Yuan Dongzhen: New Characteristics of the Left-Right Contention in Latin America and Their Impact on the Political Ecology of Political Parties
The game and competition between left-wing and right-wing parties constitute the main thread and a core component of political development in Latin America; they are also a definitive characteristic of the region’s party politics. While the development of Latin American parties and party politics maintains a large degree of continuity and stability, new changes are constantly emerging. The contest between left and right now exhibits new characteristics and trends, exerting a significant impact on the pattern of party politics and the political ecosystem.
I. Changes in the Cycles of Left-Right Alternation
The struggle between the left and right remains a distinct feature of Latin American party politics. However, from the perspective of longitudinal comparison, the current cycle of alternation between left and right has become relatively blurred, lacking the clear and sharp definitions of the past.
During the roughly twenty years from the end of the 20th century to the beginning of the 21st century, Latin America experienced pronounced cycles of left-right alternation. From the turn of the century until 2014, left-wing parties took office in many Latin American countries, forming a distinct regional “Pink Tide.” This phenomenon emerged against a backdrop where the negative consequences of neoliberal reforms in Latin American countries became increasingly apparent at the end of the 20th century, leading to the intensification of social contradictions and the aggravation of social conflict. At that time, many right-wing governing parties were unable to resolve numerous governance challenges and gradually lost popular support. Left-wing parties seized the moment to propose exploring new development paths and slogans to replace neoliberalism, which largely met the public’s psychological desire and demand for change, winning broad social support. Starting from the turn of the century, Latin American left-wing parties rose as a group, successively winning general elections and taking power in countries such as Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Peru. Some scholars believe the scope of this “Pink Tide” was unprecedented in Latin American history [1]. Influenced by various unfavorable internal and external factors, the Latin American economy entered a downturn after 2014. The negative consequences of the economic recession continued to ferment and gradually spread to the political and social spheres, with social unrest appearing in some countries. Right-wing parties utilized public discontent to make a comeback, leading to a “Return Tide” of the right in Latin America; right-wing parties successively took power in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Ecuador. Due to multiple internal and external factors, this cycle of right-wing governance did not last long. After 2018, the competition between left and right began to exhibit new characteristics, with both sides being evenly matched in elections. Following the victory of a left-wing party in Mexico’s general election, left-wing parties returned to power in several Latin American countries, while right-wing parties either won elections or maintained their governing status in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Taken as a whole, the balance of power between the left and right has tended toward equilibrium, and the Latin American political arena is characterized by mutual advances and retreats, as well as “co-governance” by both left and right [2].
If the cycle of left-right alternation in Latin America was relatively clear and distinct during the nearly 20 years from the turn of the century, it has since become relatively blurred. At present, competition between the Latin American left and right remains intense; both sides experience gains and losses, neither enjoys an absolute advantage, and the competition manifests differently across various countries. In some countries, the political foundation or governing status of left-wing parties is relatively solid. For example, the left-wing Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua holds a clear political advantage and has governed continuously since 2007, while the right-wing opposition remains fragmented and marginalized. In the 2020 general election, Bolivia’s left-wing Movement for Socialism (MAS) returned to power only one year after losing it, winning more than half the seats in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. In other countries, left-wing parties have lost their political advantage, and the power and influence of right-wing parties have grown significantly. For instance, the right-wing Colorado Party of Paraguay holds a clear political advantage and has governed almost continuously since 1950, interrupted for only four years between 2008 and 2012. In Ecuador, right-wing parties first won the 2021 general election and then won the early general election in 2023 to continue governing. In December 2022, Peru's left-wing President Castillo was impeached by a right-wing controlled Congress, and the Free Peru party lost its governing status. The United Socialist Party of Venezuela, the left-wing governing party, also faces enormous pressure from the right-wing opposition, making governance difficult.
II. The Trend of the Left-Right Contest has Become More Complex
In the Latin American “Super Election Cycle” of 2021–2024 [3], the competition between the left and right has become more deadlocked, entering a state of pitched battle. Although the balance of power is not absolutely equal, it is roughly comparable, making the cycle of alternation even more obscure. In the 18 general elections that have concluded, left-wing parties won 11 (winning in Peru, Chile, Nicaragua, Honduras, Colombia, Brazil, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Venezuela, and Uruguay); right-wing parties won 6 (winning in Ecuador—which held two elections—Costa Rica, Argentina, Paraguay, and Panama); and a centrist party won 1 (winning in El Salvador). Compared to the more obvious “left advance/right retreat” or “left retreat/right advance” of previous election cycles, the contest between the left and right in this cycle is more complex.
