Li Yitian: The Epochal Benchmark of Marxist Ethics
Marxist ethics is a grand theoretical undertaking. This is true not only because Marxism itself focuses on the historical structures and general laws of human society—ensuring that ethical research conducted from a Marxist standpoint, with its particular perspectives and methods, often possesses a similarly grand vision and character—but also because, throughout its nearly two-hundred-year development, the global dissemination of Marxism has exhibited immense richness and complexity. This has led to numerous transformations within Marxist ethics, manifesting in diverse forms. When Marxism is not confined to the speculative musings of the study but is instead integrated with actual revolutionary activity and social construction, Marxist ethics breaks through the form of pure theoretical knowledge to manifest as a more pragmatic and pluralistic practical conception.
"Large Scales" and "Large Scopes"
Strictly speaking, Marx and Engels did not write specialized treatises on ethics. In discussions of Marxist ethics, the works most frequently excerpted or cited—the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, the Grundrisse (1857–1858), and the Critique of the Gotha Programme—were all manuscript works that were either unpublished or never saw the light of day during Marx’s lifetime. While Engels’s Anti-Dühring can be regarded as the most concentrated expression of his ethical thought, the content pertaining to this field occupies only three sections; furthermore, it takes the form of a rebuttal which, along with other content (natural philosophy, dialectics, etc.), was intended to constitute a counter-argument to the entirety of Eugen Dühring's [1] philosophy. As for the moral discourses scattered throughout works such as The German Ideology, The Communist Manifesto, and Capital, these often provoke more controversy due to the constraints of their primary writing objectives or linguistic contexts.
Whether Marxist ethics possesses epistemological legitimacy is, in fact, related to whether the classical Marxist authors systematically discussed and reflected upon moral phenomena or problems, and whether Marxist theory contains or points toward ethical normativity. Even if we limit ourselves to the discourses of Marx and Engels themselves, we can still argue and establish that they meet these two criteria, thereby acknowledging the existence of a strict or narrow sense of Marxist ethics. Moreover, if we further fix our gaze upon a broader theoretical horizon and practical standards, then the existence of Marxist ethics becomes even more tied to whether moral problems exist in real life and whether Marxists intend to apply Marxist theory to address them. Therefore, what truly determines the existence of Marxist ethics is never the "small standard" of whether specialized ethical works were written, but the "large scale" of whether it responds to real-world ethical problems.
Admittedly, the moral discourses of Marx and Engels constitute the core of Marxist ethics. However, due to the derivative and expansive nature of theoretical development itself, the strong emphasis on practice and class in Marxism predestined its intervention in the empirical processes of proletarian revolution and socialist construction. Marxists facing practical problems in these revolutionary and constructive activities always proposed different ethical understandings or programs as historical tasks and social contexts shifted. Among these programs, some might particularly emphasize the autonomy and independent function of morality; others might primarily value the dependence and ideological nature of morality; while still others might hold a changing view of the nature and role of morality at different stages of revolution and construction. From the perspective of the overall historical process, the positions behind these programs are not necessarily entirely accurate, yet they collectively constitute the specific links in the history of Marxist development.
"Grand Ethics" and "Grand Theory"
On the basis of scientifically revealing the fundamental contradictions and laws of human society, Marxism proves the inevitability of the demise of capitalism and the realization of communism. Although this factual demonstration logically requires no moral argument as a supplement or support, it does not logically dissolve the existential space or validity of moral argumentation. Therefore, on a normative level, the critique of capitalist failure and the justification of socialist success do not exceed the rational scope of this theory.
From the texts of the classical authors, we can reasonably derive three "theses"—freedom, equality, and association—and three "antitheses"—alienation, exploitation, and division. In capitalist society, alienation occurs because workers lose control over the labor process and mastery over the fruits of their labor. Thus, behind alienation lies exploitation. Exploitation implies both inequality of personhood and inequality of distribution. The root of exploitation, in turn, lies in the unequal [2] ownership of the means of production. This unequal relationship of ownership does not bring about the "distinction" of individuals, but the "division" of classes. Consequently and correspondingly, the elimination of alienation is for the return of individual freedom; the elimination of exploitation is for the attainment of individual equality; and the elimination of division is for the ultimate realization of association among free and equal individuals. It can be said that the theses and antitheses of Marxist ethics contain a clear moral orientation. However, a complete grasp of them requires us to transcend the boundaries of ethics and obtain normative explanations compatible with empirical evidence within the broader scope of economics, sociology, and anthropology.
The justification of moral propositions must be grounded in normativity. However, the scope of normativity is far larger than the field of morality. Since the primary work of Marx and Engels did not revolve around moral problems, their normativity actually involves certain ethical categories that are related to morality but possess broader meanings—for instance, value and humanity. In Marxist theory, "value" is first an ontological or economic concept, reflecting the relationship between humans and objects or humans and "others" regarding needs and their satisfaction. Marxist ethics, while sharing this premise, further distinguishes between moral and non-moral value. Within Marxist ethics, whether concepts like "justice," "community," and "self-actualization" belong to moral or non-moral value remains a subject requiring proof. In this sense, Marxist ethics cannot remain at the level of moral propositions themselves but must move toward a larger set of problems.
The normativity of Marxist ethics both penetrates the philosophical foundations of ethics and expands into the periphery of the field. Issues such as the state and power, market and labor, and religion and faith also enter the vision of Marxist ethics because they involve the aforementioned theses or antitheses across different dimensions. For Marxist ethics, on the one hand, it is necessary to critique and deconstruct the historical essence and ideological nature of these human activities according to the basic principles of historical materialism; on the other hand, it remains necessary to interpret and construct their normative functions and principles (especially under socialist conditions) based on realistic considerations and judgments. Therefore, Marxist ethical theory naturally intersects and merges with political, economic, and religious theory, thereby presenting the structural pattern of "Grand Theory."
"Grand History" and "Grand Practice"
As a research program proceeding from practice and problems, Marxist ethics cannot be confined to speculative games of concepts like good and evil, nor need it be restricted to an artificially demarcated moral domain. This is because what truly grants Marxist ethics its greater theoretical advantage is its high degree of concern for actual human history and practice.
The study of Marxist ethics must take historical materialism as its premise. Historical materialism provides us with a "long-duration" [3] (longe durée) picture that explains and permeates the whole of human history. Far from becoming narrow by adhering to historical materialism, Marxist ethics gains a deeper recognition of moral phenomena and propositions by introducing this "long-duration" perspective. Not only this, but the genealogy of knowledge within Marxist ethics itself will present rich forms and styles when placed against this "long-duration" historical background. Researchers of Marxist ethics must answer: what are the primary characteristics of the major propositions, events, and changes involved in Marxist ethics in the global historical process of the past two centuries? What are their mutual connections, the reasons behind them, their internal laws, and their future trends? Therefore, under the vision of "Grand History," Marxist ethics needs to explore moral theories consistent with the science of history, and even more so, the "changes from ancient to modern" [4] within Marxist ethics itself.
Admittedly, history is "grand" because of its great distance in time, but it is also grand because of its depth. "Grand History" is not only a temporal concept concerning the long duration, but also a practical concept that situates the present within that long duration. Standing at specific moments in history, grasping the trends of the times, and fulfilling the missions and tasks of this historical junction through "great practice"—these are likewise internal requirements posed by the scientific and practical nature of Marxist ethics. Incorporating the social phenomena occurring in the process of "Grand Practice" into research objectives will further assist in the construction and refinement of the knowledge system of Marxist ethics.