Wu Huiping: The Fragmentation and Transformation of Radical Left Parties in Europe: The Case of Germany
As a representative of the European radical left, the Die Linke (The Left party) in Germany adheres to the fundamental values of democratic socialism. Emerging from the successor party to East Germany’s ruling party—the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)—and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the oldest extant party in Germany, its developmental trajectory epitomizes the fragmentation, adjustment, and transformation of the European left-wing camp. In January 2024, Die Linke underwent a split. Sahra Wagenknecht, chair of the party’s parliamentary group, left the party to establish the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht – Vernunft und Gerechtigkeit (BSW, Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance – Reason and Justice), hereafter referred to as the "Wagenknecht Alliance." Compared to Die Linke, the new party’s programmatic line has undergone a major shift. The split and metamorphosis of Die Linke reflect a new round of party innovation by the European radical left under the pressure of political reality, serving as an excellent case study for observing and researching the theoretical and practical development of the 21st-century European radical left camp.
I. Presentation of the Issue
(1) Origins of the German Left Party The formal establishment of Die Linke occurred relatively recently, through the merger of two left-wing parties in June 2007: the PDS and the Electoral Alternative for Labour and Social Justice (WASG). In the early years of German reunification, the PDS, as the successor to the East German ruling party, carried a heavy historical burden and functioned primarily as a "protest party" on the left fringe of the political spectrum, seeking support from social groups dissatisfied with political and social realities; mainstream parties often avoided cooperation with it. The other formative source of the Left Party, the WASG, emerged from the SPD. It was founded by high-level members of the SPD’s left wing who left the party and combined forces with trade unions in opposition to the social welfare and labor market reforms [1] led by then-SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. After the 2007 restructuring, the Left Party's activities and influence expanded across all of Germany; it began to consistently enter the Bundestag and gradually established a foothold in the party system. Due to its unique historical origins, the party’s development across the federal states is extremely unbalanced. Relying largely on the differences in the political ecosystem [N] between the East and West following reunification, it cultivated deep roots in the five Eastern federal states and East Berlin, showing great potential to become a "catch-all party" (Volkspartei) in the East. It has consistently entered Eastern state parliaments and governed multiple times in the East and Berlin, even leading the state government in Thuringia from 2014 to 2024. However, since 2015, the Left Party has gradually fallen into crisis under internal and external pressures, suffering frequent defeats in various elections. Its national polling support has long hovered near the 5% threshold required to enter federal and state parliaments. Meanwhile, the party’s membership has shrunk significantly; while the PDS had 280,000 members upon its founding in 1990, the Left Party's membership dropped to 50,000 by the end of 2023. (1)
(2) Internal Factional Struggles Factional splits are deeply rooted within the Left Party. The PDS in the East historically saw conflict between "reformers" and "orthodox" elements, while the WASG in the West was itself a product of the SPD’s party split. The Left Party is a patchwork of various social milieus, ideologies, economic and social traditions, and political interests, divided internally into two major camps: conservatives and pragmatic reformers. The conservatives, mainly from the West, believe that Marxist thought still holds practical relevance; they demand a change to the existing system to achieve a fundamental transformation of the economy and society, and they oppose the participation of the Federal Defense Forces (Bundeswehr) in overseas operations on matters of foreign security. The pragmatic reformers, mainly from the East, hold a more pragmatic stance; they strive to participate in governance at the federal level and enhance their capacity for political alliance-building, and they support UN peacekeeping operations. This camp division also led the Left Party to adopt a dual-chairmanship model since its founding to reflect the balance between East and West, and between pragmatists and conservatives.
In addition, several factions belonging to these two camps exist within the Left Party, including the Socialist Left (Sozialistische Linke), the Anti-Capitalist Left (Antikapitalistische Linke), the Communist Platform (Kommunistische Plattform), Marx21, the Reform Left Network (Netzwerk Reformlinke), the Forum for Democratic Socialism (Forum Demokratischer Sozialismus), and the Left Emancipatory (Emanzipatorische Linke). Among them, the Socialist Left brings together Trotskyist and pro-union forces within the party, while the Anti-Capitalist Left advocates for breaking the capitalist ownership structure; these two conservative forces view themselves as "orthodox" and engaged in fierce competition for programmatic dominance and gained power within the party as early as the PDS era. (2) The Communist Platform follows Marxist-Leninist traditions and is the largest faction in the party; Marx21 is the German branch of the International Socialist Tendency (IST), a Trotskyist organization seeking to establish a communist social order. These conservative left-wing factions possess distinct anti-establishment characteristics and are openly listed as subjects of surveillance by the German constitutional protection agencies [2]. (3) Conversely, the Forum for Democratic Socialism advocates for thorough debate on the programmatic line and party innovation tailored to political and social realities. While these internal factions are relatively small—ranging from 300 to 1,200 members—they continuously compete for power resources, programmatic dominance, and policy lines within the party. (4) Their members include high-ranking politicians: Janine Wissler, one of the former co-chairs, was an active member of the Socialist Left and Marx21, while Wagenknecht was once a member of the Communist Platform.
(3) Party Split The existence of two major camps and several factions within the Left Party created practical problems, making it difficult for the party to form a shared identity and cohesion. This led to constant high-level personnel disputes, and core political decisions and major directional issues remained unclearly positioned due to internal line struggles, resulting in the accumulation and eventual eruption of internal contradictions. In an effort to escape the predicament of party infighting, Sahra Wagenknecht—the party’s most publicly influential politician—launched the collective movement "Aufstehen" (Stand Up) in September 2018 along with former party chair Oskar Lafontaine. They hoped to use a mobilization method combining a political party with a social movement to energize those uninterested in existing politics, initiate public discussions on social issues of common left-wing concern, and form local action groups to conduct joint operations on the daily concerns of residents. However, the movement’s organizational form was loose, and its social resonance was minimal, gaining support only from several prominent cultural figures; it failed to effectively integrate left-wing political forces or push the Left Party out of its marginal status.
