Zhu Huiling: Sandel's Critique and Reconstruction of the Rawlsian Conception of the Self

Rawls explicitly states in A Theory of Justice: "Since the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it... we should therefore reverse the relation between the right and the good proposed by teleological doctrines and view the right as prior." Based on this assertion, Rawls constructs his entire system of the theory of justice. It is precisely this conception of the self and its relationship to ends that Sandel regards as the logical starting point of Rawlsian justice theory; it is from this foundation that he launches his challenge. It can be said that Sandel’s critique of the Rawlsian conception of the self is the most distinctive and theoretically weighty part of his political philosophy. This critique initiated a rethinking and re-examination of the Rawlsian self within Western political philosophy, opening a new dimension for considering Rawls’s theory of justice while triggering reflections on the relationship between the self and others, and the self and society or community.

In summary, Sandel criticizes Rawls’s conception of the self and the proposition that "the self is prior to its ends" from two aspects: the moral subject and the agent of action. He discusses Rawls's arguments concerning the self, its attributes, and its capacities within the original position. He further points out that Rawls’s construction of the original position fails to reconstruct Kantian moral and political claims within the scope of empirical theory. Rawls's effort to seek an "Archimedean point" ends in failure, leading to a fallacious conception of the self.

I. Qualitative Defects of the Deontological Moral Subject

Sandel deeply analyzes Rawls’s conception of the self, discovering two parallel dimensions implicit within it: first, the plurality of the self; and second, the relationship between the self and its ends. Through an analysis of these two levels, Sandel reveals the essence of Rawls's moral subject.

(1) The Impoverished, Unencumbered Self

The plurality and complexity of moral subjects is one of the assumptions Rawls employs when designing the original position. From this, Sandel further infers that for Rawls, individual plurality is a necessary presupposition for the possibility of justice: "Rawls’s view of the moral subject is that every individual person is a moral subject, and every moral subject is an individual person." Therefore, the plurality of moral subjects must take precedence over their unity. We cannot grant equal priority to unity and plurality; unity is not based on our nature. Because we are first distinct individuals, we only enter into relations or cooperation with others when circumstances permit or when prompted by practical needs. That is to say, we recognize the plurality of subjects a priori, and only subsequently understand the basis of unity and cooperation through practical experience. Thus, Sandel argues that for Rawls, the priority of the plurality of the self over its unity is a prerequisite for the primacy of justice.

Sandel acknowledges that Rawls’s theory is not the kind of "narrow individualist doctrine" ^[1] described by empiricism. The assumption of mutual disinterestedness does not sacrifice communal values to favor individual values in the choice of principles of justice. However, through further reasoning, Sandel concludes that the Rawlsian conception is individualistic in essence. "The Rawlsian self is not only a subject of possession, but also an antecedently individuated subject, always standing at a certain distance from the interests it possesses... The consequence of this distance is to place the self in a position beyond empirical limits, rendering it invulnerable, thereby fixing its identity once and for all. No commitment could grip me so deeply that I could not understand myself without it; no change in life pursuits or plans could be so vexing as to disrupt my identity boundaries; no project is so important that eschewing it would make 'who I am' a question. Since I stand independent of the values I possess, I can always depart from them; my public identity as a moral person is unaffected by changes in my conception of the good over time and external circumstances." In Sandel’s view, the self stipulated by Rawls in the original position is an atomized, "unencumbered self," standing independent of and prior to all ends, goals, and bonds. For the unencumbered self, what is most important and substantively significant to our nature is not the various goals we choose, but our capacity to choose them. This "priority of the self to its ends implies that I am not merely a passive vessel for a sequence of goals, attributes, and pursuits thrown up by experience, nor simply a product of the vagaries of circumstance, but always an irreducible, active, and willing agent, capable of separating from my environment and possessing the capacity for choice. Any quality identified as my goal, ambition, or desire always implies an 'I' of the subject standing behind it, and the image of this 'I' must be prior to any ends or attributes I possess... Before an end is chosen, there must be a self capable of choosing."

It is precisely this quality of the self that Sandel rejects. In his view, such a radically independent and unencumbered self excludes various conceptions of good and evil that are of constitutive significance to the self's identity. Such a self also excludes any possibility of attachment that could transcend our values and emotions to become our identity itself. This conception of the self further excludes the possibility of a public life in which the participants' identities, bonds, and interests are of vital importance; it even excludes the possibility that public intentions and ends could, to a greater or lesser extent, inspire and expand the understanding of the self, thereby defining a community in a constitutive sense.

