Jia Zhonghai and Wang Zhiwei: Evolution, Current Status, and Future of Left-wing Political Forces in Spain Since the Financial Crisis
The category of "left-wing political forces" encompasses both left-wing political parties and non-party organizations, such as trade unions and certain left-wing social organizations. Among these, left-wing parties can be categorized based on various analytical perspectives—mainstream versus marginal, traditional versus emerging, or radical versus moderate—with these classifications often overlapping. Given that Spanish left-wing parties possess the capacity to win state power through elections and subsequently influence the national political process, using the general elections held since the financial crisis as the primary thread of inquiry allows for a comprehensive connecting of the evolutionary trajectory of Spanish left-wing political forces during this period, providing insight into their future prospects.
I. The Evolutionary Process of Spanish Left-Wing Political Forces Since the Financial Crisis
Following the outbreak of the financial crisis, Spain fell into a systematic and comprehensive crisis to which the traditional left responded feebly. Simultaneously, the rapid rise of the radical left transformed the landscape of Spanish party politics, triggering continuous and violent adjustments that produced a frequent succession of new political vistas. Currently, many issues and details regarding the evolution of Spanish left-wing political forces still require scholarly investigation. By providing an overview and sketch of the developmental trajectory of these forces since the financial crisis, and by parsing the political logic contained within their evolution, we can provide an academic basis and theoretical reference for understanding the current state of the Spanish left-wing movement.
(1) The Stage of Maintained Equilibrium: The PSOE as Governing Party Struggling to Preserve the Status Quo (August 2008 – November 2011)
Following the 2008 financial crisis, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), as the governing party, remained exhausted by its efforts to cope with the crisis. During this period, the formation of the party "Podemos" was still in its embryonic stage, and "United Left" (Izquierda Unida) achieved a degree of recovery by virtue of its anti-austerity stance but failed to provide an effective alternative. Consequently, the PSOE was still able to exert itself to maintain the situation within the left-wing landscape.
Initially, then-Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero underestimated the severity of the situation. "The PSOE government not only refused to acknowledge that the international economic crisis was affecting Spain, but also failed to see that Spain's high level of personal debt would exacerbate the domestic crisis." [1] Even on the eve of the crisis, Prime Minister Zapatero requested that major banks continue to provide loans to real estate enterprises. Due to the PSOE's lack of a comprehensive and clear judgment regarding the severity of the economic crisis and its failure to take timely and effective measures, the Spanish economy suffered a severe downturn. In short, a series of Zapatero's promises went unfulfilled, and Spain failed to escape its economic malaise under PSOE leadership; consequently, public trust and confidence in the PSOE and Zapatero plummeted to freezing point.
With the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in May 2010, the crisis across Spain's entire financial and economic system began to worsen. Concerned about unfavorable growth prospects for the Spanish economy, Zapatero adopted a new round of austerity measures on May 12th. Meanwhile, although the voter share for "United Left" rose from 5.5% to 6.3%, it remained unable to provide any genuine alternative political strategy. That is to say, from the perspective of the situation at the time, the traditional left-wing parties were either disappointing or incapable of proposing viable alternatives; this political vacuum became the perfect breeding ground for the outbreak of anti-austerity movements. In the spring of 2011, the "Indignados" [2] occupied the squares of Spain's major cities, turning them into the main battlegrounds for discussing various political and social issues. Opinion polls showed not only massive public support for the Indignados movement but also that over 75% of the population opposed both Zapatero and the leader of the People's Party (PP), Mariano Rajoy.
Round after round of austerity measures continuously eroded the PSOE’s voter support, leading to its crushing defeat in the May 2011 municipal elections, where it lost 21.8% of its voters. To prevent the continued decline in public support from bringing catastrophic results to the party, Zapatero announced in July of that year that the general election would be held on November 20, 2011—four months earlier than expected. Nevertheless, the PSOE still suffered the anticipated landslide defeat in the national elections. According to statistics, "a total of 3.9 million voters who supported the PSOE in 2008 transferred their votes to other parties, and approximately 500,000 previous PSOE supporters abstained." [3] The actual vote gap between the two major parties reached nearly 16%, the highest record since the establishment of democracy following the death of Franco [4].
During this stage, the PSOE struggled and labored within the dilemma of trying to save the Spanish economy while simultaneously rescuing its own party's credibility. Ultimately, however, it could not withstand the People’s Party overtaking it in political influence, and it regretfully surrendered the leadership of the government in the 2011 general election. Beyond the two traditional major parties that drew most of the attention, a party that would later bring a powerful shock to the Spanish political map—Podemos—was quietly gestating amidst the Indignados movement and its aftershocks.