Against the backdrop of the 2024 European Parliament elections, Wagenknecht established a new party named after herself, highlighting the personalized nature of its leadership. Moving from radicalism toward conservatism, she proposed a unique programmatic stance. Currently, the Wagenknecht Alliance has already made a showing in elections, demonstrating certain developmental potential. While its party structure is still being established, the party focuses on maintaining a streamlined structure, upholding internal party unity, and strictly controlling the size of its membership. Does the establishment of the Wagenknecht Alliance threaten the survival of the Left Party? Can the new party overcome the Left Party’s limitations through its unique programmatic stance and develop into a lasting political force? Is there a "conservative turn" in the European radical left? Clarifying the programmatic evolution and political performance of the German radical left from the Left Party to the Wagenknecht Alliance is of value for analyzing the ideological shifts, latest practices in party innovation, and future developmental directions of the European radical left.
II. The Programmatic Tradition of the German Left Party
In the spectrum of German political parties, organizations like the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany (MLPD), and the Socialist Equality Party (SGP) explicitly advocate for the subversion of the basic capitalist system and are typically defined as left-wing extremist parties. In contrast, the Left Party, as the most left-wing established party in the Bundestag, ideologically adheres to democratic socialism and is generally categorized by scholars as belonging to the radical left or categorized as a left-wing populist party. (5)
(1) Democratic Socialism As a branch of socialist ideology and a sect of the labor movement, democratic socialism originated during the split of the European labor movement in the early 1920s, exerting a long-term and profound influence on labor movements and various left-wing parties worldwide. Germany is a country that has made significant contributions to the theory and practice of democratic socialism. Democratic socialism resolutely opposes the dictatorship of the proletariat, the nationalization of the means of production, and the planned economy represented by Bolshevism; its concepts emerged through the process of distinguishing itself from the latter, and social democrats in different countries have interpreted it differently. Eduard Bernstein advocated for achieving socialist goals through gradual, peaceful political and social reforms rather than violent revolution, championing the combination of democracy, freedom, and social justice, seeking a balance between social equality and economic efficiency, and emphasizing the importance of ethical orientation and ideological-cultural factors. (6) Willy Brandt, who served as SPD chairman and German Chancellor, always emphasized the programmatic value of democratic socialism. He believed it was not a dogmatic catalog of measures for achieving a preset goal, but rather defined the basic "direction of movement" for social democratic politics—a realist reform strategy based on democratic value orientations aimed at making "individual rights and political freedoms a social reality." (7) Political scientist Thomas Meyer argues that democratic socialism, through the reinterpretation of the SPD’s Godesberg Program [3], has become the political-ideological foundation for international social democrats. As a reform party, the SPD's political strategy lies in realizing the fundamental values of democratic socialism—a persistent task and long-term process whose current important mission is to critique the failures of neoliberalism and implement the basic values of freedom and equality. (8)
Yin Xuyi [4] argues that the concept of democratic socialism is open-ended, so interpretations of it do not seek uniformity. Nevertheless, several connotations of the concept are generally recognized: first, the realization of de-Marxization and ideological pluralism; second, the assertion that socialism is the realization of certain ethical values; third, the continued advocacy for achieving socialism through reform within the framework of a parliamentary democratic republic, while fully acknowledging the "rules of the game" of existing power structures; and fourth, no longer insisting that public ownership is the primary hallmark of the socialist economic base. Overall, democratic socialism seeks to realize fundamental socialist values such as freedom, justice, and solidarity through reform and democratization. (10) It emphasizes that democratic socialism is a long-term transformation process, rejects the path of radical change through violent revolution, and advocates for reforming existing political structures within a pluralistic and democratic framework to improve the social and economic conditions of the people and achieve socialism through concrete, gradual social reforms. These basic assumptions are still reflected in the SPD’s Hamburg Program.
In its various programmatic adjustments, the SPD has simultaneously used the political concepts of "democratic socialism" and "social democracy." For example, the 2007 Hamburg Program both highlights the vision of democratic socialism and emphasizes the principles of action of social democracy; currently, social democracy is gradually replacing democratic socialism. (11) Regarding these two similar concepts, Yin Xuyi believes that although the predecessor of democratic socialism was social democracy, historical social democracy—whether interpreted from a revolutionary or reformist perspective—always advocated for socialism as a new system should replace capitalism. In literature regarding the contemporary socialist movement, the term "social democracy" has been gradually replaced by "democratic socialism." The latter still seeks to replace capitalism with socialism and advocates for achieving socialism through reform within the framework of a parliamentary democratic republic, viewing socialism as a long-term, persistent task. It must be clarified that not only is the social democracy currently advocated by the SPD no longer the original social democracy but rather a "social democracy" (gesellschaftliche Demokratie), but those who advocate for retaining the concept of democratic socialism also no longer pursue the institutional replacement of capitalism with socialism. (12) Jia Zhonghai and Li Juan point out more sharply that the essence of democratic socialism is a form of reformist capitalism—a type of reformism that opposes scientific socialism. (13)
(2) Programmatic Content of the Left Party [To be continued]
Democratic socialist thought, as the theoretical system embraced by social democratic parties across Western Europe, has likewise exerted a lasting influence on the theoretical development of the Left Party (Die Linke), consistently occupying a central position in its party program. Coffey and Plasser compared the programs of the party’s two founding sources and argued that the core connotation of the Left Party’s political program is not a balanced compromise between the two, but is closer to the PDS—that is, a continuation of democratic socialist thought. [18] Since its adoption at the Erfurt Party Congress in October 2011, the Left Party's program has remained in effect, explicitly positioning the party as a "socialist party." [19] It follows the tradition of social transformation, viewing democratic socialism as the ideal economic and social system, guiding ideology, and ultimate goal. The program contains extensive critiques of capitalism and the social market economy, employing common terminology of Marxist thought. It points out that Germany is a class society and attacks the capitalist system for being based on exploitation, competition, and profit—identifying it as the primary culprit behind social unrest, destructive competition, and militarization, undermining democracy through economic power and causing a crisis of human civilization.
