Zhou Jiabin: The CPC's Exploration of "Chinese Experience" and "Chinese Theory" During the Period of the New Democratic Revolution

Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), through unremitting struggle, China has achieved a historic leap from falling behind the times to catching up with the times, and then to leading the times. It has become a builder of world peace, a contributor to global development, and a defender of the international order, profoundly influencing the direction of global progress. As General Secretary Xi Jinping has stated, "To develop 21st-century Marxism and contemporary Chinese Marxism, we must stand firm on Chinese ground while looking out toward the world, maintaining the theoretical character of advancing with the times." As the relationship between China and the world undergoes historic changes, China shoulders a dual mission in the realms of thought and theory: to answer the "questions of China" and the "questions of the people" from a "Chinese dimension," and to respond to the "questions of the world" and the "questions of the era" from a "world dimension." In this regard, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core attaches great importance to the summarization, generalization, and dissemination of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory." General Secretary Xi Jinping has emphasized the need to "summarize Chinese experience well using Chinese logic, and elevate Chinese experience into Chinese theory." "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" must not only be rooted in Chinese soil to study and resolve major issues facing China's development, but also actively respond to the universal concerns of people across all nations, contributing to the resolution of common problems facing humanity. Currently, academic research on "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" focuses primarily on the "Chinese dimension," while research involving the "world dimension" is relatively scarce. Most studies explain "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" from the perspective of building socialist culture with Chinese characteristics in the New Era, particularly from the perspective of China's independent knowledge system. Research approaching from the "world dimension" mainly looks at practical issues, focusing on Chinese-path modernization as well as the fields of economic development, cultural communication, poverty alleviation, ecological and environmental protection, and global governance, explaining the formation process and global influence of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" in the New Era from theoretical, policy, and practical perspectives. Our understanding today of the relationship between China and the world, and our emphasis on "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory," are not "water without a source or a tree without roots" ^[1]; they were formed gradually through the process of historical development. Starting from the New Democratic Revolution ^[2] period as the historical fount, studying the CPC's understanding of the relationship between China and the world—as well as its exploration of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" based on a "world dimension"—helps us to more profoundly understand the historical necessity of proposing "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" in the New Era. Taken as a whole, the CPC's exploration of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" during the New Democratic Revolution period went through five stages: germination (1921–1922), initiation (1922–1928), development (1928–1935), maturity (1935–1945), and deepening (1945–1949).

I. The Germination Stage: Individual Party Members Propose "Chinese Experience"

From the founding of the CPC in 1921 to the Fourth Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1922 was the germination stage of the CPC's exploration of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory." The CPC clarified that the Chinese revolution was part of the colonial and semi-colonial revolution within the global proletarian socialist revolution following the October Revolution, and, proceeding from its own experience, promoted the development of Comintern theories regarding the types and tactics of colonial and semi-colonial revolutions. However, at this time, the generalization of "Chinese experience" was individualistic; the primary agents were individual Party members in close contact with the Comintern, and a conscious awareness of this process had not yet formed.

For a considerable period, the international communist movement primarily concerned the proletarian revolutions of capitalist countries; colonial and semi-colonial revolutions were not incorporated into the international communist movement. The First International basically refrained from detailed discussions on colonial and semi-colonial issues. It was only during the London, Paris, Amsterdam, and Stuttgart congresses held by the Second International between 1896 and 1907 that some issues related to colonies and semi-colonies were limitedly discussed, yet there was no serious consideration of incorporating these revolutions into the international communist movement. In fact, it was Lenin and the Third International (the Comintern) under his leadership that systematically studied and expounded upon the colonial and semi-colonial revolution and formally incorporated it into the international communist movement. Although the First Congress of the Comintern included the colonial and semi-colonial revolution in the movement, it did not form a corresponding revolutionary program. This task was not completed until the Second Congress of the Comintern. The "Theses on the National and Colonial Questions" drafted by Lenin and the "Supplementary Theses on the National and Colonial Questions" (hereafter "Supplementary Theses") drafted by M.N. Roy, both adopted at the Second Congress, were the earliest programmatic documents in the history of the international communist movement to systematically expound upon the colonial and semi-colonial revolution. These two documents divided colonial and semi-colonial countries into two categories: one being "relatively backward countries and nations where feudal or patriarchal and patriarchal-peasant relations predominate," and the other being "politically oppressed countries where the capitalist system prevails." The "Supplementary Theses" categorized China into the latter group, formulating a struggle strategy for the Chinese revolution that simultaneously opposed both imperialism and the domestic national bourgeoisie.

