Lv Zhen: Mao Zedong's Working Method of Having "Figures" in Mind
The law of the unity of quantitative and qualitative change is one of the fundamental laws of dialectical materialism. Mao Zedong creatively applied this law to the practice of leading China’s revolution and construction, forming the "having 'figures' in mind" working method. In March 1949, in the conclusion to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh CPC Central Committee [1], he summarized twelve methods of work for Party committees, the seventh of which was to achieve "having 'figures' in mind." He pointed out: "This means that for any situation or problem, one must attend to its quantitative aspect and conduct a basic quantitative analysis. Any quality manifests as a certain quantity; without quantity, there can be no quality. To this day, many of our comrades do not understand that they must attend to the quantitative aspect of things—they do not attend to basic statistics, major percentages, or the quantitative limits that determine the quality of things. They have no 'figures' in their heads for anything, and the result is that they cannot help but make mistakes."
Under normal circumstances, the Chinese expressions xiongzhong youshu or xinzhong youshu mean "to have a basic understanding of situations and problems and to have a degree of confidence in handling matters." Here, however, Mao Zedong specifically placed quotation marks around the word "figures" (shù), expressing it as having "figures" (shù) in mind precisely to distinguish it from colloquial usage and to highlight the literal meaning of the term. The "figures" here refer to "numbers" and "quantities." The working method of having "figures" in mind is a valuable experience Mao summarized from the practice of China's revolution and construction. It is a creative development and Sinicization of the laws of Marxist philosophy, possessing rich ideological connotations.
I. Requirements for Scientific and Meticulous Work
All things in the world possess a certain quality; quality is the internal regularity that distinguishes one thing from another. However, things possess not only qualitative determinations but also quantitative determinations. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, while reading works of Marxist philosophy, Mao Zedong noted in the margins: "Quantity and quality exist simultaneously (they are inseparable) and develop simultaneously; the two are a unity." He further noted, "Because quantitative changes produce qualitative changes, and conversely, qualitative changes produce quantitative changes," and "Scientific research must recognize things not only in their qualitative differences but also through their quantitative complexity." Therefore, in the cognition of things, distinguishing their quality is the beginning and the prerequisite for recognizing quantity; moving from quality to quantity is the deepening and refinement of cognition. By further grasping quantity on the basis of recognizing quality, one can obtain a clearer understanding of things, thereby correctly guiding practice. The working method of having "figures" in mind requires that the analysis of the particularity of contradictions be raised to a level of precision and accuracy, which places requirements of scientific rigor and meticulousness on leadership work.
Having "figures" in mind requires that for any important work or decision, a basic quantitative analysis must be conducted, grounding the formulation of policies, strategies, and principles on a scientific and accurate foundation. Therefore, leading officials must persist in seeking truth from facts, act according to objective laws, enhance their sensitivity to key figures, be adept at observation, reflection, and calculation, learn to conduct "quantitative analysis," and be skilled at discovering internal connections and regular patterns from chaotic phenomena so as to carry out work scientifically and precisely.
At the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh CPC Central Committee, after proposing the method of having "figures" in mind, Mao Zedong used the example of land reform to illustrate its meaning. He said: "For example, to carry out land reform, one must understand the figures for how many landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, and poor peasants there are in the population, and how much land each group holds; only then can correct policies be formulated based on this." The reason he cited land reform was his profound realization of the extreme importance of doing this work well. He pointed out: "If we can solve the land problem universally and thoroughly, we will have obtained the most fundamental condition for defeating all enemies." To perform land reform—work which has very high policy and tactical requirements—one must meticulously and accurately grasp all aspects, conduct basic foundational surveys, statistics, analyses, and calculations, and formulate correct policies and strategies accordingly. As Mao emphasized, "It must be recognized that mass work and land reform work are extremely meticulous tasks; the art of leadership must be studied." He noted: "In any mass movement, how many actively support it, how many oppose it, and how many are in an intermediate state—there must be a basic investigation and basic analysis of these. Problems must not be decided groundlessly or subjectively."
