Yang Jianmin and Shan Chongyun: Exploration of National Development Models by Latin American Leftist Ruling Parties
The current political landscape in Latin America presents a trend of complex evolution. After experiencing the "super-election cycle" of 2022–2024, Latin America has once again returned to a political ecosystem [1] where the left is widely in power. Looking at the number of countries governed by the left, 13 of the 19 major Latin American nations are ruled by left-wing or center-left parties. In particular, the return to power of the Brazilian Workers' Party (PT) in 2023 after a six-year hiatus marked the climax of this new round of left-wing governance in the region. Overall, the Latin American left continues to oppose neoliberalism, attempting to explore new alternative development models. They emphasize the role of the state in economic and social development as well as social equity, advocate for regional integration and strengthened regional left-wing solidarity and autonomy, and value their collective identity within the "Global South."
While the Latin American left is experiencing a comprehensive resurgence, far-right forces have launched a powerful challenge against the left's exploration of alternative models to neoliberalism. The power struggle between left and right at both national and regional levels is intense. The far-right adheres to fundamentalist liberalism, promoting market freedom, rejecting government intervention, and implementing a series of radical liberalization reform measures. Furthermore, even when left-wing candidates win general elections, the margin of victory over right-wing candidates is often very slim, and the right remains powerful at the parliamentary level. Behind this fierce competition between the Latin American left and right lies a deeper struggle between the neoliberal development model and various alternatives to it.
I. Analysis of National Development Models and Primary Types of Ruling Left-Wing Parties in Latin America
Different scholars have varying understandings of "national development models." Yu Keping believes that a development model refers to a series of development strategies, institutions, and concepts with distinct characteristics. The American economist Charles K. Wilber argues that a development model abstracts minor features from various instances of a country's historical development experience, concentrating and summarizing their primary commonalities and most relevant characteristics. Zhou Hong proposes that the concept of a development model should include two meanings: first, it explains the particularity of a nation's development path, defining the specificities of models such as the "East Asian model," "Latin American model," or "EU model"; second, development models are exportable and imitable, often accompanied by strategic exportation—for instance, the United States forcibly promoting the neoliberal development model in Latin America. Zhao Hong, comparing the four major global development models of the 20th century, analyzed the US neoliberal model, the Soviet socialist model, the European democratic socialist model, and the China model, noting that any development model has its externalized theoretical trends and internal pursuits, which are closely related to its historical conditions and the social problems it faces. Wang Youming believes that the US-led neoliberal model and the Rhine model (centered on Germany’s social market economy) are currently waning, while the "Global South's" exploration of development models is increasingly attracting international attention. This article adopts the definition used by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), which views the development model as a comprehensive exploration by Latin American countries in the fields of political development, economic development, and foreign relations. This article maintains that "development model" carries no positive or negative connotation but reflects questions of what a country or region develops, how it develops, and the results of that development.
Since independence, Latin American countries have successively experienced the primary-product export model, the import-substitution industrialization (ISI) model, and the neoliberal outward-oriented development model. Following the outbreak of the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s, the neoliberal model gradually came to dominate the region's direction, exerting a comprehensive and profound impact on its political, economic, and social development. The privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) mandated by neoliberalism made Latin American countries excessively dependent on foreign capital, leading to the continuous drain of state assets and exacerbating the fragility of national economies and financial systems. Due to the lack of effective public policy, unemployment has become increasingly prominent, poverty has increased, and social polarization has intensified. Since the beginning of the 21st century, left-wing forces in Latin America have come to power one after another, attempting to change the neoliberal model and seeking to explore new alternatives.
Latin American countries have a left-wing tradition spanning over 100 years, with thoughts deeply influenced by socialist and communist ideologies. Because of this, the Latin American left has become a progressive force pursuing independence and social justice, and a vital political force for these nations to escape dependent development and explore autonomous developmental paths and models. Although different factions of the Latin American left vary in their political inclinations, they share a long historical heritage and common characteristics. In terms of political concepts, they advocate for popular politics, defend national independence, and generally oppose elite rule. Regarding their mass base, because left-wing forces oppose traditional privileges and vested interests, advocate for changing unreasonable social orders, and demand a just redistribution of interests, large numbers of informal workers and the poor have become their steadfast supporters. Ideologically, they lean toward socialist policies, advocating for a degree of government intervention in the economy, expanding public welfare, and ensuring social equity while opposing laissez-faire market models. In foreign policy, they particularly oppose US intervention in regional affairs and support the process of regional integration.
Regarding the classification of the Latin American left, scholars at home and abroad generally divide them into "radical left" and "moderate left" based on the governance methods adopted by the ruling parties. This article argues that the Latin American left possesses diversity in both theory and practice. While using governance methods as a premise, one should further subdivide them by the depth of their exploration of alternative development models, which better fits the reality of Latin American countries. Currently, ruling left-wing parties in Latin America continue to explore alternatives to neoliberalism, attempting to revise the neoliberal model to varying degrees. However, major differences exist in how different countries construct these alternatives. Accordingly, this article divides them into three categories: the radical left, the ultra-left, and the moderate left.
