low-grade content and forms. He pointed out that conducting criticism must not be set in opposition to implementing the "Double Hundred" policy ^[25], and "no matter what kind of expert, scholar, writer, or artist—as long as they are a Party member—they are not permitted to view themselves as special." After Deng Xiaoping's speech, although work was carried out to clear away spiritual pollution, the problem was not resolved. The phenomenon of spiritual pollution continued to appear and disappear, rising and falling; in some fields, it even intensified and worsened, becoming one of the problems the Party had long wanted to solve but failed to resolve.

Entering the New Era, the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, acting with a high sense of responsibility and a spirit of daring to take charge, convened a forum on literature and art—the first such meeting held since the 1940s ^[26]. At the forum, General Secretary Xi Jinping delivered an important speech, noting: "The cause of literature and art is an important cause for the Party and the people, and the literary and art front is an important front for the Party and the people." While affirming the significant achievements made by the vast ranks of literary and art workers, he also candidly criticized prominent problems existing in literary and artistic creation. These include, for example, plagiarism and imitation, stereotyping, mechanized production, and fast-food style consumption; mocking the sublime, distorting classics, subverting history, and vilifying the masses and heroic figures; failing to distinguish right from wrong or good from evil, treating ugliness as beauty, and excessively playing up the dark side [of society]; searching for the exotic or the erotic, blindly pandering to low tastes, and engaging in vulgarity, treating works as "money trees" for chasing profit and "ecstasy pills" for sensory stimulation; reckless writing, shoddy production, and far-fetched interpretations that create cultural "garbage"; pursuing luxury, over-packaging, and flaunting wealth, where form outweighs substance; and being obsessed with so-called "art for art's sake," writing only of one's own joys and sorrows or "a storm in a teacup" ^[27], detached from the masses and reality. He pointed out: "All of this warns us that literature and art must not lose their direction in the great tide of the market economy, nor can they deviate on the question of 'for whom they exist,' otherwise literature and art will have no vitality." He emphasized: "Vulgarity is not popularity, desire does not represent hope, and pure sensory entertainment does not equal spiritual joy." He said that under the conditions of a socialist market economy, literary and art works cannot ignore economic benefits. "However, compared to social benefits, economic benefits come second. When the two benefits and the two types of value conflict, economic benefits must submit to social benefits, and market value must submit to social value. Literature and art must not be slaves to the market, nor should they be reeking of money." Literary criticism "cannot consist entirely of praise or even vulgar flattery and sycophancy; it cannot mechanically apply Western theories to prune the aesthetics of the Chinese people, and even less can it allow simple commercial standards to replace artistic standards, or equate literary and art works entirely with ordinary commodities, believing that 'the thickness of the red envelope determines the height of the review' ^[28]." His words were earnest and well-intentioned, hitting the current maladies head-on and giving people a feeling that had been missing for a long time.

V. On the issue of institutional reform, more emphasis is placed on rectifying direction, focusing on practical results, deepening comprehensively, and promoting fairness.

Since the beginning of reform and opening up, some people have propagated the "theory that reform and opening up has no direction," the "theory that political structural reform is lagging," and the "theory that public ownership is inefficient." They have advocated for propositions such as "quantifying state-owned assets to individuals," "placing fairness in a secondary position," and "continuing to expand the income distribution gap." The crux of these fallacies lies in using the banner of reform and opening up to speak only of reform and opening up while ignoring the Four Cardinal Principles ^[29]. They sever the "one center, two basic points" ^[30] within the Party's basic line for the primary stage of socialism, attempting to pull reform and opening up off the socialist track. They speak only of the primary stage without mentioning socialism, severing the basic program of the primary stage of socialism from the Party's highest program ^[31], attempting to freeze and immortalize the primary stage. They speak only of the market economy without mentioning macro-regulation, severing the market economy from the basic socialist system in an attempt to turn the reform of the economic system into a fundamental change of the economic system. They speak only of "letting some people get rich first" without mentioning common prosperity, pitting fairness against efficiency in an attempt to strip efficiency of its inherent requirement and starting and ending point: social equity and justice. Whenever reform fails to satisfy the desires of these people, they create public opinion, babbling that "reform has stagnated" or "lagged behind."

The aforementioned fallacies were quite popular for a time, confusing many people and even influencing policy-making to a certain extent. Regarding these fallacies, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out incisively after the 18th CPC National Congress: "Our reform and opening up has a direction, a stance, and principles. Of course, we must hold high the banner of reform, but our reform is a reform that continuously advances on the path of Chinese-path socialism." "What should be changed and can be changed, we will resolutely change; what should not be changed, we must resolutely hold the line." During a group study session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee in December 2012, he said: "We cannot 'walk like the people of Handan' ^[32]. Use your own legs. The world is developing and society is progressing; without implementing reform and opening up, there is only a dead end, but engaging in 'reform and opening up' that negates the socialist direction is also a dead end." In his speech at the conference celebrating the 40th anniversary of reform and opening up, he stated even more powerfully: We must "firmly grasp the forward direction of reform and opening up. What to change and how to change must be fundamentally measured by whether it conforms to the general goal of improving and developing the system of Chinese-path socialism and promoting the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity. What ought to be changed and can be changed, we will resolutely change; what ought not be changed and cannot be changed, we will resolutely not change. We must adhere to the Party's basic line, and unify the focus on economic construction with the two basic points of adhering to the Four Cardinal Principles and adhering to reform and opening up within the great practice of New Era Chinese-path socialism, persisting over the long term and never wavering." He also reminded everyone: "Some hostile forces and people with ulterior motives are also there cheering, creating public opinion and blurring the lines, defining reform as moving toward Western political systems—otherwise, they call it 'not reforming.' They have 'the drunkard's heart not in the wine' ^[33]; they are like 'Xiang Zhuang performing the sword dance with his mind on the Duke of Pei' ^[34]. We must see through this as clearly as a fire and maintain political steadfastness and a clear political orientation."