On the basis of this critique of capitalism, the Erfurt Program endows the concept and value pursuits of democratic socialism with contemporary ideological content. It proposes a political program for building "21st-century democratic socialism," calling for step-by-step political, economic, and social reforms to change the fundamental direction of development. These include halting privatization policies and thoroughly transforming capitalist forms of ownership, economic models, and democratic systems. Guided by democratic socialism, the program seeks to achieve a process of radical economic and social transformation, replacing the dominance of capital with democratic, social, and ecological forces, altering capitalist modes of production, lifestyle, and wealth distribution to achieve distributive justice. The tone of these political positions is anti-capitalist and more radical than the expressions found in the PDS's Chemnitz Program. This reflects how, through the debates of the Erfurt Congress, the party maintained its traditional ideology on fundamental issues such as ownership, power, and redistribution. [20]
It should be noted that the anti-establishment expressions in the Left Party’s various programmatic documents are relatively moderate. The message conveyed to the outside world is complex and contradictory, indicating an anti-capitalist stance while not aiming to overthrow the capitalist system itself. Although the party program follows the leftist positions of the socialist, social democratic, and communist labor movements—invoking the vision of human society described in the Communist Manifesto and maintaining a critical stance against capitalism and neoliberalism—it avoids mentioning Marxism or the subversion of the fundamental capitalist system. Instead, it essentially accepts the democratic order. Its attitude toward the market economy has also softened, focusing more on preserving the core features of social fairness and proposing a democratic socialist policy program centered on reforming capitalist society. Political scientist Luke March argues that after decades of development, the Left Party has undergone multiple strategic adjustments between pragmatism and traditional identity, ideology and de-ideologization, and radicalism and moderation. It has gradually transformed from an anti-establishment, anti-capitalist populist force in the East into a moderate party of political pragmatism, seeking to govern within the framework of the existing basic order. [21] Political scientist Matthias Micus similarly believes the party is pragmatic, with an interest in taking office that outweighs any desire to subvert the system. [22]
3. Policy Demands of the Left Party
The Erfurt Program proposes an implementation path for an alternative to capitalism. Based on fundamental political values such as freedom, equality, peace, solidarity, and social and ecological sustainability, it advocates for a "socio-ecological" transformation of the crisis-ridden capitalist economic and social order. On one hand, it promotes social welfare transformation, guaranteeing individual freedom and personal development through equal participation and building a peaceful, solidary, fair, and inclusive society to repair the damage wrought by capitalist modes of production and life upon laborers. On the other hand, it advances ecological transformation, changing the economic development model focused on profit and growth to realize values of ecological sustainability, thereby repairing the damage inflicted by capitalist modes of production and life upon natural resources. In the ecological dimension specifically, the Left Party champions concepts such as eco-socialism and green socialism. Mario Candeias argues that while the concept of eco-socialism was proposed during the heyday of neoliberalism and failed to gain influence, the concept of green socialism appeared later. It emerged against the backdrop of widespread attention to ecological issues and the setbacks of neoliberalism, functioning as a counter-proposal to new concepts like "green capitalism" and "green economics," aiming to endow traditional leftist programmatic issues—such as redistribution, planning, democracy, and ownership—with new contemporary significance. [23]
Guided by democratic socialist thought, the Left Party has proposed numerous radical reform plans in specific policy areas. In the realm of ownership, it calls for various nationalization policies. For example, the Left Party in Brandenburg demands the nationalization of private railways, public transport, telecommunications, hospitals, and real estate companies; the Berlin Left Party supports the citizens' initiative to bring real estate companies into public ownership and advocates for referendums to decide on nationalization. [24] In the realm of democracy, it advocates for the democratization of society, demanding increased power for parliaments at all levels and forms of direct democracy, creating more opportunities for joint labor-management decision-making, and calling for strengthened democratic supervision of the financial sector to limit the power of banks and large corporations. Regarding taxation, it advocates for a wealth tax and inheritance tax on the rich. In the social sphere, it demands guarantees for social fairness, labor rights, and jobs, a reduction in weekly working hours, the introduction of a minimum wage system, and the realization of minimum social standards across Europe. In housing, it advocates for the expansion of subsidized housing for low-income groups. In the environmental field, it promotes an ecological transition, advocating for changes to the energy system and the socio-ecological transformation of sectors including energy, agriculture, and transportation, alongside the development of regional circular economies. In foreign and security policy, it advocates for large-scale debt relief for underdeveloped countries and increased development aid, opposes increases in defense spending and arms exports, opposes military means for resolving international conflicts, and demands the dissolution of NATO, to be replaced by a collective security system involving Russia. In its 2021 federal election manifesto, the Left Party proposed numerous leftist reform plans in the areas of environment, energy, transport, education, and taxation—for instance, demanding the addition of 250,000 units of social housing annually, the full replacement of fossil fuels with renewable energy by 2035, and further increases in income tax rates for high earners and the wealth tax. [25]
III. Programmatic Transformation Following the Radical Left Split
1. Programmatic Features of the BSW