The first category consists of the long-term ruling radical left, primarily including the current ruling parties of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. Cuba established a socialist system after the 1959 Revolution; its "updating of the model" [2] constitutes the self-perfection and development of the socialist system. In terms of exploring alternatives to neoliberalism, Venezuela is representative and more radical. Its characteristic is that the government has adopted large-scale privatization policies or sought absolute majority ownership in almost all fields, strongly impacting the neoliberal model and even shaking the foundations of capitalism. It possesses distinct radical-left characteristics and an anti-US, anti-hegemonic color in both domestic and foreign policy.
The second category is the ultra-left, represented by the current ruling party in Mexico. The ultra-left features distinct characteristics of nationalization and resource nationalism, but its nationalization primarily involves the energy and mineral sectors, and its development model still retains the basic framework of neoliberalism. The López Obrador government proposed the "Fourth Transformation" [3], characterized by promoting anti-corruption, eliminating privilege, and improving people’s livelihoods, using it as a development model. Its foreign policy emphasizes national sovereignty and maintains an anti-US but non-radical basic stance. Since Claudia Sheinbaum took office, she has continued Mexico’s ultra-left development model, pushing the "Fourth Transformation" into its second phase.
The third category is the moderate left, represented by the current ruling parties in Chile, Colombia, and Brazil. The main characteristic of the moderate left in Chile and Colombia is that they appeared as ultra-leftists when taking power, strongly condemning the neoliberal model, but after being constrained by domestic traditional forces, they ultimately devolved into the moderate left. Brazil’s multi-party governing coalition means the moderate left does not intend to completely change the neoliberal model but uses "model transformation" as a slogan and policy priority, focusing more on environmental protection, sustainable development, and improving livelihoods, seeking to replace the existing model through gradual and moderate means. Externally, moderate left governments advocate for diversified diplomatic strategies, value their "Global South" collective identity, and support regional integration, hoping to carry out economic and trade cooperation with major powers outside the region to obtain practical benefits and enhance their international status.
II. Different Explorations of Alternative Development Models by Ruling Left-wing Parties in Latin America
Currently, the new round of Latin American left-wing governance is at its peak. As a vital political force aiming for equality and justice, Latin American left-wing parties—while launching strong criticism and solemn denunciations of neoliberalism—are attempting to explore new alternative development models. However, there are clear differences in the depth of these explorations, represented primarily by the radical left model in Venezuela, the ultra-left model in Mexico, and the moderate left models in Chile, Colombia, and Brazil.
(1) Venezuela’s Radical Left Development Model
Since 1999, under the successive leadership of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, the radical left has ruled in Venezuela for 25 consecutive years. In terms of development models, the Venezuelan radical left are believers in statism and advocates of economic nationalism, striving to realize a transformation of the national development model and a restructuring of the interest distribution pattern. To this end, Chávez established the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and advocated for the goal of "21st-century socialism" through the "Bolivarian Revolution." Venezuela has exerted the strongest destruction of neoliberalism, even shaking the foundations of capitalism. In the economic sphere, Venezuela is the only Latin American country to implement large-scale nationalization policies. Through over one hundred laws, Chávez implemented large-scale nationalization in almost all fields—including land, oil, and telecommunications—gaining absolute control over key strategic sectors such as energy and resources. He used the constitution to guarantee the government's complete ownership of oil companies to thoroughly break the neoliberal model. In Chávez’s view, Venezuela had to defend its oil sovereignty and use oil revenue as a tool for transforming the development model, as the primary source of funding for improving people's lives and expanding investment in productive sectors, thereby seizing the initiative in national development. In the political sphere, Chávez vigorously constructed "participatory democracy," replacing elite democracy with social democracy, making popular power the legitimate basis of the national political system, and causing massive changes in the distribution of political, economic, and cultural power. Under the participatory democracy system, previously marginalized informal workers, the urban poor, and indigenous peoples gained channels for direct political participation. During Chávez’s tenure, the PSUV invested massive funds into social sectors, significantly improving social welfare levels. In foreign policy, Chávez pursued an expansionist strategy, strongly supporting Latin American left-wing forces, actively promoting regional integration, using oil as a weapon for anti-US diplomacy, strongly attacking US hegemonic behavior, and vigorously developing relations with Third World countries.
After taking office, Maduro basically continued the radical left development model of the Chávez era, continuing to explore a path different from neoliberalism. The Maduro government similarly maximizes oil revenue through state control of oil exploration, production, and sales, using it to develop non-oil economic sectors and improve livelihoods. Maduro proposed the "New Era of Transition to Socialism (2022–2030)" national development plan, arguing that neoliberalism caused severe destruction in the social sphere and is the root of social chaos in Latin America. On July 29, 2024, Venezuela held its most important general election in 25 years. Maduro defeated Edmundo González, the candidate for the opposition alliance "Democratic Unity Platform," with 51.2% of the vote, beginning his third term (2025–2031) and maintaining radical left governance.