Clearly, the Comintern Second Congress's judgment of the Chinese revolution did not conform to China's actual conditions. However, because the CPC had not yet been formally founded when the meeting was held, the overseas Chinese Liu Zerong (刘泽荣), who attended on behalf of China, was not a representative of the CPC and failed to provide correct opinions. It was not until the Third Congress of the Comintern in 1921 that Chinese Communists truly dispatched their own representative, Zhang Tailei. Based on his own experience, Zhang Tailei raised dissenting opinions regarding the judgment of the Comintern Second Congress. He argued that while China was gradually being absorbed into the world capitalist system, its original agriculture and handicrafts were gradually disintegrating under the impact of the capitalist economy, failing to establish large-scale industry during the modernization process in the way Western capitalist countries had. He noted, "In China, apart from a few factories concentrated mainly in major treaty ports, so-called modern industrial enterprises are few and far between. China is undoubtedly still in a primitive stage of economic development." Based on Chinese experience, he further divided colonial and semi-colonial countries into three categories building upon the Second Congress: "countries that are already industrially developed," "countries that have just begun to participate in international trade (which is still preliminary in form)," and "uncivilized countries that are not yet completely dependent on imperialist-world capitalist relations." Among these, "industrially developed countries" corresponded to the Second Congress’s "politically oppressed countries where the capitalist system prevails"; "countries that have just begun to participate in international trade" mainly referred to countries like China; and "uncivilized countries not yet dependent on world capitalism" corresponded to "backward countries where feudal or patriarchal relations predominate." The Comintern gradually accepted Zhang Tailei’s views. In 1922, Safarov, then head of the Eastern Department of the Comintern Executive Committee, proposed at the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East that "most countries in the Far East are industrially backward and have only taken the very first steps on the path of capitalist development." At the Fourth Congress of the Comintern held that same year, M.N. Roy, who had drafted the "Supplementary Theses," was also forced to admit that Zhang Tailei's "three-tier classification" was more reasonable. He stated that "Eastern countries can be divided into three categories": "the first category consists of countries where capitalism is relatively well-developed," where "not only has capital imported from large capital centers developed industry, but indigenous capitalism has also developed"; the "second category consists of countries where capitalist development has begun but remains at a low level, and feudalism remains the main pillar of society"; and a third category where "primitive relations still prevail and the social system is feudal-patriarchal." The "Theses on the Eastern Question" adopted by the meeting confirmed the "diversity" of colonial and semi-colonial countries, holding that different countries "reflect the various stages of the transition from feudal and feudal-patriarchal relations to capitalism that the colonies are undergoing."

From the process described above, it can be seen that since its founding, the CPC began to integrate the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific realities, summarizing "Chinese experience" from Chinese practice and exerting global influence for that experience by influencing the Comintern. This was possible primarily because the entry of the colonial and semi-colonial revolution into the international communist movement occurred relatively late, and the relevant theories were not yet mature. The international communist movement began in the 1840s, while China's New Democratic Revolution began in the early 20th century, starting more than 70 years after the movement's inception. However, regarding the Chinese revolution—or the colonial and semi-colonial revolution represented by China—the CPC's start was not late compared to other national communist organizations including the CPSU (Bolsheviks), or even compared to the Comintern. In terms of accumulating and summarizing the experience of colonial and semi-colonial revolution, the CPC and the Comintern can be said to have started roughly at the same time.

Of course, at this point, the CPC's exploration of "Chinese experience" was still in the germination stage. Zhang Tailei's summarization of "Chinese experience" was not an organizational act of the CPC but purely an individual act. Although Zhang Tailei proposed new viewpoints, he had not yet developed a conscious "theoretical awareness" ^[3] of "Chinese experience." He believed the views he proposed were merely intended "to strengthen, with new arguments, the conclusions regarding the colonial question made by Vladimir Ilyich [Lenin] at the Second Congress of the Comintern."

II. The Initiation Stage: The Generalization of "Chinese Experience" Becomes an Organizational Act

The period from the Fourth Congress of the Comintern in 1922 to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 was the initiation stage of the CPC's exploration of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory." As the CPC proposed and practiced the theory of proletarian leadership in the colonial and semi-colonial revolution during the May 30th Movement ^[4], the status of the Chinese revolution within the world revolution rose rapidly. The Chinese revolution's experiences regarding proletarian leadership, united front work, and military struggle also promoted the development of the Comintern's relevant theories. During this stage, the generalization of "Chinese experience" evolved from the individual actions of Party members into the organizational behavior of the CPC.

