Li Shenming: Correctly Understanding the Arduous Exploration and Great Achievements of China's Economic Construction Led by Mao Zedong
In his speech at the symposium commemorating the 130th anniversary of the birth of Mao Zedong, Xi Jinping explicitly pointed out: "Mao Zedong was a great Marxist, a great proletarian revolutionary, strategist, and theorist; he was a great pioneer of the Sinicization of Marxism and a great founder of the cause of Chinese-path modernization; he was a great patriot and national hero of modern China, the core of the first generation of the Party's central collective leadership, and a great man of a generation who led the Chinese people in completely changing their own fate and the appearance of the country; he was a great internationalist who made significant contributions to the liberation of the world's oppressed nations and the cause of human progress." Compared with the speech at the symposium commemorating the 120th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth, the evaluation of Mao Zedong delivered by Xi Jinping on behalf of the Party Central Committee at the 130th anniversary symposium added two very important and striking new points: namely, that Mao Zedong was the "great founder of the cause of Chinese-path modernization" and a "great internationalist who made significant contributions to the liberation of the world's oppressed nations and the cause of human progress." These two evaluations have received the heartfelt support of the whole Party, the whole army, and the people of all ethnic groups throughout the country, and have garnered attention and praise from people all over the world. The evaluation of Mao Zedong as the "great founder of the cause of Chinese-path modernization" fully affirms the great and brilliant achievements of socialist construction led by Mao Zedong in the 27 years after the founding of New China.
For a long period, and even up to the present day, some people have held the view that Mao Zedong never went abroad, practiced a policy of "closing the country to the outside world" [1], did not know how to manage economic construction, and made a mess of the Chinese economy. This viewpoint is fundamentally untenable and has misled many people.
The economic construction of New China was a grand and arduous undertaking without precedent, aimed at completely overturning the economic base of the exploiting classes that had existed for thousands of years. During this extremely difficult period of exploration and pioneering, the Mao Zedong era, including Mao Zedong himself, did indeed make mistakes in economic construction. Regarding this, Mao Zedong himself spoke many times at meetings and in conversations, including with foreign guests on diplomatic occasions. However, to say that Mao Zedong did not understand economics or did not know how to manage economic construction is by no means a fact. The author believes that the evaluation of Mao Zedong as a great Marxist completely encompasses the essential fact that Mao Zedong was also a great Marxist political economist. The question of "for whom?" is a fundamental question, a question of principle. The economic efficiency and economic interests sought in Mao Zedong's Marxist political economy were not the short-term, partial, or even individual economic efficiency and interests of a tiny minority—the kind of "efficiency first, with due consideration to fairness" [2] spoken of by some economists. Rather, they were the economic efficiency and interests of the vast majority of people, unifying the long-term and the short-term, the whole and the part, and the interests of the state, the collective, and the individual. They were the concentrated embodiment of the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of the people as dictated by the tenet of "serving the people heart and soul." The author believes that Mao Zedong's Marxist political economy thinking was undoubtedly manifested throughout the 27 years of the New Democratic Revolution and the socialist revolution and construction he led after the founding of New China; however, his thoughts and writings on Marxist socialist political economy are primarily reflected in Mao Zedong's Reading Notes and Talks on Socialist Political Economy [3]. This important work is a major contribution to upholding and developing Marxist political economy. To claim that Mao Zedong did not understand economics and made a mess of New China's economic construction is, in a certain sense, to deny the correct material and economic base of Mao Zedong's thoughts on socialist revolution and construction, as well as his ideas on ensuring the Party does not change its nature. Compared to the mistakes, the achievements of economic construction in the Mao Zedong era were not only primary but also great and brilliant. Speaking only of economic construction, the economic base at the time of New China's founding was extremely weak. Starting from 1840, China entered the period of semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. During the 109 years from 1840 to 1949, our country signed more than 1,100 unequal treaties with foreign powers. The imperialist powers directly and indirectly plundered a huge amount of our country's tangible and intangible wealth. In 1949, our country's steel output was only 158,000 tons. Daily necessities, such as nails (called yangding—"foreign nails") [4], kerosene for lamps (called yangyou—"foreign oil"), and even the horseshoes used by Xinjiang herdsmen, almost all had to rely on imports. When Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan, he took almost all of the country's foreign exchange reserves and the gold held by the national treasury. "Old China was impoverished and weak; New China was poor and blank" [5]—this is by no means an exaggeration. Mao Zedong said: "The Chinese have always been a great, courageous, and industrious nation; it is only in modern times that they have fallen behind. This falling behind was entirely the result of oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and the domestic reactionary government." Once New China was founded, it was not that we wanted to "close the country." Even while our War of Liberation was still ongoing, Western powers were assisting the Chiang Kai-shek government in imposing an economic blockade on the liberated areas led by the CPC. As soon as New China was founded, the imperialist powers implemented an even more severe economic blockade against our country. The items on the technological embargo list imposed by the United States and other Western powers against China were 500 more than those against the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist countries. Only by placing it within this broad historical context can one truly appreciate the incomparably great and brilliant achievements of economic construction in the 27 years after the founding of New China.
I. Great Achievements in Economic Construction Led by Mao Zedong
(1) Effectively defending our country’s sovereignty and sacred territory We successively won the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea and the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Vietnam, invested massive human, material, and financial resources in the construction of the "Great Third Line" and "Small Third Line" [6], and successfully neutralized the Soviet hegemonists' attempt to launch a "nuclear strike" against our country. This was effectively equivalent to winning three relatively large-scale wars against aggression. It forcefully defended our country’s sovereignty and sacred territory, laying a solid foundation for the Reform and Opening-up and for over 70 years of a peaceful environment for construction.
The decision to send troops to aid Korea was incredibly difficult. For more than half a month after sending troops to Korea, Mao Zedong worked under high intensity nearly 24 hours a day, except for a very small amount of time for eating and sleeping. The Biography of Mao Zedong edited by Pang Xianzhi and Jin Chongji uses two entire chapters to reflect this immense historical contribution. The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea and the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Vietnam were both forced upon us by U.S. imperialism; both had to be fought, both were fought against the strongest opponent in the world, and both were fought outside our borders. During the Land Revolutionary War period, the "Counter-Encirclement and Suppression" struggles led by Mao Zedong involved letting the opponent into the Soviet Areas to fight, opposing the strategy of "engaging the enemy outside the gate." During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, we moved to the enemy’s rear. In the late stages of the War of Liberation, we advanced into the Chiang-controlled areas. In the wars after the founding of New China, we basically "engaged the enemy outside the gate." This greatly reduced the depletion of national strength, financial resources, and people’s labor, and especially averted heavy losses to the lives and property of the people. In these two wars—the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea and the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Vietnam—we engaged in a battle of wits and courage with the United States and the U.S. military, and we won both. In a certain sense, the Chinese people truly "stood up" not when it was announced from the Tiananmen Gate, but when it was proven through these two wars. In 2004, when I visited Germany, an overseas Chinese person told me that his father had said they were always bullied abroad; every day, the neighbors would pile their trash in front of his family's door. One morning, he suddenly found that the trash that was usually piled there was gone. He felt very strange. A neighbor told him: "Don't you know?! Yesterday China and the U.S. signed the Korean Armistice Agreement. Your People's Republic of China has defeated the United States of America!" This overseas Chinese man said that at that moment, his father was so moved he could not contain himself; he knelt for a long time facing East, his tears falling like rain.
During the Khrushchev era, Soviet hegemonism took advantage of our country's natural disasters and work errors to pressure us to repay debts, attempting to force our submission. From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, in order to meet the needs of its global strategy, the Soviet Khrushchev leadership group successively proposed and insisted on establishing a "Long-Wave Radio Station" and a "Joint Fleet" on our territory, attempting to control our country militarily and politically. After meeting with our stern refusal, in June 1959, the Soviet Union unilaterally tore up the "Agreement on New Technology for National Defense" signed between China and the Soviet Union in October 1957, refusing to provide our country with samples of certain nuclear technologies and their production technical data. On September 30, 1959, after finishing a visit to the U.S., Khrushchev hurriedly led a Soviet party and government delegation to visit China, demanding that we abandon sovereignty over Taiwan and release American criminals in China, in order to realize his dream of "U.S.-Soviet cooperation to dominate the world." This was naturally met with determined resistance from our country. Thereafter, the Soviet Union listed some minor so-called "aid" programs, which were merely attempts to lure our country into making concessions on major issues of principle such as Taiwan's sovereignty. On July 16, 1960, the Soviet Union issued a note to us, unilaterally deciding to withdraw all 1,390 Soviet experts in China between July 28 and September 1, 1960, and demanding debt repayment from our country. I will cite only two examples here. First, Zhou Enlai’s economic secretary Gu Ming recalled: "Once, a Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union was negotiating with the Premier in the Great Hall of the People, demanding that we pay back money. The Premier said we were currently having temporary difficulties. After the talk, the Premier walked him out. He saw a piece of quartz stone weighing over 300 kilograms by the door and said to the Premier, 'If you have nothing else, this will do fine.' The Premier snapped back, 'If you want it, take it away.'" Second, on July 31, 1960, Mao Zedong presided over a plenary session of the Central Work Meeting. Zhou Enlai reported on the issue of the Soviet withdrawal of experts and foreign trade issues. Zhou Enlai said: "The Soviet withdrawal of experts has affected all aspects of our work; they want to use this to pressure us, but how can they succeed?" "What we owe the Soviet Union is mainly four kinds of agricultural products: grain, oil, meat, and eggs. In terms of foreign trade, we now owe them over 1.6 billion rubles, plus 700 million rubles in loans due; next year we need to repay 2.3 billion rubles." The meeting was filled with indignation; everyone expressed that they would "tighten their belts" to repay the debt. Some said we must "save face" [win back our dignity] and repay the debt next year. Others said we should "overcome the national crisis together," with those who have money contributing money and those who have strength contributing strength. Mao Zedong finally said: "First, for foreign trade, I entrust the three-person group of the Premier [Zhou Enlai], [Li] Fuchun, and [Li] Xiannian to take overall charge; under this, both the central and local levels should set up foreign trade command offices. Second, please ask the three groups of the meeting to discuss it tomorrow—is there a possibility of striving to repay all 2.3 billion rubles next year? If we can squeeze out this small amount of materials and it meets their needs, I think that would be a very good thing. Then our Party will have hope, the people will have hope, and the country will have hope." At that time, the various loans and interest due to the Soviet Union totaled more than 5.2 billion yuan (over 60% of which was loans and interest for military supplies borrowed during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea). According to the original agreement, these foreign debts were to be fully repaid by 1965. At that time, New China had been founded for only a little over ten years, and industry was still in its infancy, so we could only use agricultural and sideline products such as pork, eggs, and apples to repay. Henan Province has always been a major province for grain and live pig production. In 2004, the then-Party Branch Secretary of a primary-level unit in Jinshui District, Zhengzhou, told me: "In the 1960s, I worked on the production line of the Zhengzhou Meat Processing Plant. For several years, during the half-year period around winter each year, the plant had to slaughter more than 5,000 high-quality fat pigs every day, which were immediately shipped to the Soviet Union to repay the debt." This further increased the livelihood difficulties of the Chinese people. However, the Chinese people had aspirations; by 1964, our country had repaid all the loans and interest owed to the Soviet Union from the 1950s, one year ahead of schedule. Regarding the 156 projects aided by the Soviet Union, we will always be grateful to the Soviet Union for their internationalist spirit and precious assistance. However, because we had no foreign exchange reserves, most of this aid was exchanged for high-quality, low-priced agricultural and sideline products, which went North wagon-load by wagon-load, "clanging and banging" along the tracks.