In terms of resource endowment, Venezuela is a typical petro-state; its political and social development is deeply influenced by oil factors. This dependence makes Venezuela susceptible to shocks from international market fluctuations, making economic booms and busts a norm. Due to the sharp decline in oil revenue, Venezuela's GDP has shrunk significantly. Although the Maduro government has implemented a series of reform measures targeting the economic crisis—such as gradually loosening currency and exchange controls and relaxing regulations on mining and oil industries—and has prioritized the construction of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to break the dependence on an oil economy, the structural problems and institutional obstacles restricting sustained economic development have yet to be eliminated.
Currently, the political situation in Venezuela is complex and the economy faces considerable difficulties, yet Maduro maintains firm control over the military, and the general social situation remains stable. Regarding its social base, the work of the Venezuelan radical left focuses on integrating the "excluded"—urban poor, informal workers, indigenous peoples, peasants, and housewives who have long failed to derive real benefit from national development—into the country's political, economic, and social life. Because these "excluded" persons are numerous, their support is sufficient to allow a revolutionary regime to remain in power over the long term. However, the theory and practice of Venezuela’s "21st Century Socialism" also faces an unprecedented crisis; a series of deep-seated problems in economic growth, political stability, and social development have been exposed.
In the realm of foreign relations, the Maduro government has made South-South cooperation a diplomatic priority, opposing neoliberalism, free trade, and hegemonism while supporting world multipolarity and regional integration. It relies on support from countries such as China and Russia across multiple fields, including diplomacy, energy, and military affairs. The Maduro government has studied and drawn upon China’s experience in building Special Economic Zones, continuously deepening pragmatic cooperation between Venezuela and China in agriculture, investment, education, and tourism, elevating bilateral relations to an all-weather strategic partnership. Led by the Russia-Venezuela High-Level Intergovernmental Commission, cooperation between the two nations in energy, science and technology, and finance has gradually deepened, demonstrating a solid foundation for strategic cooperation. On November 7, 2024, Venezuela and Russia officially signed an energy cooperation agreement, including plans for the joint development of natural gas fields. Vice President Rodríguez stated at a press conference that the new agreement covers 17 bilateral cooperation projects, not limited to the energy sector but also including transport, mining, tourism, and education. The core intention of this move is to enhance the development potential of the Venezuelan economy through diversified cooperation.
In short, the Venezuelan radical left opposes the neoliberal development model guided by the "Washington Consensus." Some of its measures have even broken through the capitalist framework, yet it has still not successfully scouted out a new development model. In the economic sphere, Venezuela urgently needs to reduce its reliance on oil and broaden its economic base; in the political sphere, it needs to smash elite politics, break the monopoly on power held by old political blocs, and enable the broad masses to truly participate in the national political process; in the social sphere, it needs to achieve a higher degree of integration so that the middle and lower classes can fully enjoy oil wealth and the developmental fruits it brings. For the Venezuelan radical left, the road to shaking off oil dependency and finding an alternative development model is tortuous, and exploration must continue in the future.
(2) The Development Model of the Mexican Far-Left
For a long time, the political party landscape in Mexico was a "tripod" consisting of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), with the neoliberal development model deeply rooted in the country. In 2018, López [Obrador] won the presidency as the candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), becoming Mexico's first leftist president in nearly half a century. Because the previous right-wing parties failed to implement effective reform measures—allowing social problems such as corruption, poverty, and violent crime to intensify—the public urgently hoped the left could change the previous neoliberal model and lead the country out of its developmental bottleneck.
The Mexican far-left's development model is characterized by distinct nationalization and resource nationalism, though its nationalization primarily involves the energy and mineral sectors. Although the far-left criticizes neoliberalism, it nonetheless retains the basic neoliberal framework. Since taking office, López has proposed the "Fourth Transformation" [4] centered on anti-corruption, eliminating privileges, and improving people's livelihoods, treating it as a development model. Politically, he advocates restoring state credibility, promoting judicial reform, strictly investigating graft and corruption, and preventing human rights violations. Economically, he proposes increasing the government’s interventionist role, strongly criticizes the neoliberal model, and focuses on fostering two state-owned energy enterprises—PEMEX and CFE. He halted the energy reforms directed toward privatization initiated by the former right-wing president Peña Nieto and advanced the nationalization process of core industries like energy and minerals. Socially, he advocates expanding social welfare, raising the minimum wage, and providing more education and employment opportunities for the youth to tangibly improve the living standards of the middle and lower classes. Since the ruling party coalition led by López holds a majority in both houses of Congress, this has provided an important guarantee for the transition of the development model.
