Constructing China's Independent Knowledge System of International Relations: A Dialogue with Zheng Yongnian
General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: "The rich practice of reform and opening up and socialist modernization in the New Era is a 'gold mine' for theoretical and policy research." Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, and especially since the 18th CPC National Congress, our country’s economic strength, comprehensive national power, and international influence have achieved a historic leap. The vivid practice of socialism with Chinese characteristics contains immense momentum, vitality, and potential for theoretical innovation. International relations (IR) research falls within the scope of theoretical research and is an important branch of the social sciences; it also concerns the formulation of a country’s foreign policy. Facing the strategic overall situation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the world's changes unseen in a century [1], how can we persist in using Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy as guidance to construct an autonomous Chinese knowledge system for international relations that matches these "two overall situations," providing China's own theoretical framework for understanding and responding to changes in the international situation? Rooted in the great practice of advancing Chinese-path modernization, how can we deepen practical propositions into theoretical subjects, thereby effectively answering the "Questions of China, the World, the People, and the Times"? Focusing on these issues, the People’s Forum magazine invited Zheng Yongnan—Xueqin Chair Professor, President of the School of Public Policy, and President of the Institute for International Affairs (IIA) at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen)—to engage in an exchange.
China and the West have different experiences in international relations; Chinese theory must be used to explain Chinese practice.
People’s Forum: Constructing an autonomous Chinese knowledge system has become a hot topic in academic research. Regarding the discipline of international relations, what is the realistic background for constructing an autonomous Chinese knowledge system?
Zheng Yongnian: Since General Secretary Xi Jinping proposed the mandate to "construct an autonomous Chinese knowledge system," this proposition has become a focal point of attention and a research priority in theoretical and academic circles. Building such a system has also been the long-cherished wish of several generations of Chinese scholars. The practice of Chinese-path modernization is unprecedented; it provides a powerful impetus and vast space for theoretical creation and academic prosperity. After years of development, China has grown from a poor and weak backward agricultural country into the world's second-largest economy, becoming a responsible power with strong international influence on the world stage. Facing the world's changes unseen in a century, China is also in a critical period for achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In this context, there is an urgent need to construct an autonomous Chinese knowledge system for international relations.
From the perspective of history and reality, constructing such a system draws upon long and rich practical experience. China possesses an uninterrupted civilizational history of several thousand years and rich diplomatic practice; it has the painful experience of being invaded by imperialism in modern times, and the successful experiences in various fields since the founding of the PRC, especially in the New Era. If we can conceptualize, theorize, and systematize these practical experiences, we can not only generate various theories of international relations and diplomacy but also form theoretical tools that can truly explain and predict IR and diplomatic practice. Using an autonomous Chinese IR knowledge system can inject strong developmental momentum into the international academic community.
People’s Forum: In the actual process of construction, what challenges do scholars face?
Zheng Yongnian: First, in terms of patterns of thinking, some scholars—consciously or unconsciously—still mechanically apply Western modes of thinking or Western theories to interpret Chinese practice, without fully considering how Chinese practice was generated and developed. Since the beginning of reform and opening up, the Chinese academic community has trained a sizable contingent of IR researchers and produced increasingly mature theoretical results. At one time, several Western IR theories, including (neo-)liberalism, (neo-)realism, and constructivism, were prevalent in domestic academic circles. In recent years, as the autonomous consciousness of our scholars has strengthened, this phenomenon has seen significant improvement.
General Secretary Xi Jinping noted: "Whether our philosophy and social sciences have Chinese characteristics depends, in the final analysis, on whether they possess subjectivity and originality." Since the New Era, the vast majority of our scholars have realized that we cannot copy Western theories to explain and summarize China's IR experience; rather, we must engage in autonomous innovation starting from China's historical traditions. Just as Western scholars often look to the "international relations" between ancient Greek city-states for ideological sources, some domestic scholars are also trying to find inspiration from ancient Chinese history, especially the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods [2]. From that time until the modern era, China has accumulated rich experience in handling relations between states. Summarizing Chinese experience is important, but the process is not easy; there are at least two major problems to solve.
First, when summarizing China's historical experience, it is necessary to avoid using Western modes of thinking to analyze it. Some ancient Chinese historical experiences have been used by some as "cases" to verify Western concepts and theories. This may look like academic innovation, but in reality, it is "Western concepts, Chinese materials" or "Western propositions, Chinese cases." In such research, China appears to be the subject on the surface, but it cannot form original concepts and theories based on Chinese experience.