The Soviet Union once planned to conduct a "surgical" nuclear strike against China's nuclear bases around the time of the 1969 National Day. Some views suggest this was a fabrication—a rumor deliberately manufactured by the U.S. authorities to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union. In fact, both the United States and the Soviet Union harbored the malevolent intent to use nuclear weapons against China. From the outbreak of the Korean War until the end of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons against China on six separate occasions. After the start of the 1958 August 23rd Artillery Command on Kinmen [7], high-level U.S. military figures again considered launching a "nuclear strike" against the Chinese mainland. At the end of 1960, the CIA claimed to have "completed one of its most significant missions": finally confirming the existence of China's nuclear program. In April 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a long report to the Pentagon proposing to destroy China's nuclear projects through preemptive means, including the selective use of tactical nuclear weapons against Chinese targets. However, in the face of the great Mao Zedong, the great Communist Party of China, and the great Chinese people, the American atomic bomb ultimately became a "paper tiger."
"With the declassification of a batch of U.S. archives in 1994 following the expiration of the 30-year limit, the leakage of classified archives after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the gradual disclosure of archives by the Chinese side, history has gradually taken shape: around 1964, the United States did indeed formulate a plan for a surprise attack on China, which caused high vigilance in China; and in 1969, opinions did indeed exist within the CPSU Politburo regarding the implementation of a nuclear strike against China. The two peaks formed by the Third Front Construction [8] originated from these circumstances."
Beginning in 1960, the Soviet Union repeatedly provoked incidents along the Sino-Soviet border. After Brezhnev came to power in 1964, he not only continued Khrushchev's policies but further exacerbated and strained Sino-Soviet relations. On May 16, 1989, Deng Xiaoping told the visiting General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev: "In the 1960s, the Soviet Union strengthened its military installations along the entire Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders. Missiles were constantly increased, reaching one-third of the total Soviet missile force, and troops were continuously added—including the dispatch of troops to Mongolia—reaching a total of one million men. Where did the threat to China come from? Naturally, China drew its conclusion." The one-third of Soviet missiles mentioned by Deng Xiaoping were deployed across more than 30 missile bases in Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal Military District, mainly targeting China's nuclear bases. Furthermore, the Soviet Union deployed more than 50 large long-range bombers and over 400 medium bombers, all capable of carrying hydrogen bombs for strategic nuclear attacks. The Soviet Union also deployed 20,000 tanks and 3,000 aircraft along the Sino-Soviet border. From October 1964 to the outbreak of the Zhenbao Island incident [9] alone, the Soviet military provoked as many as 4,189 border disputes. In February 1969, the Soviet Far Eastern Border Defense Forces entered a state of first-level combat readiness, an action that immediately aroused Chinese vigilance. In March 1969, the Soviet Union again provoked armed conflicts on China’s Zhenbao Island; during several weeks of engagement, the death toll on both sides reached a thousand. On August 27, 1969, CIA Director Richard Helms secretly revealed to a small number of reporters that the Soviet Union had informed Eastern European countries of the possibility of a preemptive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. On August 28, the Soviet newspaper Pravda published an editorial stating: "Under the conditions of existing technology, lethal weapons, and modern delivery systems, if a war breaks out, it will not leave any continent uninvolved." At the end of the month, U.S. intelligence agencies revealed that the Soviet Air Force stationed in the Far East had entered a state of first-level combat readiness. On August 28, the CPC Central Committee issued an emergency combat readiness order, requiring the nation’s military and civilians to be in full battle array, ready at any time to annihilate invading enemies. In the face of a severe threat of war, a high tide of combat readiness rapidly rose across China. At the end of September, while explicitly rejecting the Soviet proposal for a joint U.S.-Soviet nuclear attack on China, the United States also secretly notified the Chinese side of the Soviet intentions through its ambassador to Poland. Various signs indicated that the Soviet command was "strategically" envisioning, studying, and preparing for a nuclear war against China. "On September 11, 1969, Zhou Enlai held talks with Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, at the Beijing airport, where the two sides reached a temporary understanding to 'maintain the status quo of the border and avoid armed conflict.' During the talks, Zhou Enlai sternly questioned Kosygin regarding the recent Soviet nuclear threats against China; Kosygin was left speechless." To respond to the Soviet nuclear threat, before the 1969 National Day, China first quietly conducted two nuclear tests: one was a 20-to-25-kiloton underground atomic fission explosion on September 23, and the other was a 3-megaton hydrogen bomb thermonuclear explosion on September 29. Second, on October 17, 1969—following a decision made by Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee based on the prevailing situation to evacuate veteran comrades in Beijing to other regions for combat readiness in October or shortly thereafter—Zhou Enlai met with several veteran comrades in Beijing in batches to convey the evacuation decision. This included the evacuation of the ailing Liu Shaoqi to Luoyang, Henan (later transferred to Kaifeng) as a precaution; this was not the persecution by Lin Biao that some people have claimed. The primary reason the Soviet Union ultimately did not dare to use nuclear weapons was that Mao Zedong proposed the strategic policy of "dig deep tunnels, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony" [10], and urged its implementation several times. Spending vast amounts of manpower, material, and financial resources, he arranged for the construction of the "Big Third Front" and "Small Third Front" early on, making effective advance preparations for "fighting early, fighting on a large scale, and fighting a nuclear war." By subduing the enemy's troops without fighting, a Soviet nuclear strike against us was thus averted. Shevchenko, a high-ranking Soviet KGB official who defected to the West, stated that he believed the reasons the Soviet Union did not launch a nuclear attack on China were "not only because the United States warned the Soviet Union that this would lead to a serious confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR, but also because China was fully prepared." Afterward, American scholars also believed that had China not been in full battle array, the Soviet Union might have even been able to launch a surprise attack and destroy China's nuclear forces within 30 minutes. Furthermore, China's own atomic bombs were undoubtedly a reason for the Soviets to avoid using nuclear warheads for mutual attacks.
In the specific process of implementing the "Big Third Front" and "Small Third Front" construction, individual errors certainly occurred, which Mao Zedong criticized at the time. On June 8, 1964, at an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, Mao Zedong said: "Everyone agrees to speed up the construction of Third Front bases, but do not be reckless. We only have so much money; the local projects should be spread less widely, and the central projects should also be fewer." On June 26, 1965, Mao Zedong spoke with Wang Dongxing. When Wang mentioned that Yu Qiuli had conveyed Mao’s instructions regarding the Third Five-Year Plan at the 14th National Public Security Conference, Mao said: "This time I have reined them in again. I told them long ago to pay attention to the Third Front issue, but they didn't pay much attention. Now that it’s here, it's over 100 billion yuan (referring to the total investment in capital construction during the Third Five-Year Plan period — Author's Note). How can the common people bear this? To carry out such large-scale construction, we must provide grain, but if transportation cannot keep up and the three railways in the Southwest cannot be built at once, steel and timber will be in short supply, and there may be another reversal in the future. We must not overturn the common people. If you ask them to do it, they either don't listen and won't do it, or if they do it, they do it desperately. Everything is to be feared in excess; I will correct them first to avoid future reversals." Yet it is undeniable that the construction of the "Big Third Front" and "Small Third Front" was the prelude to our country's development of the Great Southwest and Great Northwest.
(II) Independently and Self-reliantly Researching and Developing the "Two Bombs, One Satellite, and One Submarine"
As early as April 1956, Mao Zedong pointed out: "We do not have atomic bombs yet." We "must not only have more planes and artillery but also atomic bombs. In today's world, if we are not to be bullied by others, we cannot do without this thing." In June 1958, Mao Zedong further stated: "I still hope to build up the Navy and make the Air Force stronger. And that atomic bomb—I hear it's only such a small thing, but without it, people say you don't count for anything. Very well then, we will make a few. We'll make some atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, and intercontinental missiles. I think ten years of work is entirely possible. Not by grasping it once a year, or twice, or four times, but by grasping it seven or eight times." On May 15, 1958, the Soviet Union's third man-made satellite went into space, coinciding with the Second Session of the 8th National Congress of the CPC; this was a great inspiration to the Chinese people who were in the midst of a high tide of socialist construction. On May 17, Mao Zedong raised the issue of developing China's man-made satellites at the session, saying: "The Soviet Union's third satellite into space is a good thing." "Since the Soviet satellite has gone up, shouldn't we think about making one or two satellites? We must also develop some satellites." In 1962, when our country was experiencing three years of severe natural disasters, some leaders advocated for the cancellation of research and development of sophisticated weapons like the "Two Bombs, One Satellite" [11]. Mao Zedong decisively pointed out: "In scientific research, the research and trial production of sophisticated weapons should still be carried out vigorously; there must be no relaxation or cancellation." In December 1963, Mao Zedong pointed out: "Death rays (i.e., lasers — Author's Note) require a group of people to be organized specifically to study them. There should be a small group of people who do nothing else but eat and study them. It doesn't matter if there are no results. In military affairs, besides offensive weapons, attention must be paid to the study of defensive issues. Perhaps in future combat, we will mainly be on the defensive." Nuclear submarines, which integrate powerful strike capability, stealth, and endurance, are important strategic weapons that countries compete to develop. The nuclear submarine was one of the most advanced naval technologies at the time, possessed by the United States in 1954 and the Soviet Union in 1957. In September 1959, when Khrushchev came to China to attend the 10th anniversary celebration of the founding of the People's Republic of China and heard that China intended to manufacture nuclear submarines, he responded dismissively: "Nuclear submarine technology is complex and costs a great deal of money. You in China cannot produce them. As long as we in the Soviet Union have them, it will suffice for us to establish a joint fleet." Mao Zedong waved his broad hand and said, "Nuclear submarines—we will build them even if it takes ten thousand years!" In October 1964, China's first atomic bomb was successfully detonated. In December 1966, the principle test of China's first hydrogen bomb was successfully detonated. In April 1970, China's first man-made satellite was successfully launched. In September 1971, China's first nuclear submarine was launched; it officially joined the combat sequence of the People's Navy in August 1974. Many people pay much attention to "Two Bombs, One Satellite" but know little about the nuclear submarine. The nuclear submarine mentioned here refers not just to a nuclear-powered vessel, but to the possession of a nuclear submarine with a strategic second-strike capability; it is the most powerful "assassin's mace" [12] to deter hegemonists and practitioners of power politics who attempt to threaten China's peaceful development. Although China's research into laser weapons started later than that of the United States, the follow-up speed was very fast. Especially in the areas of anti-ship missiles and satellite detection, China has made certain progress. Of course, in some aspects, a gap exists between us and the United States, but in certain areas of laser weaponry, we have already surpassed the United States, reaching world-class or even top-tier levels. Deng Xiaoping clearly pointed out in 1988: "If China had not had atomic and hydrogen bombs and had not launched satellites since the 1960s, China could not be called a major power with significant influence, and would not have its current international status." This evaluation is both pertinent and just.
(III) Self-reliantly Establishing an Independent and Relatively Complete Industrial System and National Economic System
In the early days of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the fields of science and technology were essentially a blank slate. We not only independently researched and developed "national defense trump cards" such as the "Two Bombs, One Satellite, and One Submarine" [13], but also established an independent and relatively complete industrial system and national economic system by relying on self-reliance. In establishing this system, Mao Zedong placed particular emphasis on the necessity of breaking with convention and adopting advanced technologies to the greatest extent possible. In January 1956, Mao pointed out: "The Chinese people should have a grand plan to strive to change China’s economic, scientific, and cultural backwardness within a few decades, and rapidly reach the advanced levels of the world." In September and December 1963, Mao further noted: "If we do not strive to thoroughly change the state of our economy and technology, which lags far behind the imperialist countries, being beaten is inevitable." He also said: "We cannot follow the old path of technological development taken by other countries and crawl step by step behind others. We must break with convention, adopt advanced technology as much as possible, and within a not-too-long historical period, build our country into a modern socialist power." In December 1963, Mao remarked: "The battle of science and technology must be fought, and it must be fought well... Scientific research has practical applications as well as theoretical aspects; we must strengthen theoretical research, and have specialized personnel doing it. It will not do to neglect theory. We must cultivate a group of talents who understand theory, and they can also be cultivated from among the workers and peasants."