The Mexican far-left possesses a strong tendency toward resource nationalism. The massive fiscal deficit faced by the government is a practical necessity for adopting resource nationalism, while the general resurgence of the Latin American left has provided the political foundation for it. The Mexican far-left’s resource nationalism aims to strengthen resource sovereignty and enhance resource value, shifting from traditional fields toward new energy minerals crucial for green economic development, such as lithium, copper, and zinc, with "lithium nationalism" being the most typical example. A bill for the nationalization of Mexican lithium mines has passed both houses of Congress, and "Litio para México" (Lithium for Mexico) was established to take full responsibility for lithium mining and extraction. Lithium is regarded as a national strategic resource, and private enterprises attempting to enter Mexico to exploit lithium resources are rejected.
In foreign relations, the Mexican far-left supports leftist movements in other Latin American countries and co-founded the "Puebla Group" with regional leftists, aiming to strengthen solidarity and autonomy among the Latin American left and jointly curb the development of right-wing conservative forces. The attitude toward the United States is one of maintaining distance without being radical, adhering to the national concept of "Mexico First." López refused to attend the Summit of the Americas because Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela were not invited; he publicly criticized NATO's policy toward Ukraine and sued American arms manufacturers, demanding they take responsibility and provide compensation for the proliferation of gun violence in Mexico. Although disputes exist between Mexico and the U.S. regarding Mexico's energy reform policies, cooperation between the two sides has generally progressed in an orderly fashion.
As a political protégé of López, Sheinbaum’s election has brought the "Fourth Transformation" into its second stage. The development model she promotes largely continues López’s far-left line, advocating for nationalization in the energy and resource sectors, judicial reform, expanding civil rights, and raising wages, which has garnered support from the broad laboring class and the grassroots. In October 2024, Sheinbaum signed decrees for energy and railway reforms, officially returning PEMEX and CFE to the people as state-owned public service enterprises, forcefully advancing the nationalization process of strategic pillar industries. Furthermore, she is rebuilding the national passenger rail system through reform to improve transport efficiency, strengthen traffic safety, enhance the quality of life for the masses, and reduce carbon emissions. Sheinbaum previously served on the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); as an expert on energy and environmental issues, she launched an energy transition plan after taking office to vigorously promote renewable energy development, proposing a target of 45% renewable energy in total electricity generation by 2030. Her energy transition plan not only focuses on increasing the proportion of renewables but also announced limits on oil production, not to exceed 1.8 million barrels per day. Facing increasingly severe domestic drought issues, she has also formulated a water resource management plan. In foreign policy, Sheinbaum emphasizes independence and anti-hegemony, adopting an attitude of both struggle and cooperation toward the United States, advocating for strengthened regional solidarity and the advancement of regional integration. Regarding Trump’s policy of imposing tariffs on Mexico, she expressed resolute opposition and stated she would take all necessary measures to protect her people and jobs, while simultaneously engaging in dialogue and negotiations with the Trump administration.
In short, the Mexican far-left’s development model takes the "Fourth Transformation" as its primary content. It has implemented partial nationalization policies in the energy and minerals sectors and displays characteristics of resource nationalism, but in economic and trade relations, it still chooses to uphold the USMCA, and in economic policy, it retains the basic framework of the neoliberal development model. Before leaving office, López’s approval rating was as high as 77%; the Mexican people saw hope for national development in the "Fourth Transformation," which is also an important reason why they chose Sheinbaum and continued to support the far-left.
(3) The Development Model of the Moderate Left in Chile, Colombia, and Brazil
Since the "return of power to the people" [5] in the 1990s, the political situation in Chile has been generally stable. The reason for this is that whether a leftist or right-wing party is in power, both tend to follow a moderate middle-of-the-road path, and policies possess more steadiness and continuity compared to other Latin American countries. However, the neoliberal development model caused social classes to gradually solidify and the domestic gap between rich and poor to widen daily, leading to frequent social protest movements. The broad masses urgently hoped the government would play a larger role in areas such as macroeconomic regulation, pension system reform, and public healthcare. Consequently, the statist concepts advocated by President Boric—a former radical student movement leader—such as increasing social welfare and conducting constitutional reform, were more in line with the public's demand for change.
Regarding the development model, as a paragon of neoliberal reform, Chile's neoliberal development model has never undergone substantive change. Although Boric condemned and rejected the "Pinochet neoliberal model" and proposed relatively radical policy positions such as constitutional revision and the nationalization of natural resources, he lacked sufficient capacity to change the neoliberal development model in the face of powerful domestic neoliberal forces and constraints within parliament. He eventually devolved into a moderate leftist, using the transition of the development model merely as a slogan while shifting more toward issues like environmental protection, sustainable development, and improving livelihoods, attempting to explore alternative models in a gradual and moderate manner.