Second, international relations are realistic and changing; the environment faced by modern China is very different from that of ancient China. While ancient Chinese knowledge and experience can be drawn upon, it is difficult for them to help us establish a knowledge system that can fully explain modern international relations. Western scholars draw on the historical experience of the interactions and wars between ancient Greek city-states primarily to explore the nature of international relations; therefore, they borrow concepts useful to them, such as hegemony, power, and alliances.
People’s Forum: In what aspects is the significance of constructing an autonomous Chinese IR knowledge system reflected?
Zheng Yongnian: Western IR theories are built upon the international relations and diplomatic practices of Western countries. They can explain Western experience but cannot explain China's IR and diplomatic practice. Obviously, the IR experiences of China and the West are not the same. In fact, there is no single IR theory (or set of theories) in the world that applies to all countries, nor is there a theory that can be taken and applied universally. Even among Western countries, the IR theories of European countries and the United States are not identical, despite their cultural similarities. Furthermore, even among European countries, the focus of each country's IR theory varies.
General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized: "We must accelerate the construction of a Chinese discourse and narrative system, use Chinese theory to explain Chinese practice, use Chinese practice to sublimate Chinese theory, and create new concepts, categories, and expressions that integrate China and the world, more fully and vividly displaying the Chinese story and the ideological and spiritual power behind it." An autonomous Chinese IR knowledge system is both based on China's practical experience in international relations and inherits and develops fine traditional Chinese culture. Constructing this system has significant meaning in at least two aspects. On the one hand, it can be used to explain China's IR and diplomatic practices. In areas such as peripheral diplomacy, major-country diplomacy, regional integration, and economic globalization, China has accumulated extremely rich experience that needs to be comprehensively summarized and sublimated into a theoretical system. On the other hand, it can provide a methodology for the world to understand China's IR practices and foreign policy. A few Western countries have an unclear understanding of—or even intentionally distort and mislead regarding—China's IR and diplomatic concepts. This makes it even more necessary for us to provide the world with the correct method for understanding China. If we cannot provide concepts and theories that explain China’s practice, it will be difficult for the world to accurately understand China.
Geopolitics both affects a country's international relations practice and shapes its concepts and ideas regarding international relations.
People’s Forum: Looking at the generation and development of Western IR concepts and ideas, what are the key factors?
Zheng Yongnian: Geopolitics is a key factor. Geopolitics affects a country's practice and shapes its concepts. The emergence of modern international relations can be traced back to Europe. European geopolitics profoundly influenced European IR practice and theory.
European international relations were built between sovereign states. The concept of sovereignty determined both the internal structure of modern sovereign states and the relations between them. An important characteristic of European international relations is the emphasis on the legal equality of sovereignty. Why emphasize equality? Primarily because modern Europe did not produce a superpower; the strength of the major states was comparable, and no single country could completely dominate another. It was precisely because of this factual relative equality that European countries emphasized equality when handling relations, an equality that was further reflected in international law.
Another important feature of European international relations is alliance politics and the balance of power between states. Establishing the principle of sovereign equality did not mean they would not face the "security dilemma under anarchy" that exists in the reality of international relations—that is, the emergence of self-interested sovereign states that pose a threat to others. Thus, forming alliances became an important strategy, using them to prevent threats from another country or another alliance. Only two groups of states of equal strength can constitute mutual restraint.
A third characteristic of European international relations is the strategy of maritime expansion, which is closely related to geopolitics. Many European countries are coastal nations familiar with the sea, but their internal resources were very limited. This prompted these countries to pursue maritime development strategies.
People’s Forum: How did American IR theory and practice develop? Is it also related to geopolitics?
Zheng Yongnian: Conceptually, American IR theory was deeply influenced by Europe. But in reality, there is a large difference between the two. American IR theory was basically founded and developed by European scholars who immigrated to the United States. The U.S.'s ability to become a hegemonic state and maintain that hegemony is also closely related to its geopolitics.