Broadly speaking, the Fourth Congress of the Comintern handled the issue of revolutionary leadership with theoretical ambiguity. Although the Comintern emphasized that leadership of revolutions in all countries would ultimately belong to the proletariat, it also believed that the proletarian forces in many countries were still very weak. Thus, it only required the communist parties of colonial and semi-colonial countries to "achieve the status of an independent revolutionary factor," emphasizing that the current stage was merely "preparatory work" for gaining leadership rather than immediate acquisition. In practice, it even recognized the leadership of the bourgeoisie in national liberation movements. The joint manifesto signed by Sun Yat-sen and Adolf Joffe in January 1923 directly reflected this thinking. In the Sun–Joffe Manifesto, the Soviet Russian representative Joffe agreed that "the Communist order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China," effectively acknowledging that the Chinese revolution would be led by the national bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang (KMT).

As the Great Revolution ^[5] unfolded, Chinese Communists recognized the tendency of the bourgeoisie toward compromise. In January 1925, the Fourth National Congress of the CPC adopted the "Resolution on the National Revolutionary Movement," asserting that "the higher the social class, the more it is prone to compromise." It creatively proposed the issue of proletarian leadership, demanding that the proletariat "attain a leading position." Shortly after the conclusion of the Fourth National Congress, the May 30th Movement broke out. The outbreak of the May 30th Movement and the subsequent Canton–Hong Kong Strike proved the correctness of the theory of proletarian leadership in practice, causing the CPC's ambition to strive for proletarian leadership to transform from theory to practice. As Luo Yinong pointed out: "Before the May 30th Movement broke out, we did not see clearly; after it broke out, we reached the conclusion that the Chinese workers certainly can lead the national revolution." Even Chen Duxiu, who had previously proposed the "two-stage revolution theory," believed that the National Revolution after the May 30th Movement would either "be led by the revolutionary working class toward revolution until the national liberation of all China is completed, or be influenced by the compromising big merchant class, gradually returning to the 'slave-to-foreigners' Shanghai of the past."

The outbreak of the May 30th Movement caused a rapid elevation in the status of the Chinese revolution, leading some within the CPC to begin viewing China as the center of the world revolution. The May 30th Movement happened to occur during what the Comintern identified as a stage of "capitalist counter-offensive" ^[6]. Among the various revolutionary movements across the Eurasian continent...

In the midst of the "ebbing tide," China’s May Thirtieth Movement ^[7] shone like brilliant fireworks in the dark night, capturing the attention of the Comintern and communist parties worldwide and igniting revolutionary passion across colonies and semi-colonies. On June 7, 1925, the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), the Executive Bureau of the Red International of Labour Unions (Profintern), and the Executive Committee of the Communist Youth International issued the "Message to Workers, Peasants, and All Laboring People Regarding the Massacres in Qingdao and Shanghai," calling on the world’s workers, peasants, and soldiers to "fully support the struggle of Chinese workers." That same month, the Presidium of the ECCI telegraphed the central committees of the communist parties in France, Italy, the United States, and other countries, demanding they take all necessary measures to support the May Thirtieth Movement. The Comintern spoke very highly of the Chinese revolution. In February 1926, Solomon Lozovsky, head of the Profintern, noted at the Sixth Plenum of the ECCI that "the rise of the Chinese proletariat is the most important event since the October Revolution." This formulation—"the most important event since the October Revolution"—was subsequently written into the plenum's resolution, The Current Tasks of Communists in the Trade Union Movement, becoming the Comintern's official assessment of China’s May Thirtieth Movement. In 1926, the Comintern also established the Far Eastern Bureau in China, and in 1927, it convened the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference, using China as a hub to contact and coordinate communist organizations across Eastern nations; China thus became the revolutionary center of the Far East. The Communist Party of China (CPC) gained a new understanding of the Chinese revolution’s status within the world revolution. For instance, Qu Qiubai proposed that in the world history of 1925, "the 'Chinese revolutionary movement' must occupy the position of primary importance." Precisely because of the significance of the May Thirtieth Movement, CPC members during the New Democratic Revolution period generally regarded it as the starting point of the Great Revolution ^[8]. Today, when we speak of the "Great Revolution period" in CPC history, it generally refers to the historical period from the Third National Congress of the CPC to the Nanchang Uprising. As an event, the "Great Revolution" generally refers to the series of revolutionary occurrences from the establishment of the KMT-CPC cooperation in 1924 to the Nanchang Uprising. However, prior to the founding of the People's Republic of China, references to the Great Revolution denoted the historical period from the 1925 May Thirtieth Movement to the failure of the Great Revolution [in 1927].