In a more general sense, Sandel believes Rawls’s explanation excludes alternative possibilities for self-understanding, namely "intersubjective" or "intrasubjective" forms. "Intersubjective conceptions do not assume a prior way of understanding the self." On one hand, an intersubjective conception allows the relevant description of the self within a certain moral environment to incorporate dimensions such as family, community, class, and nation, rather than being limited to a non-singular, individual person. On the other hand, for certain specific purposes, the intersubjective conception allows the description of the moral subject to refer to a plurality of selves within the individual. Sandel asserts that while Rawls does not explicitly oppose intersubjective conceptions, he does so implicitly by assuming that each individual corresponds to a singular system of desires and by arguing that the error of utilitarianism lies in applying principles suitable for individuals to society as a whole. If each individual possesses a systematic set of desires, there is no need to merge various desires within the individual; only when society is composed of pluralistic individuals do we need principles of justice for coordination. Clearly, Rawls excludes or fails to recognize intersubjective ways of understanding the self. However, this exclusion is not thorough; occasionally, his theory relies on a similar conception. This is primarily reflected in his argument for the Difference Principle.

Therefore, taken as a whole, Sandel argues that the conception of the self upon which Rawls and his theory of justice depend is essentially impoverished. Stripped of all constitutive attachments and connections, it excludes fuller understandings of the self and fails to recognize the essential value that community holds in the construction of individual identity and even in personal life ideals.

(2) The Subject of Possession Cannot Sustain Legitimate Expectations

In Sandel's view, when Rawls opposes the principles of natural liberty and liberal equality, he combines two aspects: the self as a possessor and the concept of desert. According to the conception of the subject of possession, a certain distance exists between me and the natural talents or abilities I possess; in myself, the self owns nothing, and no substantive features or qualities can be attributed as a basis for desert. The characteristics and qualities I have are mine, but they are not me; they are appendages I possess but do not constitute my being. Precisely because of this, Rawls further believes that human beings have no intrinsic value; no value is inherent, nor is it my being itself. Consequently, principles of justice should not involve moral desert. Thus, by viewing the conception of the self as a pure, essentially unencumbered subject of possession, Rawls denies desert and the basis of desert, opposes the principles of natural liberty and liberal equality, and subsequently argues that the Difference Principle is an unavoidable principle.

However, in Sandel's view, establishing principles and theories of justice upon a conception of the self that lacks essential value and is stripped of all dispositions, talents, and ends will face greater difficulties. He believes the pure conception of the self implicit in Rawls’s theory is a subject of possession stripped of all contingencies, unconstrained by any a priori moral bonds or ends, and is therefore a "thin" subject. Sandel points out that this independent self of deontology is essentially deprived of all intrinsic value, talents, and dispositions; it is too thin to attain desert in its everyday sense.

From this, Sandel challenges Rawls’s conception of desert: Rawls denies desert based on arbitrariness and allows society as a whole to obtain and distribute the talented assets of its members and the resulting benefits. This requires us to theoretically assume that society possesses characteristics prior to institutions, for only such a society could possess its members' assets in a strong, constitutive sense. Yet, such a view conflicts with Rawls’s assumed theory of the individual, especially his view that society is not a living organic whole and is prior to the individual. At this point, Rawls’s conception of desert would implicitly rely on a broader subject of possession. Thus, an intersubjective dimension may once again force its way into Rawls’s individualistic project.

Why then does Sandel point out Rawls’s reliance on an intersubjective conception of the self? Is this point important? In fact, this is precisely where the brilliance of Sandel’s critique lies. Sandel attacks the fundamental claim of Rawls (and liberalism): that a community is an association formed by independent individuals, and therefore the value of the community should be evaluated and measured by terms related to justice formed by these individuals. Sandel, however, insists that we cannot understand community this way because the existence of individuals who can reach agreements and form alliances presupposes the existence of a community. Rawls’s reliance on intersubjectivity confirms this view, and this reliance directly threatens his own theory. In Sandel’s view, Rawls attempts to define the association of a just society as the product of a contract entered into by free and equal individuals, but this project actually fails. Because such individuals are selves without motivation, capacity for choice, or capacity for reflection. Such individuals cannot reach substantive conclusions. To reach substantive conclusions, Rawls is forced to invoke an assumption inconsistent with his own theory—namely, that there indeed exists a community in whose life the individual is completely encompassed.