1. Using the Four Cardinal Principles to rectify the direction of reform

General Secretary Xi Jinping proposed: "On major issues of right and wrong and political principles concerning whether to uphold or negate the Four Cardinal Principles, we must increase our initiative, master the dominant power, and fight a good proactive battle." "No matter what is changed or how it is changed, the orientation cannot change and the positions cannot be lost."

2. Guarding against the defects of a capitalist market economy during reform

General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "We are developing a market economy under the major premise of the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system; we must never forget the qualifier 'socialist.' The reason we call it a socialist market economy is specifically to persist in the superiority of our system and effectively guard against the defects of a capitalist market economy." "The market playing a decisive role in resource allocation does not mean it plays the only role." "The market's decisive role is spoken of in aggregate; we cannot blindly or absolutely say the market plays a decisive role. Rather, we must both let the market play the decisive role in allocating resources and better play the role of the government."

Regarding the question of whether ownership reform must uphold the dominant position of public ownership, he pointed out that "state-owned enterprises are an important force for promoting national modernization and guaranteeing the common interests of the people," and we must "unwaveringly make state-owned enterprises stronger, better, and larger." "The dominant position of public ownership cannot be shaken, and the leading role of the state-owned economy cannot be shaken. This is the institutional guarantee for the people of all ethnic groups in our country to share the fruits of development, and it is also an important guarantee for consolidating the Party's governing position and adhering to our country's socialist system." Regarding public opinion favoring the privatization of rural land, he emphasized: "Persist in the collective ownership of rural land by peasants. This is the 'soul' of the basic rural operation system." "No matter how rural reform is carried out, the collective ownership of rural land must not be destroyed."

After the start of reform and opening up, in handling the relationship between efficiency and fairness, efficiency was for a long time placed above fairness—for example, proposing "efficiency first, with due consideration to fairness." Although this was later adjusted to "giving consideration to both efficiency and fairness," in actual work, efficiency remained the priority. Regarding this, General Secretary Xi Jinping explicitly stated: "Comprehensively deepening reform must take promoting social equity and justice and increasing the people's well-being as its starting and ending point. ... If it cannot bring tangible benefits to the common people, if it cannot create a fairer social environment and instead leads to more unfairness, reform loses its meaning and cannot be sustained." He pointed out: "We must use the promotion of social equity and justice and the enhancement of people's well-being as a mirror to examine our systems, mechanisms, and policy regulations in all aspects. Wherever there is an issue that does not conform to the promotion of social equity and justice, that is where reform is needed; whichever field or link has prominent problems, that field or link is the focus of reform."

After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee ^[35], as the shackles of traditional concepts regarding ownership were broken, a new understanding was gained of capital's role as an important factor of production, a tool for market resource allocation, and a method or means of economic development. We began to utilize various types of capital to promote economic and social development under the socialist system. At the same time, phenomena such as the disorderly expansion of capital, "wild growth," and unfair competition gradually surfaced. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, the understanding of the nature of capital has gradually deepened, the recognition of its role has become more comprehensive, the grasp of its movement has become more profound, and the governance capacity regarding capital operations has continuously improved. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "Capital is an important link for driving the aggregation and configuration of various production factors and an important force for promoting the development of social productive forces. We must give play to the positive role of capital in promoting the development of social productive forces. At the same time, it must be recognized that capital has a profit-seeking nature; if not regulated and constrained, it will bring immeasurable harm to economic and social development." Under the guidance of this thought, over the decade of the New Era, the Party and the government have focused on guaranteeing that capital receives accumulation and development through its participation in social distribution, while placing even greater emphasis on maintaining the dominant position of distribution according to work. At the same time, they have comprehensively implemented the fair competition review system, improved the legal system for capital development, and strengthened anti-monopoly and anti-corruption measures in the capital field, ensuring the healthy development of all types of capital.