In the five general elections held in 2021, left-wing parties won in four countries and the right-wing won in only one, giving the left a clear advantage. In the February election in Ecuador, no presidential candidate won the required majority for direct election; the two candidates with the highest votes entered a second round in April. Ultimately, Lasso, the candidate for the right-wing alliance of the Creating Opportunities (CREO) movement and the Social Christian Party, defeated Arauz, the candidate for the left-wing Union for Hope (UNES), ending 14 years of continuous left-wing rule. In the April election in Peru, no candidate was directly elected; the two candidates with the most votes held a second round in June. Ultimately, Castillo, the candidate for the left-wing Free Peru party, defeated Keiko Fujimori of the right-wing Popular Force, and a left-wing party replaced the right-wing in power. Similarly, in Chile’s November election, no candidate was directly elected; the two leading candidates held a second round in December. Boric, the candidate for the left-wing Approve Dignity alliance, defeated Kast (candidate for the Christian Social Front, though the text references the "Chile Forward" [N] context), ending right-wing governance. In the November election in Honduras, Castro, the candidate for the left-wing Liberty and Refoundation (Libre) party, was elected president, ending the right-wing rule that had been in place since 2010. Nicaragua also held an election in November, where Ortega, the incumbent president and candidate for the Sandinista National Liberation Front, was re-elected, and the left-wing party continued to govern.
In the three general elections of 2022, left-wing parties won two and the right-wing won one, with the left holding a slight edge. In the February election in Costa Rica, no candidate received enough votes for direct election; the top two candidates entered a second round in April. Ultimately, Chaves, the candidate for the right-wing Social Democratic Progress Party (PPSD), won, replacing the left-wing Citizens' Action Party (PAC). In the May presidential election in Colombia, no candidate won outright; the top two entered a second round in June. Ultimately, Petro, the candidate for the left-wing Historic Pact alliance, was elected. This was the first time a left-wing party won a general election in Colombia, ending a long period of right-wing rule. In the October election in Brazil, no candidate won the required votes outright; the top two held a second round. Lula, the candidate for the left-wing Workers' Party (PT), defeated the right-wing candidate Bolsonaro, and the left-wing returned to the governing stage.
In the four general elections of 2023, left-wing parties won one and right-wing parties won three, giving the right a clear advantage. In the April election in Paraguay, Peña, the candidate for the right-wing Colorado Party, defeated his main rival Alegre, the candidate for the left-wing National Coalition for a New Paraguay (Concertación), and the right-wing party continued to govern. In the June election in Guatemala, because no candidate won outright, the top two entered a second round in August. Ultimately, Arévalo, the candidate for the left-wing Semilla (Seed) Movement, defeated Torres, the candidate for the right-wing National Unity of Hope (UNE), and the left-wing secured power. In the August election in Ecuador, no candidate’s vote share exceeded 50%; the top two held a second round in October. Ultimately, Noboa, the candidate for the center-right National Democratic Action (ADN) alliance, defeated Gonzalez, the candidate for the left-wing Citizen Revolution Movement (RC), and the right-wing continued to govern. In the October election in Argentina, no candidate won outright; the top two entered a second round in November. Ultimately, Milei, the candidate for the right-wing Liberty Advances alliance, defeated Massa, the candidate for the left-wing Union for the Homeland (UP), and a right-wing party replaced the left-wing in government.
In 2024, there were six general elections: right-wing parties won one, a centrist party won one, and left-wing parties won four, giving the left the advantage. In the February election in El Salvador, Bukele, the candidate for the New Ideas party which advocates a "New Middle Way" [4], was elected president with a high vote count. Both the left-wing Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the right-wing Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) suffered crushing defeats, with the former failing to even secure seats in the legislature. In the May election in Panama, Mulino, the candidate for the right-wing opposition party Realizing Goals (RM), was elected president, and a right-wing party took power. In the May election in the Dominican Republic, Abinader, the incumbent president and candidate for the center-left Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM), was elected, and the center-left party continued to govern. In the June election in Mexico, Sheinbaum, the presidential candidate for the governing left-wing National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), defeated Gálvez, the nominee of a coalition of three major parties (PRI, PAN, and PRD), becoming the first female president in the country's history as the left-wing continued to govern. In the July presidential election in Venezuela, Maduro, the candidate for the governing United Socialist Party (PSUV), was re-elected, and the left-wing continued to govern. However, the opposition refused to recognize the results after they were officially announced, reflecting the intensity of the competition. In the October election in Uruguay, as no candidate won outright, the top two entered a second round in November. Ultimately, Yamandú Orsi, the candidate for the center-left opposition alliance Broad Front (FA), defeated Álvaro Delgado, the candidate for the right-wing governing Republican Coalition, and the left-wing party returned to power after five years.