II. Insufficiencies in the Capacity of the Deontological Agent

Starting from the perspective of agency and the agent, Sandel returns to Rawls's contractarianism and the veil of ignorance. He discusses and criticizes Rawls’s conception of the self and the arguments regarding the subject’s capacities from levels such as the capacity for choice and reflection, further criticizing the deontological liberalism and theory of justice built upon this foundation.

(1) The Loss of "Possession"

Sandel begins with the concept of possession, deriving the problem of agency from the relationship between the self and its various ends. Through a deep analysis of Rawls’s conception of the self and the moral subject, he concludes: Rawls spends a great deal of effort distinguishing between the self and its various possessions. This is a necessary component of the entire deontological system; it provides the foundation for the priority of the self over its ends, which in turn supports the priority of the right and the primacy of justice. However, in Sandel’s view...

"One consequence of the dual nature of possession is that possession may diminish or disappear in two different ways. I gradually lose possession of an object not only when a distance is created between my person and that thing, but also when the distance between my self and that thing gradually shrinks to the point of vanishing. I lose possession of a certain desire or ambition not only when my commitment to it fades and I no longer persist in that commitment, but also, beyond a certain point, as my grasp of it increases and I gradually obtain it. As that desire or ambition gradually becomes constitutive of my identity, it becomes more and more me and less and less mine... the less I possess it, the more I am possessed by it." In Michael Sandel’s view, possession must be related to human agency and self-command. Looking at the two ways in which possession can vanish, the deprivation of possession can be understood as a deprivation of power. When I lose possession of something—whether because it is beyond my grasp or because it is so powerful that I am controlled by it, thereby losing power over it—the agency I have toward that object also disappears. Each of these challenges is related to a conception of agency, which in turn reflects a different interpretation of the relationship between the self and its ends.

When the self is prior to its ends, as John Rawls believes, then self-knowledge in this sense is impossible, because the boundaries of the self are fixed, and within these boundaries, everything is transparent. The relevant moral question is not "Who am I?", for the answer to that question is already given in advance; rather, it is the question "What ends should I choose?", which is essentially a question of the will. Thus, the voluntarist ^[2] conception of agency is a key component in Rawls's theory and plays an important role in deontological ethics. As Rawls points out: "It is not our aims that primarily reveal our nature but that capacity for choice which is also shown in the principles of justice. Thus a moral person is a subject with ends he has chosen."

However, this is precisely what Sandel opposes. In his view, the danger of losing "possession" cannot be resolved through Rawls’s voluntarist subjective capacity and the associated notion of the priority of the self over its ends. When the self loses power because it is detached from its ends, this voluntarist capacity can transcend the distance between the subject and its objects through choice. However, when the self loses power because it is unable to distinguish its ends from itself, the voluntarist subjective capacity becomes ineffective and must be resolved through an epistemological dimension. Yet, the Rawlsian self does not possess this cognitive subjective capacity. Only when the ends of the self are given beforehand is the capacity of the subject not voluntarist, but cognitive. For such a subject does not achieve self-command by choosing things that are already given; on the contrary, it achieves self-command by reflecting on itself, peering into its constitutive nature, discerning its laws and principles, and accepting its ends as its own.

In Sandel's view, this latter capacity is the capacity for reflection. While the capacity of the will attempts to preserve the relationship between the self and its ends by establishing continuity between them, the capacity for reflection is a capacity for distancing. In the process of reflection, the self looks inward, making the self the object of its own examination and reflection; when I can reflect on my possession and pick it out as the object of my reflection, I establish a certain distance between it and me. Thus, it becomes more of an attribute of mine and less a constituent of my identity. Furthermore, when the identity of the self is constituted by those ends given in advance, the subjective capacity no longer appeals to the will, but rather seeks self-understanding. Consequently, the relevant question is not "What ends shall I choose?", because the answer to that question is already given; rather, it is "Who am I?" and "How do I distinguish what are ends and what is myself?". Here, the boundaries of the self are not fixed but are full of possibilities; its contours are no longer clear and distinct, but are, at least in part, yet to be formed. From this, it is evident that in Sandel's view, the relationship between the self and its ends also affects the capacity of the subject: when the self is prior to the ends, the dominant capacity of the subject is choice, appealing to a voluntarism; when ends are given prior to the self, the dominant capacity of the subject is reflection. In fact, Rawls also emphasizes the subject’s capacity for reflection, even emphasizing the achievement of principles of justice through "reflective equilibrium." However, in Sandel's view, because Rawls inverts the relationship between the self and its ends, the capacity for choice he emphasizes cannot truly choose anything, and the reflection he emphasizes cannot truly and effectively reflect.