(2) The Stage of Disequilibrium: The Strong Entry of Podemos as an Emerging Party (November 2011 – June 2016)
After the PSOE’s defeat in the 2011 general election, government power fell into the hands of the conservative People's Party. However, just three months after being sworn in, the Spanish financial markets suffered a total collapse. Subsequently, Spain witnessed several waves of massive "protest tides" and "strike tides." As a typical representative of Spain's traditional left-wing political forces, "United Left" not only failed to seize the opportunity to grow its own strength but instead fell into internal organizational friction, missing a window for development. In this context, Podemos, by virtue of its distinct anti-austerity stance and its more radical and populist [5] strategies of struggle, successfully won broad support from the grassroots masses.
Between 2012 and 2014, to protest the austerity policies introduced by the national government, Spanish trade unions and several anti-austerity organizations launched dozens of protests, demonstrations, and strikes; labor-capital contradictions had brewed to the point of a concentrated explosion. During this period, some radical members of the Indignados movement began to realize the necessity of establishing a formal party organization and adopting political marketing strategies; Podemos became the crystallization of this organizational development process. On March 11, 2014, Podemos was officially registered as a political party. In less than 24 hours, it gained over 50,000 supporters online. By June 2014, Podemos's polling rate had already surpassed that of the PSOE, ranking second behind the People's Party. By October, it overtook the People's Party to hold the first position. The party overturned Spain's original political landscape with astonishing speed, and the political map long occupied by the PSOE and the People's Party began to take on a brand-new appearance.
However, by early 2015, the robust development momentum of Podemos slowed down, mainly due to two factors. First, internal programmatic and organizational divisions emerged within Podemos. One faction was led by Pablo Iglesias and Íñigo Errejón, while another was led by Pablo Echenique and Teresa Rodríguez; this internal strife inevitably affected organizational development. Second, it was difficult for Podemos to explain the political orientation of its policies; some left-wing forces accused it of "Venezuelan-style" populism and attacked the personal integrity of the party's leader, Iglesias. Polls indicated that the party's electoral support slid from 22.5% in November 2014 to 16.3% in June 2015.
Following the December 2015 general election, the Spanish political situation became intricate and complex. None of the four major parties that entered parliament managed to obtain an absolute majority of votes, and the efforts of each party to form a cabinet ended in failure. To enhance its competitiveness in the 2016 Spanish general election, Podemos chose to form an electoral alliance with "United Left" called "Unidos Podemos" (renamed United We Can in 2019). Finally, in the election on June 26, 2016, "the People’s Party continued to lead with 137 seats; although the PSOE decreased from its previous 90 seats to 85, it still maintained its position as the second-largest party; 'Unidos Podemos' won 71 seats; and the Citizens party (Ciudadanos) won 32 seats." [6] Although the People’s Party received the most votes, it still lacked the number of seats required to form a government. Ultimately, after multifaceted coordination, the People’s Party agreed to make concessions to Citizens on important government issues such as the annual budget, labor market reform, and tax reform, reaching an agreement for a coalition government.
It is evident that, against the political backdrop of this "four-legged race," clashes and maneuvering among the four major parties were inevitable. The political logic behind this was complex, encompassing both the challenge posed by emerging parties to traditional ones and the contest between left-wing and right-wing parties. During this period, the path toward solidarity and breakthroughs in coalition governance for all parties remained long and arduous.
(3) The Stage of Standoff: The Coexistence of the PSOE and Podemos (June 2016 – May 2023)
The general election of June 2016 confirmed the end of the "two-party system" in Spain and the fragmentation of the party system. A system composed of four major parties—the People's Party, the PSOE, Podemos, and Citizens—took preliminary shape. As the participants changed, the modes of competition and governance also changed—the possibility of forming coalition governments emerged.
History and practice have proven that minority governments possess an inherent fragility. Although the People’s Party and Citizens reached a cooperation agreement, they were still constrained by left-wing forces outside the parliament. The PSOE played the role of the parliamentary opposition, frequently uniting with Podemos to challenge the People’s Party government and attack its governing philosophy, policies, and regulations. Starting in July 2017, the PSOE exerted its full strength to push the Spanish National Court to conduct a deep investigation into corruption within the People's Party. On May 24, 2018, the Spanish National Court delivered the final verdict on the "Gürtel case" [7] against the People's Party. On the night the verdict was announced, the PSOE immediately convened an emergency meeting to evaluate the current situation and attempt to impeach Prime Minister Rajoy. Given the circumstances at the time, Podemos and the Catalan regional independence parties, due to their hostile stance toward the central government, were certain to vote in favor of the impeachment. After secret negotiations, the PSOE secured the support of seven other left-wing parties (Podemos, Republican Left of Catalonia, Basque Nationalist Party, Together for Catalonia [8], Compromís, EH Bildu, and New Canaries) and successfully ousted Rajoy in a vote of no confidence with "180 votes in favor, 169 against, and 1 abstention." [9] Subsequently, a PSOE caretaker government took power.