Constitutional reform has been the core agenda in Chile’s political sphere for the past five years. The public held high expectations for the formulation of a more socially inclusive new constitution to replace the old constitution of the Pinochet military government era, which was characterized by neoliberalism. However, during Boric’s term, new constitutional proposals were rejected in two national referendums. Radical proposals in the draft constitution put forward by the leftist government—such as nationalizing natural resources, the freedom to choose healthcare, education, and pensions, and refusing to consolidate private welfare models at the constitutional level—were met with strong opposition from traditional classes. This also exposed the fact that the leftist government’s reforms failed to find a suitable balance between efficiency and equity. After two failures, Boric announced that he would no longer push for constitutional reform during his term but would instead focus on advancing other political agendas. The Chilean left, represented by Boric, has realized that political polarization will not improve the status quo and that it is necessary to seek consensus with the right to push reforms forward. Its policies in the later period of governance have gradually shifted toward moderate pragmatism, and its demands for change have become more realistic. Overall, the Chilean moderate left’s exploration of a development model has failed to touch the basic framework of neoliberalism due to various obstacles.
The moderate leftist government in Colombia has similarly failed to touch the basic neoliberal framework. Colombia was long governed by right-wing elite classes, with relatively stable political and economic development, yet its levels of corruption, social inequality, and poverty rates were among the highest in Latin America. Driven by dissatisfaction and distrust of right-wing governments, and influenced by the two waves of the Latin American left since the 21st century, voters tended to try different development models. As Colombia's first leftist president in history, Petro also appeared as a member of the far-left upon taking office, proposing to replace the neoliberal development model with "democratic socialism" to solve long-accumulated social problems and build a welfare-oriented government. He explicitly stated that continuing neoliberalism would destroy Colombia, and that the state's role in the economy should be expanded, the current healthcare and pension systems abolished, private enterprises forced out, and existing individual savings in the pension system nationalized along with future fund flows to be operated by the state. In international trade, Petro advocated for trade protectionism, raising tariffs and revising free trade agreements. However, his alternative plan was likewise met with strong opposition from domestic traditional classes. After various reform measures triggered great controversy, he gradually turned toward pragmatism, focusing more on issues such as poverty reduction, increasing education enrollment, combating drug trafficking, governing corruption, protecting the environment, and abolishing compulsory military service.
In Brazil, after Workers' Party (PT) leader Lula returned to power, he proposed several social programs and advocated for change under the slogan of transforming the development model. In January 2024, the Lula government officially announced the launch of the "New Industry Brazil" (Nova Indústria Brasil) plan. This national industrial development scheme for the next decade emphasizes social, economic, and environmental dimensions, positioning the strengthening of national industry as a vital pillar of sustainable development. Since the 1980s, due to the boom in commodity exports, Brazil experienced a rapid process of deindustrialization, characterized by the "primarization" [6] of industrial production and the shortening and weakening of industrial chains. Lula believes that the "deindustrialization" policies adopted by the previous far-right government, which relied on the production and export of agricultural commodities to grow the economy, came at the expense of national industrial development. He announced that the government would provide 300 billion reais in financing for the new industrial plan to reverse the deindustrialization process of the past decades. The "New Industry Brazil" plan includes six priority tasks: building sustainable and digitalized agro-industrial chains to guarantee food, nutritional, and energy security; building a health industrial-economic complex; building sustainable infrastructure, sanitation, housing, and transportation; promoting digital transformation in industry; promoting green development; and promoting technological development related to national sovereignty and defense. Through this new strategic layout and policy measures, the Lula government places greater emphasis on innovation, aiming to achieve sustainable and inclusive development. It seeks to optimize and upgrade Brazil's industrial structure by increasing productivity and expanding exports, yet it has not touched the basic framework of neoliberalism.
In the realm of foreign relations, moderate left-wing governments in Chile, Colombia, and Brazil have actively pursued diversified foreign policies. They support regional integration processes, value their collective identity as part of the "Global South," and hope to carry out economic and trade cooperation with major powers outside the region to obtain practical benefits and enhance their international status. Regarding relations with the United States, Petro has engaged in consultations with the U.S. on issues such as renegotiating free trade agreements, protecting the Amazon rainforest, ending the drug war, and Colombia's economic transition. Currently, Colombia is seeking to become a middle power, actively developing partnerships with emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil, and establishing new forms of cooperation with the European Union, the African Union, and the Arab League. Moderate left-wing governments have also strengthened cooperation with other left-wing governments in Latin America, coordinating positions with countries like Mexico to address international issues. Through changes in diplomatic strategy and deep participation in the international agenda, they seek to better realize their national interests.
III. Lessons and Experiences of Latin American Left-wing Governing Parties in Exploring National Development Models
Currently, left-wing governing parties are active on the Latin American political stage, serving as an important force in the region's pluralistic political landscape and a vital component of the world socialist movement. To break free from dependency and forge an autonomous path of development, the Latin American left has actively sought change and independently explored development models to substitute for neoliberalism, yielding both successful experiences and profound lessons.