(2) Inventory rather than Choice

As Rawls states, since the self exists prior to its ends, it needs to acquire various ends through the exercise of its capacity for choice. If our fundamental ends, values, and conceptions of the good are all to be chosen by ourselves, then in this process, the subject is precisely exercising its own capacity. In Rawls, the subject’s choice often depends on our clear understanding of our own desires and the intensity of those desires. However, in Sandel's view, the kind of choice based on my current preferences that Rawls describes is only choice in a special sense. This is because Rawls himself believes that the expectations and desires upon which my choice depends are not themselves chosen; on the contrary, they are products of circumstances. Therefore, the choice that depends on these desires is not an act of will, but merely an account of the content of these expectations and desires. Thus, Sandel points out that the decision made by the agent here is merely an assessment and inventory of the various expectations and preferences they already possess, rather than a choice of values or a pursuit of ends. At the same time, "to reach a plan of life or a conception of the good simply by heeding my existing expectations and desires is not to choose that plan, nor to choose those desires; it is merely to match the ends I have with the means that can best satisfy them. In this description, my goals, values, and conceptions of the good are not the products of choice, but the objects of a shallow introspection, a mere uncritical inward observation of the motives and desires left to me by my environment."

Therefore, in Sandel's view, although Rawls hopes to endow the agent with a capacity for choice and attempts to rely on this subjective capacity to choose one's ends, values, conceptions of the good, and way of life, in reality, the agent does not truly choose these things. This capacity does not play the role Rawls expected in the relationship between the self and its ends. Furthermore, Sandel believes that in the "veil of ignorance" ^[3] and the "original position," ^[4] the agents do not actually choose the principles of justice or reach a corresponding contract. In his view, the original intention of setting up the veil of ignorance was to place the parties in the original position in a similar situation, making the differences in the capacities and knowledge of the parties disappear, thereby rooting out possible sources of unfairness. Once this is done, any contract reached by the parties is purely procedural justice, and whatever the outcome of such a contract, it is fair. However, because various differences in interests, preferences, power, or knowledge are screened out, all individual characteristics of the parties in the original position are also excluded, and the parties are in the same situation. The "priority of plurality over unity" that Rawls initially set up no longer exists. Once plurality disappears, the parties in the original position lose the possibility of bargaining necessary for entering into a contract; they are merely subjects with the same situation and the same rationality, accepting or understanding the same content. Therefore, what Rawls initially relied on as choice and identification through the will turns out in the end to be a form of insight and self-understanding; choice and will are replaced by understanding and perception. People in the veil of ignorance do not choose the principles of justice; they only recognize them. Thus, Sandel concludes: "The secret of the original position—and the key to its justification—lies not in what they do there, but in what they understand there. What matters is not what they choose, but what they see; not what they decide, but what they discover. What is formed in the original position is not a contract at all, but a self-identification of intersubjectivity."

Thus, starting from the capacity of the agent and moving through an examination of the veil of ignorance and the original position, Sandel denies Rawls's initial postulation of the plurality of the self and the priority of plurality over unity. Further, on the basis of the disappearance of plurality, he denies the capacity for choice of the agent that Rawls relies on, ultimately denying the contract and principles of justice built upon this specious capacity for choice. He once again highlights the dependence of Rawls's conception of the self, the original position, and his theory of justice on the very intersubjectivity he sought to exclude.

(3) Outward and Limited Reflection

Sandel further questions the capacity for reflection of the agent as described by Rawls. In Rawls's view, the subject needs the capacity for reflection in order to decide what things we want and to what extent we desire them; the subject's plan of life or conception of the good are the results of reflection. However, in Sandel's view, Rawls's conception of the self and the setting of the relationship between the self and its ends limits the subject’s objects of reflection to the following two: first, various plans to be chosen and various possible outcomes generated after the subject's desires are realized; second, the subject's various expectations and desires themselves, and the intensity with which the subject wants them. In both cases, the agent's objects of reflection are limited to desires, without reflecting on the self that is the subject of those desires. The weighing of various optional plans and their consequences in the first case is not reflection at all; the reflection here is outward, not inward, and it only achieves a kind of deliberative reasoning. This reasoning could, in principle, be completed by an external expert who knows little about the agent but knows everything about the various options and the interests and desires to be satisfied. The assessment of the intensity of various desires in the second case is indeed inward in a sense, but it is not thorough. It takes the self's contingent desires and preferences, rather than the self itself, as the object of reflection; it does not involve the subject behind the expectations and desires, and it cannot reach the self that is the subject of those desires. Since the capacity for reflection Rawls speaks of is nothing more than weighing the intensity of existing expectations and desires, the deliberation it contains cannot peer into the identity of the agent to ask "Who am I?", but can only enter the perceptual level of the agent to ask "What do i really like?". Because such deliberation is limited to evaluating the moral subject's various desires—and the identity of this moral subject is given in advance and without reflection—this deliberation cannot form the kind of self-understanding in a strong sense that would allow the agent to participate in the constitution of its identity. Sandel further analyzes why Rawls's object of reflection cannot be the being that we are, but can only be the causes of various desires: first, the being that we are is given in advance and does not change through reflection or the actions of the agent; second, because Rawls's self does not carry any constitutive elements, but merely possesses some contingent attributes at a certain distance, there is nothing in this self to be reflected upon or understood.