In early 2019, the 2019 Fiscal Budget submitted by the PSOE caretaker government to parliament was rejected, forcing Pedro Sánchez to announce that the general election originally scheduled for 2020 would be held early. However, as no party obtained an absolute majority of seats in parliament and the parties were long unable to reach a coalition agreement, the government remained vacant for over six months. In the second general election held that same year, the PSOE won 120 seats and Podemos won 35 seats. Having been tempered by the two general elections of 2019, the PSOE re-evaluated the domestic political situation. To break the caretaker deadlock as quickly as possible, it extended an olive branch of coalition governance to Podemos. After multiple rounds of consultation, both sides decided that forming a coalition government was their primary objective, with each making concessions on many important political issues. Through the active efforts of both parties, Sánchez was successfully elected Prime Minister in the second round of parliamentary voting held on January 7, 2020, with a slim margin of "167 votes in favor, 165 against, and 18 abstentions." [10] On January 12th, the first new left-wing coalition government was officially established, with the number of cabinet members increasing to 23, four of whom were members of Podemos.
After the new left-wing coalition government took office, it committed itself to improving people's livelihoods, optimizing the national governance system, and enhancing national governance capabilities. However, it still struggled to counter public disappointment over soaring inflation and declining purchasing power in the Eurozone’s fourth-largest economy. Furthermore, Pedro Sánchez relied on the support of Catalan and Basque separatist parties to pass legislation, which to some extent compromised his standing as a ruler. Right-wing parties seized this momentum to fiercely attack Sánchez for his reliance on separatists and the far-left within the coalition, claiming that "Sánchez is being held in the hands of radicals" [16]. All of these factors directly impacted the performance of Sánchez’s Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and its ally, Podemos (We Can), in the 2023 elections.
(4) The power struggle phase: The PSOE narrowly retains power despite pressure from the People's Party (May 2023 to present)
As a political bellwether on the eve of Spain's general election, the results of the May 2023 local elections showed that the PSOE not only trailed the People's Party (PP) in terms of total vote share in municipal elections, but also lost nearly all major cities to the center-right PP. Simultaneously, the political performance of its left-wing ally, Podemos, plummeted. This was due, on one hand, to the "squeeze on its political space caused by the PSOE’s ‘return to the left’ route" [17], and on the other hand, to its mediocre performance as a participant in the coalition government. Driven by the combined effect of these factors, Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias announced his resignation from the central government on March 15, 2021. Following a cabinet reshuffle, Yolanda Díaz—then Minister of Labour and a member of the Communist Party of Spain—took over as Deputy Prime Minister. As her political influence grew, Díaz formed an electoral alliance in 2023 composed of 15 left-wing parties called the Sumar (Unite) movement. After much deliberation, Podemos finally decided to join this alliance just four hours before the registration deadline.
Against the backdrop of the defeat in local elections, Sánchez decided to take a risky move by moving the general election, originally scheduled for December, forward to July 23. This was aimed at curbing the expanding influence of the right-wing camp and resolving the governing and internal party trust crises triggered by the local election losses. Judging from the election results, this strategy yielded practical effects. Although the PP returned as the largest party in Parliament, it could not successfully cross the threshold to form a cabinet even by allying with Vox. The failure of the PP created an opportunity for the PSOE. Under the unprecedented pressure of a crushing defeat in local elections and consistently low pre-election polls, the PSOE’s performance in the general election exceeded expectations, reaching a vote share of 31.7% and securing 122 seats. The newly formed left-wing electoral alliance, Sumar, obtained 12.31% of the vote and 31 parliamentary seats.
Since PP leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo failed to obtain the absolute majority required to be elected Prime Minister in two rounds of parliamentary voting in September 2023, Sánchez was subsequently nominated as the candidate. To unite all small regional left-wing parties, the PSOE did not hesitate to make concessions on sensitive issues such as "regional autonomy" and "amnesty for separatists," eventually securing enough support from allies. On November 16, 2023, PSOE leader Sánchez was finally elected Prime Minister of Spain by a narrow margin of "179 votes in favor and 171 against" [18]. The current government is a coalition of two major left-wing parties, the PSOE and Sumar, "consisting of 22 cabinet ministers, with all four Deputy Prime Ministers being women" [19]. In the future, the new left-wing coalition government still faces many challenges.