On the basis of this elevated status of the Chinese revolution, the CPC began to actively promote the new "Chinese experience" of proletarian leadership ^[9] to the Comintern. In 1925, during conversations with Vaksov, editor of the organ of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions of the USSR, and at several other venues attended by international figures, Deng Zhongxia proposed: "In the national revolution, our working class has in fact already become the main force and the leader." In 1926, at the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI, Tan Pingshan, representing the CPC, submitted a written report to the Comintern further introducing the CPC's understanding of proletarian leadership. He pointed out that during the May Thirtieth Movement, the proletariat "powerfully propelled the national revolutionary movement and seized the leadership of the movement from the hands of the bourgeoisie." The plenum passed the Resolution on the Chinese Question, emphasizing that "the proletariat is becoming the leader of the movement with increasing clarity." That is to say, the Comintern recognized that the May Thirtieth Movement had demonstrated the strength of the Chinese proletariat, but unlike the CPC—which emphasized that the proletariat had already exercised revolutionary leadership—the Comintern believed its practice of contending for leadership had only just begun. After the failure of the Great Revolution, the Sixth National Congress of the CPC and the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 conducted a more systematic summary of the experience of the Chinese revolution. Qu Qiubai and others summarized experiences regarding proletarian leadership, the united front, and military struggle in the Chinese revolution, and actively promoted this "Chinese experience" to the Comintern, emphasizing that "the experience of the Chinese revolution can serve as a reference not only for colonial countries but for communist parties in all countries." Based on the Chinese experience, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern explicitly stated: "Without the leadership of the proletariat (of which the leading position of the Communist Party is an organic component), the bourgeois-democratic revolution cannot be carried through to the end, to say nothing of the socialist revolution." It established the realization of proletarian leadership as the fundamental task of the entire colonial and semi-colonial revolution. Experiences in other areas were also largely recognized by the Comintern. After the meeting, the "Chinese experience" was promoted in practice. For example, following the resolutions of the Sixth Comintern Congress, the Communist Party of Japan abandoned its previous practice of attempting to establish a legal worker-peasant party and, in principle, rejected the establishment of any political party other than the Communist Party.

During this stage, the CPC's exploration of "Chinese experience" saw several new developments. First, the CPC’s consciousness in promoting the internationalization of Chinese experience gradually rose. The CPC became aware that the Chinese revolution could provide new experiences for the world revolution. Some within the CPC even made preliminary proposals to elevate "Chinese experience" into "Chinese theory." For example, Cai Hesen proposed: "Acquire the rich experiences and lessons of the Chinese revolution over the past eight years, and establish the Chinese proletarian-Leninist party’s own theory." Second, the internationalization of Chinese experience began to transform from individual actions into organizational behavior. From Tan Pingshan representing the CPC to introduce proletarian leadership at the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI, to the reports of the "Chinese experience" by Qu Qiubai and other CPC delegates at the Sixth Comintern Congress, internationalizing Chinese experience had become an organizational act of the CPC. Finally, the internationalization of Chinese experience began to receive explicit recognition from the Comintern and the CPSU (Bolsheviks). For instance, the Sixth Comintern Congress not only summarized the experience of the Chinese revolution but also promoted it to other colonial and semi-colonial revolutions, emphasizing that "the past experience of the Chinese revolution should undoubtedly be utilized by the revolutionary movements in India and other similar colonial countries." In addition to the Comintern, communists from some other countries began to proactively study the experience of the Chinese revolution. For example, at the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI, the Argentine delegate Codovilla suggested studying the "experience gained in the revolutionary movements of various colonial countries (China, Indonesia, etc.)."

III. The Development Phase: Summarizing "Chinese Experience" Becomes a Conscious Action

The period from the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928 to the Zunyi Conference in 1935 constitutes the development phase of the CPC’s exploration of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory." The Chinese revolution underwent a transition from the failure of the Great Revolution to the rise of the Agrarian Revolutionary War ^[10], and the status of the Chinese revolution in the world revolution consequently fell and then rose. Meanwhile, the Chinese revolution—with armed crossover occupation ^[11] as its primary form of struggle—opened a new revolutionary path different from the October Revolution’s model of urban armed uprisings. The CPC gradually pushed the Comintern to accept "armed crossover occupation" as a new "Chinese experience."

In 1928, the Sixth National Congress of the CPC and the Sixth Comintern Congress judged that the high tide of the Chinese revolution had passed, and the Comintern turned its gaze toward the Indian revolution. Influenced by this, the status of the Chinese revolution temporarily declined. However, with the storm of the Agrarian Revolutionary War erupting in China, the Chinese revolution developed once again in an unexpected manner. The Chinese Soviet Republic established in 1931 became the world’s second long-term Soviet regime after the Soviet Union. This led the Comintern to place the Chinese revolution at the very forefront of the colonial and semi-colonial revolution, and indeed the entire world revolution, stating that "China ranks among the best in the national revolutionary movements of the colonial world."