3. Placing the focus of reform more on common prosperity

Regarding the problem that the distribution gap remains relatively large, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out that currently, "the problem of unfair distribution is quite prominent, and the gaps in income and public service levels between urban and rural areas and different regions are large. In sharing the fruits of reform and development, there are still imperfections in both the actual situation and institutional design." We must "enable all people to move steadily toward the goal of common prosperity, and we must never allow a situation where 'the rich accumulate millions while the poor eat chaff' ^[36]." Facing the rhetoric of those who oppose emphasizing common prosperity in the primary stage of socialism, he stated: "Our country is in and will long remain in the primary stage of socialism. We cannot do things that transcend this stage, but this does not mean we can do nothing in terms of gradually achieving common prosperity. Rather, we must do as much as possible based on existing conditions, accumulating small victories into a large one, and continuously move toward the goal of common prosperity for all people." That is to say, emphasizing common prosperity does not mean achieving it in one step, but rather placing the focus of work more on common prosperity, doing what is within our means while also exerting our greatest effort. He pointed out that the winning or losing of the people's hearts does not depend solely on economic development: "With development, there is still the question of common prosperity. If material wealth is abundant but development is extremely unbalanced, the gap between rich and poor is vast, society is unfair, and polarization occurs—can you win the people's hearts?" In the report to the 19th CPC National Congress, he proposed that before the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC, we must concentrate our strength to win the battle against poverty. After the battle against poverty was won, he proposed effectively linking the consolidation and expansion of poverty alleviation achievements with rural revitalization. At the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee in 2020, he further emphasized: "We must place the promotion of common prosperity for all people in a more important position." At the conference celebrating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC, he pointed out more clearly that we must "develop whole-process people's democracy, safeguard social equity and justice, focus on solving the problems of unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's pressing anxieties, and promote well-rounded human development and more obvious substantive progress in common prosperity for all people." At the 20th CPC National Congress, he again required "focusing on the most direct and realistic interests of the people that concern them most, persisting in doing our best within our means... and solidly promoting common prosperity." He reiterated the need to increase the share of personal income in the distribution of national income and the share of labor remuneration in primary distribution, and proposed "exploring multiple channels to increase the factor income of low- and middle-income groups" and "regulating the order of income distribution and the mechanism for wealth accumulation." All these expositions demonstrate that the current focus is on how to steadily promote common prosperity, gradually repair the defects of an excessively large income gap, and prevent the phenomenon of "the rich accumulating millions while the poor eat chaff." Of course, we must also guard against egalitarianism and "robbing the rich to help the poor," but such problems do not currently exist, nor are they the emphasis of our Party.

VI. On safeguarding national security and promoting the great cause of national reunification, more emphasis is placed on awareness of potential dangers, bottom-line thinking, and the spirit of "not believing in heresies and not fearing ghosts."

From Lenin’s proposal of the theory of imperialism at the beginning of the 20th century to the present day, over a hundred years of history have repeatedly proven that capitalism has indeed moved from the stage of free competition into the stage of monopoly; that banking capital and industrial capital have indeed merged to form a financial oligarchy based on finance capital; that the export of capital has indeed taken on particularly significant meaning; and that revolution and war have indeed become the concomitants of the imperialist era. However, as the world entered the 1970s and 80s, obvious changes occurred in the international situation. Peace and development gradually replaced war and revolution to become the primary issues and prominent characteristics of the era.

Based on these changes in the international situation, in the mid-1980s, Deng Xiaoping formulated the thesis that peace and development are the two prominent issues in the world today. This thesis represented a new judgment by the Communist Party of China regarding the international situation and served as one of the important foundations for implementing the policy of reform and opening up and opening the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Based on this judgment, the Party Central Committee later summarized "peace and development" as the two major issues of the era in official documents, sometimes expressing them as the two major themes, the two major tasks, or the characteristics of the era. Proceeding precisely from these characteristics of the era, the Party Central Committee proposed to seize opportunities and accelerate development. In the strategy of implementing opening up to the outside world, it combined "bringing in" with "going out," made full use of both international and domestic markets and resources, and joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, forming a more comprehensive pattern of export-oriented economic development.

Since entering the 21st century, many changes with new historical characteristics ^[37] have occurred in the international situation, confronting humanity with many new challenges. It was precisely these changes and challenges that aroused the high alertness of the Party Central Committee, leading to several new judgments on the situation. After the 18th National Congress, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core affirmed on the one hand that peace and development remain the themes of the era, that the broad directions of world multipolarity, economic globalization, and the democratization of international relations have not changed, and that the general trend toward peaceful development is irreversible. On the other hand, it pointed out that the instability and uncertainty facing the world have become increasingly prominent, and the various risks facing our country's development are continuously increasing or even manifesting in a concentrated manner. The "instability and uncertainty of the security situation have increased," and "suppression and containment from the outside could escalate at any time." General Secretary Xi Jinping has called on all countries to join hands in building a community with a shared future for humanity, to respect each other, to consult on an equal footing, and to resolutely reject Cold War mentality and power politics, following a new path of state-to-state interaction characterized by dialogue rather than confrontation and partnership rather than alliance. At the same time, he required that the domestic prevention of risks be placed in a more prominent position, establishing and implementing a holistic approach to national security ^[38]. He emphasized the need to "focus on security work in all aspects, including political, economic, territorial, social, and cyber security," to "persist in planning the layout with global thinking, coordinate development and security, maintain bottom-line thinking ^[39], integrate principle with strategy, and firmly grasp the strategic initiative for maintaining national security in our own hands," and to "strive to create a new situation for national security work." The above indicates that, in the face of the great changes unseen in a century ^[40] that the world is undergoing, the Party Central Committee has made new judgments on the international situation and corresponding adjustments to international strategy. This strategic adjustment is most evident in the following aspects:

1. Establishing the goals for strengthening the military in the New Era and military strategic guidelines

Our Party has always attached importance to armed struggle and military development. "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" and "using armed revolution to oppose armed counter-revolution" were not only characteristics of the Chinese Revolution but also its experiences. After the founding of New China, under extremely difficult conditions, we developed sophisticated technologies such as "Two Bombs, One Satellite" ^[41], expanded the defense industry from nothing, developed the single-service army into a combined force, and continuously raised the level of revolutionization, modernization, and regularization of the people's army, steadily increasing national defense strength. Since the 18th Party Congress, the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission while inheriting and carrying forward the glorious traditions of the people’s army, have carried out a series of rectifications, reforms, innovations, and optimizations in response to problems that emerged in the previous period.

First, addressing the issue where the Party’s leadership over the people’s army was weakened under the sinister influence of the so-called "nationalization of the military" ^[42], the Party emphasized the absolute leadership of the Party over the people’s army and the principle that "the Party commands the gun." It convened the Gutian All-Army Political Work Conference ^[43], gripped the comprehensive and strict governance of the military, made decisive moves to rectify military political discipline and conduct, advanced political rectification in the spirit of "rectification movements" ^[44], pushed forward the building of clean government and the anti-corruption struggle within the military, and promoted a fundamental turnaround in the military's political ecosystem.

Second, it vigorously carried out the most extensive and profound reform of national defense and the military since the founding of New China. This involved restructuring the leadership and command system of the people's army, the system of modern military forces, and the system of military policies. It formed a new pattern where the Central Military Commission manages the overall situation, the Theater Commands focus on combat, and the Services focus on construction. It adjusted and optimized the strategic military layout, expanded strategic forces and new-domain/new-quality combat forces, strengthened the joint combat command system and capacity building, constructed a "three-in-one" ^[45] new military personnel training system, implemented the strategy of governing the military according to law, and advanced the construction of the military honors system.

Finally, it firmly established "combat effectiveness" as the sole fundamental standard, resolutely redirected the focus of all military work toward preparing for and fighting wars, focused all energy on fighting, exerted all effort toward fighting, emphasized realistic combat military training, strengthened training and preparedness, improved the ability to win, and corrected "peace-time maladies" ^[46].

2. Comprehensively advancing major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics

After the 18th Party Congress, while continuing to implement New China’s principles of independence and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, our Party responded to the profound adjustment in the international balance of power, the transition of the world into a period of turbulence and transformation, and unprecedented external risks and challenges. On the one hand, it took the initiative to set agendas, made strategic plans for major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, and promoted the building of a community with a shared future for humanity. On the other hand, it actively carried forward the spirit of struggle ^[47], placed political security first, and resolutely safeguarded national sovereignty, security, and development interests. It resolutely opposed hegemonism, power politics, bullying behavior, and Cold War mentality, forcefully striking back against external interference in our internal affairs and the "master teacher" style of condescending preaching ^[48], ideological bias, and zero-sum games. At the same time, it protected the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and enterprises overseas, continuously improving the system for protecting overseas interests.

Over the decade of the New Era, China has held high the banner of peace, development, cooperation, and win-win results; advanced and perfected an all-directional, multi-layered, and three-dimensional diplomatic layout; and promoted the construction of a new type of international relations and major-country relations. It has adhered to the policy of "amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness" and of building friendships and partnerships with neighbors, deepening relations with surrounding countries. Upholding the principles of "sincerity, real results, amity, and good faith," it has strengthened unity and cooperation with the vast number of developing countries. It has deepened inter-party exchanges and cooperation, actively participated in the reform and construction of the global governance system, and promoted economic globalization toward a more open, inclusive, balanced, and win-win direction. Increasingly, China has become the initiator, advocate, and organizer of international organizations, conferences, and actions, opposing the formation of camp-based and exclusive "small circles" targeted at specific countries. Its international influence, appeal, and power to shape have significantly increased, as it moves increasingly toward the center of the world stage. After the global outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, our country launched the largest global emergency humanitarian rescue operation since the founding of New China, demonstrating the image of a responsible major power and winning broad international praise.

3. Comprehensively and accurately advancing the practice of "One Country, Two Systems" and implementing the overall strategy for resolving the Taiwan issue in the New Era

The issues of Hong Kong and Macau were legacies of modern Chinese history. At the founding of New China, the older generation of revolutionaries considered that allowing the British and Portuguese authorities to temporarily maintain administrative power would help break the blockade of China by the United States and the West; when conditions were ripe in the future, they could be recovered at any time. In the 1980s, as the lease on the Kowloon Peninsula approached its end, Deng Xiaoping, considering the international and domestic situation at the time, proposed the concept of "One Country, Two Systems" to resolve the Hong Kong and Macau issues, allowing for "Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong," "Macau people administering Macau," and a high degree of autonomy, reaching agreements with the British and Portuguese governments respectively. Subsequently, the smooth return of Hong Kong and Macau was achieved in 1997 and 1999.