First, this round of exploration by the Latin American left is the second beneficial attempt by Latin American countries to seek an autonomous development path, yet it has not broken through the capitalist framework institutionally. From the 1930s to the 1960s, a series of populist regimes—such as the Cárdenas government in Mexico, the Perón government in Argentina, and the Vargas government in Brazil—pursued indigenous structuralist theories and import-substitution industrialization (ISI) strategies to break the shackles of Western modernization theory. They embarked on a "Third Way" and achieved economic and political miracles that drew world attention. However, after the drastic changes in Eastern Europe [7], Communist parties worldwide were weakened to varying degrees, and the socialist movement suffered unprecedented setbacks. Neoliberal reforms brought a series of negative consequences to Latin American countries, including slow economic growth, a wide gap between rich and poor, unequal income distribution, and social polarization. Under these circumstances, the Latin American left withstood huge shocks, survived tenaciously, and gradually recovered and developed, becoming a highlight of the contemporary world socialist movement. The Latin American left actively sought unity and cooperation, establishing the "São Paulo Forum" and the "World Social Forum." They strongly criticized capitalism and neoliberalism while actively exploring new alternative models, bringing Latin American countries back to the path of autonomous development. However, viewed as a whole, this round of exploration has not broken through the neoliberal and capitalist framework; what it seeks to replace is merely the neoliberal development model, and progress has not been smooth. In Venezuela, the right-wing opposition camp led by Juan Guaidó and Edmundo González has continuously gathered strength, frequently instigating strikes and military coups; there has even been a chaotic situation where two presidents and two national assemblies coexisted. Private capital still holds an important position in the economy, and vested interest groups strive to maintain their economic privileges. Holding monopolies in finance, construction, transportation, and services, they do their utmost to obstruct the development of "Socialism for the 21st Century." In Mexico, some critics argue that the current economic development model of the far-left is closer to neoliberalism than to genuine left-wing thought. In Brazil, the Workers' Party, constrained by the domestic multi-party governing coalition and the influence of interest groups, has adopted moderate reform policies without touching the economic and social systems or the fundamental interests of conservatives, and has not made the replacement of the neoliberal development model a governing objective.
Second, during their time in power, the Latin American left has made certain contributions to correcting the injustices in distribution and the polarization between rich and poor caused by neoliberalism, as well as in social governance. However, overall, the exploration of development models has not been successful. By strengthening the role of the state, they made social equity and redistribution important agenda items and used active state intervention to achieve economic development, representing a correction of the "Washington Consensus" and the neoliberal development model. Large-scale reforms in the social sphere—emphasizing political inclusion, valuing civil rights, and collective participation—also differ essentially from the individualistic concepts emphasized by neoliberalism. It is worth noting that in the seven years since the implementation of the "Fourth Transformation" [8], Mexico has achieved significant results in the economic field and gained strong support from its people. Brazil’s moderate left has focused on promoting the "Growth Acceleration Program" (PAC), centering on social infrastructure, digitalization, and connectivity. This has created many jobs for the lower and middle classes, allowed the fruits of development to be shared by more people, and consolidated political democratization. On the other hand, the alternative development model implemented by the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) failed to effectively solve the series of political, economic, and social problems facing the country. The socialist concepts it advocates have not ascended to a social consensus, and the new development model has exposed serious flaws. According to UNHCR statistics, as of June 2024, 7.7 million Venezuelans have left their homeland due to hyperinflation, currency devaluation, and shortages of food and medicine. Therefore, finding a development path that fits their actual conditions remains a long-term task for radical left-wing governments. Regarding the moderate left, the failure of two constitutional reform attempts dealt a major political blow to Gabriel Boric’s government in Chile and produced a series of negative effects, leading to a continuous decline in public trust. Poll results from October 2024 showed President Boric’s approval rating at only 30%.
Finally, the Latin American left has achieved some success in improving the Party's governing capacity and level, but in the process of exploring national development models, it has neglected the Party's ideological and organizational building. As an emerging party founded in 2014, Mexico's far-left National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) deeply summarized the lessons of the long-term governance and subsequent downfall of established parties like the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the National Action Party (PAN) over the past century. Throughout its governance, it has consistently adhered to the "People First" concept and the idea of "Transformation," leading to a continuous improvement in its governing capacity and level. Lula, the leader of Brazil's moderate-left Workers' Party, after summarizing the lessons of his first two terms, has done his best to downplay ideological overtones. He focused on engaging with entrepreneurs, farmers, scholars, and military figures, and formulated a relatively moderate and pragmatic campaign platform. This maximized responsiveness to the demands of the lower and middle classes and appealed to the psychology of many voters. Furthermore, the Latin American left-wing governing parties show a clear trend toward multilateral diplomacy, actively developing relations with traditional major powers in the U.S. and Europe as well as emerging powers. They have actively united Latin American left-wing forces and restarted regional integration initiatives, effectively enhancing the international influence of Latin American left-wing parties. According to the new domestic and international situations, these parties have adjusted their development models in a timely manner and responded actively to various public demands, creating the necessary conditions to win voter support and govern effectively. Their governing capacity and level have improved to some extent. However, in their exploration, they neglected their own ideological and organizational building, encountering varying degrees of trust crises and governance dilemmas. Only by continuously strengthening ideological and organizational building can the Party better enhance its governing capacity and level and effectively resolve various governance challenges. In the future, left-wing governing parties in Latin America need to make the enhancement of ideological and organizational building a long-term goal, promptly resolve political, economic, and social problems, and continuously improve political systems and mechanisms to continue winning governing status on the multi-party competitive political stage of Latin American countries.