III. The Political Effects of the Left-Right Struggle Continue to Spill Over
To a certain extent, political development in Latin America is a process of competition and alternating development between the left and right. There are clear differences in social foundations, political preferences, value systems, and policy orientations between the Latin American left and right. Traditionally, the competition and confrontation between the left and right in Latin America were mainly confined to the domestic sphere of each country, revolving around internal issues and related policies. In recent years, however, the effects of the left-right struggle have continuously spilled over, increasingly evolving into a significant component and a prominent manifestation of regional political development.
(i) The linkage of left-right forces within and outside the region has intensified the opposition between the Latin American left and right
The left-right struggle in Latin American countries has led to a pattern of left-right regional antagonism; meanwhile, right-wing forces from both inside and outside the region have continuously strengthened their alliances in an attempt to suppress the growth of the Latin American Left. In February 2022, the Spanish far-right Vox party and its affiliated think tank, the Disenso Foundation (Fundación Disenso), held the first regional conference of the "Madrid Forum" in Bogotá, the capital of Colombia, attended by dozens of right-wing political figures from various European and Latin American countries. Under the slogans of democracy and freedom, right-wing forces from within and outside the region attempted to join hands to oppose Latin American leftist parties and block the expansion of leftist power—specifically aiming to prevent the victories of the Colombian leftist presidential candidate Gustavo Petro and the leader of the Brazilian Workers' Party (PT), Lula, in the 2022 general elections. The "Madrid Forum" not only opposes the São Paulo Forum organized by the Latin American Left but also opposes the leftist governments of countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. The coordination between the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), an important political platform for American conservatives, and the Latin American Right has also become increasingly close, with frequent interactions and tight cooperation in inhibiting the development of leftist forces in the region. In 2019, CPAC officially entered Latin America, with Brazilian right-wing forces holding a Brazilian edition of the conference, which has been held almost annually since. In 2022, CPAC landed in Mexico, holding its first Mexican edition. In 2024, CPAC held three consecutive meetings in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. Latin American right-wing forces are attempting to use CPAC to strengthen coordination and cooperation, "huddling together for warmth" [5] and speaking with a unified voice. Furthermore, Latin American right-wing forces support each other on issues such as elections; for instance, during the 2023 Argentine general election, key right-wing figures from Brazil and Chile publicly supported Javier Milei, even traveling to Argentina to campaign for him. In 2024, Milei traveled to the United States, Brazil, and Mexico to participate in CPAC meetings, where he condemned the Brazilian leftist government for its "political persecution" of Jair Bolsonaro and called for an end to the "socialist advance" in Latin America.
On the other hand, leftist forces from within and outside the region are also strengthening coordination and cooperation to voice support for Latin American leftist governments. The Puebla Group, composed of former leftist political figures from Latin America and related regions, held its annual meeting in Colombia in November 2022. Attendees included former Colombian President Ernesto Samper, former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, former Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, former Bolivian President Evo Morales, former Dominican President Leonel Fernández, and over 100 representatives from more than 20 countries within and outside the region, including the United States, the UK, Brazil, and Mexico. The meeting focused on the development of progressive leftist forces in Latin America and the issue of Latin American integration, attempting to formulate a new agenda for these forces under special political circumstances and to provide a platform of support for Latin American leftist parties in power. The São Paulo Forum held a Central American and Caribbean regional meeting in Havana, the capital of Cuba, at the end of April 2022, with representatives from leftist parties of 10 countries in the region attending to express solidarity with the leftist governments of Cuba and Nicaragua. The 27th São Paulo Forum in 2024 fully affirmed the growing presence of leftist forces across Latin American governments. The ALBA-TCP (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) summits held in 2022 and 2024 both expressed solidarity with Latin American leftist governments and called for the Latin American Left to strengthen its unity. Leftist leaders in Latin America also voice support and provide mutual aid on electoral matters; for example, Brazilian President Lula publicly announced his support for the Argentine leftist presidential candidate Sergio Massa in 2023.