During this period, through the process of exploring the armed crossover occupation of workers and peasants, China gradually carved out a revolutionary path in practice that differed from the October Revolution. The October Revolution had set a precedent for a proletarian party seizing power through urban armed uprisings; with the establishment of the Comintern, this revolutionary form was promoted throughout the international communist movement. In the early stages of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the CPC also attempted to learn from the October Revolution's experience, launching a series of armed uprisings such as the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising, and the Guangzhou Uprising. However, none of these achieved their intended goals. History proved that the experience of the Russian Revolution, especially that of urban armed uprisings, was not entirely applicable to the Chinese revolution. It is worth affirming that while the armed uprisings did not achieve a single-stroke victory like the October Revolution, they nurtured the "single spark" of armed crossover occupation. An armed uprising is a revolutionary form aimed at seizing power through sudden armed action; it is violent at its outbreak but short in duration. Compared to an armed uprising, armed crossover occupation is a revolutionary form of longer duration that relies more heavily on professional soldiers; its characteristic is to use certain base areas ^[12] as a foothold to gradually expand the scope of the revolution until final total victory is achieved. Influenced by the traditional thinking of armed uprisings, the Comintern initially held a negative attitude toward this new "Chinese experience" of armed crossover occupation. Bukharin even personally attended the Sixth National Congress of the CPC, proposing: "Do not gather the Red Army in one place; it is best to divide it into several parts, three or four parts," and "after a certain period, move to another place. Stay there for a while, kill some local tyrants and evil gentry ^[13], eat a meal, drink some chicken soup, and then go to another place. In that other area, still kill the tyrants and eat chicken just the same, then advance further after a certain time." Influenced by the Comintern, the Sixth National Congress of the CPC continued to regard armed uprisings as the primary revolutionary form and subsequently adopted a series of restrictive measures against armed crossover occupation. It was for this reason that Zhou Enlai later criticized the Sixth National Congress for "failing to emphasize rural armed crossover occupation." In February 1929, the CPC Central Committee sent a letter to Mao Zedong and others, proposing to split the Fourth Red Army into units of no more than 500 men each and "disperse our armed forces into various villages." It also instructed Mao Zedong and Zhu De that there was a "need to leave the troops and come to the Central Committee," believing that "the departure of Comrades Zhu and Mao from the troops will not only cause no great loss but will be more conducive to the implementation of the plan to reorganize and disperse the troops." This is the famous "February Letter" in history. Provinces with armed crossover occupations, such as Hunan, Guangdong, Hubei, and Fujian, all received similar instructions. In a letter replying to the Central Committee in the name of the Front Committee, Mao Zedong tactfully criticized the "February Letter" for being "too pessimistic in its estimation of the objective situation and subjective forces." He essentially persisted in his correct opinion and refused to execute the erroneous instruction to disperse the armed forces. In contrast, many other localities eventually carried out the instructions. After Bukharin's fall from power, the Second Plenum of the Sixth CPC Central Committee in June 1929 attempted to withstand Comintern pressure by suspending the dispersal strategy established by the Sixth National Congress. The meeting decided: "Whether the tactics of Red Army movement are concentrated or dispersed must be decided by all objective and subjective conditions, such as the situation of warlord wars, the state of peasant struggle, the composition of Red Army organizations, and geographical conditions. One should not give mechanical or general instructions on concentration or dispersal tactics." After the Middle Eastern Railway Incident ^[14], as the importance of armed struggle rose, Stalin and the Comintern pivoted to recognize China's armed crossover occupation, demanding the CPC concentrate resources on developing it. In 1930, they issued instructions regarding the establishment of a "Central (Provisional) Revolutionary Government of the Soviet Areas," pushing the CPC to establish the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. The large revolutionary base areas we are familiar with today, such as the Central Soviet Area and the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Area, were all formed after the Middle Eastern Railway Incident.

Constrained by objective and subjective conditions, neither the CPC nor the Comintern was able to systematically summarize this new revolutionary path during this stage. Nevertheless, centering on the issue of Soviet power—especially the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants—and the issue of armed struggle—especially guerrilla warfare—the CPC summarized a series of...

"Chinese experience" ^[15]—this experience drove the development of the Communist International's understanding of related issues. Regarding the question of Soviet power, the Comintern had long viewed Soviets as a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its primary symbol. Yet, the Soviet power established in China was clearly not a dictatorship of the proletariat, but a democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants ^[16]. As early as 1931, the Comintern had noted that the "Chinese experience" of Soviets differed from the Russian experience. Otto Kuusinen, then head of the Eastern Department of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), pointed out: "The bourgeois-democratic revolution in China is also different from bourgeois-democratic revolutions anywhere else. We have Soviet areas there. But if we carefully study the basic characteristics of their development, the situation there is completely different from what it should be according to European standards." The October Revolution followed the sequence of seizing state power and then establishing a Red Army and Soviets. The steps of the Chinese Revolution, however, were exactly the opposite: "First, individual Communists formed Red Army detachments, and these detachments established new proletarian power"—that is, establishing the army and Soviets first, and then gradually seizing national power.