On September 5, 1965, Mao Zedong met with a Guinean government delegation led by Alassane Diop, Minister of Posts and Telecommunications. When Diop spoke of how posts and telecommunications act as a nerve in world affairs, Mao said: "Our nerve is not yet so agile; it may be a backward nerve, lagging twenty years behind the world, and we must catch up. Our country still has very few televisions. Telegrams, telephones, broadcasting, and mail delivery—these are things that can be done. All African countries must be independent and self-reliant; when there are temporary difficulties, obtaining some foreign aid is necessary, but it must primarily rely on the domestic people. Nine fingers must rely on the people, and one finger is so-called foreign aid [14]. Of course, this one finger is also based on equality and exchange of equal value. The Third World has a large population. You should not be superstitious and think imperialism is so great. We ourselves are not doing very well and have a sense of inferiority, but in the beginning they were also very poor and quite barbaric."
The Communist Party of China united and led the broad masses of the Chinese people in self-reliance and arduous struggle, cultivating a large number of scientific and technological talents and achieving many major research results, such as the discovery of major oil fields, the synthesis of bovine insulin, the million-operation computer, hybrid rice, and the proof of Goldbach’s conjecture. The relatively complete industrial system and national economic system planned during this period were scientific. In mid-July 1970, Mao Zedong inspected Shanghai and remarked that since Shanghai's industrial base was so good, it could produce airplanes. On August 21, the State Planning Commission and the National Defense Industry Leading Group of the Central Military Commission approved in principle the "Report on the Trial Production of Transport Aircraft in Shanghai" submitted by the Aviation Industry Leading Group. The mission was named "Project 708," and the aircraft was designated "Yun-10" (Y-10). A total of 262 units from central ministries, the military, and 21 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions participated in the research and development. The required machine tools, bearings, large forgings, profiles, and plates were coordinated by the First Ministry of Machine Building and the Ministry of Metallurgy. All design drawings were completed in 1975, and the first successful test flight took place on September 26, 1980. The Y-10 subsequently flew to major domestic cities including Beijing, Harbin, Urumqi, Zhengzhou, Hefei, Guangzhou, Kunming, and Chengdu, and flew to Lhasa seven times. Test flights proved that the Y-10's performance met design requirements. In 1966, the contact lithography machine led by Professor Xu Ruiyi of Tsinghua University was successfully developed. In 1977, the earliest semi-automatic lithography machine, the "GK-3," was born. In contrast, ASML in the Netherlands, the current giant in the field of lithography machines, was only founded in 1984. Some advanced projects such as large aircraft and lithography machines, which China initiated through self-reliance, once squeezed into the world's first or second tiers at that time. However, later influenced by the erroneous idea that "building is not as good as buying, and buying is not as good as renting," these projects were forced to shut down, leading to a situation of being controlled by others, which is most regrettable. Nevertheless, in general, the independent and relatively complete industrial and national economic system established then remains the foundation and pride of China's manufacturing industry today. On April 8, 1980, Deng Xiaoping pointed out when meeting a Malaysian delegation: "In the 1960s, there was a gap between our scientific and technological level and the international level, but it was not very large." Deng Xiaoping particularly emphasized seeking truth from facts, and this statement was indeed seeking truth from facts.
(4) Completion of a vast amount of basic infrastructure necessary for the national economy and people’s livelihood
Li Xiannian explicitly stated that in basic construction, seven units of input yield one unit of output, whereas in the processing industry, one unit of input yields seven units of output. What was done in the Mao Zedong era was often the work of "inputting seven to produce one"—like stacking blocks to build a base, the height of which is difficult to see immediately. What has been done since the Reform and Opening-up is often "inputting one to produce seven," which is like building upward on the massive base already laid during the Mao Zedong era; the height of the blocks can thus increase rapidly. In the short 27 years after the founding of New China, more than 84,000 reservoirs were built primarily through manual labor, and they still play the most fundamental and backbone role in agricultural production today. The Miyun, Guanting, and Ming Tombs Reservoirs in Beijing were all built during that time. The Miyun Reservoir alone can currently reach a maximum storage capacity of 4.375 billion cubic meters, which is equivalent to 22 times the annual water diversion volume of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project. Between 1966 and 1976, large-scale farmland water conservancy construction was carried out nationwide, causing the area of China's farmland affected by disasters and the area resulting in actual crop failure to show a downward trend overall. This was particularly effective in dealing with floods: the ratio of crop failure to total disaster-affected area decreased from 54.1% in 1952 to 16.9% in 1974, an average annual decrease of 5.2%. None of this was factored into the Gross Domestic Product at the time. If they had not been built then, building them now would face many difficulties, such as costs being too high and the return on investment period being too long.
(5) Completion of the socialist transformation
The completion of the socialist transformation through "One Industrialization and Three Remoldings" (socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce), especially agricultural cooperation, laid a solid foundation for rapidly increasing grain production, establishing a firm alliance between workers and peasants, and accelerating industrialization and national defense construction. Some comrades say that, in hindsight, the "One Industrialization and Three Remoldings" proposed in 1952 might have been carried out a bit too hastily. It should be said that "there were also shortcomings and deviations in this work." However, from a general and fundamental perspective, the "One Industrialization and Three Remoldings" was very successful and had to be done that way. Precisely because of this, the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China explicitly states: "History has proven that the General Line for the Transition Period proposed by the Party was entirely correct" and "During the transition period, our Party creatively opened up a path for socialist transformation suited to Chinese characteristics." To speak this way, one must return to the history of that time.
First, look at the international environment: the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was signed on September 8, 1951; the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty was signed on August 30, 1951; the Pacific Security Treaty (ANZUS) between the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand was signed on September 1, 1951; the U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty was signed on October 1, 1953; and the U.S.-Pakistan Mutual Defense Treaty was signed on May 19, 1954. From September 6 to 8, 1954, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) was signed by eight countries including the U.S., UK, France, Australia, Philippines, New Zealand, Thailand, and Pakistan. In December 1954, the U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek signed a "Mutual Defense Treaty" in Washington, basically completing a "C-shaped encirclement" around the People's Republic of China with the United States at its core.
Tao Lujia, who served as the First Secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee from July 1953 to August 1965, recalled: "The U.S. encirclement of New China was one island chain after another [15]. With a powerful enemy pressing at our borders, if we wanted to maintain sovereignty at that time, we had to resolutely integrate national strength and begin cooperation starting from the agricultural base. Otherwise, we could only seek survival through compromise and obey their every whim. New China was very poor then; what could we use to fight against a powerful enemy? Many people today say that agricultural cooperation was done too early and too fast, but that ignores this broader context. Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee originally planned to transition to socialism 15 years after the founding of New China. But it wouldn't work; the international environment would not give you 15 years of peaceful development."
When reading the Soviet Textbook of Political Economy, Mao Zedong said: "Currently, we do not calculate the value of land. Since ancient times, there have been houses that are destroyed, but no land that is destroyed. Our country has 1.58 billion mu [16] of cultivated land; the vast majority was left by our ancestors and managed through the labor of people for thousands of generations. Up to now, we also add our own labor to it every year. Land is the most basic means of production; it would be best if economists could calculate the value of land." This discourse by Mao Zedong still shines brightly today. In a certain sense, all our wealth is inseparable from the land; land is the mother of all wealth. Without the land, we have nothing—unless in the future we can obtain resources from the moon or other planets.
Over the past 40 years of Reform and Opening-up, in addition to the decisive role played by the correct policies of Reform and Opening-up, one of the key secrets of our rapid economic growth has been that various forms of material wealth on our 9.6 million square kilometers of land have entered the fields of digitalization and monetization. This was the fundamental material foundation laid by the "One Industrialization and Three Remoldings" and the conversion of land into state and collective ownership during the Mao Zedong era. In this way, when establishing Special Economic Zones and High-Tech Development Zones, attracting foreign investment, expanding cities, and building high-speed railways, highways, and airports, land could be leased on a large scale, generating land rent, differential rent, and absolute rent. Furthermore, various mines such as oil fields, coal fields, rare earths, and gold mines could be leased out for sixty or seventy years at a time—just imagine how much "dividend" this released.
In other words, the generations of ours have basically enjoyed the results of this dividend release, and it is also highly likely that we have consumed in advance the wealth that our descendants should enjoy. Our own descendants may also have to find another way to make a living, and the process of finding such a path may be extremely difficult. For over 70 years, successive authorities in Taiwan have wanted to build a ring-island expressway, but have always failed because the cost is too high and public finances cannot bear it. Since the Reform and Opening-up, our "managing cities"—that is, managing land—has achieved great things. But now, "land finance" [17] has come into conflict with our strategic food security. In 2017, China imported as much as 95 million tons of soybeans alone, which, if converted into cultivated land, would be about 800 million mu, while China's total cultivated land is only about 1.8 billion mu. Therefore, how to implement Comrade Xi Jinping's important assertions that "our rice bowls must be filled with grain produced by ourselves" and "houses are for living in, not for speculation" is a very arduous task. It can be said that the cycle of maintaining economic growth primarily through land finance is about to end. If China's mode of economic development does not resolutely "break the wrist like a brave warrior" [18] to end land finance and actively implement a transformation, it will be forced to transform later, and the cost will be even greater and more numerous, and it is even highly likely the economy will enter a relatively difficult period.
Xi Jinping has shown great foresight by putting forward the "Five New Development Concepts" [19] in a timely manner, with "Innovation" at the forefront. Now we must eliminate all interference and conscientiously and solidly implement these concepts. In a certain sense, transforming the "economic growth mode" and adjusting the "mode of wealth ownership and income distribution" is a matter of great urgency. This "one transformation" and "one adjustment" are the "ox's nose" [20] for current sustainable economic and social development. By grasping these two "ox's noses," we can lead the "ox's nose" of the entire economic and social development. Only then can Reform and Opening-up and socialist modernization, as well as the realization of the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, open up an entirely new situation.
(6) Rapid increase in average life expectancy
Average life expectancy is a fundamental indicator for measuring the level of economic and social development. During the Mao Zedong era, while the population increased by 400 million, the average life expectancy rose from 35 years to 65 years. In contrast, India's average life expectancy was 41 years in 1952, and it did not reach 65 until 2011—a full 35 years later than China. This fully demonstrates the superiority of the socialist system. The rapid increase in population thinned the per capita GDP and the welfare the people could have enjoyed, and which should have increased rapidly; however, it also accumulated and released a very generous labor dividend for the subsequent Reform and Opening-up.
(7) Striving for opening-up, importing foreign technology, and absorbing foreign capital
As early as 1936, during his conversations with the American journalist Edgar Snow in Yan’an, Mao Zedong said: "After we win independence, China will negotiate and conclude treaties of mutual aid, mutual benefit, and mutual agreement with friendly countries... China has failed in the past to utilize foreign capital to bring real benefits to the Chinese people; foreign capital brought little or no benefit to the masses. Only after China achieves true independence and democracy will it be possible to apply large amounts of foreign capital to the large-scale development of productive enterprises; and only a free China, due to the extensive development of its productive economy, will be able to repay the principal and interest of such foreign investment. Legitimate foreign debts will be recognized. We will consider all foreign debts incurred for the purpose of construction and used for construction to be legitimate." In 1939, Mao told Robert Martin, a journalist for the United Press, in Yan’an: "When China embarks on socialism, if the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and other countries are still capitalist, and if these countries do not attack China, then the Chinese government will provide protection (with compensation) for foreign investment and foreign property in China." My former superior, Wang Zhen [21], also told me: "As early as the Yan’an period, the Chairman talked to me several times about how, after the victory of the revolution, the first country he wanted to visit was the United States, to learn from them how to engage in modernized industry and modernized agriculture." It is a great pity that, due to the blockade imposed by the U.S. authorities, Mao Zedong was unable to make this trip after the founding of the PRC. In early 1949, when the overall situation of the country was nearly decided, Mao said in a conversation with Stalin's representative Mikoyan: We are in no hurry to resolve the issues of Hong Kong and Macau. It is likely more advantageous to utilize the original status of these two places, especially Hong Kong, for developing overseas relations and import-export trade. Shortly after the founding of New China, Britain was the first among Western capitalist countries to recognize the PRC and negotiate the establishment of diplomatic relations. Precisely because of Mao Zedong’s strategic decision, when Western countries followed the United States in imposing blockades and embargoes on China, the country was able to use the special channel of Hong Kong to import petrochemicals and other important strategic materials. Later, Hong Kong became a lookout tower, a weather station, and a bridgehead for New China to develop foreign relations, serving as an important window to Southeast Asia, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Western world.