Striving to master the working method of having "figures" in mind is highly beneficial for enhancing the scientific spirit, disciplining the mind's precision, and improving the capabilities of leading officials. If one consistently insists on doing things carefully and meticulously in daily life—paying attention to thinking about and analyzing problems from a quantitative perspective, and frequently performing calculations, comparisons, and analyses—it becomes easy to cultivate habits of rigor and caution over the long term. Conversely, if one always relies on "more or less," "probably," or "perhaps" to make decisions and do things, the understanding of situations and problems in the mind will remain fuzzy and "figure-less." Operating in such a state of blindness will not only lead to mistakes in work over time but will also make it difficult to achieve any real improvement in one's own capabilities. Zhou Enlai once said, "In our work, we must always have figures in mind; the accounts must be calculated clearly." Chen Yun also remarked, "One-sidedness always comes from being busy deciding policies without studying the actual situation... I belong to the 'calculation faction'; I have figures in my head."
II. "Figures" Come from Investigation and Research
How can one achieve having "figures" in mind? Mao Zedong pointed out: "At the beginning of any undertaking, one always has no 'figures' in mind." He asked: "For newly emerging problems, who could have figures in mind?" He answered: "It does not matter if one has no figures; we can study the problem thoroughly... Without investigation and research, correct and concrete policies cannot be produced."
Mao Zedong attached great importance to investigation and research, while emphasizing the need to conduct investigations correctly to ensure their quality. He proposed that "he who makes no investigation has no right to speak," and "he who makes no correct investigation likewise has no right to speak." He advocated that in conducting investigation and research, one must "dismount to look at the flowers" [2] rather than "look at flowers while riding a horse" [3]; one must "examine the flowers minutely, analyze a single 'flower,' and dissect a 'sparrow' [4]" to truly grasp and understand the problem. Grasping a large amount of vivid and authentic first-hand data and conducting meticulous statistical analysis is a key lever for conducting correct investigations and ensuring their quality.
During the Great Revolution [5] period, while serving as the director of the Guangzhou Peasant Movement Training Institute, Mao Zedong presided over the drafting of 36 survey items, including rent rates, land taxes, the origins of landlords, resistance to rent, rent reduction, and rural organizational status. He guided students from various provinces to conduct investigations and required them to conscientiously fill in the details of their hometowns according to these items. After the failure of the Great Revolution, throughout the long and harsh practice of revolutionary struggle, Mao Zedong continued to attach high importance to investigation and research.
Take for example his Xunwu Investigation conducted in May 1930. The resulting report of over 80,000 characters not only covered all aspects of the local situation but also contained a large volume of statistical figures concerning products, commerce, population, and land ownership. These figures were extremely detailed and specific; the commodities listed alone were divided into 14 major categories, with specific analyses for each. Among them, general merchandise items numbered as many as 131, with prices and trade volumes noted in detail. Even on the minor issue of the profit and loss of "opening a barbershop," the report recorded it clearly: "Opening a barbershop requires forty to fifty yuan in capital. Usually, two masters are employed, one at minimum, three at most. Labor costs for half a year are at least thirty to forty yuan, normally fifty to sixty, and eighty at most. In a barbershop with good business, each person can do one yuan of business per day. Usually, there is one owner and two workers, bringing in an average of three yuan a day, or about a thousand yuan a year. After paying over a hundred yuan in wages, the rest goes to the owner. After then paying for food (calculated at seventy-five yuan per person for four people), shop rent (about thirty yuan), and the wear and tear of equipment (within a hundred yuan), one can earn about four hundred yuan (including the owner's own labor)." Similarly, when explaining the "rural population composition" of Xunwu, the report's statistics were very precise: large landlords (those collecting over 500 dan [6] of rent) accounted for 0.045%; middle landlords (collecting 200 to 500 dan) for 0.4%; small landlords (under 200 dan) for 3%; declined households for 1%; newly enriched households for 2%; rich peasants (those with surplus money and grain to lend) for 4%; middle peasants (those with enough to eat and no debt) for 18.255%; poor peasants (those without enough to eat and in debt) for 70%; manual workers (various artisans, boatmen, professional porters) for 3%; vagrants (unemployed) for 1%; and agricultural laborers (long-term and specialized odd-job laborers) for 0.3%. These were but a small part of the 80,000-character report, illustrating the degree of attention paid to quantitative issues.