The split of the radical left has brought about a major shift in programmatic direction. The BSW was founded recently, and its official documents published to date include the Founding Manifesto, the Party Program, and the 2024 European Election Manifesto. Through these brief official documents, as well as Sahra Wagenknecht's personal writings and interviews, one can gain a preliminary insight into the basic ideology and programmatic positioning of this emerging party. CDU Chairman Friedrich Merz described the BSW as a "mixture of socialism and nationalism," [26] but in fact, the party no longer emphasizes the ideology of democratic socialism in its official documents. The terms "socialism," "class struggle," and "Marxism" are not mentioned in the party program, nor does it provide a concentrated exposition of views on fundamental issues such as ownership, capital, or growth; it no longer maintains the Left Party's anti-capitalist stance or critique of capitalism. In the introduction to its party program, the party states that its purpose is a return to "political reason," and that Germany needs a strong and innovative economy, social justice, peace, fair trade, and respect for the personal freedom of citizens. This content is first and foremost a reckoning with current elite politics, directing its critical spearhead at social injustice, lagging public infrastructure, an irrational education system, declining economic competitiveness, and various other irrational phenomena—especially the flaws in political decision-making. The program frequently mentions "ordinary people," juxtaposing them against political and business elites as well as US-led large corporate groups. It conveys anti-elite and anti-establishment signals, highlighting the party’s primary positioning as a populist force. Scholars generally currently identify the party as a populist party with a clear anti-establishment orientation. [27]
The populist attributes of the BSW explain to some extent why the party lacks a clear ideology. Populism researcher Cas Mudde argues that populism is a "thin-centered ideology," not a coherent system of doctrine. In practice, it often attaches itself like a chameleon to existing ideologies, such as nationalism, using different ideological recipes according to the country, political culture, and historical situation. This flexibility is one reason for the success of populism. [28] The BSW is precisely such a populist party with a "thin-centered ideology." At the same time, its programmatic line exhibits unique attributes. In party studies, scholars increasingly describe the political positions of parties and voters along two dimensions: the socio-economic dimension, which examines views on the welfare state, redistribution, and state intervention in the economy; and the socio-cultural dimension, which examines views on cultural identity, liberal versus egalitarian lifestyles, nationalism, and ecology. [29] On this basis, a new set of social cleavage standards has been established, distinct from the traditional Left-Right divide: progressive versus conservative, green-liberal versus conservative-authoritarian, and open versus demarcation. The BSW is difficult to categorize simply; many scholars characterize it as a "left-conservative" party—that is, radical on the socio-economic dimension but very conservative on the socio-cultural dimension.
Figure 1 (omitted) illustrates the BSW's approximate positioning within the current German party system. According to Tomeczek’s comparative study of the issue compatibility of 34 German parties participating in the 2024 European Parliament elections, the political positions and policy demands represented by the BSW are quite complex. On issues such as immigration and asylum, its political compatibility with the Union (CDU/CSU) and the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)—right-wing and even right-wing populist parties—is far higher than with the Left Party. However, on the issue of the EU political system, its compatibility with the Left Party is high, as both oppose the expansion of EU power and membership. Regarding environmental and climate issues, it clearly opposes the radical demands of the Left Party and is closer to the Union. In other words, the party is not a typical radical left party; it is more like a hybrid of the Left Party's socio-economic stance and the Union's socio-cultural stance. While culturally conservative, it emphasizes state intervention and redistribution. These claims may appear contradictory and do not fit into existing political spectrums, yet they offer a combination of positions not previously represented by other parties, potentially filling a certain representational vacuum and occupying a unique position in elections. [30]
2. Policy Demands of the BSW
The BSW’s program focuses on the basic categories of economic reason, social justice, peace, and freedom. In economic policy, the party demands large-scale investment in public infrastructure and the education system, emphasizing the importance of economic strength and an innovative economy. It criticizes the influence of large corporations, financial groups, and digital monopolies, calling for Germany and Europe to formulate active economic policies to protect domestic enterprises from the squeeze of large US and British tech and financial firms. In social policy, it emphasizes building a social welfare state, ensuring social security, raising the minimum wage, and strengthening the tradition of collective bargaining. It advocates for equal opportunities for children and demands an end to privatization in basic public services such as health, nursing, and housing, and the construction of a fair tax system that reduces the burden on low-income groups while increasing taxes on high earners and large corporations. On environmental and climate policy, it acknowledges that climate change and environmental destruction are global challenges but argues that Germany's energy supply cannot be guaranteed by renewable energy alone. It criticizes the government's decision to abandon cheap Russian energy supplies and advocates for a pragmatic approach: formulating innovative climate and environmental policies and developing key innovations for climate neutrality. However, unlike the Left Party, it supports promotion policies and competition policies for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), calling for the creation of a level playing field and advocating for performance incentives and responsibility.
Regarding foreign and security policy, the party largely continues the Left Party's anti-war stance, opposing military solutions to conflicts and the expansion of nuclear weapons while demanding an end to arms exports. It supports the Bundeswehr (Federal Defense Forces) in fulfilling a national defense function and expanding armaments, but opposes deploying German soldiers overseas. It maintains that EU economic sanctions against Russia harm Germany’s own economy and competitiveness, opposes new bloc confrontations and excessive sanctions, and advocates for the resumption of oil and gas supplies from Russia. It calls for ending the Russia-Ukraine conflict through negotiations, opposes providing weapons and deploying long-range missiles to Ukraine, and objects to EU accession negotiations with countries like Ukraine and Moldova. Furthermore, it advocates for the construction of a "Europe of Sovereign States," opposing the excessive centralization and over-regulation of the EU, and demands that the EU maintain a consensus-based voting mechanism for foreign and security policy. It calls for an external economic policy that develops stable commercial relations with as many partner countries as possible to guarantee the supply of raw materials and energy.