After the founding of New China, Mao Zedong was constantly occupied with domestic affairs and only went abroad twice, both times to the Soviet Union. On December 16, 1949, Mao arrived in Moscow. Following a series of arduous efforts, on February 14, 1950, with both Mao and Stalin in attendance, Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Vyshinsky signed the historic Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, along with the Agreement on the Changchun Railway, Lushun, and Dalian, the Agreement on Loans to the People's Republic of China, and agreements regarding Soviet assistance for the construction of 50 enterprises in China. In November 1957, Mao visited the Soviet Union again. This visit was to attend the celebrations for the 40th anniversary of the "October Revolution," the Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, and the Meeting of Representatives of 64 Communist and Workers' Parties. This not only strengthened political and cultural exchanges with countries in the socialist camp but also enhanced economic and trade exchanges. In April 1956, Mao said: "We must resolutely resist and criticize all the corrupt systems and ideological styles of the foreign bourgeoisie. However, this does not prevent us from learning the advanced science and technology of capitalist countries and the scientific aspects of their enterprise management methods." From August to September 1956, in his comments on and revisions to the political report for the Party’s Eighth National Congress, Mao explicitly pointed out: "Based on our country’s situation of a large population and rich resources... whenever possible, we should develop trade relations with any country in the world willing to trade with us." In June 1959, Mao said: "In the struggle against nature, our first teacher was the Soviet Union, and we must first learn from them, but the United States is also our teacher." In March 1960, Mao said: "We were students in the past and are still students now; for example, in cutting-edge science, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain have it whereas we do not, so we must learn from them." In the 1960s, the focus of our country's technical acquisition was the introduction of new technologies and complete sets of equipment from ten countries including Japan and Western Europe, such as equipment for petroleum, chemicals, metallurgy, mining, and electronic precision instruments.
In October 1971, China regained all its legitimate rights at the United Nations and its status as a permanent member of the Security Council. In 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China, and by the end of 1973, our country had basically completed the process of establishing diplomatic relations with developed capitalist countries other than the United States. The breakthrough in diplomatic relations brought new opportunities for developing foreign trade and cooperation. Entering the 1970s, as major Western countries experienced relatively severe economic crises, they were eager to find new markets for their commodities, technology, equipment, and capital. Starting in 1972, our country entered a second high tide of large-scale introduction of new technologies and complete sets of equipment. Around 1972, the Party Central Committee decided to import a large amount of equipment from the United States, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, and other countries, including 13 sets of large-scale chemical fertilizer plants, 4 sets of large-scale chemical fiber plants, 3 sets of petrochemical plants, one alkylbenzene plant, 43 sets of comprehensive coal mining units, 3 large power stations, and the 1.7-meter rolling mill for the Wuhan Iron and Steel Plant. The total contract value was approximately 4.3 billion USD, known as the famous "4-3 Plan." During the implementation of this plan, additional import projects were added, bringing the total planned imports to 5.14 billion USD. The introduction of these technologies and equipment was of positive significance for filling certain technical gaps in the country, meeting domestic production needs, and promoting our country's socialist modernization. The majority of these large-scale sets of equipment went into operation around the 1980s. Consequently, in the 1980s, our country's agriculture advanced by leaps and bounds and the people's standard of living improved significantly; besides the implementation of the household contract responsibility system [22], the large-scale introduction of foreign technology in the early 1970s played an extremely important role.
(8) Looking at New China's rapid economic development through horizontal comparison
According to World Bank statistics, the average annual growth rates of industrial and agricultural output for several major countries between 1951 and 1980, compared with China, are as follows: China's industry was 12.5% and its agriculture was 4.0%. For the Soviet Union, industry was 8.6% and agriculture was 3.1%. For the United States, industry was 4.0% and agriculture was 1.6%. For West Germany, industry was 5.8% and agriculture was 1.9%. For Britain, industry was 2.3% and agriculture was 2.3%. For France, industry was 5.0% and agriculture was 2.5%. For India, industry was 5.9% and agriculture was 2.6%. From the above data, it is clear that China's growth rate in both industry and agriculture during this period was the fastest in the world. Furthermore, according to the China Statistical Yearbook (published by the National Bureau of Statistics in 1994), during the 26-year period from 1952 to 1978, China's GNP grew at an average annual rate of 6.5%, while the world growth rate during the same period was 3%, with the U.S. at 4.3%, and Britain, France, and Italy even lower than the U.S. This means that China's development speed was more than double the world average for the same period, far exceeding countries like the U.S., Britain, France, and Italy.
(9) Overcoming various forms of interference to return to the United Nations
On October 25, 1971, the 26th session of the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2758 by an overwhelming majority, deciding to restore all rights of the People's Republic of China in the UN and recognizing the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal representative of China to the United Nations. This was a victory for the Chinese people and for the people of the world; it marked the return of the Chinese people, who account for one-fourth of the world's population, to the UN stage. This has great and far-reaching significance for both China and the world. Our return to the UN was the inevitable result of Mao Zedong’s diplomatic line. From 1966 to 1976, 64 countries established diplomatic relations with China, with the peak occurring in 1971 and 1972, when a total of 33 countries established ties. By 1976, a total of 111 countries had established diplomatic relations with China. By this point, the vast majority of independent countries in the world had established diplomatic relations with us. Those establishing ties were not only from the socialist camp and the Third World; the majority of West European countries, as well as Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, also established relations with China during this decade. Due to the correct guidance of Mao Zedong's Three Worlds Theory [23], our country’s diplomatic relations with major countries such as the United States, European nations, and Japan achieved breakthrough progress, successfully breaking the harsh blockade of external hegemonism and power politics, truly entering the ranks of great powers, and laying a solid foundation for the contemporary themes of peace and development.
(10) In the Mao Zedong era, our country had neither internal nor external debt
Of course, our country did not borrow foreign debt and for a time had no internal debt, which to a certain extent affected economic and social development at the time. However, from an objective perspective, the international environment for large-scale introduction of foreign capital did not yet exist. From a dialectical point of view, having no internal or external debt meant leaving no burden of debt repayment for later generations. In contrast, the current substantial amount of local government, corporate, and private debt is a mountain weighing on our heads and even on the heads of our descendants. It could be said that to truly stimulate domestic demand, it is urgent to start from the demand side—namely, the distribution of wealth across the whole of society.
The ten points mentioned above required a vast investment of manpower, material, and financial resources and were very time-consuming. They laid the solid material wealth for our country’s reform and opening up, created the necessary themes of peace and development for our era and a favorable international environment, truly established our country’s status as a great power, and secured the prerequisites for over 70 years of peaceful construction and reform and opening up. In this sense, without Mao Zedong and the Mao Zedong era, there would be no subsequent reform and opening up. These ten points were also achieved through the accumulation of massive material and financial resources by the people of all ethnic groups throughout the country "tightening their belts" and "living through lean years." The Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China [24] explicitly points out: "The history of the Communist Party of China since the founding of the People’s Republic of China is, generally speaking, a history in which our Party, under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, has led the people of all ethnic groups throughout the country in carrying out socialist revolution and socialist construction and achieved great successes. The establishment of the socialist system is the most profound and greatest social transformation in our country's history and is the basis for all our country's further progress and development."
II. How to correctly view the errors in economic construction from the founding of New China to the period before reform and opening up
At the beginning of the "Great Leap Forward," everyone was somewhat caught up in the heat of the moment, and Mao Zedong’s mind was also "feverish." For example, on February 18, 1958, at an enlarged meeting of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau, Mao pointed out: "The issue of ownership has been resolved; now we must resolve the issue of mutual relations between people in production—that is, the mutual relations between Party, government, and military cadres and the masses, between factory leadership and workers, and between cooperative leadership and members. There is a great revolutionary enthusiasm among the masses." He continued: "One must appear in the posture of an ordinary laborer. No matter how high your office—be it Chairman, Premier, Minister, or Provincial Governor—you can only appear in the posture of a laborer." He further noted: "Before [the 1957 Rectification Movement], there was no liberation; parts of the superstructure and certain links had errors and shortcomings, and the relations of production were imperfect. Because of the Rectification, things have improved: the bad has been destroyed, the relatively good has been established, relations between people have become more equal, people can speak up now, they can post big-character posters [25], and there is less of the 'lordly air.' Thus, the masses are happy, and a production climax has arrived." He added: "There was an upsurge in the spring of 1956"; "a bit of over-ambition [26] is unavoidable"; "what was that 'anti-adventurism' [27] of 1956? It was a situation where everyone was under the correct line but held differing opinions on individual issues." Mao concluded: "In the second half of this year, you will see a 'great leap' [28]. To deal with this situation, what should we do? Faced with this great mass climax, the CPC Central Committee and the Communist Party must take a stance. Henceforth, do not raise the slogan of 'anti-adventurism'; raise the slogan of 'opposing right-deviationist conservatism.' People's thinking often lags behind reality." At this time, Mao advocated: "Do not raise the slogan of anti-adventurism; raise the slogan of opposing right-deviationist conservatism." He inappropriately criticized anti-adventurism and shouted the slogan of opposing right-deviationist conservatism too loudly. While opposing one erroneous tendency, he failed to pay simultaneous attention to another hidden erroneous tendency that might emerge, which ultimately fueled the "Great Leap" from the central to local levels.
However, Mao Zedong was the first to cool down, the first to detect, and the first to begin correcting the "Left" erroneous tendencies that emerged during the "Great Leap Forward" and the establishment of People's Communes. Bo Yibo [29] once recalled: "To be fair, regarding the 'Left' errors of 1958, it was Comrade Mao Zedong who first proposed their correction." Mao began the correction starting with the People's Daily. Wu Lengxi, who served as Editor-in-Chief of the People's Daily and President of the Xinhua News Agency, recalled in his monograph Reminiscences of Chairman Mao: Fragments of Several Major Historical Events I Personally Experienced: On March 15, 1958, Mao found Wu Lengxi for a talk, saying: "The People's Daily must hold the line; otherwise, this province will publish [inflated targets], then that province will publish them, everyone will race to be first, and the world will be in chaos." Mao said: "I am a bit of an opportunist; one must leave some leeway. The provinces should not act like a gust of wind. Don't look at Henan saying they will finish in one year and then say you will also finish in one year. Just let Henan try for a year this year; if it works, let them be first. You can do it next year. It’s only a one-year difference—what does it matter? This matter is of great significance." He continued: "The propaganda and reporting in the newspapers must be adjusted now. Do not always sing in a high key; 'compress the air' [30]. This is not pouring cold water, but rather not advocating impractical high targets. Everyone should act according to actual conditions. When raising slogans and setting targets, leave some leeway."