Through the effort of such meticulous and in-depth investigation, statistics, and research, Mao Zedong came to understand the state of urban commerce and grasped various conditions for land distribution. This provided the practical basis for formulating policies to correctly treat the urban poor and the commercial bourgeoisie, and for determining the principle of "taking from the fat to pad the lean" [7] to restrict rich peasants during land distribution. Mao later recalled, "It was only after I did the Xunwu Investigation that I clarified the issue of rich peasants and landlords and proposed methods for solving the rich peasant problem."
Furthermore, to gain an in-depth understanding of rural conditions in various regions, in April 1931, in his capacity as Director of the General Political Department of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, Mao Zedong issued the "Notice of the General Political Department on Investigating Population and Land Conditions." The Notice stated: "We have now prescribed two survey forms for population and land. These two forms are primarily intended to produce statistics on the land and population proportions of each class, using 'hard facts' to answer many of our current questions more concretely." It continued: "It is strongly hoped that the Red Army Political Department will pay attention to filling these in wherever they go, and that local government organs will fill them in township by township. It is especially hoped that every person in charge in the Red Army and the government will conduct such investigations and statistics anytime and anywhere." The Notice also laid out specific regulations on how to ensure "the materials obtained from the investigation are true and correct," one of which was that "the investigator must not be afraid of trouble." It stipulated: "To investigate a township, one must find their household and land registers for land distribution, find the land committee members who handled the distribution and those familiar with the township's situation, first distinguish the class status of each family and which class occupies each mu [8] of land (belonging to landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants...), then use the 'hard calculation' method to clear the statistics and fill them in according to the actual numbers."
Why was it necessary to conduct investigation and statistics so meticulously? Mao Zedong explained in the Notice: "In the past, many places often ignored the investigation of actual facts, deciding work plans and guiding subordinate work based solely on their own fantasies. As a result, the plans were unfeasible and the guidance was wrong." He added: "Now, with these two forms, if we can fill them in with correct statistics by paying profound attention to reality, they can solve many of our problems, especially many practical problems in the current distribution of land."
It can be said that it was precisely through continuous investigation and research—by dissecting small "sparrows" like Xunwu and tiny numerical proportions—that Chinese Communists calculated the "big account" of the development of the Chinese revolution. Regarding a series of fundamental questions—what revolutionary path to take, whom to rely on, whom to unite with, and whom to strike, who are our enemies and who are our friends—having "figures" in mind laid a solid foundation for the subsequent victory of the revolution.
After the founding of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong continued to repeatedly emphasize achieving having "figures" in mind through investigation and research. He proposed, "People doing leadership work must rely on their own personal investigation and research to solve problems. Written reports can be read, but this is not the same as one's own personal investigation. Running around or staying for a week to ten days to do an investigation—mainly one should stay down to do a systematic investigation and research." Through going deep among the masses and conducting practical investigation and research, "those who now have no figures in mind will gradually come to have them."
III. Observe the General Outline, Calculate the Big Account, and Seek the Major Figures
To achieve having "figures" in mind, one must not only know how to calculate detailed accounts and "see clearly down to the tip of an autumn hair" [9], but also keep the overall situation in mind and grasp the essence of things. One must select and analyze figures from an overall and strategic height, observing the general outline, calculating the big account, and seeking the major figures, while mastering the ability to "discern the first signs of change" and "know that autumn is coming from the fall of a single leaf" [10].
Why is it necessary to do this?