In terms of immigration policy, however, the party’s platform deviates significantly from the basic stance of the Left Party. It advocates for the preservation of national cultural identity and argues that the scale of immigration should not exceed the capacity of German society and public infrastructure. It calls for intensified crackdowns on human traffickers, the termination of guest-worker recruitment agreements with "Global South" countries, and an end to disordered migration from other countries into the EU. Simultaneously, it emphasizes the importance of governance at the source, arguing that immigration is not the solution to world poverty and advocating for reducing the desire to emigrate by improving development prospects in the countries of origin. These political demands clearly absorb the conservative positions of right-wing populism.
(3) Differences Between the New and Old Parties
Both the old and new parties can be categorized as left-wing populist parties. Overall, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) follows the traditional positions of the Left Party in the fields of economic and social policy, adhering to left-wing demands such as large-scale investment in basic public services, expansion of the welfare state, job security, wage increases, expansion of local public transport, nationalization of energy networks, higher taxes on the wealthy, and curtailing the power of banks and large corporations. In the fields of foreign, military, and security policy, both parties intend to project the image of thoroughgoing pacifists; their policies toward Russia and Europe differ from most other parties, though the Left Party’s positions are more radical. However, unlike the radical-left attribute of the Left Party, the BSW’s programmatic stance does not follow the traditional paradigm of "either left or right." Instead, it exhibits a so-called "left-wing conservatism"—maintaining a radical-left position on socio-economic policy while absorbing right-wing conservative ideas regarding immigration. In this regard, Wagenknecht herself has repeatedly emphasized that the new party is not "Left Party 2.0." [11] The primary differences between the two parties exist in the following areas:
On the issue of systemic critique, the Left Party maintains an anti-capitalist stance, whereas the BSW avoids direct critiques of capitalism. In its Erfurt Program, the Left Party proposed an alternative to capitalism, a move closely linked to the background of the capitalist crisis during the program’s drafting. The international financial and economic crises exposed the institutional flaws of the capitalist economy and society; neoliberalism was mired in a systemic predicament, bringing about the worsening of wealth inequality and the serious consequences of market and democratic failure. It was against this backdrop that the Left Party put forward its anti-capitalist stance, dedicating a large portion of its party program to criticizing the symptoms of capitalism’s systemic crisis and offering a plan for the transformation of capitalism situated between Marxism and social democracy. Conversely, the founding manifesto and party program of the BSW make no mention of capitalism throughout. It is only in the 2024 European Election Manifesto that the party mentions the harm the Anglo-American model of capitalism has brought to the European welfare state, primarily targeting the "elite establishment" as policymakers and large corporations, thereby exhibiting anti-establishment rather than anti-systemic characteristics.
Regarding socio-cultural positions, the stances of the new and old parties are worlds apart. The Left Party follows the lenient, inclusive, and liberal stance typical of left-wing parties toward immigration, arguing that as an immigration country, Germany should improve the social integration and political participation of migrants. It advocates for eliminating structural discrimination in education, training, the labor market, and social services. It opposes the EU’s exclusionary policies and advocates for a lenient and friendly asylum policy, accepting refugees resulting from war, politics, and various other reasons, and opening borders to all those in need. In contrast, the BSW adopts more culturally conservative positions and populist discourse, viewing immigrants and refugees as competitors for social resources such as employment and housing, and advocating for limits on the scale of immigration and refugees. Several factors have influenced the BSW’s unique stance on immigration policy: first, Wagenknecht’s own upbringing in East Germany; second, the traditional conservative exclusion of foreign immigrants in East Germany; and third, the political success achieved by the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) through its conservative stance on immigration and refugee policy. The overlap of these factors has led the new party to move from radicalism toward conservatism.
IV. The Impact of the Party Split on the Left Party
The split of the radical left has seriously weakened the Left Party's political influence and social base, causing it to fall into its most serious existential crisis since its founding amid intense party competition and lead to its further marginalization within the political landscape.
(1) Changes in Political Influence
A grave problem currently facing the Left Party is the electoral rules. For a long time, the "Basic Mandate Clause" (Grundmandatsklausel) of the German Federal Electoral Act stipulated that if a party won at least three direct mandates (constituency seats) in the "first vote," it could still receive additional seats proportional to its share of the "second vote" and form an independent parliamentary group (Fraktion), even if it failed to cross the 5% threshold in the second vote. The reform of the Federal Electoral Act that took effect in June 2023 abolished the "Basic Mandate Clause." Although the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in July 2024 to retain this clause—giving the Left Party hope to enter the Bundestag even if its vote share is under 5%—forming a parliamentary group requires at least 37 members; otherwise, the party can only operate as a "group" (Gruppe) within the parliament. In the 2021 federal election, although the Left Party’s vote share was only 4.9%, it was able to form an independent parliamentary group of 39 members due to having three direct-mandate members in eastern constituencies. Following the departure of Wagenknecht and her followers, the parliamentary group was forced to dissolve at the end of 2023 due to insufficient numbers and was downgraded to a parliamentary group (Gruppe). This was the first direct blow the BSW dealt to the Left Party.
The BSW chose to form in early 2024, precisely targeting the opportunities for breakthrough in the 2024 European Parliament elections and the state elections in three eastern German federal states. Judging by the results of the European elections, the eastern state elections, and polling support, the decline of the Left Party stands in stark contrast to the strengthening of the BSW. The formation of the new party has plunged the Left Party into an unprecedented existential crisis. In the 2024 European elections, the Left Party’s vote share dropped by 2.8 percentage points to 2.7%, only securing seats because Germany does not set a minimum threshold for European Parliament elections. In the September eastern state elections, the party completely lost its status as a "catch-all party" (Volkspartei) in the east; in Thuringia, its vote share fell by more than half and it lost its status as the primary governing party. In Saxony and Brandenburg, it failed even to reach the 5% threshold and was forced to leave the state parliaments. The party's support at the national level has further declined from its long-term weakness to 3%–4%, making it unable to reach the 5% threshold.