2. Contradictions and confrontations between Latin American leftist and right-wing governments have intensified significantly
Due to the spillover effects of the left-right struggle, contradictions and conflicts between leftist and right-wing governments in Latin America have occurred frequently. In December 2022, the Peruvian Congress impeached the leftist President Pedro Castillo and detained him, with Vice President Dina Boluarte taking over the presidency. Regarding this event, leftist governments in Mexico, Colombia, and Honduras clashed with Peru. Then-President of Mexico, López Obrador, repeatedly expressed public support for Castillo, calling for his immediate release and providing political asylum to his wife and children; Boluarte accused López Obrador of interfering in Peru's internal affairs and downgraded diplomatic relations to the chargé d'affaires level in February 2023. Colombian President Petro also repeatedly voiced support for Castillo; the Peruvian government accused him of "interference and offense" toward Peru, ordering the recall of its ambassador to Colombia in March 2023 and downgrading relations to the chargé d'affaires level. Honduran President Xiomara Castro stated in January 2023 that she did not recognize the Boluarte government; Peru immediately announced the withdrawal of its ambassador to Honduras and downgraded bilateral relations.
Regarding the incident in which Ecuadorian police forcibly entered the Mexican embassy to arrest former Ecuadorian leftist Vice President Jorge Glas, several leftist governments in Latin America announced the severance of diplomatic ties with the right-wing Ecuadorian government. Glas served twice as Vice President of Ecuador from 2013 to 2017. In December 2022, citing "fears for his physical safety and freedom," he went to the Mexican embassy in Ecuador to seek asylum. Subsequently, the Ecuadorian government applied to the Mexican side for entry into the embassy to arrest Glas, but Mexico refused and announced it would provide him with political asylum. On April 5, 2024, Ecuadorian security forces forcibly entered the Mexican embassy and arrested Glas. Mexico accused Ecuador of violating the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and harming Mexican diplomatic personnel, announcing the severance of diplomatic relations. Leftist governments in Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, Brazil, and Nicaragua voiced support for Mexico and condemned the right-wing Ecuadorian government for violating international law; Nicaragua also announced the severance of ties with Ecuador. To a certain extent, the Glas incident demonstrates the intensifying trend of left-right political polarization in the Latin American region.
3. Instances of Latin American leftist and right-wing leaders publicly attacking one another have increased
Although the political stances, policy propositions, and value preferences of Latin American leftist and right-wing leaders differ, instances of mutual public attacks were not common in the past. Recently, however, this public confrontation has increased, and the intensity of mutual attacks has escalated. Argentine President Milei has repeatedly attacked leftist leaders of Latin American countries, calling Mexican President López Obrador "ignorant," Brazilian President Lula "corrupt," and Colombian President Petro a "terrorist killer," which led the Colombian government to expel the Argentine ambassador. Latin American leftist leaders have also publicly traded barbs with right-wing figures like Milei; Petro remarked that Milei "is a carbon copy of Hitler," López Obrador accused Milei of being unreliable, holding the people in contempt, and being a "conservative capitalist," and Lula stated that Milei "speaks a lot of nonsense."
4. The opposition between the ruling party and the opposition in Venezuela has exacerbated regional left-right divisions
For many years, the domestic political crisis in Venezuela has been in a state of high-frequency cyclical occurrence. Centering on the national development path and the practical exploration of "Socialism for the 21st Century," two opposing blocs have gradually formed within Venezuela: first, the ruling faction centered on the leftist ruling party; and second, the opposition faction composed of a coalition of opposition parties. After the opposition alliance won the parliamentary elections at the end of 2015, the "conflict between the executive and the legislature" escalated, and the antagonism between the ruling party and the opposition intensified. To cope with internal and external pressures, Venezuela held elections for a National Constituent Assembly in 2017 and established the assembly, moving the presidential election originally scheduled for the end of 2018 forward to May. Maduro was re-elected president amidst an opposition boycott and began a new six-year term on January 10, 2019. Opposition leader and President of the National Assembly Juan Guaidó immediately declared Maduro a "usurper," demanded his resignation, and declared himself interim president. Since then, the situation in Venezuela has deteriorated sharply, with domestic conflicts escalating, which in turn triggered a comprehensive political crisis.
Regarding the Venezuelan political crisis, Latin American countries have shown divergences and even engaged in confrontation. Leftist-led countries such as Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador supported Venezuela in holding the National Constituent Assembly elections and establishing the assembly, while right-wing-led countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Peru did not recognize the election results or the laws passed by the assembly. Regarding the 2018 Venezuelan presidential election, divergences among Latin American countries further intensified. More than ten countries in the leftist-led "Bolivarian Alliance" (ALBA) supported Venezuela's early elections and reaffirmed their support for the Maduro government, while more than ten countries in the right-wing-led "Lima Group" questioned the Maduro government, opposed the early elections, and argued that it was "impossible for Venezuela to hold a democratic, transparent, and credible presidential election." After the May 2018 Venezuelan election, several right-wing governments in Latin America refused to recognize the legitimacy of the election and declared their support for the Guaidó interim government. Regarding the struggle between Venezuela's ruling and opposition parties, Latin American leftist and right-wing governments have formed a clear situation of "picking sides."