Next, Mao Zedong issued loud appeals at formal Party meetings. On March 20, 1958, during his third speech at the Chengdu Conference, Mao pointed out: "Henan Province has proposed achieving the '4, 5, 8' targets [31], water conservancy, the elimination of the 'four pests,' and the eradication of illiteracy within one year. Some of this might be achievable, but even if all is achieved, do not publish it in the newspapers. For the whole country, our slogan remains five, six, seven, or eight years to strive for the '4, 5, 8' targets. If everyone races to be first, the world will be in chaos. Just do the solid work. The provinces should not act like a gust of wind; if Henan says one year, don't all say one year. We can let Henan experiment for a year. If it works for Henan, next year other provinces can start another movement—a 'Great Leap Forward.' If the '4, 5, 8' and the eradication of illiteracy are achieved in one year, there may also be major shortcomings—at the very least, the work would be crude and the masses overly strained. As long as the general line is correct, finishing the 'Forty Articles' [32] one, two, three, or even five years late cannot be considered a loss of face or dishonorable; perhaps it would even be better. There are two lines for building socialism: we should work with great fanfare and joy, not in a lonely and dejected manner. The speed of construction is an objective reality. Whatever can be achieved based on subjective and objective conditions should be done according to the principle of 'achieving more, faster, better, and more economically' [33], going all out and aiming high. But do not force what cannot be done. Currently, there is a wind—a force-ten typhoon. Do not block it publicly; explain it internally and compress the air. Compressing the air is not pouring cold water, but rather making things more solid. We must eliminate false reporting and boasting; do not struggle for fame, but seek substance and have specific measures." He added: "Under the general line of 'more, faster, better, and more economically,' going all out and aiming high, we advance in waves. This is the unity of opposites between urgency and relaxation, between labor and leisure. If there is only urgency and labor, it is one-sided. The unity of opposites between hard struggle and rest and reorganization is a law, and they transform into one another." "Errors will still be made; it is impossible not to make them. Making errors is a necessary condition for the formation of a correct line. The theory of 'unavoidability' is correct; the theory of 'avoidability' is incorrect. The point is to make fewer and smaller errors."
On March 25, 1958, in his fifth speech at the Chengdu Conference, Mao further noted: "I hope some of the excessively high targets will not be so high; they must be achievable and feasible. At least some things should not be published in the newspapers." "This year, there is a high surge among the masses. I am very worried that some of our comrades will be hot-headed under this surge and propose unfeasible slogans. I do not wish to eliminate the atmosphere, but only ask to 'compress the air'—to compress the expanded minds and be a bit more level-headed." On April 3, 1958, at the Wuhan Conference, Mao said: "I am skeptical of the claim that water conservancy can be achieved in three years of hard struggle. To fundamentally change our appearance in three years—I think we can only achieve a preliminary change. The phrasing 'preliminary change in three years' is better, but it's hard to change it now. The People's Daily should not casually announce this or that '-ization' [34]. Currently, '-ization' is being handled very poorly; at every turn, an '-ization' is announced." On the 4th, he said: "Current propaganda pays attention to 'more' and 'faster,' but pays insufficient attention to 'better' and 'more economically.' There is no need for big talk. Ambition for greatness and achievement [35] is needed, but being flashy and without substance is no good." On the 9th, he said: "In the affairs of the world, where there is truth, there is falsehood; where there are gains, there are losses. One cannot disbelieve everything, nor believe everything. Believing one hundred percent leads to being duped; not believing at all leads to a loss of confidence. We must thoroughly check all work and various models to verify them clearly. Some are fake doctors, fake professors, fake 'giving one's heart' [36], fake high yields, fake 'leaps,' and fake reports."
In the first half of 1958, Mao spent much effort trying to persuade the whole Party to prevent and correct the "Left" errors in the "Great Leap Forward," but with little effect, and sometimes to no avail at all. The reasons for this are worth deep reflection. One important reason was that after the Eighth National Congress in 1956, the General Secretary was responsible for the execution of specific affairs. During the preparations for the Eighth Congress, Mao had said: "I say of our group, including myself and the Commander-in-Chief [Zhu De] as one, and Comrade Shaoqi as half (excluding Comrade Enlai, Comrade Chen Yun, and Comrade Deng Xiaoping, as they are the 'younger faction'), that we are just 'utility players' [37]. We cannot take the stage as the leads; we are no longer qualified. We can only maintain things, help out—that is our role." At the same time, we should also see that while Mao saw the serious problems of false reporting and boasting that had already emerged in the "Great Leap Forward," he was also worried that one tendency might cover the emergence of another. He feared that over-correcting the "Left" errors would pour cold water on the production enthusiasm of the masses that had just peaked. Nevertheless, at this time, Mao had undoubtedly shifted the focus of his work toward correcting "Left" errors.
Perhaps because the talk with Wu Lengxi on March 15, 1958, was not very effective, Mao sought out Wu again on April 11: "Recently, newspaper propaganda hasn't reflected reality enough, and there are even inaccuracies, such as speaking excessively about targets and plans. Now we must adjust and compress the air. Words of encouragement should be spoken, but do not be flashy and without substance." "Currently, various places are proposing this '-ization' and that '-ization.' '-ization' means change, reflecting the wishes of the masses. The slogans for these '-izations' are resonant and can mobilize the masses. But the newspapers must be cautious when publicizing them." "Newspaper propaganda must be deep, solid, and meticulous. We speak of the principle of 'more, faster, better, and more economically'; the newspapers cannot only speak of 'more and faster' and ignore 'better and more economically.' We do want greatness and achievement. But greatness without achievement is actually being 'fond of the small' rather than the 'great.' Being unrealistic means returning without achievement." "The problem with newspapers is universal; it exists not only in the People’s Daily but also in provincial papers. This summer, a national meeting of newspaper editors-in-chief should be held to discuss how to improve news propaganda. This matter should be told to Comrade Lu Dingyi and reported to the Central Secretariat." Regarding the issue of press propaganda, Wu Lengxi later recalled: "I handled all these matters according to Chairman Mao's opinions." Relevant leadership comrades said: "We are too busy in the summer; we'll talk after the autumn." At the Beidaihe Meeting, no decision was made on this matter either. "By the time of the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress in May, the call to 'emancipate the mind' and 'dare to think and act' overwhelmed everything. When I presided over the propaganda of the People's Daily and Xinhua News Agency, I followed the tide. However, because of Chairman Mao's repeated injunctions, I was initially relatively cautious. But by June, agricultural production 'satellites' [38] began to be launched, followed by steel 'satellites' and coal 'satellites' in succession. The Great Leap Forward formed a climax, and the 'wind of boasting' spread everywhere. Regarding the People's Communes, at first it was limited to reporting on models, but later, starting with the communization of the whole of Henan Province, a 'communist wind' [39] began to blow. Although it cannot be said that the People's Daily and Xinhua News Agency should bear the primary responsibility for the 1958 wind of boasting and communist wind, I still feel deep remorse to this day for the ill effects caused by the propaganda work of the two units I presided over during that period."
According to Wu Lengxi's view, in the second half of 1958, a large part of Mao Zedong's energy was drawn away by international issues. First was Khrushchev's visit to China in early August; second was the shelling of Jinmen (Quemoy) shortly after; and third were other major international events like De Gaulle's rise to power and the Lebanon crisis. The specific leadership of the Great Leap Forward and the People's Commune movement was mainly in the hands of other central leadership comrades working on the "front line." From July 14 to 18, 1958, a major central leader inspected Shouzhang County, Shandong. Newspaper reports stated that after inspecting fields in the Taiqian Commune where corn yields were expected to reach 30,000 to 50,000 jin per mu [40], millet 30,000 to 50,000 jin, sweet potatoes 300,000 jin, and the Hongwei Commune's cotton yield of 15,000 jin of ginned cotton, the leader praised them: "You have surpassed the scientists; what they didn't dare think of, you have achieved—this is a revolution." The report also stated that the central leader "was very concerned about the emergence of the 'sprouts of a communist lifestyle.' He said that some places have now organized public canteens, nurseries, and sewing groups, socializing domestic labor." Once these talks were published in the press, experimental and high-yield fields across the country replaced their signs—which originally showed yields of a few thousand jin—with signs showing yields of several thousand, ten thousand, or even over a hundred thousand jin. The reported yields in these false reports lept from thousands of jin per mu to tens of thousands. Many places began to emulate the establishment of public canteens and other such measures.
When the People's Daily repeatedly announced "extraordinary good news" of per-mu yields reaching ten thousand or even tens of thousand of jin [41], and the rapid promotion of People's Communes characterized as "larger in size and having a higher degree of public ownership" [42], Mao Zedong decided—on the eve of the Beidatite enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau—to conduct a one-week field inspection starting August 4, 1958. He visited Hebei, Henan, Jiangsu, Shandong, Tianjin, and other locations. During the inspection, Mao held symposiums with cadres and the masses at all levels, inspected experimental and high-yield plots, and chatted with the people he encountered. Almost everything he heard and saw was the "great news" of grain production doubling annually. Upon hearing and seeing these reports, Mao always followed up with series of questions to verify the facts on the spot. To seek truth from facts, the fields across the country in 1958 were indeed bursting with vitality, and the crops were indeed growing impressively. Everywhere Mao went, there was a scene of jubilation. This further bolstered his confidence in the "Great Leap Forward" of agricultural production. In Xushui, Hebei, Mao asked: "What will we do with so much surplus grain?" In Qiliying, Henan, Mao said: "It seems 'People's Commune' is a good name; it encompasses industry, agriculture, the military, education, and commerce, managing production, daily life, and political power." He continued: "The characteristics of the commune are, first, being large, and second, being public. Regarding the content of the commune, the presence of canteens and nurseries means the 'tail' of private plots has been cut off; production is militarized, and the distribution system has changed. It is a merger of small into large, of private into public, and the integration of township and commune. The People's Commune is still socialist in nature, but it is one level higher than the cooperatives." This shows that at the beginning of the "Great Leap Forward" and the People's Commune movement, Mao was indeed "feverish" in his thinking. However, during this very inspection, Mao became highly alert and discovered "Leftist" erroneous tendencies such as exaggeration [43]. Subsequently, he quickly shifted the focus of his work to correcting these "Leftist" errors, an effort that continued until the first half of the 1959 Lushan Conference.
Even now, some people place the primary responsibility for the errors that appeared in the "Great Leap Forward" and the People's Commune—such as exaggeration, the abolition of commodity production, the abolition of family life, reckless actions, and the "transition in poverty" [44]—entirely on Mao Zedong alone, often speaking of him in a disparaging or mocking tone. This does not accord with historical reality. Please consider the following authoritative historical materials.