In contrast, the BSW has performed prominently as a newly emerging small party. In its first participation in a European Parliament election, it obtained 6.2% of the vote, significantly surpassing the Left Party. Although elections at the European level place more weight on European issues from candidates to topics, they serve as a touchstone and bellwether for testing party influence; the new party was able to translate polling support into European Parliament seats. In the eastern state elections, the party achieved impressive double-digit results, gaining opportunities to participate in coalition-building and diverting a large scale of traditional voters from other parties, even showing a rare trend of standing as a rival to the AfD. The party's national polling has remained stable around 7%, not only comprehensively overtaking the Left Party but actually jumping to become the third or fourth-largest party in various eastern states.
(2) Changes in the Social Base
The traditional voters and supporters of the Left Party are mainly left-wing groups such as workers, union members, anti-capitalists, anti-war activists, and feminists, as well as the unemployed and socially vulnerable groups. As competition among German parties intensifies, its voter base has been continuously eroded. Since Janine Wissler began leading the Left Party, she has not continued to focus on the policy core of social justice as a spokesperson for the "little people" (kleine Leute). Instead, she shifted the focus to winning over young urban activists, emphasizing radical-left issues such as lenient immigration policies, humanitarian aid, and the legalization of soft drugs. Conversely, the AfD, founded in 2013, not only competes for the same voter base but also the same geographic regions, likewise styling itself as the spokesperson for low-income groups and focusing on livelihood issues, thereby greatly diverting the votes of the Left Party’s die-hard supporters in the eastern region.
Since the founding of the BSW, the Left Party's social base has been eroded once again. In fact, the new party's targets for competition are not limited to voters of left-wing parties like the Left Party and the Greens, but also include the AfD as a primary opponent. According to a representative survey by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the potential voters for the BSW are mainly middle-aged and elderly men with a medium level of education; voting intentions in the eastern region are higher than in the western region. Their potential supporters value the party’s substance and political personalities, emphasize economic growth over climate protection, demand more stringent immigration policies, and have lower-than-average satisfaction with the democratic system. Specifically regarding the competition for voter bases with other parties, scholars like Aiko Wagner, based on an analysis of leadership, programmatic positions, and the socio-economic and social-psychological status of potential supporters, argue that BSW potential supporters are concentrated among low-income groups who have not benefited from the existing economic system and lack trust in the establishment institutions; thus, the party first poses a strong competitive threat to the AfD while also finding potential supporters among Left Party voters. Simultaneously, Wagenknecht’s own East German political background and her image as a spokesperson for the German working class appeal to East Germans' feelings of economic marginalization, increasing her popularity in the region.
However, judging from the 2024 election results, the BSW still dealt the greatest blow first to left-wing parties, especially the Left Party. Looking at voter movement, in the European Parliament elections, the BSW primarily competed for votes from left-wing voters who supported the SPD and the Left Party in the last election, and only secondarily from right-wing voters. The party won the most voters from the SPD and the Left Party—580,000 and 470,000 respectively—while diverting 260,000 and 160,000 votes from the Union (CDU/CSU) and the AfD. The largest portion of votes lost by the Left Party was precisely those turning to the BSW, highlighting that the latter's emergence has greatly weakened the political influence of other left-wing parties. At the same time, the BSW also diverted supporters of right-wing and even right-wing populist parties like the Union and the AfD, which can be attributed to the party’s conservative proposals in areas such as asylum and security. In the Saxony and Thuringia state elections, the party similarly obtained the most votes from the Left Party, followed by the Union and the AfD. In Thuringia, the votes captured from the Left Party (84,000) far exceeded those captured from the two right-wing parties, the Union (18,000) and the AfD (11,000).
(3) Drivers of Party Competition
According to Oskar Niedermayer's theory of party competition, whether a political party can distinguish itself in the competition of the "political market" depends primarily on three factors: first, framing conditions, where internal and external environments and major historical processes may trigger changes in voter electoral behavior and party strategies, thereby altering the state of party competition; second, demand-side factors, referring mainly to various elements affecting voter behavior, including social cleavages arising from major principled political or social issues—cleavages often based on different value orientations that trigger significant controversy and influence voter preferences; and third, supply-side factors, including the issues, political programs, and strategies of the party and its opponents, especially their positions and orientations on major issues of principle.[48] This theory effectively explains the political success of the BSW since its founding.
From the perspective of framing conditions and demand factors, the spread of neoliberalism has brought new challenges to Europe, including the refugee crisis, security crises, and the transformation of traditional industrial zones. Particularly in the socio-cultural sphere, new social cleavages have emerged in European politics and society surrounding how to view cultural conflicts within mass migration and how to win over the "losers" of globalization and regional transformation; voters urgently desire a change in the status quo regarding the economy, migration, and social security. From the perspective of supply factors, radical left parties have generally struggled to produce persuasive programmatic solutions to these new challenges, allowing center-right and even right-wing populist parties to develop "specialized competence" and steadily grow stronger in areas such as migration and European policy. Against the realistic background of society's "turn to the right," the radical left camp has moved toward fragmentation. The BSW criticizes left-wing forces for focusing too much on cultural issues of left-wing equal rights while ignoring practical problems like wage stagnation, poverty, and housing. It argues that the implementation of migration and climate policies has sacrificed the interests of German families and low-income earners. This has formed a mixed orientation—left-wing on economics and right-leaning on culture—which both caters to German concerns over migration and maintains a stance supporting the welfare state system. This facilitates the BSW's ability to "play both sides" [49] during the current fragmentation and polarization of the party landscape, continuously increasing its political influence. The BSW also possesses an advantage over Die Linke in its capacity for coalition-building; following the three state elections in the autumn of 2024, it has already participated in governing coalitions in Brandenburg and Thuringia, demonstrating strong potential for political alliance.