II. General Characteristics and New Trends in the Development of Spanish Left-wing Political Forces Since the Financial Crisis
Since the financial crisis, Spain's political and social environment has undergone drastic adjustments and changes. Accordingly, Spanish left-wing political forces have experienced a series of evolutions and developments, exhibiting several distinct characteristics during this process.
(1) A development pattern dominated by "one strong and many weak," with occasional "dual-power parity"
"One strong and many weak" refers to a pattern in the left-wing camp where the PSOE is the sole dominant party, while the influence of other left-wing political forces is far lower. "Dual-power parity" refers to the emergence of two leading parties of comparable strength—the PSOE and Podemos—which exist in a delicate state of competition and cooperation. Regarding these two patterns, the following important issues are involved:
First, the specific manifestations of the "one strong and many weak" and "dual-power parity" patterns. Under the "one strong and many weak" pattern, regardless of whether it holds power, the PSOE's vote share in general elections has been far ahead of other left-wing parties. Specifically, the best performance achieved by any other single left-wing party during these periods was Podemos in the 2019 general election with 14.32% of the vote and 42 seats, barely exceeding one-third of the seats won by the PSOE in the same election (123 seats). Conversely, the PSOE's worst performance during these periods was 110 seats in the 2011 election, demonstrating that its strength far exceeds that of other left-wing parties. During the June 2016 general election, a "dual-power parity" pattern briefly appeared. In this election, the PSOE obtained 22.63% of the vote and 85 seats, while Podemos obtained 17.6% of the vote and 69 seats, a difference of only 16 seats. It was also from this election onward that Podemos gained the leverage to negotiate with the PSOE regarding the formation of a coalition government.
Second, the specific causes of the "one strong and many weak" and "dual-power parity" patterns. The causes for the "one strong and many weak" pattern in Spanish left-wing political forces primary lie in two aspects. On one hand, as one of Spain's two traditional major parties, the PSOE possesses unshakeable strength and status. Although the rise of anti-establishment and populist waves partially eroded the advantages of the two traditional parties, the political foundation and voter cohesion formed by the PSOE over the 140 years since its founding have granted it a considerable degree of resilience against political risks. On the other hand, Spain’s national question [11] is long-standing, leading to the formation of numerous regional left-wing parties. In autonomous communities such as Catalonia, the Canary Islands, Galicia, and the Basque Country, there are numerous regional nationalist forces, including many left-wing nationalist parties—such as Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), EH Bildu (Basque Country Unite), Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP), and the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG), among others. However, due to the regional nature of these parties, it is difficult for them to break through regional limitations and achieve greater development, thus creating a characteristic of being "numerous but not strong."
The cause of the "dual-power parity" pattern is quite obvious: it was the masterpiece of the peak period of the Spanish populist wave. Building upon populist discourse, Podemos adopted an organizational form similar to new social movements, utilizing the dual carriers of the internet and traditional media to achieve a rapid rise. It can be said that the peak of Podemos's development was the product of the alignment of "Heavenly timing" [12] (the outbreak of the international financial crisis), "Geographic advantage" [13] (Spain’s fertile populist soil), and "Human harmony" [14] (the public's disappointment with traditional parties' inability to represent their interests). Once any factor changes, the situation shifts accordingly. Therefore, from a long-term perspective, this "dual-power parity" pattern is not sustainable or replicable.
Third, "one strong and many weak" will likely become the "new normal" for Spanish left-wing politics. The results of the most recent general election indicate that Spanish left-wing political forces have restored the "one strong and many weak" pattern, which is likely to be maintained for a long time. First, the "political window" [15] opened by radical left ideology is limited, and the development of Podemos has entered a period of fatigue; in the short term, it is difficult for any new left-wing party to replicate the development myth of Podemos and stand on equal footing with the PSOE. Second, although the PSOE has lost the ability to govern alone, even during the period of parity with Podemos, it remained the largest left-wing party by a narrow margin, and its "one strong" status is not easily shaken. Finally, as long as Spain's national question is not completely resolved, regional left-wing parties will exist and maintain influence for a long time, forming the "many weak."
(2) The development curve mirrors the radicalization process of European left-wing political forces
Following the outbreak of the financial crisis, European left-wing political forces began a process of radicalization driven by a wave of populism, bringing a brand-new appearance to the European left-wing political ecosystem. A careful comparison reveals that the development curve of Spanish left-wing forces coincides with the radicalization trend of European left-wing forces.