First, the quantity of a thing has many aspects; it is neither necessary nor possible for people to examine every aspect of quantity. Rather, one should examine specific aspects of quantity based on the needs of social practice. However, it is no easy feat to discover valuable and persuasive figures and proportional relationships within the labyrinthine complexities of social life. Lenin explicitly opposed the haphazard enumeration of examples without analysis. He pointed out: "In the field of social phenomena, there is no method more common and more untenable than that of snatching out individual facts at random and playing with examples," and "it is no trouble at all to pick any example you like, but that has no significance, or a purely negative one." He continued, "If facts are not taken in their entirety and in their interconnection, if they are fragmentary and arbitrarily selected, then they are merely a plaything, or even less than a plaything." He further noted: "If they are taken in their entirety, in their interconnection, facts are not only 'stubborn things' but undoubtedly foundational evidence."
This is true for examples, and it remains true for figures. Mao Zedong proposed: "The characteristic of dialectical materialism lies in grasping the core of facts, the essence of facts, and the internal laws of development [11] of facts; it does not lie in respecting the surface of facts." That is to say, the representativeness and profundity of figures stem from a grasp of the overall strategic situation and the root of the problem; they stem from the process of "discarding the dross and selecting the essential" [12] from a vast array of vivid figures with purpose and direction.
Furthermore, among the quantities of a thing, there are those related to quality and those unrelated to quality; in one's work, one must be careful to master those quantities that determine the nature and direction of the thing. Mao Zedong set a paradigm in this regard; in his work, he always focused on the overall situation to grasp the principal contradiction [13], calculating the "big accounts" [14] and planning with "large numbers." For instance, he always took note of the question of the majority and the minority. He advocated that in the struggle against the enemy, we should "make use of contradictions, win over the majority, oppose the minority, and crush them one by one." He maintained that the establishment of a democratic government should take as its starting point the ability to "unite more than 90 percent of the Chinese common people to strive together." He argued that in carrying out socialist political construction, we must improve democratic centralism so that "we can mobilize the enthusiasm of the broad masses both inside and outside the Party and unite the masses of the people, who constitute more than 95 percent of the population." When handling international relations, he advocated that "we must expand the scope of unity, bringing together more than 90 percent of the people in all of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the rest of the world, excluding only the imperialists and the reactionaries of all countries." In short, we must unite all forces that can be united and establish a solid united front to mobilize the hearts and strength of the people to overcome various difficulties and challenges on the road ahead. This is the foresight and sagacity of calculating the "big accounts."
To take another example, he proposed the theory of People's War, emphasizing that "the deepest source of the supreme power of war exists among the masses." It was precisely because our Party relied closely on the people, uniting, leading, organizing, and mobilizing them, and stimulating the supreme power of war latent within the broad masses, that we were able to lead the people's army to continuously defeat powerful enemies from all quarters. Following the victory of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea [15], Mao Zedong summarized: "Our experience is: by relying on the people and having a relatively correct leadership, we can defeat an enemy with superior equipment using our inferior equipment." This is the breadth of mind and spirit of planning with "large numbers."
During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, in his work On Protracted War, Mao Zedong persisted in surveying the grand strategy, calculating the "big accounts," and planning with "large numbers," providing a comprehensive analysis of the era in which the Sino-Japanese war occurred and the fundamental characteristics of both the Chinese and Japanese sides. Regarding those who held the "theory of national subjugation" or the "theory of quick victory," Mao Zedong pointed out: "Their method of looking at problems is subjective and one-sided—in a word, unscientific." In other words, both were calculating "small accounts" or "local accounts." Those who believed in national subjugation only saw the single characteristic that the enemy was strong and we were weak; those who believed in quick victory completely forgot this characteristic. Mao Zedong, however, calculated a "big account" for the Sino-Japanese war from the heights of the overall and strategic situation, reaching the conclusion: "Will China be subjugated? Answer: No, she will not be subjugated; final victory will belong to China. Can China win a quick victory? Answer: No, she cannot win a quick victory; the War of Resistance is a protracted war."
Mao Zedong analyzed: "The Sino-Japanese war is not just any war; it is a life-and-death war between a semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan, fought in the 1930s." Both sides of the war possessed many contradictory characteristics. The fundamental characteristics were that "Japan’s military power, economic power, and political organizational power are strong, but her war is retrogressive and barbaric, her human and material resources are insufficient, and the international situation is unfavorable; China is the opposite—her military, economic, and political organizational power are relatively weak, but she is in a progressive era, her war is progressive and just, and she has the conditions of a large country sufficient to support a protracted war, while most countries in the world will support China." "These characteristics determined and are determining all political policies and military strategies and tactics of both sides, and they determined and are determining the protracted nature of the war and that final victory belongs to China rather than Japan."