V. The Transformation of Other European Radical Left Forces
Holtshäuser argues that "left-conservatism" is not a new phenomenon; it mixes populist antagonism with nationalist overtones and adopts anti-liberal stances on issues such as migration, anti-discrimination, identity, and climate. These developments deviate from the traditional line of the radical left and go beyond traditional issues of war and peace, potentially leading to a split into two opposing forces: progressives and conservatives.[50] Currently, the morphology of the European radical left camp is becoming increasingly complex. While it generally still represents progressive, socialist, and anti-capitalist values, a split and transformation within radical left forces can be observed in several European countries, including Germany.
(1) Trends in Adjustment In recent years, accompanied by the rise of populism and even far-right forces, conservative ideological trends have gradually influenced the left-wing camp. Some left-wing forces are attempting to combine the fundamental principles of social justice with elements of conservatism and nationalism to adapt to the changing political landscape and voter demands. The BSW, with its highly personalized character and mixed left-right political program, is a typical representative of this, but similar trends of adjustment have appeared in other European countries.
In France, La France Insoumise (LFI), founded by Jean-Luc Mélenchon in 2016, generally adheres to a radical left political program, advocating for the resolution of urgent social problems, demanding an increase in the minimum wage, investing in the construction of social housing, and advocating for a reduction in weekly working hours and the retirement age. At the same time, the party often integrates conservatism into the left-wing agenda, reflecting a conservative stance; Mélenchon has repeatedly emphasized the need to protect French cultural identity, defend the French nation-state tradition, and oppose the EU's erosion of national sovereignty. Regarding migration policy, the party on one hand continues the humanitarian migration policies advocated by the left, opposing the government's introduction of stricter asylum laws; yet on the other hand, it also raises questions of national identity, suggesting that while the basic right to asylum is important, it would be better if people did not have to leave their motherlands in the first place. Its stance on migration is thus ambiguous or even self-contradictory.[51]
In Italy, the Five Star Movement (M5S) has similarly adopted a populist path that mixes left- and right-wing policy elements. The party evolved from a radical left social movement and possesses distinct populist characteristics. Since its founding by Beppe Grillo in 2009, the party's political stance has continuously transformed. It exhibits radical left positions on certain economic and social issues, including opposition to privatization, promotion of a basic citizenship income, and support for environmental protection, but it does not systematically promote a socialist or anti-capitalist agenda like traditional radical left parties. Meanwhile, the party supports right-wing stances on migration, EU policy, and the rule of law, criticizing the EU's fiscal austerity policies and adopting anti-migrant positions. Consequently, the party achieved remarkable success against the backdrop of social crisis, maximizing its range of supporters and taking office. During its period of coalition government with the far-right Lega party, it leaned further toward nationalism and conservatism, supporting the Lega's hardline anti-migrant policies.
In Slovakia, the left-wing Smer–SD (Direction – Social Democracy) has also gradually exhibited conservative tendencies. Since splitting from the Party of the Democratic Left in 1999, it has emphasized the welfare state, economic equality, and public services while opposing privatization. Under Robert Fico's leadership, the party's economic and social policies have trended toward conservatism and nationalism, forming a political line situated between social-democratic and nationalist positions. It has gradually adopted a harder stance on EU policy as well as migration, religion, and national identity, increasingly deviating from the positions of traditional social-democratic parties. Fico sparked controversy during the 2015 European migrant crisis due to his anti-migrant rhetoric. Of course, as this party's original positioning was social-democratic, it cannot be categorized as part of the radical left camp in the strict sense.
(2) Common Characteristics Amidst the overall stagnation of the contemporary European left, the aforementioned parties have all achieved a degree of political success against the tide, exhibiting several common characteristics in their programs and policy propositions.
First, the political positions of these parties are difficult to place within the traditional political spectrum. Whether it is the BSW or the Five Star Movement, they deliberately maintain ideological ambiguity, distancing themselves from left-wing ideologies such as democratic socialism and social democracy. These parties combine both left- and right-wing policy stances; thus, they cannot be simply categorized as radical left parties in the traditional sense, but are closer to a new type of party formation that seeks to transcend the binary opposition of left and right.
Second, these are all populist parties. They exhibit clear populist attributes, not only adopting populist mobilization strategies—opposing traditional party structures and the political elite establishment while advocating for direct democracy and transparent politics—but also deviating from the traditional left's permissive, pluralistic stance to favor restrictive positions on migration and asylum policy. Cas Mudde argues that the BSW’s use of extensive anti-migrant rhetoric during elections only bolsters far-right arguments; by mainstreaming such narratives, it weakens the media’s sensitivity toward the spread of such grievances, thereby supporting right-wing populist political positions.[52]
Finally, these parties all exhibit nationalist coloration. Sahra Wagenknecht's left-conservatism combines left-wing social demands with nationalism and conservatism, emphasizing nation-state values and the necessity of protecting national interests, focusing on national identity and economic protectionism, and criticizing excessive EU regulation for harming nation-state sovereignty. This stance shares commonalities with LFI, Italy's M5S, and Slovakia’s Smer–SD under Fico. These parties show clear euroskeptic tendencies, opposing the intervention and expansion of EU institutions; their shift toward right-wing conservative stances on migration, anti-discrimination, and identity issues can similarly be attributed to their emphasis on national cultural identity.