In 1932, representatives of the Communist Party of China (CPC) at the 12th Plenum of the ECCI argued that the development of armed independent regimes ^[17] and the establishment of Soviet power in China "pointed out and proved a truth in practice to the whole world: namely, that the Soviet system is entirely feasible in colonial and semi-colonial countries." In 1933, at the 13th Plenum of the ECCI, the CPC representatives further systematized these assertions regarding "Soviets," proposing that the Chinese Revolution "proved in practice that Soviets are not only the sole form of the dictatorship of the proletariat," but also the "best form" for the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants. Regarding the international significance of the "Chinese experience," they argued that China's armed independent regimes and the construction of Soviet power "enriched Lenin’s theoretical principles regarding the immense role and significance of provisional revolutionary governments, revolutionary armies, and the establishment of revolutionary base areas (even if small in scale at first)." They claimed it "became not only the most precious treasure of the CPC, and not only an effective model for the liberation struggle of the people throughout the entire colonial world, but also a rich lesson for Communists in all capitalist countries, first and foremost our comrades in countries like Japan and Spain." During the drafting phase of the resolution, the speeches of the CPC representatives altered the content of Kuusinen’s report, The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International. Kuusinen’s initial draft still emphasized that "Soviets" were the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the report adopted by the Plenum incorporated the CPC’s new formulation, affirming that "Soviet power is the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat," as well as "the state form of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry."

The military struggle experience of the Chinese Revolution was also gradually disseminated by the Comintern. For instance, on October 28, 1934, the Eastern Secretariat of the ECCI suggested publishing works on specific campaigns of the Chinese Red Army, the history of the CPC’s armed struggle, the theory of guerrilla warfare, the theory of small-scale warfare in mountainous regions, and the operational art of the Chinese revolutionary army. They requested that the CPC "regularly and extensively inform brother parties of developments in China to propagate the issue of armed struggle." On the same day, the Eastern Secretariat also proposed establishing an "Eastern Operations Center" to study the issue of armed struggle in Eastern countries "using the experience of the Chinese Red Army as a foundation." The "Chinese experience" once again propelled the development of the world revolution.

At this stage, the CPC's exploration of the "Chinese experience" saw several new developments. First, the CPC achieved a clearer and more self-aware recognition of the international significance of the "Chinese experience." Second, the "Chinese experience" shifted from applied innovation to original innovation. During the initial stage, the CPC’s exploration of proletarian leadership ^[18] was essentially a successful application of the concept in a colonial or semi-colonial revolution. By this stage, however, the armed independent regimes birthed by the Chinese Revolution represented an entirely new revolutionary form within the international communist movement. This was no longer an applied innovation of existing theories or practical experiences within the movement; rather, it was an innovation of original significance based on the Chinese Revolution itself. Finally, the degree of importance the Comintern attached to Chinese experience increased. In the initial stage, it was only after the failure of the Great Revolution ^[19] that the Comintern truly recognized and promoted the importance of proletarian leadership in colonial and semi-colonial revolutions at its Sixth Congress. At this current stage, however, the Comintern had already recognized the uniqueness of China’s experience with armed independent regimes as early as 1931—the early-to-mid period of the Land Revolutionary War—and proposed "formulating basic programs for other countries" based on the experience of the Chinese Revolution.

IV. The Mature Stage: "Chinese Experience" Evolves into "Chinese Theory"

The period from the Zunyi Conference in 1935 to the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in 1945 constitutes the mature stage of the CPC's exploration of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory." The CPC arrived at a brand-new understanding of the relationship between the Chinese Revolution and the world revolution, establishing a new concept centered on the Chinese Revolution. On this basis, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, creatively proposed the major proposition of the "Sinicization of Marxism" ^[20] and established Mao Zedong Thought as the Party's guiding ideology, driving the evolution of "Chinese experience" into "Chinese theory."