Taken as a whole, in the more than 20 years of left-wing governance in Latin America since the start of this century, most Latin American countries have not fundamentally negated the neoliberal development model and path. Because the contradictions between the left and right in the political landscape are prominent, the conflict between replacing or adhering to the neoliberal model is difficult to reconcile. This has resulted in the less-than-ideal effects of left-wing governments’ attempts to explore alternative models, which have also been buffeted by the far-right "fundamentalist" liberal model. Consequently, the contest between these two forces will persist over the long term.
IV. Challenges and Prospects of the Development Models of Latin American Left-Wing Governing States
The overall trend of slowing economic growth in Latin America has become the greatest challenge facing left-wing governance. From 2015 to 2024, the average economic growth rate in the region was only 0.9%, and it is facing another "lost decade" [9] following that of the 1980s, which has exacerbated the governing difficulties of the Latin American left. In addition, right-wing and especially far-right forces pose a significant challenge to left-wing governance.
(1) Slowing economic growth and insufficient momentum for recovery
The primary challenge facing countries governed by the Latin American left is insufficient momentum for economic growth. In 2024, affected by factors such as the significant slowdown in world economic growth, the continued decline in commodity prices, and high global financing costs, the momentum for growth in the region is clearly insufficient. The growth rate in 2024 is only 1.8%, far lower than the 2.2% in 2023 and 4.0% in 2022.
Cuba's GDP growth rate in 2023 was -1.0%. Rising prices, high inflation, and foreign exchange shortages have become massive challenges. In July 2024, Cuba held the third session of the 10th National Assembly of People's Power and decided to adopt a series of new measures aimed at promoting macroeconomic stability, including budget cuts, establishing a single price policy, and attracting foreign investment to cope with the current "war economy" situation. Prime Minister Marrero submitted a progress report on the government's efforts to correct economic distortions and revitalize the economy in 2024, stating that the government had approved 116 new measures, 53 of which have been implemented. Restoring macroeconomic balance remains the most important goal for the current Cuban government. Regarding the external environment, U.S. economic, trade, and financial blockade policies will continue to trouble Cuba for a long time. Although the U.S. has relaxed restrictions on the inflow of personnel and remittances, restrictions on medical service exports, external financing, and tourism remain, making Cuba's economic recovery difficult. The radical left in Venezuela also faces severe pressure from inflation and currency devaluation. After the third currency reform, the speed of money supply decreased but still grew too fast, which is a major reason for the persistently high inflation. Furthermore, Venezuela has long suffered from U.S. sanctions, which restrict its export capacity and have caused a large amount of international funds to be frozen, constraining the Maduro government's ability to regulate the domestic economy. The radical left government of Nicaragua launched the "National Plan for Poverty Reduction and Human Development (2022–2026)" and the "Indicative Plan for Expanding Energy Production 2021–2035," actively promoting energy reform to achieve relative macroeconomic stability. However, due to factors such as high global inflation, rising food and energy prices, and supply chain shocks, its economic growth rate decreased instead of increasing, reaching 3.6% in 2024, though it remains higher than the Latin American average.
The left-wing governments of Brazil and Mexico have turned in relatively impressive performances. Since his election, President Lula [10] has prioritized stimulating economic growth. In 2024, Brazil's economic growth rate reached 3.4%, driven by bumper harvests of agricultural products, increased commodity exports, and growth in services and industry, though it still faces certain inflationary pressures. Mexico’s Far-Left government introduced a new investment plan, utilizing the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and US "nearshoring" policies to restructure its industrial chains. In 2023, Mexico's economic growth rate was 3.3%, and 1.5% in 2024, while the poverty rate fell to a historic low of below 40%. However, due to the deep integration of the US and Mexican economies, Mexico's growth is expected to slow to just 0.4% in 2025, affected by the decelerating US economy and a decline in domestic aggregate demand, particularly investment.