Broadly speaking, this "left-conservatism" which combines left-wing socio-economic programs with right-wing nationalism has shown certain developmental trends in countries like Germany, France, and Italy, and has achieved initial political success. However, this trend is more of a pragmatic shift driven by Realpolitik [53] than a movement that can be broadly defined as a "conservative turn." The current split and transformation of the radical left stem from the contemporary background of society's "turn to the right." It is an emergency adjustment to realistic pressures—migrant waves, economic insecurity, geopolitical tensions, the rise of right-wing populism, intensified party competition, and changes in voter structure. Pragmatists within the radical left hope to moderate the extreme or idealized positions of the traditional radical left to attract voters who wish to return to national values. Once they have the opportunity to participate in government, radical left parties often adjust their positions to win over coalition partners or a broader range of voters.
VI. Conclusion: Developmental Prospects for the European Radical Left
The split in the radical left camp has intensified the survival crisis of Die Linke. Amidst the overall weakness of the left-wing camp, the radical left can only find a way forward in 21st-century Europe if it properly manages the relationship of competition and cooperation with other left-wing parties, firmly seizes the historical opportunities presented by the crisis of capitalism, and develops pragmatic and effective alternatives to capitalism.
On one hand, the radical left can still tap into the potential for political alliances among left-wing parties. In recent years, right-wing populist and far-right parties have risen by seizing the opportunities provided by Europe’s multiple dilemmas, pushing the European political spectrum to the right. Yet under this general trend, the "New Popular Front," a left-wing alliance led by the French radical left in the 2024 National Assembly elections, defied the trend to become the largest force in parliament. In the Netherlands, the newly formed left-wing alliance between the Labor Party and the GreenLeft defeated the surging right-wing populist Freedom Party (PVV) to become the largest party in the European Parliament elections. In these two countries, cooperation among left-wing forces was the key to success, providing an important revelation for left-wing political forces in other countries. In a state of overall weakness, radical left parties undoubtedly need to tap into the alliance potential of the left-wing camp and properly handle the competitive-cooperative secondary relationships with other left parties. Whether they are radical left, moderate left, or eco-left, all take social fairness and justice as their traditional core characteristic. Specifically in Germany, the three left-leaning parties—the SPD, the Greens, and Die Linke—easily reach consensus in the areas of economic development, social justice, and climate protection, and share many similarities in policy demands and social bases. This shows that the left-wing camp always possesses a certain potential for alliance.
However, the main obstacle to left-wing coalition-building lies in the Fact that Die Linke's peace positions in the fields of foreign policy and military security are too idealized and deviate from the development of Realpolitik. The party opposes increasing defense spending and arms exports, refuses to send the Bundeswehr on overseas missions, demands the dissolution of NATO and Germany's withdrawal from it, and advocates for a European collective security system that includes Russia. These propositions are far removed from the positions of other left-wing parties. The SPD and the Greens have been integrated into mainstream politics for a long time and have long since shed the "protest party" image they had at their founding; their peace propositions in foreign and security fields are moving toward political pragmatism as the European security environment deteriorates. A practical problem brought about by these differences is the limitation of political alliance potential. Whether left-wing parties can coordinate their positions in these areas of divergence will undoubtedly have a very important impact on the overall developmental prospects of the left-wing camp.
On the other hand, and more importantly, the radical left should seize the historical opportunities presented by the crisis of capitalism. Since the end of World War II, European left-wing parties have been committed to refining social welfare systems within parliaments and governments. European countries generally adopted protective labor rights legislation, restrictive financial rules, and welfare systems benefiting the general public to "tame" the market. However, in the third wave of globalization since the 1990s, the neoliberal economic model has become dominant, financial capital has overridden the will of the people, and the divide between rich and poor has once again become a practical problem. The Erfurt Program [54] once attempted to seize the favorable opportunity of a major capitalist crisis to propose a constructive program. Yet, constrained by changes in the external environment, intensified party competition, and internal factional splits, Die Linke failed to reap dividends from the systemic predicament of capitalism or substantially improve its sluggish electoral results.
Presently, the expansion of capitalism has brought about a multitude of crisis symptoms and global hazards, including phenomena such as labor exploitation, class society, social fragmentation, the failure of democracy, ecological destruction, and the rampant power of transnational corporations. Among the left-wing intellectual elite, the reflection upon, liquidation of, and critique [18] of capitalist modes of production and life are in the ascendant. Starting from the sphere of distribution, the Western intelligentsia has revealed phenomena of social injustice, distributive inequity, and hierarchical society, advocating for the reform of fundamental systems. They either predict that the capitalist economy has reached the limits of its adaptive capacity and will undergo a long and painful process of crisis symptoms and disintegration, or they propose entirely new theories such as post-capitalism, post-growth economics, neo-socialism, and eco-socialism. [19] At the same time, the approval ratings and favorability toward socialism among the general public are rising. A 2019 survey by the polling organization Gallup showed that since 2010, the general view of capitalism among Western youth has deteriorated, with favorability toward capitalism and socialism now being essentially equal. A 2016 survey by the polling organization YouGov indicated that German citizens’ favorability toward socialism (45%) even exceeded their favorability toward capitalism (26%). In recent years, issues such as levying taxes on the wealthy and strengthening the regulation of banks and financial markets have become hot topics of public concern in Europe. This historical background brings new opportunities for the left-wing camp to "tame capitalism." The radical left should utilize its capacity to critique and transform capitalism. Based on the programmatic characteristics of its own values—such as social justice, democracy, peace, and stability—it must continuously introduce critiques of capitalism and alternative proposals on principled issues such as ownership, wealth distribution, economic growth, and democracy. On this basis, they should form a collective force with other left-wing powers, accurately identify the long-term strategic positioning of left-wing forces within the new economic and social environment, and propose pragmatic and effective visions for economic and social transformation.
(The author’s affiliation: Institute of German Studies, Tongji University) Web Editor: Zhang Jian Source: Social Sciences in the World, Issue 6, 2024