Following the Zunyi Conference, after reflecting on both the positive and negative experiences of the Chinese Revolution, the Chinese Communists, represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, formed a distinct consciousness of the Chinese Revolution’s subjectivity. First, they gained a deeper understanding of the endogenous nature of the Chinese Revolution. In 1936, during his conversations with Edgar Snow, Mao Zedong noted: "Stalin said in a talk with an American journalist: 'Revolution cannot be exported.' It is equally true that revolution cannot be imported." This demonstrated that the Chinese Communists realized the Chinese Revolution was the result of complex social evolution within China since the beginning of the modern era, deeply rooted in Chinese soil. Second, they developed a new understanding of the relationship between the Chinese Revolution and the world revolution. The new central leadership re-evaluated this relationship based on the developmental trajectory and realistic needs of the Chinese Revolution itself, gradually forming a fundamental position with the Chinese Revolution at the center. In this regard, Mao Zedong pointed out: "In our research on China, we must take China as the center; we must sit on the body of China to study the things of the world." Third, they more consciously upheld the independence of the Chinese Revolution. Previously, the CPC had shown considerable independence in many important theoretical and practical explorations; however, when its own views conflicted with those of the Comintern and pressure was applied, the Party would often choose to compromise and accept the Comintern’s views. After the formation of the new central leadership, the CPC became more resolute in adhering to major matters of principle regarding the Chinese Revolution. For example, regarding the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the Secretariat of the ECCI once telegraphed the CPC Central Committee, requesting that "Communists should not raise the issue of their leadership within the national front." Within the CPC, Wang Ming echoed this, asserting that "we cannot now hollowly shout about the bourgeoisie leading the proletariat or the proletariat leading the bourgeoisie," and "the central issue today is 'everything for the resistance, everything through the united front, everything subservient to the resistance,'" emphasizing that "the Eighth Route Army must also be under the unified command of Chiang [Kai-shek]." Facing pressure from both within the Party and the Comintern, the first generation of the Party's central collective leadership, with Comrade Mao Zedong at the core, maintained the correct political direction, consistently treating the issue of leadership as the fundamental factor determining the success or failure of the War of Resistance and the Chinese Revolution as a whole. Fourth, they more clearly elucidated the basic foothold of the Chinese Revolution. The CPC had taken detours in handling the relationship between its own struggle and international assistance. After the Zunyi Conference, proceeding from the subjectivity of the Chinese Revolution, the Chinese Communists realized that "international assistance is necessary for the revolutionary struggles of all countries and nations in modern times," but "China should at all times take self-reliance as its basic foothold."

On the basis of a thorough awakening of the consciousness of the Chinese Revolution’s subjectivity, Mao Zedong formally proposed the major proposition of the "Sinicization of Marxism" at the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee. Regarding the connotation of the "Sinicization of Marxism," Mao primarily elaborated on three aspects: "solving Chinese problems," "creating something new," and imparting a "Chinese style and Chinese flavor." Specifically, "solving Chinese problems" meant applying Marxism to resolve practical issues in the Chinese Revolution; "creating something new" meant continuously summarizing "Chinese experience" and elevating it into "Chinese theory"; and imparting "Chinese style and Chinese flavor" meant rooting Marxism in fine traditional Chinese culture. For a time, some interpreted the Sinicization of Marxism as the combination of Marxist theory with Chinese reality to produce experiences and theories applicable only to China. Mao Zedong countered: "How are Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of the Chinese Revolution to be linked? To use a common expression, it is 'shooting an arrow at a target' ^[21]. The 'arrow' is the arrow, and the 'target' is the target; when you release the arrow, you must aim at the target. The relationship between Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese Revolution is that of the arrow and the target." So, which is the target and which is the arrow? Mao emphasized: "The 'target' is the Chinese Revolution, and the 'arrow' is Marxism-Leninism. We Chinese Communists seek this 'arrow' specifically to shoot it at the 'target' of the Chinese Revolution and the Eastern revolution." In Mao’s view, the "arrow" of Marxism-Leninism was meant to hit two "targets." These two targets were not only the "Chinese Revolution" but also the "Eastern revolution." That is to say, Chinese Communists were to explore not only the laws of the Chinese Revolution but also, based on the Chinese Revolution, the general laws of the "Eastern revolution"—namely, colonial and semi-colonial revolutions. The proposal of the "Sinicization of Marxism" marked the formation of a high degree of theoretical self-awareness within the CPC regarding "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory."

During this period, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, considered and studied the Chinese Revolution within the context of the entire colonial and semi-colonial revolution, forming the theory of New Democratic Revolution. The theory of New Democratic Revolution was not a theory designed specifically for China alone, but a "Chinese theory" elaborated on the basis of "Chinese experience" that was applicable to the entire colonial and semi-colonial revolution. Mao Zedong proposed: "This kind of revolution is developing in China and all colonial and semi-colonial countries; we call this revolution the New Democratic Revolution." He discussed the general characteristics of the New Democratic Revolution in detail in terms of its nature, targets, motive forces, prerequisites, and program. Mao emphasized: "The revolutions in various colonial and semi-colonial countries will inevitably have certain different characteristics, but these are minor differences within a grand commonality." In other words, these components of China’s New Democratic Revolution were generally applicable to colonial and semi-colonial revolutions. On this basis, the Chinese Communists further systematically summarized Chinese revolutionary experience, driving the transition from fragmented experiences to theorization and systematization, and developing the "Chinese experience" into "Chinese theory"—namely, Sinicized Marxism: Mao Zedong Thought.