However, for a period, "anti-China and destabilizing" elements in Hong Kong colluded with external anti-China forces, repeatedly holding illegal assemblies and marches, engaging in frantic violent destruction such as smashing, looting, and burning, and even raising the banner of "Hong Kong independence," causing the situation in Hong Kong to become severe for a time. In the face of these circumstances, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core responded calmly, emphasizing that "One Country, Two Systems," "Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong," and a high degree of autonomy must be implemented comprehensively and accurately. It pointed out that a high degree of autonomy is not total autonomy, and that it is necessary to persist in "Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong" with patriots as the mainstay, developing and strengthening the forces that love the country and Hong Kong, and enhancing the national consciousness and patriotic spirit of Hong Kong compatriots. To improve the system by which the central government exercises comprehensive jurisdiction over the Special Administrative Regions (SARs) according to the Constitution and the Basic Law, and to promote the establishment and improvement of the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for the SARs to safeguard national security, the Standing Committee of the 13th National People's Congress (NPC) and the Fourth Session of the 13th NPC successively passed the Hong Kong National Security Law and the decision on the Hong Kong SAR election system. The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong SAR was also established; the Hong Kong SAR also established the Committee for Safeguarding National Security in accordance with the law and improved the oath-taking system for public officials. These measures solved the problem of Hong Kong long failing to be integrated into the national governance system after its return to the motherland. They are of great and far-reaching significance for Hong Kong's transition from chaos to governance, for the effective implementation of the central government’s comprehensive jurisdiction over Hong Kong, and for ensuring Hong Kong's long-term peace, stability, and prosperity. This represents a true return of administrative power following the return of sovereignty.

The Taiwan issue is a legacy of the Liberation War (1946–1949). The older generation of revolutionaries once considered using the "One Country, Two Systems" method to solve this problem. After reform and opening up, our Party further proposed the policy of peaceful reunification and achieved the "Three Links" ^[49] across the Taiwan Strait in accordance with the "1992 Consensus." At the same time, our Party emphasized that the one-China principle is the political foundation of cross-Strait relations and that we will make the greatest effort to strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force. Since "Taiwan independence" elements came to power, the Taiwan authorities have continuously intensified separatism, causing the momentum of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations to be severely impacted. Entering the New Era, our Party has proposed a series of new important concepts and major policy propositions regarding work related to Taiwan, forming an overall strategy for resolving the Taiwan issue and firmly grasping the leadership and initiative in cross-Strait relations. The Chinese government declared: we will never allow any person, any organization, or any political party, at any time, in any form, to separate any piece of Chinese territory from China. When a high-ranking US official made a provocative visit to Taiwan ^[50], the Chinese People's Liberation Army immediately conducted live-fire exercises surrounding Taiwan Island, resolutely striking back against provocative behavior. This was also something that had not happened in the past.

VII. In terms of the governing party's self-construction, the keynote of "Comprehensively and Strictly Governing" has become more prominent

The Communist Party of China is the leader and organizer of China's socialist modernization and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Persisting in and strengthening the Party's comprehensive leadership is the fundamental guarantee for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. This determines that it is of exceptional significance for the Party to ensure, through its own construction, that its character as a proletarian party, its advanced nature, its purity, and its purpose of serving the people remain unchanged. The ancients said: "All have a beginning, but few can reach the end" ^[51]. This is true for an individual, and even more so for a party. Especially for a large party like the Communist Party of China, which has long been in the core position of leading the country and faces the situation of reform and opening up, it must constantly face serious questions: how to withstand the tests of governance, reform and opening up, the market economy, and the external environment; how to deal with the dangers of mental sluggishness, lack of capacity, alienation from the masses, and passivity and corruption; and how to ensure it "never changes its quality, its color, or its flavor." If these problems are not handled well, it will not only be impossible to maintain vitality but even the qualification to lead will be lost. The only way to solve this problem is through continuous self-purification, self-perfection, self-innovation, and self-improvement.

During the Yan'an Rectification Movement ^[52], Mao Zedong noted: "Many Party members have joined the Party organizationally, but have not fully joined ideologically, or even not joined at all... Although most of our ranks are pure, in order to lead the revolutionary movement toward better development and faster completion, we must conduct a serious rectification both ideologically and organizationally. To rectify organizationally, we must first rectify ideologically and launch an ideological struggle of the proletariat against the non-proletariat." He further stated: "A house should be swept regularly, or it will be covered in dust; a face should be washed regularly, or it will be caked with dirt. The thoughts of our comrades and the work of our Party can also be stained with dust, and should likewise be swept and washed. 'Running water does not stagnate, and a door hinge never rusts' ^[53] means that they resist the erosion of microbes or other organisms through constant motion." Regularly reviewing work and conducting criticism and self-criticism "is precisely the only effective method for resisting the erosion of our comrades' thoughts and the Party’s body by various types of political dust and political microbes." These expositions demonstrate that to maintain the Party's advanced nature and purity, and to prevent the ideological degeneration of members and their alienation from the masses, there is no other way but to continuously conduct criticism and self-criticism and engage in frequent ideological, stylistic, and organizational rectification.