Looking at the rapid rise of new radical left-wing parties across Europe, their emergence was mainly concentrated between 2012 and 2015, with their peak development occurring between 2015 and 2019. In terms of chronological order, "the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) in Greece was the first left-wing political force to rise in Europe after the financial crisis" [20], seizing 71 seats in the 2012 Greek national elections to become the second-largest party. At this time, the Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy had already achieved brilliant results in local council elections—winning seats in 28 cities across the country—and similarly secured the status of the second-largest party when it participated in the 2013 national general election. Two years later, the Left Bloc (BE) in Portugal won 19 seats in the 2015 Portuguese elections, returning to its status as the third-largest party. By this time, SYRIZA had reached its zenith, governing in coalition with the Independent Greeks as the largest party in parliament. In March 2018, Italy’s Five Star Movement reached an agreement with the League party to form a coalition government.
Regarding Spain, the rise of Podemos (2014) as a typical representative of the new left was nearly concurrent with that of the Portuguese Left Bloc, while its entry into a coalition government to participate in ruling (2019) was slightly later than Italy’s Five Star Movement. The alignment on the timeline is only one criterion for judging that the rise and development of Podemos belong to the same wave as these other parties. The most important basis is that the drivers of its emergence were identical to those of other new left parties: all benefited from public dissatisfaction with traditional parties and austerity policies after the financial crisis, as well as the powerful shock and challenge presented by populist trends to the neoliberal model.
Thus, it is evident that since the financial crisis, the development curve of Spanish left-wing political forces has consistently mirrored the radicalization process of European left-wing political forces. In terms of the sensitivity of curve changes, the European left-wing development curve usually changes and reacts first, while the Spanish curve shows a certain degree of lag. This means that by studying the radicalization process of European left-wing forces, we have the opportunity to predict the future development of Spanish left-wing forces to some extent.
(3) Development space is generally occupied and squeezed by the right-wing camp
First, the new political space brought by populism has been half-taken by the right-wing camp. The new political stars rising in the Spanish populist wave were not limited to the radical left party, Podemos; they also included right-wing newcomers such as Citizens (Cs) and Vox. Citizens defined itself as a force opposing the "old" and defending the "new," but simultaneously distinguished itself from Podemos by advocating for "sensible and calm" [21] change rather than radicalism. Meanwhile, Citizens utilized the political framework shifts pushed by Podemos to overturn Spain's political map once again, becoming part of a right-wing coalition government by supporting the PP in the 2016 election. Vox was founded in 2013; with its victory in the 2019 national elections, it transformed from an extra-parliamentary party into one of the major parties within the establishment, beginning to play an important influential role in national political life. Simultaneously, as a far-right party, it further exacerbated the trend of fragmentation in Spain's political ecosystem. In other words, the "window of opportunity" brought by the populist wave opened to both the left and the right; while the new left gained development space, it also faced intense competition from right-wing populist parties.
Second, right-wing parties frequently launched attacks against the stability of the left-wing government while in opposition.
After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the Spanish left-wing coalition government exerted every effort to combat this health crisis; however, the aftermath of the pandemic in Spain became, to a certain extent, political capital for the right. On one hand, right-wing forces banded together, dedicating themselves to opposing any decision made by the Spanish left-wing coalition government. On the other hand, right-wing forces launched a massive "disinformation war" to undermine the stability of the coalition, causing a vast amount of fake news to circulate widely on social media. Overall, some of the negative impacts brought by the right-wing "disinformation war" to the left-wing coalition government are nearly irreversible.
Third, the single party with the highest share of the vote in the most recent general election belongs to the right-wing camp.
In the general election of July 2023, the People’s Party (PP) gained 47 more seats than in the previous election, regaining its status as the largest party in Parliament; its vote share and number of seats increased to 33.05% and 136 respectively. The reasons for the recovery in voter support for the People's Party mainly lie in the following aspects: First, the party shook off its internal crisis to some degree by changing its leadership. Second, the "political pendulum effect" swung toward the People's Party, granting it a political advantage. Third, the number of right-wing parties in the Spanish political arena decreased, thereby reducing the fragmentation of the People's Party vote. Although the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) ultimately achieved a turnaround against the wind, laboriously forming the second Sánchez government with the support of small regional left-wing parties, the People's Party, as a powerful right-wing opposition, is bound to pose a massive challenge to the left-wing camp.
(4) The development model has gradually shifted from "going it alone" to left-wing coalition governance.
Previously, the PSOE was the sole dominant force within the left-wing camp, while other left-wing forces had to compete for the limited remaining political space under the shadow of the two-party system. On January 12, 2020, the PSOE and "Podemos" formed Spain's first left-wing coalition government, marking a shift in the development of left-wing political forces from acting individually to coalition governance. On November 16, 2023, the two major left-wing parties—the PSOE and the "Sumar" movement—once again formed a left-wing coalition government, signaling that left-wing alignment has increasingly become an inevitable choice for left-wing governance.