III. The Constitutive Self

In Sandel's view, the discourse on the subject cannot be merely empirical; to some extent, it constitutes part of who we are. He advocates understanding the self from an intersubjective perspective, emphasizing a constitutive conception of the self.

Unlike the "unencumbered conception of the self" relied upon by Rawls—which views the boundaries of the self as prior and fixed, linking the self to its ends in a voluntaristic sense through the subject—the constitutive conception of the self holds that the self and its identity are, to a large extent, constituted by the society in which it is situated and its ends. The relationships and attachments it finds itself in are not chosen beforehand; rather, they have a constitutive influence on its identity. "We are constituted in part by our central aspirations and attachments, and are always open, subject to modification in the light of revised self-understandings." In the "constitutive conception of the self," it is not the self that is prior to its ends, but rather its ends that are prior to the self; the self acquires its ends not through choice, but through reflection. This "constitutive conception of the self" views the boundaries of the self as open and regards the subject's identity as a product, rather than a prerequisite, of its agency. In summary, the identity of the constitutive self is partially constituted by ends that exist prior to it.

It is evident, then, that Sandel understands the self and the relationship between the self and society from the perspective of intersubjectivity. At the same time, he acknowledges that there is no essential difference between his "constitutive self" and MacIntyre's "narrative self." Both emphasize the influence of prior ends on the identity of the self, and both oppose the "unencumbered self" upon which deontological theory relies. The only difference is that the "constitutive self" places greater emphasis on the status and role of community bonds and attributes in the formation of identity, while the "narrative self" focuses more on the influence of history.

From the perspective of subjective capacities, the "constitutive self" is engaged more in seeking self-understanding than in exercising the will. It does not rely on the capacity for choice; rather, it relies on the capacity for reflection to look back upon itself to explore its constitutive essence and its various attachments. By acknowledging their respective and differing claims, it draws a boundary between the self and others and achieves a self-understanding that partially constitutes the subject’s identity and partially defines who he is. In Sandel's view, the capacity for reflection is the essential capacity of the constitutive self and the fundamental factor distinguishing it from the deontological self—and the reflective capacity possessed by the constitutive self is reflection in its true sense. As mentioned earlier, Sandel argues that because the deontological self has no character at all—unconstrained and essentially shorn of everything—it cannot take itself as an object of reflection. In contrast, the constitutive self regards ends as prior, and its identity is constructed based on these prior ends. Consequently, it can turn its attention inward, making the self an object of reflection, thereby breaking through the two dangers existing in the relationship of possession between the self and its attributes. For when I am able to reflect on my attributes, a certain space is created between them and me, weakening their power; thus, they become more an attribute of mine rather than a constituent of my identity. At the same time, the capacity for reflection establishes a connection between the attributes and the self. Relatedly, the constitutive self does not choose a certain end as the deontological self does, but rather seeks to understand who I am and how I can distinguish myself from various ends.