Based on the various contradictory factors of both the enemy and ourselves, as well as the development and changes of these factors during the war, Mao Zedong predicted that China's protracted resistance would pass through three stages: "The first stage is the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defense. The second stage is the period of the enemy's strategic conservation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage is the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat." He meticulously analyzed the balance of power between the enemy and ourselves at that time, pointing out: "The first stage is not yet over. The enemy's attempt is to occupy the three points of Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Lanzhou and link them together. To achieve this goal, the enemy must deploy at least fifty divisions, about 1.5 million troops, for a duration of one and a half to two years, with expenses exceeding 10 billion yen. For the enemy to penetrate so deeply, the difficulties are enormous, and the consequences will be unimaginable." "China is a vast country; even if Japan could occupy regions with a population of 100 to 200 million, we are still far from defeat." At the same time, he noted: "In the first stage, there are also two kinds of changes on the enemy's side. The first is downward, manifested in: hundreds of thousands of casualties, consumption of weapons and ammunition, deterioration of morale, domestic public dissatisfaction, reduction in trade, expenditures of over 10 billion yen, condemnation by international opinion, and so on. This aspect provides the basis for our ability to endure and achieve final victory. However, we must also estimate the enemy's second kind of change, the upward change—that is, he has expanded his territory, population, and resources. From this point, the basis arises for the fact that our war is a protracted war and cannot be won quickly."
On the basis of these scientific analyses, Mao Zedong further proposed a series of fundamental strategic and tactical policies for defeating Japanese imperialism, which greatly strengthened the Chinese people’s confidence in final victory through protracted resistance and pointed out the correct direction for achieving victory in the War of Resistance. This is the foresight and sagacity of calculating the "big accounts."
IV. Paying Attention to Grasping the "Degree"
Paying attention to grasping the "degree" [16] is a deeper conceptual requirement of the "having figures in one's head" work method. The so-called "degree" is the "quantitative limit that determines the quality of a thing." The theoretical source of the "having figures in one's head" work method is the law of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes in dialectical materialism. In fact, "having figures in one's head" does not only emphasize the importance of quantitative issues; it also encompasses the requirement to grasp the dialectical unity of quality and quantity. Only by scientifically understanding the "degree" of a thing can one grasp the laws of its development and propose correct policies to guide practical activities.
Mao Zedong paid great attention to promoting the development of the revolution by accurately grasping the "degree" and scientifically dividing the stages of revolutionary development. In 1947, during the period when the CPC Central Committee was moving through northern Shaanxi, the Northwest Field Army achieved "three victories in three battles" and subsequently won the Battle of Shajiaodian. on August 23, the day after the Battle of Shajiaodian ended, Mao Zedong pointed out that the battle was indeed fought well and was decisive for the war situation in the northwest; the most difficult period had passed. To use our Hunan dialect, having fought this battle, we have "crossed the mountain pass" [17]. The facts were precisely thus: this battle broke the Kuomintang army's "point-to-point" offensive against northern Shaanxi, causing the Northwest Field Army to transition from interior-line defense to interior-line offense. It is worth noting that "crossing the mountain pass" here referred not only to the northwest theater but also reflected Mao Zedong's grasp of the national theater at the time. A few days later, on September 1, Mao Zedong synthesized the situation of the national theater and proposed to the whole Party and the whole army that "the basic task for the second year of operations in the Liberation War is: to launch a nationwide counter-offensive, that is, to use the main force to fight on the exterior lines and carry the war into the Kuomintang areas," which meant "transitioning from the stage of strategic defense to the stage of strategic offensive."
On this basis, he led the formulation of strategic guidelines and tactical policies adapted to this new stage, greatly accelerating the process of victory in the Liberation War. Why was Mao Zedong able to grasp the "degree" so accurately? It was based on precise and concrete calculations of the enemy's and our own military strength.