In the process of forming a coalition government, left-wing political forces can be categorized into three parts: the PSOE, which plays a leading and dominant role; the second-largest left-wing party, which serves as a member of the coalition; and other small regional left-wing parties that, while not participating in governance, determine the ultimate success or failure of cabinet formation. This shift in cabinet formation carries different meanings for the three parties. For the PSOE, adopting left-wing coalition governance was a choice of necessity following the loss of its position of absolute dominance. For the second-largest left-wing party, a coalition government is the preferred method of cabinet formation. When the PSOE was the sole dominant party, even if the second-largest left-wing party could obtain the same share of the vote as it does now, it could not reap the same "political dividends." Under the coalition model, however, they not only have the opportunity to secure important positions in the central government but can also exert significant influence on major national political issues and policy-making. For other small regional left-wing parties, although they cannot become members of the coalition government, they can negotiate with the PSOE during the cabinet-forming process, utilizing the PSOE’s urgency to form a government to demand that the central government implement certain regional policy preferences after taking office.
This shift in the development model has both pros and cons for the overall development of left-wing political forces. There are two advantages: First, while the left-wing camps mainly viewed each other as competitors during the period of fragmented governance, they primarily view each other as partners during the period of left-wing coalition governance; this shift in identity and perspective is conducive to different left-wing factions discovering and amplifying their theoretical consensus. Second, in the face of a common enemy, the consistent "anti-right" stance and mentality among various left-wing parties allow them to build a temporary but broad left-wing unity. There are also two disadvantages: First, the emergence of the coalition government model signifies the loss of the absolute dominant position of traditional mainstream left-wing parties; this also means that the ability of traditional left-wing parties to oppose the right-wing camp has been significantly weakened, making it difficult for them to continue serving as the "mainstay" [16] of the left-wing camp. Second, during the process of coalition governance, it is difficult to eliminate suspicion and friction between the two left-wing parties, which often results in a governing effect of "1+1<2" during the current term, and may even hinder the smooth formulation and implementation of left-wing policies.
(5) New development trends: Traditional left-wing forces are reshaping their identity markers, while the emerging left seeks to break through development bottlenecks.
Facing drastic changes in the Spanish political landscape, left-wing political forces are confronted with different dilemmas and problems, and the methods they seek for breakthroughs vary. Generally speaking, however, the fundamental reasons constraining the development of both the traditional and emerging left are internal. Only by seeking "self-change" [17] from within is it possible to strive for greater political development space and inject new momentum into the development of Spanish left-wing political forces.
On one hand, under the impact of emerging left-wing parties, traditional left-wing parties—to avoid losing more support while continuously drifting "rightward"—have begun seeking to reshape their political identities and have embarked on a path of reform to "find themselves." Although the situations faced by various parties differ, the PSOE and the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), both being long-established traditional left-wing parties, have demonstrated certain commonalities in seeking self-reform: namely, clarifying political identity, rebuilding political positioning, and reshaping left-wing identity markers. In June 2017, at its 39th Federal Congress, the PSOE proposed the slogan "We are the Left." Cristina Narbona, who took over as party president, stated after the opening of the congress, "We are a left-wing party, and we want to be seen that way" (12). This indicates that the PSOE has begun intentionally reshaping its identity as a representative of radical change to avoid losing its distinctiveness and popular support while drifting rightward. In December 2017, the Communist Party of Spain also held its 20th National Congress, undertaking profound ideological and organizational reforms and restoring Leninism for the first time in 40 years. The statutes adopted by the Congress defined the party as follows: "The reality analysis and political practice of the Communist Party of Spain... are based on Marxism-Leninism and scientific socialism" (13). The shift toward "Leninism" at the PCE's 20th Congress is of great significance; it is expected to become the political starting point for the PCE to awaken its fighting spirit and return to radicalism.
On the other hand, having passed through its peak period of development, the emerging left has entered a period of fatigue; seeking to break through the dilemmas and limitations of its development is an urgent priority. From an organizational model perspective, although organizational networks based primarily on virtual internet structures possess astonishing expansion capabilities and speeds—and were instrumental to the rapid initial development of "Podemos"—they are insufficient to replace traditional party functions in terms of the depth of organizational bonding. In terms of organizational operation, a party's daily decision-making and electoral mobilization require realistic operational mechanisms to ensure the cohesion, continuity, and effectiveness of organizational activities. That is to say, "Podemos" has experienced an imbalance between maintaining organizational expansion and maintaining stability; thus, it urgently needs to "find a balance between grassroots movements and a functional party" (14). In terms of strategy and tactics, the political labels of anti-austerity and anti-neoliberalism were the primary reasons for the rise of "Podemos" since the 2008 financial crisis. However, while the radical left can incite public anger with populist slogans, it lacks the ability and means to transform this anger into a driver for political change, and it is unable to propose effective alternative models to provide solutions for the country's economic difficulties. Some left-wing scholars have proposed that, facing this realistic problem, "Podemos" needs to "reconstruct the direction of its strategic and tactical development around a new political movement for change" (15), but they have not provided specific plans or steps for how to achieve this reconstruction.