First, regarding exaggeration. On August 8, 1958, Mao asked Liu Xueqin, Deputy Secretary of the Shangqiu County Party Committee in Henan, who accompanied him: "Do you believe those experimental plots with a yield of over 3,000 jin per mu?" Liu expressed his disbelief. Mao said: "Their heads are too hot; there is no scientific basis, and it doesn't fit reality." He added: "Warn the lower levels not to mention slogans of ten-thousand-jin yields." On August 10, Mao inspected the Xinli Village Commune in Sihezhuang Township, Tianjin. According to the recollections of Li Yinqiao, the head of Mao’s guards who accompanied him, when district and commune leaders reported that an experimental plot could produce 100,000 jin, Mao shook his head and curled his lip in disbelief: "That is impossible." Pointing at a responsible official, he said: "You have never farmed. This isn't 'launching a satellite' [45]; this is 'firing a cannon' [talking big]." Someone explained that by using electric lights to illuminate the rice and blowers to fan it, Xinli Village could achieve 100,000 jin per mu. Mao still shook his head, saying: "Bragging. It's unreliable. I have farmed the land. 100,000 jin per mu? You couldn't even pile it that high!" Someone wanted to have children stand on top of the rice plants to prove their density, but Mao still shook his head: "Children, don't go up there. The higher you stand, the harder you'll fall." On November 9, 1958, at the First Zhengzhou Conference, Mao pointed out: "We must advocate seeking truth from facts. Do not make false reports. Do not report others' pigs as your own; do not report 300 jin of wheat as 400 jin. This year's 900 billion jin of grain is at most 740 billion jin. We should treat 740 billion as the actual figure and the remaining 160 billion as false reports. The people cannot be deceived. In the past, false battle reports could only deceive the people, not the enemy; the enemy would just laugh. Where there is truth, there is falsehood, and the two are getting mixed up. Yanshi County originally wanted to hide production by reporting more as less, while others reported less as more. People's Daily had better be a bit more cool-headed." However, the problem did not seem to be resolved. On April 29, 1959, Mao felt compelled to write a letter to cadres at six levels—provincial, prefectural, county, commune, brigade, and team—points of which included: "If the actual yield last year was only 300 jin, increasing it by 100 or 200 jin this year would be very good. Bragging about 800, 1,000, or 1,200 jin is just boasting; it simply cannot be done. What good is it?" Regarding "close planting," he wrote: "It must be neither too sparse nor too dense. Many young cadres and certain superior organs lack experience and push for density. Some even say the denser, the better. That is wrong." Regarding "grain conservation," he wrote: "We must grasp it very firmly." He added: "Every year, the three tasks of harvesting, storage, and consumption must be grasped very, very tightly and in a timely manner." "Within ten years, one must never engage in big talk or high-flown rhetoric; doing so is extremely dangerous." On the issue of "telling the truth": "Honest people, those who dare to speak the truth, ultimately benefit the cause of the people and do not lose out themselves. Those who love to tell lies harm both the people and themselves; they always lose out. It must be said that many lies are squeezed out by those above. When those above 'brag, pressure, and make promises,' it makes things very difficult for those below." He concluded: "Compared to the current popular high-flown rhetoric, I am singing a 'low-key' tune here, intended to truly mobilize enthusiasm and achieve the goal of increased production. If facts prove that the yield is not as low as I say but reaches a higher goal, and I become a 'conservative,' then thank God, it would be a supreme honor." Yet, many provinces and cities failed to circulate or even implement this timely and severe instruction from Mao. This was because circulating it would have necessitated denying the "huge achievements" of yields of tens of thousands of jin that these comrades had fabricated. It is easy to say in general terms that our Party must have the courage to persist in the truth and correct errors; however, while it is often easy to negate others, negating oneself is the most difficult thing of all!
On January 13, 1965, Mao read a letter from Ma Jianxian, director of the Rice Research Institute of the Sichuan Academy of Agricultural Sciences. The letter stated: "I am boldly reporting the hidden anxieties and doubts I have carried in my heart for five years... In March 1959, I was sent down to Shidong Commune in Lu County. In early April... I saw a letter written by the Chairman to production team leaders. I couldn't wait to read this letter to the commune members, and they were all overjoyed. Then, I returned to my unit and read it to the workers. Unexpectedly, a few days later, I heard that the Chairman's letter was no longer being sent to production teams, and many teams never even knew he had written it... The unit's branch secretary criticized me, saying that reading the letter to members and workers was a distortion of the Chairman's intent. The act of shelving the Chairman's letter and not publicizing it was not restricted to individual counties or units in Sichuan; cadres were very dissatisfied but dared not speak. What exactly is the reason for this? It deserves the Chairman's attention." Mao noted in an instruction: "Circulate this to the comrades at the work conference. This letter from a people's representative is very well written. The criticism he raises is correct. In the future, we must never do those stupid things that harm the interests of the people."
Second, regarding the abolition of commodity production. On November 2, 1958, while hosting the First Zhengzhou Conference on a special train stopped in Zhengzhou, Mao pointed out: "Regarding the People's Commune, should we expand the natural economy or the commodity economy? Or both? The saying that the economy of the People's Commune is mainly a self-sufficient economy is wrong. The People's Commune should develop in both directions; it must simultaneously expand social exchange. Without exchange, there can be no consumption; without expanding exchange, wages cannot be paid." Finally, Mao emphasized once more: Communes must engage more in commodity production. Currently, it seems as though only self-sufficiency is honorable while producing commodities is disreputable—this is not good. We must expand commodity production, expand social exchange, and vigorously develop transportation. On November 9, Mao pointed out at the same conference: "Now, some of our people seem to have a tendency to abolish commodity production. They yearn for communism, and as soon as commodity production is mentioned, they worry, feeling it is a capitalist thing. They have not distinguished between socialist commodity production and capitalist commodity production, and they do not understand the importance of utilizing the role of commodity production under socialist conditions. This is a manifestation of not acknowledging objective laws and not understanding the problem of the 500 million peasants. During the socialist period, commodity production should be utilized to unite the hundreds of millions of peasants. I believe that after the establishment of People's Communes, commodity production and commodity exchange must develop even further." He added: "Commodity production cannot be confused with capitalism. Why fear commodity production? It is nothing more than fearing capitalism. Now it is the state doing business with the local People's Communes; capitalism has long been excluded, so what is there to fear? Do not be afraid; I believe we must greatly develop commodity production. Whether commodity production is capitalist or socialist depends on the economic system it is linked to. Linked to the capitalist system, it is capitalist commodity production; linked to the socialist system, it is socialist commodity production. Commodity production has existed since antiquity; the 'Shang' in the Shang Dynasty [46] signifies that commodity production already existed then."
Third, regarding the abolition of family life. In October 1958, Mao sent Wu Lengxi and Tian Jiaying to Henan to investigate the status of the People's Communes. They went to Xinxiang, Henan, to investigate the Xingning People's Commune. This commune had 4,000 households and 20,000 people, and it implemented militarized management. The entire commune was organized into 15 battalions and 50 companies. Most notably, they implemented public ownership of housing and collective dormitories, separating men from women and the old from the young. They could only return home for a reunion on Sundays. Many places in Henan were doing this. Local leaders said this was based on the words of a leading central comrade who claimed that communist society must also revolutionize the family. Hearing the report, Mao said very angrily: "Doesn't that kind of approach help the Kuomintang's slanders against us? Wherever such nonsense is being carried out, I support the masses in rising up to rebel. These cadres have lost their heads—the Communist Party doesn't want families? The breaking up of families must be prohibited." On November 3, 1958, at the First Zhengzhou Conference, Mao again pointed out: "Some cadres in Suiping advocate for the abolition of the family before achieving communism." He continued: "Now the elderly live in 'Happy Homes,' the young are in nurseries, and the able-bodied live together—isn't this fragmentation? We are not destroying the family; we are abolishing the patriarchal system [47]. The patriarchal system is a feudal system that should have been solved during the Democratic Revolution, but that was impossible; it can only be solved in the socialist era." He concluded: "Abolishing the patriarchal system is certainly not the same as abolishing the family system."
Fourth, regarding reckless action. On November 3, 1958, during the First Zhengzhou Conference [48], Mao Zedong pointed out: "Currently, people are working fifteen hours a day. An order must be issued: during busy seasons, they must get at least six hours of sleep. Falling short by even one hour constitutes a failure to complete the task and should be criticized. Working fifteen hours a day cannot be sustained; if it persists, the quantity and quality of work will inevitably decline. Besides sleep, work, and eating, there must be some free time. In addition to eating their fill and eating well, there must be a requirement for sleeping and resting sufficiently—rest includes a noon nap. During busy seasons, sleep at least six hours; usually, sleep eight hours." On November 21, 1958, at the Wuchang Conference, while discussing the tasks for 1959, Mao noted: "Industrial tasks, water conservancy tasks, and grain tasks must all be appropriately scaled back. The pressure is truly suffocating; it is too heavy." Regarding the 1958 grain production estimate of 900 billion catties [49] set at the Beidaihe Conference, Mao said: "I don't believe that 900 billion; I would be satisfied if we reach 750 billion." Regarding the goal of 27 to 30 million tons of steel for 1959, Mao asked: "30 million tons of steel—do we really need that much? Can we actually produce it?" He said: "During the Beidaihe Conference, we lacked experience in managing industry. After two months of effort, steel transport is congested everywhere. In large cities, there is no pork to eat, and no grain to eat." He further pointed out: "Water conservancy construction and other tasks are truly suffocating and too heavy; perhaps they also need consideration. The document produced by Comrades Tan Zhenlin and Liao Luyan [50] requires 190 billion cubic meters of earthwork for water conservancy projects nationwide from this winter through next summer, claiming it is indispensable. From last winter to this autumn, 50 billion cubic meters were done; 190 billion is nearly four times that amount. I think if we proceed this way, half of the Chinese people will die; if not half, then one-third; if not one-third, then one-tenth. With 500 million peasants in China, one-tenth is 50 million people. If 50 million people die, I would at least have to be dismissed from my post—the rest of you might stay, but it wouldn't just be a matter of dismissal; I would lose my head. You (referring to Zeng Xisheng [51]—Ed.) want to do more, and you can, but people must not die; the principle must be that no one dies. 190 billion cubic meters of earthwork is simply too much; please deliberate on this. If you insist on doing it, there is nothing I can do, as long as you don't cut off my head. My view is that next year’s water conservancy should stay at 50 billion cubic meters, with no increase at all. 50 billion this year, 50 billion next year, 50 billion the year after—if you do that for ten years, wouldn't that be 500 billion? I say it is fine to leave a little for our sons to do; why should we finish it all ourselves? For instance, with 30 million tons of steel, do we really need that much? Can we produce that much? We have only reached 8 million tons now, and that took 60 million people going to the front. To produce 30 million tons of steel next year, how many people would be needed? Whether to set it at 30 million tons is worth considering. These 30 million tons also involve coking coal, coal, transport, and so on; please deliberate. Furthermore, there are various other tasks: coal, electricity, oil, transport, chemicals, forests, building materials, textiles, paper. This time, let us take a low-key tone and compress our brains, turning 'air' into 'solid air' [52]. Let’s aim for less first; if we have energy to spare and things go smoothly, we can add more. The strings of a huqin [53] should not be pulled too tight; if they are, they risk breaking. Also, what are the tasks for agriculture? We still need to deliberate; there must always be practical possibility." The Wuchang Conference was an extremely important meeting in our Party's history. Please note: people often think that the realization that boasting and reckless action cause deaths and would go down in history was first stated by other central leaders at the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference [54] in 1962. In fact, Mao Zedong had already warned the whole Party in advance during the Great Leap Forward in 1958, and his words were even more severe.