On August 22, 1947, in a telegram drafted for the Central Military Commission, Mao Zedong specifically introduced the situation in the northwest theater after the main force of the enemy's 36th Division was annihilated at the Battle of Shajiaodian. After a detailed analysis of how various units of Hu Zongnan’s [18] main divisions were struck by our army and their deployment situation, Mao Zedong pointed out: "After this battle, not only is there no regular troop presence in the entire southern Shaanxi, and the bridgehead of Guanzhong is extremely empty, but even most places in northern Shaanxi are clear of enemies; the period of Hu Zongnan’s rampaging has passed." On March 7, 1948, in the commentary "On the Great Victory in the Northwest and on the New Type of Consolidation Movement in the Liberation Army," Mao Zedong once again disclosed the CPC Central Committee’s precise mastery of the situation in the northwest theater. This commentary, published after the People’s Liberation Army’s great victory at Yichuan in the spring of 1948, meticulously enumerated how three main divisions among the "twenty-eight brigades of the so-called 'Central Army' under Hu Zongnan's direct command" had been successively annihilated or struck by the Liberation Army. "The First Brigade of the Reorganized First Division was annihilated by us in Fushan, southern Shanxi, in September the year before last; the main force of its 167th Brigade was annihilated once in Panlong Town, northern Shaanxi, in May last year; the 123rd and 165th Brigades of the Reorganized 36th Division were annihilated by us in Shajiaodian, Mizhi, northern Shaanxi, in August last year; and this time the Reorganized 90th Division was again completely wiped out. Of the remaining main forces of Hu’s army, only the 78th Brigade of the Reorganized First Division and the 28th Brigade of the Reorganized 36th Division have not yet suffered annihilation." The text continued: "Therefore, it can be said that the entire army of Hu Zongnan no longer has any elite backbone." "After this annihilation battle at Yichuan, of the twenty-eight brigades of regular forces previously under Hu Zongnan's direct command, only twenty-three brigades now remain." The text then listed the specific deployments of these brigades, pointing out that some "have become dead pieces [19] on the chessboard," some are "rear-echelon brigades" consisting "entirely of new recruits," and some "have been dealt annihilating blows by our army," concluding that "these units are not only very weak, but the vast majority are assigned to defensive duties."
Furthermore, in another internal Party circular on March 20, 1948, Mao Zedong disclosed the CPC Central Committee's precise mastery of the national theater. This document likewise analyzed in detail the previous strikes and annihilations of various units of the Kuomintang regular army and the current speed at which the Liberation Army was "eliminating the Kuomintang regular army on average each month," reaching the judgment that "the possibility of eliminating the entire Kuomintang army in about five years (calculating from July 1946) exists." On November 14, in a commentary written for the Xinhua News Agency titled "The Momentous Change in China's Military Situation," Mao Zedong, acting on the new situation of the change in the balance of power after the Liaoshen Campaign [20] and similarly based on an analysis of the enemy's and our own forces, re-estimated the time for the victory of the People's Liberation War. He proposed that "China's military situation has now entered a new turning point, that is, a fundamental change has taken place in the balance of forces between the two sides," noting that within about one more year from November 1948, the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang could be overthrown. The subsequent development of the battlefield situation completely verified Mao Zedong's foresight. From these materials, one can see Mao Zedong's "having figures in his head" regarding the liberation theater, and one can also see that there is nothing mysterious about grasping the "degree"; it can only come from arduous research work on the basis of practice.