In most cases, the U.S. lacks direct and intense geopolitical competition with Europe or between European countries themselves. This factor is very important; it determined that after World War II, the U.S. could become the leader of the Western countries. It is hard to imagine that if the U.S. were located in Europe, European countries would still have accepted American leadership. The strength of various European countries was comparable, making it difficult for any one country to establish absolute hegemony. Among all great powers, the U.S. geopolitical environment is relatively simple, with only two major land neighbors: Canada and Mexico. The U.S. successfully established a North American Free Trade Area centered on itself, which consolidated its position.
People’s Forum: Besides geopolitical factors, what other important means does the U.S. use to maintain its hegemony?
Zheng Yongnian: The first is market economy means. The market not only integrated the relations between the U.S. and its allies but also reduced the costs of maintaining those alliances. Using economic means to maintain an alliance appears "softer" than using political or military means, making it easier for other countries to accept. The second means is "taxing" other countries. A relatively simple geopolitical environment inherently gave the U.S. the ability to expand its international influence. Factors such as the ability to influence the international economic and trade system, the U.S. dollar being the international currency, and being a major consumer nation have given the U.S. the ability to "tax" its allies and even other countries, forcing them to bear and share the costs of maintaining U.S. hegemony.
Western IR theory reflects these facts; it is a justification for America's international status and behavioral patterns. Whether it is (neo-)realism, (neo-)liberalism, or various mutations within these theories—such as hegemonic stability theory or the democratic peace theory—they are all direct reflections and defenses of U.S. international relations practice, rather than general laws of international relations.
In fact, since modern times, many countries have constructed regional or international orders centered on themselves. Objectively speaking, constructing an order starting from a country's actual conditions is a relatively realistic strategic choice. However, two cognitive errors that easily arise should be pointed out: first, the belief that one's own country is civilized while others are "barbaric"; and second, failing to consider the interests of other countries when formulating and implementing foreign policy, manifesting as "country first" or extremely selfish diplomatic behavior. If these two cognitive errors are widely promoted and transformed into practice, they violate the basic norms governing international relations.
People’s Forum: Historically speaking, in what ways has geopolitics mainly influenced Chinese diplomacy?
Zheng Yongnian: In traditional society, China did not produce concepts or theories of international relations in the modern sense, but this does not mean China lacked policies and experience in handling international relations. It is clear from the policies of those times that China's external engagement was also influenced by geopolitics. From frontiers to the periphery and then to the world—this was the traditional Chinese order of thinking in international relations. The primary focus of traditional Chinese geopolitics was the frontier issue. Centered on the frontier, the influence of traditional geopolitics on Chinese diplomacy manifested the following characteristics:
First, an emphasis on defense for the purpose of maintaining its own peace. A prominent example of this is the construction of the Great Wall [3] to defend against foreign invasions. Historically, China did not develop an expansionist diplomatic strategy like those of the West.
Second, an emphasis on the internal unity of a land-based state. Despite China's long coastline and early development of advanced maritime technology, these factors did not translate into a drive to develop overseas relations. The voyages of Zheng He [4] illustrate this point. Ancient China did not become a seafaring nation not because it lacked the capacity, but because of the policy choices of the time. In reality, China was not a country "locked" by land; making such a policy choice was also a result of geopolitical influence. Given the numerous countries surrounding China, peripheral diplomacy became the focus of China's international relations in order to address frontier issues. Managing the frontier was always the primary direction of traditional Chinese diplomacy.
Third, a tributary system with an open character. In recent years, the academic community has conducted extensive research on the tributary system. Some scholars believe the tributary system indicates that ancient China only desired superficial submission from other countries and did not develop its own power outward. This is a misunderstanding or distortion under the influence of Western international relations theory. In fact, ancient China emphasized the concept of gongfu [5] (tribute and tax) rather than "tribute" (chaozhong). "Tribute" is a term imposed on China by Western scholars. Viewed through modern concepts, the gongfu system was more like contemporary "unilateral opening." After foreign envoys presented gifts to the Chinese imperial court, they would receive gifts of greater value from the Chinese emperor and often obtained the right to conduct trade in China. It must be emphasized that the formation of the tributary system was also related to geopolitics; it was an institutional design by ancient China to stabilize the surrounding environment.