Fifth, regarding "transitioning in poverty"—that is, transitioning to communism as quickly as possible. On November 4, 1958, Wu Zhipu, then Secretary of the Henan Provincial Party Committee, reported that they had discussed a document title that morning called the "Outline of the Ten-Year Plan for Chinese Communist Construction," covering 1958 to 1967. Mao Zedong said: "Now you are involving communism; this is a major issue that the whole world will not understand. For now, I think the title should still be socialism. Socialism contains elements of communism, but don't jump straight into communism." Wu Zhipu said: "However, the main goal of this document is to complete socialist construction and transition to communism within ten years." Mao said: "Completing socialism is good. As for preparing to transition to communism—if you say the transition will happen in ten years, I might not believe it. Add the word 'preparing'—'preparing for the transition'—to be more flexible." Tao Lujia [55] said: "Some communes want to transition as early as 1962." Mao said: "What people think is one thing; whether it conforms to objective laws is another." On November 9, at the First Zhengzhou Conference, Mao pointed out: "Fan County in Shandong proposed achieving communism within two years; we should send someone to investigate this. Some people now always want to achieve communism in three to five years." He continued: "Henan proposed transitioning to communism in four years—there is 'too much' Marxism there; do not be in such a hurry to finish it in four years. It took us twenty-two years to carry out the revolutionary war; we patiently waited for the victory of the democratic revolution. How can we manage without patience in building socialism? Lack of patience will not do." On November 21, 1958, at the enlarged meeting of the CCP Central Committee Political Bureau in Wuchang, Mao said: "I have some thoughts for you to consider. First, the issue of transitioning to communism. Currently, our cadres at the township level and above want to transition quickly and overtake the Soviet Union. We are currently 'poor and blank' [56], and further 'poor and weak.' The boasting now is too loud; I think it does not fit the facts or reflect objective reality. We have no experience in building socialism, yet we are boasting so fiercely. I worry about our construction. There is a type of tree called the pyramid poplar; it grows very fast but is not sturdy. If construction is done too quickly, it might lead to great chaos under heaven. I am always very worried about this problem. Generally speaking, we must let the Soviet Union enter communism first, and we will follow. Even if we actually enter it, we should still hang the sign of socialism while practicing the reality of communism. We have shortcomings; the Beidaihe Conference said that in three or four, five or six, or a few more years, we would achieve ownership by the whole people. I’m afraid that won’t be possible—achieving ownership by the whole people at that time? We’ll just have to change it." Here, Peng Zhen [57] interjected: "The countryside is communized and industrialized; transitioning too slowly to ownership by the whole people will be disadvantageous after the peasants become very wealthy." Liu Shaoqi said: "It is easier to transition while the peasants are still a bit poor. During the discussions in Beijing, my opinion was to start issuing wages once they reach 150 to 200 yuan—transitioning batch by batch as they reach the target." Peng Zhen advocated: "Finish the transition in two years and issue wages." Mao clearly stated: "This 'three or four years at the minimum, five or six years at the maximum' is likely a mistake of adventurism." Liu Shaoqi said: "If we don't do it then, they will have established everything, and it will be hard to provide for them if we start issuing wages later." Peng Zhen said: "Moving slowly is disadvantageous." Mao disagreed: "According to the opinions of Liu Shaoqi and Peng Zhen, we should take advantage of this poverty to transition, otherwise they won't want to transition. We will not discuss this issue today." The author highly respects Comrades Shaoqi and Peng Zhen and has had direct contact with Comrade Peng Zhen. Peng Zhen had a profound theoretical foundation and a very strong sense of Party principle; he held Mao Zedong in high esteem. The author’s former superior, Wang Zhen [58], told the author several times: "Comrade Peng Zhen had extreme reverence and deep feelings for the Chairman. Despite the great grievances Peng Zhen suffered [during the Cultural Revolution], as far as I know, after returning to work, he never said a single negative word about the Chairman in public or private." In citing these historical facts from the Chronological Biography of Mao Zedong (Mao Zedong Nianpu), I have recorded them as they were, without concealing the faults of those I honor.
Sixth, regarding the concealment of production for private distribution, the law of value, exchange of equal values, and "egalitarianism and indiscriminate requisitioning" [59]. On May 18, 1958, at a meeting of delegation heads during the Second Session of the Eighth National Party Congress, Mao said: "Quite a few people within the Chinese Party do not understand the importance of the peasant issue; failures still occur on the peasant issue. When I see peasants concealing production, I am happy; if the peasants have it, it is the same as the state having it." On November 9, 1958, at the First Zhengzhou Conference, Mao pointed out: "People's communes must produce socialist commodities suitable for exchange to gradually increase everyone's wages. Regarding means of livelihood, we must develop socialist commerce and utilize the form of the law of value during the transition period as a tool for economic accounting, to gradually transition to communism. It is utilizing the form of the law of value, not its content, as a tool for economic accounting in the transition period. In fact, this is what we do, and we must do it every year and everywhere. Nowadays, our economists do not like economics; it’s the same in the Soviet Union. Anyone who speaks of the law of value is treated as if they are losing their reputation." "These people do not approve of commodity production, thinking the Soviet Union is already in communism, when in fact it is still very far off. We have only been doing socialism for a few years, so we are even further away." On February 27, 1959, at the Second Zhengzhou Conference, Mao noted: "Many people now do not recognize that commune ownership must undergo a development process. Within the commune, the move from small-scale collective ownership by the production team to large-scale collective ownership by the commune requires a process of several years to complete. They mistakenly believe that as soon as a people's commune is established, the means of production, manpower, and products of each production team can be directly controlled by the commune leadership. They mistake socialism for communism, distribution according to work for distribution according to need, and collective ownership for ownership by the whole people. In many places, they deny the law of value and the exchange of equal values. Consequently, within the scope of the commune, they practice leveling the rich and poor, egalitarian distribution, and the requisitioning of certain production team properties without compensation; the banks have also called in many rural loans indiscriminately. This 'egalitarianism, requisitioning, and loan recovery' [60] has caused great panic among the masses of peasants. This is currently the most fundamental problem in our relationship with the peasantry." On March 5, 1959, at the final meeting of the Second Zhengzhou Conference, Mao pointed out: "As for concealing production and private distribution, it is completely necessary; this is a result caused by our policies. It is clearly we and the gentlemen present here who forced them into concealing production and private distribution; our policies required them to do so, to engage in 'slow-downs' [61], and to flee. I am now speaking on behalf of 500 million peasants and over 10 million grassroots cadres, practicing 'Right opportunism' and persisting in it; it must be implemented. If you will not be 'Rightists' with me, I will be a 'Rightist' alone to the end, even if I am expelled from the Party. Right now, many things in the resolution of the Sixth Plenary Session [62] have not been implemented. For example, exchange of equal values—people forget the basics, they deny the law of value and exchange of equal values. With this approach, the people's communes will inevitably fall apart. If we continue like this, we will surely ruin the peasants." "What Great Leap Forward? There certainly won't be one; there won't be any kind of leap forward." "I thank the hundreds of millions of peasants for concealing production and private distribution and for their resolute resistance; it is these things that pushed me to think. Now the problem lies with the counties and the communes, especially the commune level; they must be made to understand the law of value and the exchange of equal values. These are objective laws; violate them, and you will end up bruised and bloodied." "Some also say that wealthy teams will practice capitalism—what exactly constitutes capitalism? Some say a wealthy team is like a small planet that wants to fly away and not orbit the sun. Where would it go? I simply don't believe it."
However, at that time, the urge to transition to communism and the wind of boasting were very strong. Mao's corrective measures mentioned above essentially saw no results. People often say that one sentence from Mao Zedong's instructions was worth ten thousand. In fact, at this time, even one sentence could hardly take effect. Thus, when Richard Nixon visited on February 21, 1972, and said to Mao: "I know the Chairman is a philosopher with deep thoughts. The Chairman's writings have moved the entire country and changed the world," Mao replied: "I haven't changed the world, only a few places near Beijing." In a certain sense, what Mao said reflected the true reality of the situation.
If one carefully reads the accurate historical materials above, who could still heap the primary responsibility for the errors during the Great Leap Forward and the People's Commune movement—such as boasting, the abolition of commodity production, the abolition of family life, reckless action, and transitioning in poverty—onto Mao Zedong alone? Here, allow the author to say it once more: the actual situation was that Mao Zedong was the first to detect these deviations and errors; not only was his attitude toward correction resolute, but he was also extremely patient and earnest in his persuasion.
Regarding the slogans he proposed during the early stages of the Great Leap Forward, Mao Zedong gradually refined them through practice. For example, during the early Great Leap Forward, he called for "breaking down superstitions." On November 23, 1958, at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau, Mao pointed out the other side of the issue. He said: "In breaking down superstitions, do not break down science as if it were a superstition." "Since we began breaking down superstitions, the results have been enormous; people dare to think, speak, and act. But a small portion has gone too far, breaking down even scientific truths." "All superstitions must be broken, but all truths must be protected." The "abolition of bourgeois right" [63] was also proposed by Mao when he launched the Great Leap Forward. He had analyzed this issue at the First Zhengzhou Conference. In this speech, he further provided a relatively comprehensive analysis. He said: "Bourgeois right can only be partially abolished—for example, the 'three winds' and 'five airs' [64], excessive disparities in rank, the 'lordly' attitude, and the 'cat-and-mouse' relationship [between superiors and subordinates]. These must be abolished, and the more thoroughly the better. Other parts, such as wage scales, the relationship between higher and lower levels, and certain state compulsions, cannot yet be abolished. A portion of bourgeois right is useful in the socialist era; it must be protected and made to serve socialism. If we smash it to bits, there will come a day when we fall into passivity, have to admit our mistakes, and apologize to the useful parts of bourgeois right. Therefore, we must have analysis and distinguish which parts are useful and which should be abolished."
Mao Zedong never shied away from or concealed the mistakes he made during the early Great Leap Forward. He candidly acknowledged them and used various opportunities to conduct self-criticism, even in certain diplomatic settings. On October 2, 1958, while meeting with delegations from six countries including Bulgaria at Zhongnanhai, Mao publicly conducted self-criticism: "On June 19th of this year, some comrades from our central leadership and the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry were boasting in a certain place. I said, 'Since you are aiming for nine million tons, why not do a bit more? Is it possible to simply double it?' They said it was. By August, when we checked, we were still far short. I became anxious and said my 'cannon' had been fired in the wrong direction." On November 28, 1960, in a comment drafted on behalf of the Central Committee regarding errors in the Great Leap Forward, Mao wrote that he (referring to Chairman Mao himself—Author's note) "says of himself that he shares the fate and breath of all comrades willing to correct their mistakes. He said he has committed errors himself and is determined to correct them. For example, one error was writing the timeframe for the transition of commune ownership into the Beidaihe Resolution; it was envisioned too quickly." One day in August 1961, while chatting with his guard Zhang Xianpeng about his wishes, Mao said: "I have three great wishes: first, to go down and spend a year doing industrial work, a year in agriculture, and half a year in commerce, so I can conduct more investigation and research to understand the situation. I won't be a bureaucrat, and it will serve as a push for cadres across the country. Second, to ride a horse along the banks of the Yellow River and the Yangtze River for field inspections. I lack knowledge in geology, so I would invite a geologist, along with a historian and a man of letters to go with me. Third, finally, to write a book that puts my whole life in it, including all my shortcomings and mistakes, so the people of the world can judge whether I am a good man or a bad man. As for me, if the good parts account for 70 percent and the bad parts 30 percent, I will be satisfied. I do not hide my views; that is the kind of person I am. I am no saint." On January 29, 1962, at a meeting, Mao said: "If it is my mistake, I must change. For the errors of the Central Committee, I must take direct responsibility for some and indirect responsibility for others. You are the Chairman, after all; who told you to be the Chairman?" On January 30, 1962, during his self-criticism at the 7,000-Cadre Conference [65], Mao said: "On June 12th last year, the final day of the Central Committee's Beijing Work Conference, I spoke of my own shortcomings and errors. I said, please convey this to all provinces and regions. Later I learned that many places did not convey it, as if my mistakes could be hidden. Comrades, they cannot be hidden. For any mistakes committed by the Central Committee, I am directly responsible for those that concern me and have a share in those that concern me indirectly, because I am the Chairman of the Central Committee." Led by Mao's example, Zhou Enlai also conducted self-criticism. Deng Xiaoping said: "The shortcomings and errors in our work over these years... the Secretariat of the Central Committee, which handles specific work, should bear the primary responsibility." On June 24, 1959, Mao Zedong took a train to Changsha accompanied by Wang Renzhong, First Secretary of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee. On the way, Mao told Wang: "When a decision is wrong, the leader must take responsibility. One cannot onesidedly blame those below. The leader taking responsibility for the led is a very important condition for gaining the trust of subordinates." This is exactly what Mao did; he was not only strict with himself and courageous in self-criticism, but also lenient toward others and brave in shouldering responsibility. He took upon himself errors that were primarily the direct leadership responsibility of other comrades, in order to allow them to lay down their burdens, unite the whole Party, and move forward unencumbered. This was Mao Zedong's vast magnanimity that encompassed heaven and earth.