Beyond scientifically demarcating stages, grasping concrete policy boundaries also involves the question of "degree." The general line of Land Reform was to rely on poor peasants, unite with middle peasants, and systematically and discriminately eliminate the feudal system of exploitation to develop agricultural production. Its basic strategic orientation was "to unite approximately 92 percent of households and 90 percent of the population in the countryside—that is, the entire rural laboring people—to establish a united front against the feudal system." Precisely for this reason, a scientific analysis of the proportion of poor peasants to middle peasants in the countryside was of paramount importance, as it bore upon major issues such as the demarcation of policy boundaries and the assessment of the nature of the movement. In February 1948, Mao Zedong emphasized in a telegram "different tactics for implementing the Land Law in different regions." He maintained that in the Old Liberated Areas [21], "the majority of former poor peasants have already risen to the status of middle peasants, and middle peasants now constitute the majority of the rural population." Based on this, he proposed that in such regions, one must firmly unite with the middle peasants and "absorb activists among the middle peasants to participate in rural leadership work." Conversely, in areas liberated between September 1945 and August 1947, where "middle peasants are in the minority" and "poor peasants are in the majority," he proposed that in such regions "Poor Peasant Leagues must be organized, and the leadership position of the Poor Peasant Leagues within the Peasant Associations and rural political power must be established." This fully reflects Mao Zedong’s dialectical thinking regarding the importance of grasping the "degree."
Accurately grasping the "degree" also helps avoid "going too far" [22] or "not having reached the proper heat" [23]. In February 1939, while exploring philosophical questions such as the "Doctrine of the Mean" [24], Mao Zedong used the concept of guò yóu bù jí (going too far is as bad as not going far enough) to reveal, to a certain extent, the dialectical unity between quality and quantity. He pointed out: "'Going too far is as bad as not going far enough' is a method for the struggle on two fronts, and is one of the important methods of thought." He noted that "finding and determining a certain quality from the quantity of a thing, and establishing boundaries for it to distinguish it from other heterogeneous qualities, is the purpose of the struggle on two fronts." He explained specifically: "'Going too far' [over-shooting] refers to 'Left' things, and 'not going far enough' [falling short] refers to Rightist things. Speaking from our current perspective, 'too far' and 'not far enough' refer to the movement of a certain thing in time and space. When it develops to a certain state, one should find and determine its specific quality based on quantitative relations; this is the 'Mean,' the 'Doctrine of the Mean,' or the 'Timely Mean' [25]. To say that this thing is no longer in this state but has entered another state is a different quality—that is 'over-shooting' or 'Left' deviation. To say that this thing still stops at its original state and has not developed—this is an old thing, a stagnation of concepts, conservative stubbornness, a Right deviation, and is 'falling short.'" In other words, a certain quality is always linked to a certain quantity. A quantitative surplus or deficiency may change the quality of a thing; yet "within a certain limit, although the quantity changes, the thing remains that thing. Only within a certain stage and under certain conditions can quantitative development seek qualitative change, at which point the thing loses its old quality and changes into a thing of new quality."
V. From Having "Numbers" in Mind to Taking Action
Achieving a state where one has "numbers" in mind regarding situations and problems can help us stand high and look far. In this way, when making a resolution, the resolve will be great, and when seeking a method, the method will be correct. People often say "Chairman Mao’s deployment of troops was truly godlike," but in truth, this stemmed in large part from his deep and comprehensive understanding of the war situation, his extensive calculations, and his thorough accounting. As Hu Qiaomu [26] said, Mao Zedong’s "brilliance lay in his ability to grasp the essence of things through surface phenomena, to make clear-headed assessments of the current situation, and to foresee the changes and development of things, guiding them according to the trend to organize and mobilize all forces to promote the transformation of things from quantitative change to qualitative change, leading the Chinese revolution step by step toward a new high tide."
Mao Zedong emphasized not fighting battles for which one is unprepared or battles one is not certain of winning. He proposed that "our strategy is 'pitting one against ten,' while our tactics are 'pitting ten against one.'" The essence of war is "to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy," and fighting requires "concentrating superior forces to destroy the enemy forces one by one." To achieve such goals, one must first know oneself and the enemy, achieving a thorough understanding and precise calculation of both the enemy's situation and our own. This is true for fighting battles, and it remains true for doing other work well. Only by clarifying the situation in advance and having the "numbers" in mind can one accurately identify the main direction of attack and mobilize all factors and forces that can be mobilized to achieve the set goals.