Regardless of how people evaluate traditional Chinese diplomacy, it sustained itself for millennia. Ancient China’s frontier governance, as well as its peripheral and regional diplomacy, were quite successful. A simple fact is that while other forms of empires underwent complex evolutions or even disintegrated, China largely preserved its traditional territory. How was this achieved? Many emphasize cultural factors. While culture is indeed important, how does it function? The fact that China was able to forge a culture with strong cohesive force over a long historical process is itself related to geopolitics. In world history, many empires focused solely on outward expansion while neglecting internal cultural construction, thereby lacking internal cohesion.
Forging an Independent Knowledge System Capable of Scientifically Explaining and Predicting Chinese International Relations and Diplomacy
People’s Tribune: How should we grasp contemporary China’s brand-new positioning in international relations?
Zheng Yongnian: As contemporary geopolitical conditions change, international relations have also become more complex. In keeping with China's status as a major power, Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy has proposed a series of new concepts, new ideas, and new strategies for handling international relations. Among these, the development of global partnerships has become an important innovation in China's diplomatic theory and practice in the New Era. Standing at the heights of the developmental process of human history, General Secretary Xi Jinping has gained deep insight into the future of humanity and the general trends of the era, proposing the concept of building a community with a shared future for humanity. This provides the direction and the fundamental follow-through for promoting global cooperation and constructing a new type of international relations. China adheres to a vision of global governance based on extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits, and has creatively proposed the high-quality development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), reflecting China’s role and positioning as a responsible major power.
At the practical level, China and ASEAN are each other's largest trading partners, and both sides have fully completed negotiations for the 3.0 upgrade of their Free Trade Area. Since its establishment in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has continuously grown, becoming the world's largest regional organization with 26 participating countries, cooperation in over 50 fields, and a total economic volume approaching 30 trillion USD; its international influence and appeal are growing daily. China is strengthening the alignment of development strategies and deeply advancing the high-quality development of the BRI. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) are playing increasingly important roles in global financial governance, and so on. These practices demonstrate that the propositions advocated by China—true multilateralism, an equal and orderly multipolar world, universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization, and mutual learning between civilizations—have all yielded fruitful results. China's international influence, appeal, and capacity to shape events have significantly increased.
People’s Tribune: What are the distinct characteristics of China's diplomacy in the New Era?
Zheng Yongnian: In the New Era, the strategic autonomy and proactivity of China's diplomacy have significantly increased, manifesting the following characteristics.
First, major-power diplomacy. President Xi Jinping has pointed out: "Major-power relations bear on global strategic stability, and major powers shoulder special responsibilities. China is committed to promoting coordination and cooperation among major powers, expecting them to coexist in harmony, featuring no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation." Major-power diplomacy is an essential component of China's external engagement, referring to China's development of relations with other major powers. It is vital because it affects the framework of the international order. If China is to fulfill its responsibility to promote the transformation of global governance, it must participate in major-power diplomacy as a key member. Today, China engages in frequent interaction with all major powers, including Russia, the United States, France, and India, not only to protect its own interests but also to establish a more just and reasonable international order.
Second, development diplomacy. President Xi Jinping pointed out: "Countries in the lead should sincerely help other countries develop. Blowing out someone else’s lamp will not make oneself any brighter; blocking someone else’s path will not help one go any further." China’s diplomacy exhibits the distinct characteristic of development diplomacy. This refers primarily to diplomacy with the vast number of developing countries—what we often call the Global South. Since the beginning of the modern era, many developing countries were reduced to colonies of Western nations. In their process of modernization, Western countries plundered the resources of developing nations, treating them as sources of raw materials and dumping grounds for commodities, which made it difficult for these countries to develop themselves. More severely, after individual Western countries developed, they "kicked away the ladder" [6] they had used to climb up, obstructing the right of developing countries to achieve equal development. As the world's largest developing country, China upholds the concepts of solidarity, cooperation, and common development. While developing itself, China also brings more new opportunities to the vast number of developing nations, assisting them in achieving development. We deeply realize that if some countries develop while others do not, the world economy will be imbalanced, and the international community will find it difficult to achieve sustainable development goals. Therefore, China proposes the high-quality development of the BRI, advocating for one’s own well-being while allowing others to fare well too. It emphasizes that "when everyone adds wood, the fire rises high" [7] and that mutual assistance leads to going further, seeking common development and win-win cooperation to promote the economic development and living standards of participating countries.