In the 2024 Venezuelan general election, the domestic ruling and opposition factions once again clashed, triggering a new alignment of positions among Latin American leftist and right-wing governments. In October 2023, the Venezuelan government and the opposition reached an agreement that included allowing international observers from the EU and the UN to monitor the election, after which relations between the government and the opposition eased somewhat. On July 28, 2024, Venezuela held its presidential election. Among the 10 candidates, the most competitive were the candidate of the United Socialist Party (PSUV) and incumbent President Nicolás Maduro, and the candidate of the opposition alliance "Democratic Unitary Platform," Edmundo González. After the National Electoral Council announced Maduro's victory, the opposition refused to recognize the results, and their supporters took to the streets in large-scale protests. In response, Latin American countries held three distinct attitudes: first, supporting the Venezuelan leftist ruling party and government, such as Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, Honduran President Xiomara Castro, Bolivian President Luis Arce, and the Nicaraguan leftist government. Second, supporting the opposition and refusing to recognize Maduro’s election. These countries are mostly under right-wing rule, though a few are under leftist rule, including Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay; Panama even announced the severance of diplomatic ties with Venezuela as a result. After the Venezuelan Supreme Court confirmed Maduro's election on August 22, the United States and ten Latin American countries (in addition to the seven aforementioned countries, also Ecuador, Guatemala, and Paraguay) issued a joint statement rejecting the Venezuelan Supreme Court's confirmation of the election results. Third, maintaining a neutral stance, primarily the leftist governments of Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia. These countries called on Venezuela to quickly publish detailed presidential election tally data and suggested that the government and the opposition abide by domestic laws to seek a solution to the political crisis.
IV. The Impact of New Socio-Economic Changes on the Left-Right Struggle in Latin America
Since the beginning of the new century, Latin American countries have undergone continuous socio-economic changes. The social structure—particularly the status and political attitudes of the middle class—has undergone significant shifts, driving new characteristics and trends in the development and governance of both leftist and right-wing parties.
(1) Long-term economic stagnation has significantly impacted the development and governance of the Latin American Left and Right
The alternation between the Left and Right and the turnover of ruling parties have an inherent correlation with economic development cycles; they are important manifestations of economic development within the political sphere. After 2003, Latin America experienced a "Golden Decade," during which the average annual growth rate was 4.8% from 2003 to 2008. Armed with strong economic growth, Latin American countries even successfully withstood the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis. From 2010 to 2013, the Latin American economy grew by 5.9%, 4.5%, 2.8%, and 2.9% respectively, providing a fiscal foundation for government poverty reduction and social programs. However, after 2014, the Latin American economy began a downward trend, showing negative growth in 2015 and 2016, achieving only low-speed growth of 1.1% in 2017 and 2018, and a growth rate of only 0.1% in 2019. Due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, growth was negative 6.8% in 2020, the lowest in 120 years. In short, from 2015 to 2024, Latin America experienced a second "lost decade," with an average annual growth rate of only 0.9%, lower than the growth rate of the first "lost decade" in the 1980s. The social consequences of economic recession have continued to ferment, leading to a decline in the government’s capacity for social governance, worsening unemployment, poverty, and income inequality, and the spread of public discontent.
Whether Latin American parties were of the left or the right, they failed during their time in power to effectively solve the conundrum of economic growth or lead their nations out of a long-term economic malaise. This resulted in profound public dissatisfaction with the governing authorities' administrative capacity and performance. Historically, the rotation between left-wing and right-wing ruling parties in Latin America has been more likely to occur in countries or periods with higher degrees of economic recession, manifesting at junctures where deficiencies in the ruling party's administrative or governing capacities were clearly exposed. The economic downturn after 2014 and the manifestation of its negative consequences brought an end to the "Pink Tide" [6] of the left that had lasted for over a decade. However, the right-wing parties that subsequently took power also failed to resolve this predicament, losing the public's trust in a short period. For both left-wing and right-wing parties, poor administrative performance leads to being discarded by voters, whereas only good performance makes it possible to win voter trust and continue governing. Due to a lack of confidence in both sides, voters have been left with no choice but to oscillate repeatedly between the left and the right. The result, at the regional level, is a situation of mutual advance and retreat, where ruling and opposition parties alternate in victory and defeat, and "two models coexist while neither holds the advantage." In other words, the new characteristics of development and governance for the left and right, as well as the new dynamics of their contestation, are to a large extent the consequence of Latin America's long-term economic sluggishness—the manifestation of this consequence in the political sphere.