Using figures to explain problems and clarifying principles by comparing accounts can also greatly enhance the persuasiveness of an argument. Mao Zedong was very adept at using concise and vivid numbers to explain profound principles. He once said that the founding of New China meant that "the Chinese people, who comprise one-quarter of humanity, have stood up." The phrase "one-quarter," in just a few words, vividly expressed the momentous significance of the founding of New China. He also once said, "Even ten thousand years from now, we must still struggle. The Communist Party is about struggle; it is about serving the people whole-heartedly, not half-heartedly or with two-thirds of a heart or two-thirds of a will." The terms "ten thousand years," "whole," "half," and "two-thirds" incisively portrayed the fundamental purpose that Communists must always uphold.
Mao Zedong highly praised the method of "settling accounts" (calculating the balance) to explain problems, believing it to be much more effective than simply speaking of principles or viewpoints. In 1955, while presiding over the editing of the book Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside, he wrote a comment for an article titled "A Good Experience in Rectifying a Cooperative," which introduced the experience of a production cooperative. He fully affirmed the grassroots cadres' propaganda method of "four contrasts and five calculations." (The "four contrasts" were: 1. Comparing which is better: the cooperative, the team, or the individual household; 2. Comparing which is better: socialism or capitalism; 3. Comparing which is better: an exploitative system or a non-exploitative system; 4. Comparing which is better: individual development or common prosperity. The "five calculations" were: 1. Calculating the disaster account; 2. Calculating the account of increased income from sideline occupations; 3. Calculating the account of increased work points through labor activism; 4. Calculating the account of increased production through mutual benefit between poor and middle peasants; 5. Calculating the account of overcoming production and livelihood difficulties.) Mao regarded this as "an excellent method to explain to the peasants which of the two systems is good and which is bad, making it easy to understand at a single hearing. This method has strong persuasive power. It is not like some comrades who are not good at propaganda work and merely mention the so-called 'either take the path of the Communist Party or the path of Chiang Kai-shek,' attempting only to overwhelm the audience with big labels while having no touching material in hand. Instead, it uses the local peasants' own experience to make meticulous analyses, which possesses strong persuasive power."
Mao Zedong also directly used the principle of quantitative change leading to qualitative change to boost morale and defeat the enemy. In 1951, the battlefield of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea [27] was in a state of tense, bogged-down stalemate. In view of the U.S. military's significant advantages in weaponry, air superiority, and mobility, which made it difficult for the Volunteer Army to encircle and completely annihilate enemy units of regimental size or larger, Mao Zedong proposed the operational policy of "small bites of brown candy" [28] to break the deadlock and achieve greater victory. He required the Volunteer Army to "aim at the complete and clean annihilation of one enemy battalion per army per engagement," and he enjoined the Volunteer Army headquarters to "clearly explain the long-term and arduous nature of the Korean theater, so that all cadres and soldiers have a full understanding and mental preparation." This proposed a strategy of accumulating small bits to make a whole, accumulating small victories to make a great victory, and transforming quantitative change into qualitative change, pointing the way for the Volunteer Army's victorious operations.
In summary, Mao Zedong was the progenitor of the "having 'numbers' in mind" working method and was also a great exemplar of practicing it. For a long time, this method has played an important role in educating and guiding the broad ranks of Party members and cadres to improve their leadership abilities and levels and to improve their leadership methods. Today, in the process of comprehensively advancing the great cause of building a strong country and national rejuvenation through the Chinese path to modernization, we will inevitably encounter a large number of brand-new topics that have never appeared before, and we will encounter various difficulties and obstacles, withstanding major tests of "high winds and turbulent waves" or even "tempestuous seas." All of these place higher requirements on Party members and cadres to perform their duties scientifically and with precision. "Precision" is both a work requirement and an important manifestation of Marxist epistemology and methodology. It requires us to adhere to the ideological line of seeking truth from facts, to be adept at grasping the dialectical unity of the quality and quantity of things, to have "numbers" in mind, and to act with effective methods. Mao Zedong’s "having 'numbers' in mind" working method provides ideological wisdom and beneficial inspiration for achieving the requirements of scientific and precise work.