Viewed globally, the Latin American economy fluctuates in resonance with the world economy. Consequently, left-wing governments have generally neutralized inflation as their primary economic policy goal, while increasing exports and attracting foreign investment have become crucial means of resisting recession and restoring growth. Stubbornly high inflation, intensified economic vulnerability, and a lack of growth momentum currently constitute the massive challenges facing Latin American countries under left-wing governance.
(2) Right-wing forces continue to fragment the "Pink" political landscape of Latin America
Although the new resurgence of left-wing forces dominates the Latin American political landscape, right-wing forces remain active and pose a major challenge to left-wing rule. Since the first "Pink Tide" [11] at the beginning of this century, the Latin American Left has governed in various parts of the region for over 20 years. However, whether they are the Radical Left, Far-Left, or Moderate Left, none have successfully explored a developmental model that can replace neoliberalism. They have failed to effectively enhance the efficacy of national governance and face severe challenges such as reduced fiscal revenue, rising unemployment, high inflation, a widening gap between rich and poor, and intensifying social conflict. These conditions have provided the opportunity for right-wing, and especially far-right, forces to come to power.
In countries like Paraguay and Ecuador, the traditional Right continues to govern. In some countries ruled by the Left, such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia, traditional right-wing forces maintain strong positions in Congress, while the Left is at a relative disadvantage in parliament, leaving their policy adjustments and administrative space under constant assault from the Right. The Far-Right, represented by Bolsonaro in Brazil, Kast in Chile, and Hernández in Colombia, uses absolute liberalism and market-based models to constantly challenge the ideology of the Left. Furthermore, affected by sluggish economic growth and intensifying social frustration, voters across Latin America are generally dissatisfied with establishment parties and traditional political elites, which has provided space for the rise of emerging far-right parties.
(3) Prospects for Latin American left-wing countries exploring alternative development models
Latin American left-wing leaders, relying on their individual influence and charisma, have fought on the political stage to seek welfare for the masses, becoming staunch defenders of the interests of the lower and middle classes. They have united and led their respective parties to hard-won electoral victories, pushing the wave of left-wing governance forward. However, the prospects for their rule are not overly optimistic.
First, the political contradictions between the Latin American Left and Right are difficult to reconcile, and the process of the Left exploring alternative development models will be fraught with uncertainty. To date, neither the Radical, Far, nor Moderate Left has explored a new development model that can effectively replace neoliberalism; the struggle between the Left and Right over developmental models is becoming increasingly fierce. The failure of two attempts to revise the constitution in Chile reflects that the struggle between Left and Right has reached a fever pitch. Beyond the development model, the divisions between the two sides include issues such as social welfare policies, indigenous rights, women’s rights, and environmental protection. Voters in these countries are seriously dissatisfied with the governing capacity of both the ruling parties and the governments. Therefore, neither the state-oriented development model of the Left nor the liberal-oriented model of the Right can easily pacify public discontent.
Second, rifts within the Latin American Left will continue to intensify. In May 2023, because Mexican President López Obrador argued that Peruvian President Boluarte should resign, the Peruvian Congress declared López "persona non grata." To this day, the left-wing governments of Mexico and Colombia still do not recognize the legitimacy of the Boluarte government. In July 2024, Nicaraguan President Ortega accused the Catholic Church of causing instability in Nicaragua, while Lula accused Nicaragua of persecuting the Church; this led to the mutual expulsion of ambassadors between Brazil and Nicaragua, with relations cooling to a freezing point. Regarding the Venezuelan election results, radical left-wing governments in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Bolivia congratulated Maduro on his election, while left-wing governments in Chile, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico refused to recognize Maduro's victory and demanded dialogue between Maduro and the opposition. At the October 2024 BRICS summit, Brazil vetoed Venezuela's application for membership, which Venezuela characterized as a hostile act and aggression. Clearly, the divisions between the Latin American Radical Left, Far-Left, and Moderate Left are deep and will continue to grow.
Finally, the Latin American Left will continue its resilient development. The socialist tradition in Latin America has a history of over a hundred years, spanning from the spread of utopian socialist thought to scientific socialism, from the "Long March" led by the Communist Party of Brazil to the Cuban Revolution, from the Guatemalan Revolution to Allende's parliamentary road in Chile, and from populism to the Pink Tide since the 21st century. All of these have deep historical traditions and class foundations. Socialist ideology has become an important ideological source for the Latin American Left as it explores autonomous development models. Looking strictly at terms of office, the Workers' Party of Brazil will govern until December 2026, the Left in Mexico and Uruguay will govern until 2030, and radical left-wing parties in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua are likely to remain in power for a long time. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, the Left will continue to exert significant political influence on the Latin American political landscape.
(About the Authors: Yang Jianmin is a researcher at the Institute of Latin American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Executive Director of the Cuba Research Center; Shan Chongyun is a doctoral student at the School of International Politics and Economics, University of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) Source: Journal of Contemporary World Socialist Problems, Issue 2, 2025. Online Editor: Zhang Jian.