After the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC), it remained in an underground or guerrilla warfare state for a long time, making it difficult to conduct criticism, self-criticism, and self-rectification on a large scale. It was not until the later stages of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, when the Base Areas became relatively stable, that a large-scale rectification movement centered in Yan'an could be launched throughout the Party. It was precisely this movement that laid the ideological and political foundation for the final victory of the War of Resistance and the seizure of national power. In the early period of the New China, addressing new circumstances that had emerged or might emerge after taking power nationwide, our Party launched a series of Party consolidation and rectification movements. Some of these movements committed "Leftist" errors in their guiding ideology, and some suffered from problems of simplification or overextension, leaving behind various "sequelae." However, their purpose was always to strengthen the Party's own building, and they indeed played a positive role in preventing corruption and alienation from the masses after the Party took power.

Following the launch of reform and opening up, our Party absorbed lessons from the past and no longer engaged in "storm-like" ^[54] movement-style rectification. However, it did not stop using concentrated education to conduct internal ideological struggle and the rectification of work styles. In the less than 30 years between 1983 and 2008 alone, the Party successively carried out four rounds of Party-wide concentrated education activities: Party Consolidation, "Three Stresses" education ^[55], education to maintain the advanced nature of Communist Party members, and the study and implementation of the Scientific Outlook on Development. These activities resolved, to varying degrees, problems of impurity in thought and style within the ranks of Party members, serving as a constant "alarm bell" in a complex environment. Nevertheless, due to a period of laxity in governing the Party, some organizations became weak and slack, and problems of formalism and bureaucratism became prominent. Not only was the phenomenon of serious waste and extravagance not fundamentally reversed, but passive corruption grew increasingly rampant. There even appeared localized instances of "running for office" and "buying and selling offices"—vile situations unprecedented in the history of New China—which aroused strong dissatisfaction among the broad ranks of Party members and the masses.

After the 18th National Congress of the CPC, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "Reform and opening up and the development of the socialist market economy have changed the original modes of resource allocation and organizational management. More and more 'unit people' have become 'social people' ^[56]. Various complex interpersonal and interest relationships have brought an impact on intra-Party life that cannot be underestimated, triggering various problems, among which weak organizational consciousness and organizational slackness are issues that must be treated seriously." He said: "Our current primary challenges remain the weakening of Party leadership, organizational slackness, and lax discipline... Many comrades within the Party and the broad masses were worried before the 18th National Congress, and this is exactly why." He emphasized that the primary current problem is that "governing the Party and enforcing discipline has been too broad, too loose, and too soft."

To solve the problems of being "broad, loose, and soft," the Party Central Committee since the 18th National Congress began by setting rules for the Central Committee itself, starting with the formulation and implementation of the Eight-Point Regulations to break the deadlock, and successively introduced a series of measures and systems. From then until the 20th National Congress, concentrated education activities were continuously carried out among the whole Party or among cadres above the county/division level, including: the Party’s mass line education, the "Three Stricts and Three Steadies" ^[57] thematic education, the "Two Studies, One Action" ^[58] educational practice, the "staying true to our original aspiration and founding mission" thematic education, and Party history study and education activities (which included sessions for democratic life meetings ^[59]). Looking at the practice of these years, there are two points that stand out most prominently in the way the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has approached the Party’s own building compared to the past.

1. Conducting education on ideals and convictions with unprecedented intensity

In our Party's history, especially since the founding of New China, although great importance has been attached to educating Party members on ideals and convictions, it has never been emphasized to such a degree as in the New Era. One important reason is that the root cause of those corrupt elements falling into the abyss of crime after reform and opening up was that their "ballast stone" of ideals and convictions had been shaken, and the "master switch" of their worldview, outlook on life, and values had loosened. They were defeated by bourgeois liberalized ideas such as "individualism first," "money first," and "universal values."

Prior to reform and opening up, our Party committed the error of being too eager to enter communism, causing serious losses to the cause of socialist construction. After reform and opening up, the Party restored the Marxist ideological line of seeking truth from facts and realized that because of China's backward economic base, not only would socialism be a long historical stage, but there would also be a very long primary stage within that socialist stage. In this stage, it is necessary to implement policies compatible with the actual level of productive forces, including developing the private economy and attracting foreign capital. However, some people went to the other extreme, believing that communism was indefinitely far off and advocating that we should speak less or even not at all about communism in the future, and only speak of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Some even proposed that to put capitalists at ease, the Communist Party of China should change its name—for example, to the "People’s Party," "Labor Party," or "Socialist Party." Under this influence, a strange phenomenon appeared in public opinion, where it seemed that anyone who spoke of communism was "Leftist" or opposed to reform, to the point that the word "communism" almost vanished from newspapers, radio, and television.