Sandel also finds certain points of connection within the Chinese Confucian tradition and attempts to integrate the Confucian conception of the self when articulating his constitutive conception: "More than 30 years ago, before I was exposed to Chinese philosophy, I tried to articulate this narrative conception of the self. At that time, my target of opposition was the unencumbered self advocated by Kantian and Rawlsian liberalism. Today, when I look to the East, I see my theory resonating in some ways with the Confucian tradition, even if it differs in others." In Sandel's view, the continuity of identity in our life course does not come from an "essentialist" self—a self that is the core of our existence, whose outlines are fixed and unaffected by the changes of life. Yet, he simultaneously does not believe that a person is merely a "collection" of their various roles and situations. What such a purely collectionist picture lacks is the role of narrativity and reflexivity (including critical reflection). Not only social roles and relationships, but also the interpretations of these roles and relationships, constitute personhood. However, narration and interpretation presuppose a narrator and an interpreter—the storytelling self attempting to understand its own situation—to evaluate and assess the various goals and bonds that make claims upon them. This interpretive act, this understanding, constitutes the moral subject. Therefore, Sandel opposes the peach metaphor mentioned in Henry Rosemont Jr.’s book Against Individualism. He asks in counter-argument: "Who is that (real) person who is assuming the various social roles?" He does not accept the essentialist implication of the peach pit; if our identities are partially constituted by our goals and bonds, then it would be an error to suggest they do not change as life circumstances change. He also opposes using the onion analogy—which views personhood as an onion—to explain the anti-essentialist, role-bearing conception of the person: when we peel away all the roles—son, daughter, husband, wife, parent, grandparent, friend, teacher, neighbor, etc.—nothing is left. To this, he asks: who is peeling the layers one by one? And why peel them? This is important because our identity is constituted by our self-interpretations. Changes in our various roles and relationships do not merely happen to us; they reflect and influence the narrative changes through which we understand our lives.

Clearly, Sandel attempts to combine the tradition of civic republicanism with relevant Confucian concepts to reconstruct the conception of the self in contemporary political philosophical discourse, replacing Rawls’s unencumbered self with a constitutive self. It is thus worth investigating: what is the nature and capacity of Sandel's constitutive self? Is it more reasonable and superior to Rawls's conception of the self?

First, how exactly is the constitutive self constituted?

In Sandel's view, the self is not unencumbered or devoid of any prior ends and conceptions of the good; rather, it is constituted by the ends and conceptions of the good of the community in which it exists. The self cannot be a "bare" self detached from various ends and conceptions of the good, lacking motivation, the capacity for choice, and the capacity for reflection. This is impossible in reality and unconvincing as a theoretical hypothetical. Consequently, the foundation upon which Rawls’s system of justice theory relies is a fallacy, and Rawls’s reliance on intersubjectivity in the original position and behind the veil of ignorance also proves the limitations of his theory of the self. It must be admitted that Sandel's emphasis on the role of communal ends and conceptions of the good in the constitution of the self is persuasive. We cannot imagine ourselves reaching a contract while completely detached from the constraints of family or community ends and bonds; nor can we, when entering the public sphere to discuss various social institutions, completely set aside our private moral and religious beliefs. Although defenders argue that Rawls’s conception of the self is a theoretical abstraction and does not concern people in social reality, such a theoretical hypothesis—which discards the ends, values, and influences of the community—is not necessarily desirable. Furthermore, even retreating to what Rawls calls the political domain, those who deliberate on various public affairs in the public sphere are all living individuals; therefore, even here, one cannot use a theoretical abstraction to refute Sandel’s critique of the Rawlsian self.

However, we must further ask: how do the community’s ends, bonds, and conceptions of the good constitute the self? Or, what weight and proportion do they hold in the constitution of the self? If the self were entirely constituted by these communal values and ends, it would be an indeterminate self that changes along with the community. Such a relativistic self is not the one Sandel recognizes. Thus, Sandel explicitly points out that the self is partially constituted by the community’s ends and conceptions of the good, and the self can participate in the definition of its identity through its capacity for reflection. Yet, if Sandel makes such a concession, then, as Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit point out, he admits that the "subject" can participate in the constitution of its identity—the subject can judge which ends constitute itself and which do not. From this, Sandel’s critics argue that this constitutive self is essentially no different from the Rawlsian self: "Sandel’s claim that 'the self is constituted by its ends' and 'the boundaries of the self are fluid' is fundamentally consistent with Rawls's claim that 'the self is prior to its ends' and 'the boundaries of the self are fixed beforehand.'" Both sides acknowledge that the self is prior to its ends. Their disagreement lies in where the boundaries of the "self" are drawn. This critique of Sandel's conception of the self by Will Kymlicka has been endorsed by many thinkers, including Richard Dagger, Amy Gutmann, and Philip Pettit. "If Sandel concedes that a self constituted by ends can be reorganized, then it is unclear how his view differs from the Rawlsian liberal view." Based on this, these opponents believe that Sandel’s conception of the self is not essentially different from Rawls’s, and that Sandel’s greatest theoretical contribution lies in his emphasis on the role and status of the community.