(2) The anti-ruling party and anti-establishment mentality of the public has intensified the complexity of the left-right contest in Latin America
In both left-governed and right-governed countries, the social situation has tended to deteriorate against the backdrop of sustained economic decline, and public discontent toward ruling parties and governments has increased. During the "Golden Decade" of the Latin American economy at the start of the new century, which coincided with a cycle of left-wing governance, left-wing governments continuously intensified social policies, leading to a marked improvement in the social situation. From 2005 to 2012, the growth rate of public expenditure on social policy in Latin American countries was twice that of their economic growth rate, and the share of social expenditure in GDP rose from 14% to 19%. From 2000 to 2013, the impoverished population in Latin America was reduced by nearly half, with the poverty rate falling from 41.7% to 27.9%, reaching a historical low. After 2014, the economic recession in Latin America caused a decline in the government's capacity for social spending, leading to increased unemployment and intensified poverty. The unemployment rate rose from 8.4% in 2019 to 10.6% by the end of 2020 and has remained high for a long period. The employment situation for youth has seriously deteriorated, with one in four young people unemployed [12]. In 2019, the poverty and extreme poverty rates in Latin American countries reached 30.5% and 11.3%, respectively; in 2020, these increased to 33.7% and 12.5%. By 2021, among a population of over 600 million, 201 million and 86 million people were in poverty and extreme poverty respectively [13], effectively erasing the poverty reduction achievements of the "Golden Decade." Alongside the growth of unemployment and poverty, the distribution of income has further deteriorated, inequality has further intensified, and social polarization has become increasingly serious.
The deterioration of the social situation occurred simultaneously in countries governed by both the left and the right. The intensification of the sense of injustice has caused an increasing number of people to develop anti-establishment and anti-government consciousness. Some individuals have even developed a mentality of opposing whoever is in power, hoping to improve their living conditions and environment by changing the ruling party, regardless of whether that party is on the left or the right. Most voters in Latin America do not have clear ideological biases or political orientations; they use their votes more as a means to express their own demands. Some scholars have pointed out that in the eyes of most voters, the left-wing candidates who won recent general elections in countries like Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Honduras, and Chile do not necessarily represent a left-wing position but rather represent anti-establishment forces [14]. Similarly, right-wing candidates such as Milei who won elections in countries like Argentina do not necessarily represent a right-wing position but also represent anti-establishment forces. In other words, the reason voters supported these individuals was not because they believed in their left or right ideologies, but because they hoped to express dissatisfaction with the current ruling party or leaders through their vote. This consciousness and mentality of the voters have objectively intensified the complexity of the left-right contest in Latin America.
(3) Changes in social structure, particularly the middle class, have triggered new shifts in the Latin American left-right contest
With the continuous advancement of industrialization and modernization in Latin America, the middle class gradually grew and expanded. Its members are mainly distributed across government agencies, the military, schools, and the formal economic sectors. They received preferential treatment in terms of wages, housing subsidies, medical services, and social welfare, making them the primary vested interest group in the modernization process and the main beneficiaries of economic development. Consequently, they were also the most important maintainers of socio-political stability. After entering the 21st century, the Latin American middle class expanded further, with its population approaching 200 million by 2009 [15]. Although the middle class continued to grow, it possesses significant vulnerability. Due to imperfect social security systems and mechanisms, once confronted with unforeseen events such as unemployment or illness, or situations like economic stagnation or recession, a portion of the middle class may fall back into the impoverished class, resulting in the phenomenon of the "pauperization of the middle class." During Latin America's second "lost decade" from 2015 to 2024, many middle-class families and individuals returned to poverty; the increase in Latin America’s impoverished population basically originated from this pauperization of the middle class.