After the 18th National Congress of the CPC, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out with clear-cut clarity: "A Marxist party is not a party joined for interests, but a party organized through shared ideals and convictions. Building a strong Marxist ruling party must first start with ideals and convictions." He criticized: "Among our ranks of members and cadres, the loss of faith is a problem that requires high level of attention. For some, criticizing and mocking Marxism has become a 'fashion' or a gimmick; some are spiritually empty, believing that communism is a nebulous illusion, 'not asking the people but asking the ghosts and gods' ^[60], obsessed with fortune-telling, physiognomy, and praying to Buddha, or superstitious about 'Qigong masters'; some have wavering convictions, moving spouses and children abroad and depositing money overseas to 'leave a way out' for themselves, ready to 'jump ship' at any time; some are enslaved by material things, believing in the supremacy of money, fame, and pleasure, with no reverence in their hearts and no bottom line in their behavior." He emphasized at a democratic life meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee: "What we are doing now are the affairs of the primary stage of socialism, but we must not forget our original intention, nor our ultimate goal of struggle. On this issue, we must not be vague or ambiguous. Being vague or ambiguous is a manifestation of blurred or even wavering ideals and convictions—as if this thing is too distant and we are unsure of it, so we are unwilling to mention it. We can see the things right before our eyes, so we dare to mention them: we dare to mention the primary stage of socialism, we dare to mention the 'Two Centenary Goals,' and the comprehensive building of a moderately prosperous society could be achieved by 2020—we see these clearly, so we dare mention them even more. I believe that as content explicitly stipulated in the Party Constitution and as an ideal that our Party has consistently and clearly upheld, we must strengthen our convictions and firmly believe in its scientific nature. If you feel uneasy in your heart, go and study the classic works; read The Communist Manifesto a few more times."

Regarding the view that "communism is indefinitely far off," General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "Firming up ideals and convictions and sticking to the spiritual pursuit of Communists is always the foundation for Communists to establish themselves. Faith in Marxism and conviction in socialism and communism are the political soul of Communists and the spiritual pillar for Communists to withstand any test." "Our Party takes Marxism as its foundation for building the Party, the realization of communism as its ultimate ideal, and heart-and-soul service to the people as its fundamental purpose. This is the 'root' of being a Communist. Without these, it would be a tree without roots. The logic of our entire path, theory, and system lies here... Since reform and opening up, the way our Party has led the people of all ethnic groups to create and develop the path, theoretical system, and system of socialism with Chinese characteristics all originate from this ideal and conviction. To establish a resolve of loyalty and firm belief is to firm up this ideal and conviction." At a symposium commemorating the 110th anniversary of the birth of Comrade Chen Yun, General Secretary Xi Jinping also cited Chen Yun’s view that "communism is 'remotely' within reach, and socialism is the first stage of communism," pointing out: "Faith in Marxism and communism and conviction in socialism are the spiritual 'calcium' of Communists. Without ideals and convictions, or if they are not firm, one will suffer from 'rickets' ^[61] spiritually and will waver in the face of wind and rain."

Regarding the view that since achieving communism is a very long process, why bother struggling for it, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "Realizing communism is the ultimate ideal for us Communists, and this ultimate ideal requires generation after generation of relay struggle. If everyone feels that this is something invisible and intangible and that there is no need to struggle and sacrifice for it, then communism will truly never be realized. Our current persistence and development of socialism with Chinese characteristics are the practical efforts we are making toward the ultimate ideal." He also said: In the Party's history, "generation after generation of Communists, in pursuit of national independence and the liberation of the people, did not hesitate to shed blood and sacrifice—relying on a faith and for the sake of an ideal. Although they also knew that the ideal they pursued would not be realized in their own hands, they firmly believed that as long as generation after generation continued to work for it and sacrifice for it, the sublime ideal would surely be realized."

Regarding the clamor to "change the name of the Communist Party," General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "Various hostile forces at home and abroad always attempt to make our Party change its banner and its name. The crux is their attempt to make us drop our faith in Marxism and our conviction in socialism and communism. Yet some of our people, even some comrades within the Party, have failed to see the hidden trap here, thinking: Western 'universal values' have existed for centuries, why can’t we identify with them? Why can't we borrow some Western political discourse? Accepting them won't cause us any major losses, so why must we be so stubborn?" He said: "The reason why the Communist Party of China is called the Communist Party is that from the day of its founding, our Party established communism as its lofty ideal. Our Party has been able to withstand setback after setback and rise again and again, fundamentally because our Party has lofty ideals and sublime pursuits." To firm up the whole Party’s conviction in communism, General Secretary Xi Jinping has also many times led members of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee to renew their Party admission oaths under the Party flag.

A question closely related to ideals and convictions is whether the Communist Party is still a revolutionary party after taking power, and whether it still needs "revolution." As mentioned previously, after reform and opening up, the theory of "continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" was negated. Some used this as a pretext to propose the fallacy that "the Communist Party should realize a transition from a 'revolutionary party' to a 'ruling party,'" which became the theoretical basis for some weak-willed individuals to abandon their ideals and convictions. After the 18th National Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping, targeting this public opinion that treated "revolution" as a derogatory term, repeatedly emphasized that "revolutionary ideals soar higher than heaven" and constantly reminded everyone "not to forget that we are revolutionaries" and "not to lose the revolutionary spirit." He criticized the view that the CPC had transformed from a "revolutionary party" to a "ruling party," pointing out that our Party is a Marxist ruling party, but at the same time, it is also a Marxist revolutionary party.