The author does not agree with these critics. Although on the surface it seems that these two types of self are generated in a similar way—with Rawls merely emphasizing that the self constitutes its identity through choice, while Sandel emphasizes participating in the constitution of identity through reflection—it appears the difference lies only in the application of different subjective capacities, while the essence of the subject remains the same. However, this argument is merely a rebuttal by liberals attempting to deconstruct Sandel's critique of the Rawlsian self; it emphasizes the difference in subjective capacities to mask the difference in the essence of the subject. In fact, even if Sandel and Rawls both admit that the boundaries of the subject are open and that subjective identity can be reconstructed, that does not prove the nature of the subject performing the choice or reflection is homogeneous. On the contrary, precisely because some subjects performing choice or reflection exist prior to various ends, while others are constituted by ends, there will be different results of choice and reflection. Subjective capacity itself is neither homogeneous nor heterogeneous; what plays the decisive role is the nature of the subject itself.

Nevertheless, Sandel indeed cannot explain the extent to which the community’s ends and conceptions of the good constitute the self, nor can he explain how, if a self is defined by the prior ends of the community, one self is distinguished from another self constituted by the same content. Another even more important question, which Sandel himself finds difficult to answer, is: if part of a person's life and part of their self-definition are presupposed by communal values, does this person still possess freedom of will? If a person is free, can they discard those ends or bonds in life that make life more meaningful and intimate? Can they discard the sociality that makes life more meaningful? Some critics even question the possibility of Sandel's constitutive conception of the self. As Kukathas and Pettit argue, the statement "my social background constitutes my identity" seems somewhat exaggerated. I may be consistent with my community, and I may be defined by my status within that community. But this does not mean that my background defines who I am. Sandel has never held that the self is a self without free will; he only opposes the "bare" self devoid of any prior ends and bonds. However, he indeed does not further elucidate how the free will within the self and the imprint assigned to us by the community coexist harmoniously within the same self. Can we be a self with free will while simultaneously being constituted by our nation, race, social customs, or community? In Sandel’s work, the answer is implicitly "yes." This makes it easy for some critics to...

Based on this, some argue that the self in Sandel is essentially the same as the self in Rawls and the liberalism he represents. However, in my view, this surface-level agreement on the answer cannot obscure the divergence in their conceptions of the nature of the subject. In this sense, Sandel’s critique of the Rawlsian conception of the self remains significant; he leads those both outside and within liberalism to recognize the dimension of the community and the influence of the community on the self and the subject.

Second, how exactly does the constitutive self engage in reflection?

In Sandel’s view, an essential difference between the constitutive self and the unencumbered self lies in their disparate capacities for reflection. As previously mentioned, Sandel argues that the unencumbered self cannot truly reflect; it either engages in outward-facing deliberative reasoning regarding various interests and desires, or it takes the self's contingent desires and preferences—rather than the self itself—as the object of reflection. In contrast, the constitutive self is capable of inward-facing attention to itself, making the self the object of reflection; that is, it perceives the subject itself through reflection and reconstructs the subject’s identity. However, in my view, what Sandel regards as a fundamental difference is not actually so. Since the constitutive self is partially constituted by the values and ends of the community to which it belongs, and these ends are prior to the self—and since Sandel further opposes the kind of reflection that peels the subject away from its ends—it is difficult for us to imagine that this self, which partially carries the ends and attributes of the community, could engage in the kind of thorough reflection originally envisioned. As Jack Crittenden pointed out: "If, as Sandel says, the self is inseparable from its ends and those things associated with them, then how or to what extent is the self an 'independent self'? And who is doing the reflecting? How does the self choose?"

If the self, as Sandel believes, can look inward to perceive the subject’s interior and accordingly reflect upon and filter its various ends and attributes to reconstruct the subject’s identity, then the distance required at that moment is precisely what Sandel criticized in the Rawlsian self. From another level, if the self can discriminate between its own various ends and attributes and can reconstruct the subject’s identity, then to what extent can we believe that these communal ends and concepts are indispensable to the subject’s identity? Does the filtering performed by the subject after reflecting on various ends and attributes happen to weed out those ends and attributes that possess the essential characteristics of the community? If such a possibility exists, can the self reconstructed after such reflection still be regarded as a "constitutive self" formed by the community’s ends, attributes, and conceptions of the good? Meanwhile, does Sandel’s constitutive self possess the qualities and capacities he expects? As Jack Crittenden questioned, does this constitutive self possess the reflective capacity Sandel emphasizes? "How does the self discover? How do I know that these possible ends constitute me, rather than those ends?" If, as Sandel says, the self is inseparable from its ends and those things associated with them, then how or to what extent is the self an "independent self"? And who is doing the reflecting? How does the self choose? Therefore, he argues that Sandel faces a dilemma: if the self is within the framework of the community and its ends, then the self cannot reflect upon this framework and these ends; if the self can reflect upon these ends, then these ends cannot constitute the self.