Accompanying the changes in the socio-economic status of the middle class, their political positions, attitudes, and preferences have also undergone changes. First, they no longer focus excessively on the political inclination of the rulers. The middle class possesses a desire for a better future and upward social mobility, as well as an expectation to protect their vested rights and socio-economic status. To this end, they hope that rulers can accelerate national economic development and social progress and safeguard middle-class interests; they want to prevent a reversal of social development and the return of the middle class to poverty even under conditions of economic stagnation and crisis. In this context, the middle class will choose to support parties that can bring them hope and satisfy their socio-economic demands, paying less attention to whether the ruler's political orientation is "left" or "right." Second, they no longer have specific party preferences. Traditionally, the middle class was the stabilizer and an important pillar of the Latin American democratic system, but due to changes in their socio-economic status, their political positions have become increasingly independent and their political inclinations increasingly autonomous. Mexican scholar Moreno believes that the middle class no longer follows the lines of traditional political leaders, nor the lines of national leaders and parties [16]. Many in the middle class are neither members of any party nor have connections to any party; they are simply independent voters. Many middle-class members believe that the parties they favored in the past no longer represent them, so they have turned to support other parties or no longer support any party at all, even supporting non-traditional "outside" parties or political outsiders. The new changes in the contest between the left and right in Latin America are, to a large extent, an important result and expression of the shifts in social structure—particularly the changes in the socio-economic status of the middle class and the subsequent shifts in their political positions, attitudes, and preferences.
V. Impact of New Changes in the Left-Right Contest on the Latin American Political Ecosystem
The new changes, characteristics, and trends in the contest between the left and right in Latin America have not only altered the political ecosystem, party development, and the state of party politics in the region but have also had a major impact on solidarity and cooperation among various countries.
(1) The legitimacy base of both left-wing and right-wing ruling parties in Latin America is insufficient
Many ruling parties in Latin America often manage to narrowly win general elections only by forming alliances with other parties; thus, they do not receive the support of the vast majority of voters. The legitimacy base of both left-wing and right-wing ruling parties is somewhat insufficient. On the one hand, most left-wing ruling parties only narrowly won in the second round of voting, meaning the foundations of their governing legitimacy are not solid. Castillo's vote share in the first round of Peru's 2021 election was only 13%, and he won the second round by a razor-thin margin of 0.2 percentage points. Boric's vote share in the first round of Chile's 2021 election was 25.8%, and while he won the second round with 55.9%, the advantage was not overwhelming. In the first round of Brazil's 2022 election, the difference between Lula and his main rival was only 5 percentage points, and he won the second round by a narrow margin of only 0.6 percentage points. In the first round of Colombia's 2022 presidential election, Petro's vote share was 40.32%, and he won the second round by a slim 3 percentage points. Arévalo's vote share in the first round of Guatemala's 2023 presidential election was 15.51%, and although he was elected with 58% in the second round, he also held no absolute advantage.
On the other hand, the legitimacy base of many right-wing ruling parties is also insufficient. In Ecuador's 2021 presidential election, the eventual winner, Lasso, received less than 20% of the vote in the first round; Noboa's vote share in the first round of the 2023 election was 23.73%, and he narrowly won the second round with 52.28%. In the first round of Costa Rica's 2022 presidential election, Chaves's vote share was only 16.7%, and he won the second round by a small margin of 52.9%; if one considers that the turnout in the second round was only 56.7%, the voters who actually supported him amounted to less than one-third. In the first round of Argentina's 2023 election, Milei obtained 29.86% of the votes, and his second-round vote share was 55.69%, similarly lacking a clear advantage. In Paraguay and Panama, where presidential elections consist of only one round of voting, the vote shares of the elected presidents were also quite low: in 2023, Peña was elected president of Paraguay with 43% of the vote, and in 2024, Mulino was elected president of Panama with 34.33% of the vote.
(2) Insufficient governing capacity of Latin American left-wing and right-wing ruling parties
Neither the left-wing ruling parties in countries like Peru, Honduras, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, and Guatemala, nor the right-wing ruling parties in countries like Costa Rica, Ecuador, Argentina, and Panama, can obtain a majority or occupy a dominant position in the legislative branches. Looking first at the left-wing ruling parties: the Free Peru party, which has been in power since July 2021, holds only 37 of the 130 seats in the unicameral Congress; the Liberty and Refoundation Party of Honduras, in power since January 2022, holds only 50 of the 128 seats in the unicameral National Congress; the "Approve Dignity" coalition in Chile, in power since March 2022, holds only 5 and 37 seats respectively among the 50 directly elected Senators and 155 Deputies, making it the third largest political force in the legislature; the "Historic Pact" coalition of Colombia, in power since August 2022, holds 20 of the 108 seats in the Senate and 25 of the 188 seats in the House of Representatives, both of which are less than 20% of the total; the Workers' Party of Brazil, in power since January 2023, holds 68 of the 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, ranking second, and 9 of the 81 seats in the Federal Senate, ranking fifth; and the "Semilla" (Seed Movement) party of Guatemala, in power since January 2024, holds only 23 of the 160 seats in the unicameral Congress. Turning next to the right-wing ruling parties: the Social Democratic Progress Party of Costa Rica, in power since May 2022, holds only 10 of the 57 seats in the unicameral Legislative Assembly; the "National Democratic Action" coalition of Ecuador, in power since November 2023, has only 14 seats in the 137-seat unicameral National Assembly; the "La Libertad Avanza" (Liberty Advances) coalition of Argentina, in power since December 2023, holds only 8 of the 72 seats in the Senate and 38 of the 257 seats in the Chamber of Deputies; and the Realizing Goals party of Panama, in power since July 2024, holds 13 of the 71 seats in the unicameral National Assembly [17].