III. Future Development Prospects of Spanish Left-Wing Political Forces
Although the winner of the most recent Spanish general election was the left-wing camp, the future development prospects for Spanish left-wing political forces remain far from optimistic. The underlying reasons are complex: in addition to the external challenges testing left-wing forces, more important are the internal factional conflicts and the lack of theoretical construction within the left itself. However, "in order to be able to fight, the working class must organize itself as a class at home" (16). To achieve this goal, whether for traditional or emerging left-wing forces, only by diligently practicing "internal skills" [18], reducing internal friction, and consolidating and amplifying the advantages of left-wing governance can they promote the maturation of the revolutionary situation as the general crisis of capitalism approaches.
(1) The support rate for the left-wing coalition government remains unstable against a background of multiple challenges.
In the 2023 election, the PSOE narrowly held off the right-wing People's Party—the largest party in Parliament—and formed the second left-wing coalition government in alliance with the "Sumar" movement. Regarding Sánchez’s re-election as Prime Minister, PSOE supporters called him "the resilient one" and "the survivor." However, winning the election does not mean "resting easy." Overall, in addition to the inherent fragility of a minority government, the left-wing coalition government faces other severe challenges.
On one hand, Sánchez’s compromises with various separatist parties to successfully form a cabinet have buried various hidden dangers for the post-cabinet period. To be successfully elected, Sánchez had to lead the PSOE in signing six agreements with allies, two of which are highly controversial. The first is the agreement Sánchez reached with Carles Puigdemont, leader of the pro-independence Catalan party "Together for Catalonia" (JxCAT-JUNTS); Sánchez promised to release 400 individuals involved in the Catalan independence movement between 2012 and 2023 and emphasized that this "indiscriminate" amnesty would erase the crimes of all those convicted and prosecuted. The second is the agreement Sánchez reached with the Basque Nationalist Party; Sánchez promised to upgrade the Basque region to a "Nation" (Nación) by granting the region "privileges" in law-making. As soon as this news broke, hundreds of thousands of people held protest marches across Spain every day, with the scale reaching as high as one million at its peak; PSOE offices in various locations were also frequently besieged by protesters. The Catalan Amnesty Bill, in particular, has drawn strong opposition from the Spanish public. Poll results show that 70% of voters do not support the bill, including 59% of those who intended to vote for the PSOE in the general election. The opposition took the opportunity to launch fierce attacks, directly accusing Sánchez of selling out Spanish national sovereignty and aligning with local separatist forces just to seize power. Currently, the amnesty bill is still in the legislative stage; once implemented, it is highly likely to trigger an even stronger reaction, threatening the governing status of the new coalition government.
On the other hand, variables remain in Spain’s economic development, and the left-wing coalition government still faces tests of its governing capacity. Although some international rating agencies believe the Spanish economy is stable and improving with no significant economic risks in the near future, Moody's—one of the three major international rating agencies—maintains a relatively cautious stance. In terms of economic growth rate, the quarter-on-quarter growth rate of the Spanish economy in the third quarter of 2023 was 0.3%, a slowdown from the second quarter. "In November 2023, the OECD lowered its forecast for Spain's economic growth in 2024 to 1.4%" (17). Furthermore, Moody's pointed out that Sánchez and the PSOE, in their rush to form a cabinet, recklessly promised to skew fiscal policies in favor of the Catalonia and La Palma regions, which would create certain economic risks. Once these agreements are implemented, they are very likely to cause other autonomous communities in Spain to follow suit, thereby acting as a negative drag on the country's credit and sovereign debt.
All of these factors make the path of the new Spanish left-wing coalition government full of variables. How to prevent potential issues from exploding into crisis events at a certain point will test Prime Minister Sánchez's political wisdom.
(2) Left-wing political forces lack the ability to propose a genuine political alternative.
Whether as governing or opposition parties, the lack of ability among left-wing forces to propose a political alternative is one of the important factors constraining their future development.