Evidently, Sandel’s advocated conception of the constitutive self has met with criticism and questioning regarding both the nature and the capacity of the subject. The reflective capacity of this constitutive self cannot reflect or exercise its power in the way Sandel desires, and thus it does not fundamentally solve the problems existing in the reflective capacity of the "unencumbered self." Consequently, it can be said that his critique of the Rawlsian conception of the self on this issue is unsuccessful.

Conclusion

In many respects, Sandel’s critique of the Rawlsian conception of the self is not thorough, and his reconstructed constitutive self may also be unsuccessful. Nevertheless, this effort of his still possesses extremely important significance for political philosophy. It not only leads people to re-examine the relationship between the individual and the community but also laid the theoretical foundation for Sandel’s later revival of civic republicanism and the proposal of other political-philosophical ideas.

First, Sandel’s definition of the conception of the self forces a reconsideration of the community and its values. Rawls and his principles of justice were faced with an era characterized by an emphasis on individualism, where individual values and individual uniqueness were highly exalted, while the value and role of the community in which the individual resided were neglected, devalued, or even treated with hostility. Sandel’s critique highlights the value of the community and its constitutive significance for the self—a point already discussed by many contemporary political philosophers, which I will not elaborate on here. However, it must be specifically pointed out that Sandel’s emphasis on community is not an advocacy for "communitarianism" ^[17]; the latter is a label imposed on Sandel by liberals out of misunderstanding or intentional distortion, intended to mock him as a "majoritarian" whose views might lead to the tyranny of the majority while ignoring or even infringing upon individual rights. In fact, Sandel himself noticed that communitarianism might possess such dangers; therefore, the communal values and concepts he emphasizes are not simply whatever values happen to be popular in a community, and the public good he seeks to promote is not the desires of the majority, but a public good formed through reflection. His emphasis on the relationship between the community and the self is intended to let people set aside the established influence of individualism on us, to re-examine and understand the self, and to rethink the foundational significance of the community for virtues ^[18] such as solidarity, loyalty, and patriotism. Without the community, these important virtues lose their theoretical cornerstone and realistic support.

Second, the constitutive self is a necessary condition for the formation of the public good and the foundation for realizing civic republicanism. The civic republican tradition emphasizes the public good and focuses on civic virtue; it holds that participation in public affairs is vital for citizens. Indeed, in the view of those who advocate a strong version of civic republicanism, public participation possesses essential value for citizens. These core elements of civic republicanism are inseparable from the conception of the self. Only when we view ourselves as "constitutive selves"—as "storytelling beings" linked with others—can we rely on shared values to form a public good. Only when citizens recognize their connection to the community and the tight relationship between their own rights and interests and the public good will they strive to promote and realize the public good. Guided by the public good, citizens can better recognize their bonded relationship with the republic, more fully appreciate the importance of citizenship, and care more for the republic. Active citizenship promotes social practice and encourages citizens to cultivate civic virtue, requiring that people's actions promote the public good and that they consciously place the public good above personal interests in their manner of conduct. Civic virtue also helps citizens better discuss the nature of justice and the good life, better reflect on basic social institutions, and promote and realize the public good to the greatest extent possible, thereby avoiding coercion and the "tyranny of the majority over the minority." It is clear that Sandel’s critique of the Rawlsian self was not a theoretical end point; his advocated constitutive self-conception was the starting point for his advocacy of reviving civic republicanism. This conception of the self and the relationship between self and community it represents is also reflected in his later critiques regarding market societies and meritocracy.

Finally, Sandel’s constitutive self—especially his reconstruction of the self in recent years by incorporating Confucian thought—merits our reconsideration of some traditional Confucian ideas regarding the self and society, and the self and the state. Based on the model of the "isomorphism of family and state" ^[19], the understanding and discussion of the self in China's traditional society were closely related to society and the state; even the realization of individual value and the completion of the "ideal personality" relied on society and the state. The individual was never isolated, nor was there the division between private and public spheres or between personal and public virtue advocated by contemporary liberals. Therefore, when we face these dichotomies and difficult problems in the field of contemporary political philosophy, we might do well to draw on Sandel’s approach and recognize that the problems and debates emerging in contemporary Western social and political philosophy are not universal, nor do they have once-and-for-all answers. The problems and solutions for every society and every community are different; we must look deeply into the actual conditions of the society we inhabit and, by integrating traditional Chinese classical thought, find the problems and solutions that truly belong to us.