Many ruling parties in Latin America lead "weak governments" that lack stable support in their legislatures. Their administrative processes are arduous, they find it difficult to escape the constraints imposed by the opposition and fulfill their campaign promises, and their governing capacity is severely restricted. Some ruling parties or leaders even find it difficult to complete their scheduled terms in an unstable political and social environment. For example, after taking office as President of Peru in July 2021, Castillo was constantly obstructed by the opposition, and his planned reform measures could not be effectively advanced; in December 2022, he was impeached by the opposition-controlled Congress and failed to complete his scheduled term. Lasso, after taking office as President of Ecuador in 2021, struggled incessantly with the opposition-controlled National Assembly and was forced to step down early in 2023, failing to complete his four-year statutory term.
(3) The spillover of political effects from the left-right contest endangers Latin American regional cooperation
If the struggle between the Left and Right within Latin American countries affects national governance capacity, then its political spillover effects endanger the unity and cooperation of Latin American nations. Some scholars believe that the ideological struggle between the Left and Right has exacerbated conflicts among Latin American countries [7]. Influenced by political and ideological differences between the Left and Right, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the most important regional cooperation organization in Latin America, encountered a crisis after 2018 and came to the brink of dissolution. At that time, the right-wing governments of Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru announced the suspension of their cooperation with the Union, and Colombia further announced its withdrawal. After Lula [8] took office in 2023, he attempted to revitalize the Union, but still faced significant resistance. Mercosur [9], another important regional cooperation organization in Latin America, has also experienced splits due to left-right struggles and ideological differences among the relevant countries: in August 2017, the four founding members—Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay (all governed by the Right at the time), and Uruguay—suspended Venezuela’s membership based on the "Democratic Clause" [10]. The Venezuelan left-wing government characterized this as the relevant countries "turning the organization into an apparatus for political persecution." The establishment of Spain’s "Disensus Foundation" (Fundación Disenso) and the American "Conservative Political Action Conference" (CPAC) in Latin America, along with their intensified coordination with the Latin American Right, has also exacerbated the left-right confrontation and the complexity of the regional political landscape. Furthermore, the divergence among Latin American countries regarding the Venezuela issue has seriously endangered unity and cooperation, damaging the fragile regional integration process; for instance, Uruguayan President Lacalle Pou expressed deep concern over the emergence of "clubs of ideological friends" in Latin America, a tendency that severely undermines regional cooperation.
(IV) New Changes in the Contest Between the Latin American Left and Right are Unlikely to Alter the "Normalcy" of the Region’s Party Politics
As previously mentioned, the cyclical changes in the alternation between the Left and Right in Latin America are not isolated; rather, they are intrinsically linked to cycles of economic and social development, representing the manifestation of economic and social development within the political sphere. The alternation between Left and Right usually occurs during periods of economic downturn, aggravating social crises, increasing public dissatisfaction, and difficulty in advancing reforms. The ascent of the Latin American Left to power at a specific stage does not signify the weakening or disappearance of right-wing influence; the Right still possesses various means to constrain left-wing governing parties. Similarly, the period of right-wing governance does not mean the Left is inert; the Left also has numerous means to counter right-wing rulers. In Latin America, where social inequality is severe, the propositions of the Left hold great appeal, and left-wing parties naturally exert significant political and social influence. However, because most Latin American countries lack profound social transformation, the influence of right-wing elitism remains deeply rooted. Although the Left may occupy a dominant position in a certain period, the Right may take the lead in another. Competition between the Left and Right and the alternation of power will remain the "normalcy" [11] of Latin American party politics in the future.
(Author’s Affiliation: Guangdong University of Foreign Studies) Web Editor: Zhang Jian Source: Issues of Contemporary World Socialism, No. 4, 2024