From the perspective of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), the opportunity to assume governance has come at a high price. While the party successfully gained the capacity to lead the national political agenda, its governing program is simultaneously constrained by multiple forces, including the European Union, right-wing factions, emerging left-wing forces, and regional nationalist movements, among others. Therefore, although the PSOE has undergone a certain degree of "leftward turn," various stakeholders will inevitably exert varying degrees of "counter-force" [19] against this process based on their own interests. Under these circumstances, there is almost no chance for the PSOE to truly implement radical left political programs, and it is even less likely to effect any truly "radical" transformation of capitalism. When faced again with national crises or governing dilemmas, the PSOE will inevitably prioritize maintaining its hard-won position of power as its primary objective, meaning its policy choices will lean more toward stability and compromise. That is to say, it remains difficult for the PSOE to fully escape the neoliberal political framework; it is likely to be restricted by existing institutions in both economic and social policy, making it difficult to produce an ideal-typical left-wing governing program. This limitation is not only a manifestation of the PSOE’s helplessness when confronted with realpolitik, but also reflects a universal challenge faced by contemporary European left-wing parties in the context of globalization: how to seek a balance between maintaining their governing position and fulfilling ideological commitments.
From the perspective of emerging radical left-wing forces, their characteristic lies in the ability to form "critiques of existing institutions and government policies, yet failing to provide a constructive alternative program" (18). Taking the Podemos party as an example, from a strategic and tactical standpoint, the political labels of anti-austerity and anti-neoliberalism were the primary drivers for its rise following the 2008 financial crisis. However, the precedent of Greece's Syriza remains—popular discontent is easily incited, but the actual advancement of an anti-neoliberal process at the political and social levels is fraught with difficulties. Spain is no exception. Against the backdrop of the financial crisis, emerging radical left-wing forces were able to gain a louder voice in public discourse through populist slogans, but they could not propose genuine political alternatives to address the country's economic hardships, exhibiting a distinct trait of being "heavy on critique but light on construction." In the future, although these emerging radical left forces may still possess a loyal base of anti-mainstream and anti-traditional supporters, there is a high probability that they will struggle to become an alternative force capable of providing constructive programs before the "window of opportunity" under the global crisis completely closes.
(3) The divergent trend within left-wing political forces remains evident.
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, Spanish left-wing political forces have further intensified their activities and achieved a degree of development. However, regarding their overall development, issues such as the publicizing of internal rifts, the fragmentation of organizational strength, the aging of the party membership structure, and the marginalization of political influence have still not been fundamentally resolved.
First, contradictions and rifts persist within and between the various Spanish left-wing political forces.
"Since the end of the Cold War, various left-wing political forces in the world... have each and among themselves explored and attempted certain degrees of union and cooperation, and have undertaken some policy actions. But relatively speaking, internal friction and infighting within and between them have instead become more prominent" (19). Spain is no exception. On the one hand, some left-wing parties themselves harbor internal contradictions and theoretical rifts. Taking Podemos as an example, while the limitations inherent in the party's populist strategy are certainly the primary reason for its restricted development, the tension between two opposing political strategies within its ranks is also a major factor hindering its progress. On the other hand, after the possibility of forming a coalition government emerged, the desire of Spanish left-wing political forces to strengthen mutual solidarity and coordination has continuously increased. However, because it is difficult to unify the interest perspectives of various parties and reconcile their policy positions, a situation of genuine solidarity and cooperation has been difficult to form. In the 2023 general election, the PSOE and the "Sumar" movement formed a new left-wing coalition government; while the two parties have similar economic policy orientations, rifts still exist regarding immigration policy and other areas, burying many hidden dangers for their future cooperation. Meanwhile, the PSOE, in its eagerness to form a cabinet, made a series of compromises to regional left-wing parties. However, compromise does not mean the formation of a left-wing consensus in the true sense, and brief strategic cooperation does not represent the mending or disappearance of the parties' rifts. Yet, without a unified left-wing force, it will be extremely difficult to struggle against the united bourgeoisie, for after all, "a vanguard alone cannot achieve the transition to communism" (20).
Second, the estrangement between the labor movement and the socialist movement exists and will persist for a long time.
This involves an important issue: "the labor movement and socialism are not entirely identical" (21). The labor movement is a struggle carried out to win workers' rights and improve their living conditions, primarily guided by current realities. The socialist movement, however, is a struggle intended to completely overthrow the capitalist system and replace it with a socialist system, guided by the lofty ideal of communism. Looking at Spain, a subtle estrangement has always existed between trade union organizations and the communist parties led by the "United Left." Following the 2008 financial crisis, there was actually a realistic basis for a joint struggle between Spanish trade unions and the United Left led by the Communist Party of Spain, but the idealized left-wing union did not materialize. This was mainly because, although the Workers' Commissions (CCOO) and the General Union of Workers (UGT) both hoped to organize a unified social resistance front, they were unwilling to encourage anti-neoliberal left forces to achieve a political breakthrough. Consequently, the attitude of these two unions toward the "United Left" remained ambiguous. In the future, this estrangement will persist for a long time and will continue to affect the development of relations between Spanish left-wing political forces.