2. Launching an unprecedented anti-corruption struggle

After the 18th Party Congress, the Four Winds—formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance—were severely rectified. With the sense of mission and responsibility characterized by the phrase "offending thousands to avoid failing the 1.4 billion," ^[62] chronic ailments were cured and chaos was quelled. The anti-corruption struggle was launched with unprecedented intensity, punishing a large number of corrupt elements among high-ranking officials, including former members and Standing Committee members of the Central Petroleum Bureau and former vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission. This truly achieved a "no-go zones, full coverage, and zero tolerance" approach to anti-corruption. At the same time, beyond the Party's disciplinary inspection system, National Supervision Commissions were established at all levels, and a system of inspections was set up to conduct oversight of party and government organs, enterprises, and public institutions at all levels, implementing the responsibility for governing the Party and managing its members at every tier. In the anti-corruption struggle, particular attention was paid to punishing corruption where political and economic issues are intertwined, preventing leading officials from becoming spokespersons or agents for interest groups and power blocs. Simultaneously, serious investigations were conducted into cases where spouses, children, and their spouses—as well as other relatives and staff members of leading officials—used their influence for corrupt gains. This ensured a multi-pronged approach of "striking tigers," "swatting flies," and "hunting foxes," ^[63] while persisting in investigating those who give bribes alongside those who receive them. These measures led to an overwhelming victory in the anti-corruption struggle, eliminating serious hidden dangers within the Party, the state, and the military. The situation of "lax, loose, and soft" governance of the Party was fundamentally reversed, and a clean and upright internal political ecosystem has been continuously formed and developed. In the report to the 20th Party Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping set out new tasks for the anti-corruption struggle, requiring the "punishment of new and hidden forms of corruption." He pointed out that we must resolutely win the tough and protracted battle against corruption: "As long as the soil and conditions for corruption exist, the anti-corruption struggle cannot stop for a single moment; the charge must be sounded forever."

The reason why a small number of Party members, especially leading officials, fall into corruption involves economic reasons in addition to ideological ones. Since the Reform and Opening-up, the regulatory role of the market in the economy has been continuously increased, and the development of private and foreign capital has been encouraged. Under these circumstances, the principle of commodity exchange ^[64] can easily penetrate internal Party life, and various material interests can easily exert a seductive influence. If ideological vigilance is relaxed, those with weak wills can easily fall into traps and become captives and agents of capital. Therefore, to strengthen the Party's self-construction and prevent the spread of corruption, in addition to ideological, stylistic, and organizational rectification, we must also proceed from the institutional level, improving regulations and plugging loopholes. This requires, on the one hand, unswervingly upholding the basic economic system in which public ownership is the mainstay and multiple forms of ownership develop together, alongside the socialist market economy system, giving full play to the positive roles of the market and capital under the premise of maintaining the socialist system. On the other hand, it requires correctly understanding and remaining vigilant against the defects of the market and the characteristics of capital, severing potential interest links between Party members—especially leading officials—and domestic or foreign private capital, and stopping power-for-money trades, collusion between government and business, and the funneling of interests between party and government organs and private capital.

After the 18th Party Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping proposed the concept of a "pro-government and clean" ^[65] new type of relationship between government and business. He pointed out: "For leading officials, 'pro-government' (qin) means contacting and interacting with private enterprises in an open and sincere manner... while 'clean' (qing) means the relationship with private entrepreneurs must be blameless and pure, without greed or selfishness, without using power for private gain, and without engaging in power-money trades." In the report to the 19th Party Congress, he further pointed out the need to "consciously resist the erosion of the principle of commodity exchange into internal Party life" and to "resolutely prevent the formation of interest groups within the Party." In his speech at the ceremony marking the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, he reiterated that the Party "does not have any special interests of its own" and pointed out clearly that our Party "has never represented the interests of any interest group, any power bloc, or any privileged stratum. Any attempt to divide or pit the Communist Party of China against the Chinese people is bound to fail." These expositions and practices were rarely seen or even unprecedented in the past, and they have had a significant impact and visible effect on the CPC as a ruling party and on society as a whole.

In addition to the seven aspects of periodic characteristics presented in the History of the People's Republic of China and the History of Reform and Opening-up during the decade of the New Era listed above, the conclusion that socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a New Era, that the principal contradiction in Chinese society has changed, and that China's primary stage of socialism has entered a new stage of development also shows that the history of the PRC and of Reform and Opening-up indeed entered a new period after the 18th Party Congress.

This new period is a period of conducting—and continuing to conduct—a great struggle with many new historical features. It is a period of accomplishing—and continuing to accomplish—many major and important tasks concerning long-term interests, and of overcoming many long-unresolved difficulties and long-accumulated contradictions. It is a period of advancing and expanding—and continuing to advance and expand—Chinese-path modernization; a period of moving from the comprehensive building of a moderately prosperous society toward the basic realization of socialist modernization; a period in which China's international status and influence are further enhanced and it plays a greater role in global governance; and a period in which we are closer to, and have more confidence and capability than at any time in history to achieve, the goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. What this new period must answer is the question of what kind of socialism with Chinese characteristics to build and how to build it. This is related to the previous question of "what is socialism and how to build it," but it is no longer the same question.