Third, open diplomacy. Opening up has become a prominent feature of contemporary Chinese international relations and diplomatic practice. Open diplomacy is manifested at three levels. The first level is true multilateralism. The "multilateralism" touted by certain countries is essentially exclusive "small circles" [8] targeted at third parties. The true multilateralism practiced by China is open and inclusive, not targeted at any other country, but dedicated to solving common global problems. The second level is institutional opening up. Rules and standards are the institutional conditions for the operation of the international order. As China’s economy achieves high-quality development and increasingly integrates into the tide of global economic development, it has taken solid steps in aligning rules and institutional opening up. China actively participates in the formulation of international rules and practices the vision of global governance based on extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits. The third level is being a responsible major power. China has granted zero-tariff treatment on 100% of tariff lines to all least-developed countries that have diplomatic ties with China, continuously promoting world development through a higher level of opening up. In fact, at every level, China's policy of opening up has become an effective way for China to provide international public goods to the world.
People’s Tribune: Based on the fertile soil of China-path major-power diplomacy, how should this arduous and complex systematic project of constructing an independent Chinese knowledge system of international relations be carried out?
Zheng Yongnian: The practical foundation for constructing an independent Chinese knowledge system of international relations is clear: it is the creative transformation of Chinese international relations and diplomatic practice from the traditional to the contemporary.
First, we need to re-recognize and articulate the traditional wisdom of China’s handling of international relations. For example, the gongfu system: there are reasons why this system was able to exist and develop for thousands of years. From a conceptual standpoint, this is a form of moral realism; it is the practical expression of "when in poverty, attend to your own virtue; when successful, benefit the whole world" [9]. It acknowledges the responsibilities of a major power while considering the sustainable development of the power itself. A crucial factor in China's ability to maintain a vast territory for so long is that the gongfu system was a highly flexible regional and international order.
Second, we must correctly understand the concentric structure of Chinese international relations and diplomatic practice. The previously mentioned traditional structure—from frontiers (land and maritime) to the periphery and then to the world—has undergone a creative transformation in the contemporary era. If the concentric structure once emphasized national security, contemporary China’s global and international outlook reflects a broader range of international engagement. Furthermore, whether in the periphery or internationally, the principles of international relations China adheres to remain the same.
Third, non-interventionism. Whether in ancient or modern times, China has never actively intervened in the internal affairs of other countries. The result of certain Western countries interfering in others' affairs is that the intervened countries cannot form an autonomous order; when the international balance of power shifts, these countries may fall into a state of anarchy. Interventionism is a direct reflection of Western monistic values. China practices true multilateralism, seeking to engage with all countries but never actively intervening in local orders. China has coexisted with Southeast Asian countries for millennia without ever turning any of them into a colony. China's modern history of suffering imperialist aggression has ensured that non-interventionism is not only continued but strengthened.
Fourth, engagement and autonomy. China has never been the isolated and closed-off country described by the West. On the contrary, China has a deep interest in exploring the world; otherwise, there would have been no historical Silk Road and no Belt and Road Initiative today. China advocates "benefiting the whole world when successful" and engagement with the world. The traditional theme was "harmony brings wealth" [10], while the contemporary theme is common development. China emphasizes its own autonomy and self-governance while respecting the autonomy and self-governance of other nations. Although the concept of sovereignty originated in the modern West, in essence, many traditional practices of China’s external engagement already embodied the connotations and requirements of sovereignty. Chinese-path modernization is a modernization that follows the path of peaceful development; it achieves development while maintaining independence, which is truly commendable. This is China's pursuit and the principle China applies to other countries.
Fifth, opening up and the "ceaseless continuity of life" (sheng sheng bu xi). General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "China’s opening up is not a solo performance, but a welcome for all parties to participate; it is not about seeking spheres of influence, but about supporting the common development of all countries; it is not about building one's own back garden, but about building a garden shared by all nations." Among all the major civilizations that have existed or currently exist, Chinese civilization displays a distinct openness. This openness is manifested not only at the material level but also at the spiritual level. Chinese people know deeply that only in a state of openness can they achieve sustainable development; and only in a state of openness can China benefit the whole world and develop alongside other countries. When one is well, others are also well; when others are well, one can be even better. This is the outlook demonstrated by contemporary Chinese international relations and diplomatic practice, and it is the inheritance and promotion of fine traditional Chinese culture.
Source: People’s Daily (September 22, 2025, Page 09) Web Editor: Huihui