Mao Zedong was a man who "would not repeat a mistake" [66]; he placed particular emphasis on drawing lessons from the experiences of himself and others. On January 23, 1965, Mao presided over an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau to hear Yu Qiuli’s report on planning work reforms and visions for long-term planning. During the discussion, Mao interjected: "There is not a single cadre without shortcomings or errors. Do I not have shortcomings or errors? Even if others don't say it, I know. There are no saints in this world. The nature of errors can be serious or not serious." When Yu Qiuli reported that the drive and enthusiasm of 1958 were very precious, Mao said: "The drive was sufficient, but the puffery [67] was not small!" When Yu reported that steel production could reach 11 million tons this year, Mao said: "Isn't there a report? When the British heard we were carrying out 'adjustment and consolidation,' they became afraid. If you don't engage in adventurism but instead focus on quality, variety, and specifications, they become afraid. Let the quantity go up slowly; do not rush." When Yu reported that the Central Committee's principles and policies were completely correct, Mao said: "Not necessarily all correct. We must analyze and 'divide one into two'—there are correct parts and erroneous parts. Over the past fifteen years, the correct parts have always been the mainstay; we haven't practiced revisionism! We pursued 'more, faster, better, and more economically' [68] by going for 'more and faster' while forgetting 'better and more economically'—can that be called correct? How can the Planning Commission be blamed for everything? They cannot. Making some mistakes also has benefits; one gains experience and develops immunity. High procurement quotas, blind commands, and those 1,700 items were all incorrect. Regarding 'more, faster, better, and more economically,' you must take care not to cause the kind of blind rush for quantity and speed we saw in '58, '59, and '60, which resulted in neither 'more' nor 'fast.'" On the morning of June 16, 1965, while listening to Yu Qiuli’s report on drafting the Third Five-Year Plan, Mao pointed out: "I think a construction scale of 108 billion yuan over five years is too large; there is too little leeway. By doing fewer projects, we can fight a 'war of annihilation' [69]; if it's too large, we can't annihilate anything. Don't aim for 100 billion; do 80 or 90 billion. Don't set those 1970 targets so high. Can we reach 480 billion jin of grain? 16 million tons of steel will be enough. If you don't keep these numbers down, you won't be able to suppress the blind commands of those adventurists. I see that everyone wants to do more, and you want to do more, too. But taxing and requisitioning grain from the common people—if it's too much, they will revolt, and that won't do. This is a question of principle. We must act according to objective possibilities; we absolutely cannot exceed objective possibility, and even within objective possibility, we must leave some leeway. The leeway should be large, not small. We must leave leeway for the common people; we cannot squeeze them too tightly." On February 21, 1969, People’s Daily published an editorial titled "Grasp Revolution, Promote Production, and Win New Victories on the Industrial Front," in which Mao added the sentence: "In making plans, the masses must be mobilized, and care must be taken to leave ample leeway." Even on November 13, 1970, while receiving Pakistani President Yahya Khan, Mao said regarding the fact that many Chinese steel enterprises wanted to double their output again: "Managing the economy is very difficult. We didn't know how at first; it took several turns and getting a bit better at it before we learned a little." "Now we must be vigilant against some people wanting to double things at every turn. Once this enthusiasm rises, trouble will happen again. First, materials are insufficient; second, equipment and investment cannot keep up—it creates national tension."
The facts above fully demonstrate: first, during the Great Leap Forward, especially in its early stages, Mao Zedong, like the rest of the Party, was caught up in the fever and committed unrealistic "Left" errors. However, he always took responsibility for his mistakes and consistently avoided repeating them in subsequent practical work. Second, the errors Mao committed were far from being as large or as numerous as people imagine today. Currently, some people still pile all the absurd phenomena of the Great Leap Forward period—including mistakes made by cadres at all levels and other central leaders—onto Mao Zedong alone, even going so far as to wantonly mock and insult him. Is this not a specific manifestation of historical nihilism?
Regarding our own "ancestors," we must seek truth from facts. If an "ancestor" was wrong, we must of course have the courage to admit it; we cannot, just because they are our "ancestor" or even our "biological father," "conceal the faults of the venerable" [70] or blindly defend them. However, we also cannot, just because an "ancestor" made some mistakes, exaggerate them infinitely or even smear their great achievements and contributions into a pitch-black mess. In reality, a person's physiological lineage is a single vertical line connecting history to the future, but a person's ideological and political lineage can only be acquired later in life. Different people and different "ancestors" influence different individuals; some may even deliberately seek out different "ancestors." The erroneous trend of thought that spread during the "Cultural Revolution"—"a dragon begets a dragon, a phoenix begets a phoenix, and a mole begets a burrower" [71]—harmed many people and even several generations. Some still stubbornly believe that Mao Zedong was the initiator of this trend and its disastrous consequences. This is also one of the reasons why some people to this day hold prejudices against Mao’s ideas on the Party never changing its nature, but this is by no means the historical truth.
On February 29, 1980, Deng Xiaoping said in his speech at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee: "Do not create an impression that everyone else was completely correct and only one person was incorrect. During the 1958 Great Leap Forward, we were also feverish. I'm afraid many of the veteran comrades present here were also feverish. These problems were not the responsibility of just one person. We should admit that there is no one who does not make mistakes." Huang Kecheng said in his later years: "During the Great Leap Forward, many comrades had a style of puffery, distorting facts to a shocking degree and allowing errors to develop to a serious stage; they also bear responsibility."
Some mistakenly believe that Mao Zedong possessed only the romance of a poet and lacked a scientific spirit of seeking truth from facts, and that by inappropriately applying poetic romance to the political and economic life of the state, major failures were inevitable. I do not agree with this statement for three reasons:
First, the numerous facts cited above regarding Mao Zedong’s efforts to correct the "Left" errors during the Great Leap Forward—such as puffery, the "Communist Wind" [72], and the rush to transition to communism—should clarify the blurred perceptions many people have on this matter.
Second, upon entering the period of socialist revolution and construction, what our Party essentially had to do was carry out a "second combination" of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism with the specific realities of China's revolution and construction. In a certain sense, it was inevitable that certain twists and turns and errors would occur during the difficult exploration of the path of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. On the evening of March 23, 1954, while presiding over an enlarged meeting of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee at his residence by the Zhongnanhai swimming pool to discuss Khrushchev’s secret report and the CPC’s response, Mao said: "The communist movement, counting from the publication of the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels, has existed for only a little over a hundred years. The history of the dictatorship of the proletariat, counting from the October Revolution, is less than forty years. Realizing communism is an unprecedentedly great and unprecedentedly arduous undertaking. If it were not arduous, it could not be called great; it is great precisely because it is very arduous. In the process of this arduous struggle, it is impossible not to make mistakes, because we are walking a path that no one has trodden before. I have always held the 'inevitability theory' regarding mistakes. That Stalin made mistakes was a matter of course, and Khrushchev will likewise make mistakes. The Soviet Union will make mistakes, and we will also make mistakes. The question is whether the Communist Party can overcome its own mistakes through criticism and self-criticism."
Third, in practical work, Mao Zedong always emphasized the integration of revolutionary spirit with practice. On May 8, 1958, during his first speech at the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Party, Mao pointed out: "Revolutionary spirit should be unified with the practical spirit; the revolutionary passion of Russia and the practical spirit of America must be unified. In literature, this means the unity of revolutionary romanticism and revolutionary realism. Our revolutionary spirit is not detached from practice, but combined with practice." At the Second Zhengzhou Conference on March 5, 1959, as the meeting neared its end, Mao explicitly criticized the practice during the "Great Leap Forward" [73] of demanding hundreds of millions of peasants write poetry. He said: "Only people with poetic inspiration write poetry; forcing someone to write when they have no inspiration—is that not an injustice? If you asked me to write poetry in Zhengzhou, my inspiration would have vanished into the highest heavens [74]; it simply cannot be done."
We must by no means deny the lapses and errors that occurred in economic construction from the founding of the New China to the beginning of reform and opening up, nor should we defend the lapses of the Mao Zedong era, including those of Mao himself. However, these lapses and errors were certainly not Mao’s alone, and more importantly, we must not treat Mao's achievements—even his great contributions—as lapses or errors. We cannot sever or polarize the twenty-seven years of arduous struggle from the forty-plus years of reform and opening up. Today, some describe the history of the twenty-seven years following the founding of the New China as utterly devoid of merit, or even as a period of total darkness; this is either muddleheadedness or the result of ulterior motives.
On January 5, 2013, in a speech to a seminar for newly elected members and alternate members of the Central Committee on studying and implementing the spirit of the Eighteenth National Congress of the Party, Xi Jinping explicitly pointed out: "Our Party led the people in conducting socialist construction in two historical periods: the period before reform and opening up and the period after reform and opening up. These are two periods that are interconnected yet significantly different, but in essence, both are practical explorations by our Party in leading the people to conduct socialist construction. Socialism with Chinese characteristics was initiated in the new historical period of reform and opening up, but it was also initiated on the foundation of the basic socialist system established after the founding of the New China and more than twenty years of construction... Although these two historical periods have great differences in ideological guidance, principles and policies, and practical work for socialist construction, they are by no means severed from each other, let alone fundamentally opposed. The historical period after reform and opening up cannot be used to negate the historical period before reform and opening up, nor can the historical period before reform and opening up be used to negate the historical period after reform and opening up... We must adhere to the ideological line of seeking truth from facts, distinguish between the mainstream and the tributaries, persist in the truth, correct errors, carry forward experience, and learn lessons. On this basis, we shall continue to push forward the cause of the Party and the people." This passage from Xi Jinping both fully accords with historical reality and truth and reflects the consensus—the greatest common denominator—among the broadest masses of the people. Xi Jinping’s discourse on correctly treating the two different historical periods before and after reform and opening up also perfectly aligns with Mao Zedong's statement: "Severing history is not permissible; the view that it is as if we started everything from scratch is incorrect." [75]
The important conclusion drawn in the report of the Eighteenth National Congress—that "the first generation of the Party's collective central leadership with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core" "laid the fundamental political prerequisites and institutional foundations for all development and progress in contemporary China" and "provided valuable experience, theoretical preparation, and the material foundation for pioneering socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new historical period"—has deeply won the hearts of the Party and the people.
The author was born in the same year as the New China [76] and is a native of Wen County, on the north bank of the Yellow River in northwest Henan Province. My hometown borders the Yellow River to the south and leans against the Taihang Mountains to the north; the land is fertile and the sunlight abundant. After the founding of the New China, Wen County, along with other provinces, cities, and counties, vigorously constructed water conservancy projects, and almost every year saw favorable weather and a bumper harvest. However, during the "three years of hardship" in the early 1960s, my fellow villagers and I ate grass seeds, elm bark, corn cobs, and even Guanyin clay [77] for a brief period. At that time, I was too young to know why, but as my age and experience grew, coupled with my passion for Party and national history and the disclosure of reliable materials, I gradually realized that during the three years of hardship, Henan was one of the few severely afflicted areas in the country. There were indeed "man-made" factors involved, but the direct cause was that other frontline leaders [78] gave explicit instructions to the main person in charge of the Henan Provincial Party Committee at that time to implement "egalitarianism and indiscriminate requisitioning" [79] in Henan, turning it into an experimental zone for a rapid transition to communism. This error had no direct relation to Mao Zedong; in fact, it was precisely what Mao sought to rectify with all his might after he discovered it.
I believe that when we examine history, we must never simply stand from the position of personal gain or loss. We must break through personal limitations and observe issues from the perspective of the people, of history, and ultimately of the progress of all human civilization; only then can we grasp the truth and essence of things. One cannot sever or polarize the twenty-seven years of arduous struggle after the founding of the New China from the subsequent forty-plus years of reform and opening up simply because one went hungry for a few days or lived through a few years of poverty. Looking back now, in a certain sense, I remain proud that under such difficult conditions, our country developed the "Two Bombs, One Satellite, and One Submarine" [80] and achieved brilliant successes in socialist construction. I am proud of the modest contribution our generation made to the arduous exploration and eventual formation of socialism with Chinese characteristics. I also want to remind some young people who grew up after the reform and opening up: do not, out of ignorance of the situation, groundlessly accuse our generations who lived and worked in the Mao Zedong era of being "lazybones" raised on the "big pot of rice" [81], and do not deny the hard sweat we shed back then to lay the foundation for today’s beautiful life.
(Author: Li Shenming, former Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) Online Editor: Tongxin Source: Mao Zedong Dengxiaoping Lilun Yanjiu (Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories), Issue 12, 2023.