To be sure, the formation of Mao Zedong Thought did not occur overnight. During the period of the Great Revolution, Mao Zedong Thought had already begun to sprout. From the outbreak of the Land Revolutionary War in 1927 to the Zunyi Conference in 1935, Mao Zedong Thought gradually took shape. During the embryonic and formative stages, Chinese Communists had already attempted to summarize "Chinese theory" on the basis of "Chinese experience." For example, in works such as The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains, Mao proposed the idea of "armed independent regimes of workers and peasants," and in A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire, he provided a preliminary explanation of the theory of the Chinese revolutionary path. However, at that stage, the relevant ideas had not yet been systematically elaborated, nor had they been established as the guiding ideology for the whole Party. It was only after the Zunyi Conference that "Chinese theory," including the theory of the Chinese revolutionary path, was systematically expounded and integrated into the system of Mao Zedong Thought, becoming the guiding ideology of the entire Party. It was at this point that the world significance of "Chinese theory" was systematically researched and explained.

In 1945, the Seventh National Congress of the CPC expounded upon the world-historical significance of Mao Zedong Thought, holding that "Mao Zedong Thought is the continued development of Marxism in the national-democratic revolution of colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal countries in the present era; it is an outstanding example of the nationalization of Marxism." It emphasized that this important ideology "has guided and is guiding the Chinese people toward complete liberation, and has made beneficial contributions to the liberation cause of peoples of all countries, especially the various nations of the East." The Congress also established Mao Zedong Thought as the Party's guiding ideology and inscribed it into the Party Constitution, achieving the first historic leap in the Sinicization of Marxism.

Simultaneously, the status of the Chinese Revolution was further elevated. After the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet Union and the Comintern ^[22] focused their primary energy on Europe, leaving China to play an increasingly significant role in the Asian revolution. On February 8, 1940, the Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Communist International passed the Decision on International Aid to be Provided by the CPC to Communist Parties in Far Eastern and Southeast Asian Countries, proposing that "the Communist Party of China should establish contact with the Communist Parties of Japan, India, and Indochina, and organize aid for them." That same year, Sanzo Nosaka, a leader of the Communist Party of Japan, and Alimin ^[23], a leader of the Communist Party of Indonesia, arrived in Yan'an ^[24] accompanied by Zhou Enlai. In June 1941, following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Comintern called for the establishment of an international anti-fascist united front. The CPC assumed the mission of promoting and organizing the Oriental Anti-Fascist United Front. On October 26, the Anti-Fascist Delegates' Congress of the Various Nations of the East officially opened in Yan'an. Over 130 delegates from 18 countries and nations—including Japan, India, the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, and Korea—attended alongside more than 2,000 representatives from all walks of life in Yan'an. The conference decided to establish the Great League of Oriental Nations Against Fascism, with headquarters in Yan'an and branches in various localities. Around the time of the Comintern's dissolution, the CPC gradually established direct links with communist organizations in Asia, particularly in East and Southeast Asia, and the influence of the Chinese Revolution in these regions continued to rise.

During this period, the CPC's exploration of "Chinese experience" moved toward a stage of theorization and systematization, formally proposing a "Chinese theory." Before the birth of Mao Zedong Thought, the content of Chinese experience was relatively scattered. With the emergence of Mao Zedong Thought, "Chinese experience" developed into a systematic "Chinese theory"; Mao Zedong Thought is the theorized and systematized "Chinese experience." This "Chinese theory" exerted a major international influence, receiving high praise from communist organizations in many countries. For instance, Susumu Okano (Sanzo Nosaka), a leader of the Communist Party of Japan, stated: "Comrade Mao Zedong's theories and policies not only guide the liberation of China but have also become a precious compass for the liberation of the various nations of the East." In the 1950s, the Workers' Party of Vietnam even envisioned including Mao Zedong Thought as its own guiding ideology. Their draft party constitution planned to write: "Take the combination of Marxism-Engelsism-Leninism-Stalinism and Mao Zedong Thought with the practice of the Vietnamese revolution as the ideological foundation and compass for all the Party's actions." It was only at Mao Zedong's insistence that the Workers' Party of Vietnam eventually deleted this sentence.

V. The Deepening Stage: Further Enriching and Promoting "Chinese Theory"

The period from the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in 1945 to the founding of New China in 1949 constituted the deepening stage of the CPC's exploration of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory." The victory of the New Democratic Revolution raised the status of the Chinese Revolution to an unprecedented level. Meanwhile, the CPC summarized the path of the Chinese Revolution into a "formula" consisting of four aspects—Party leadership, Party building, the united front, and armed struggle—and emphasized the universal applicability of this path to revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries. The content of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" became richer, and its appeal and influence further increased.

The status of the Chinese Revolution within the world revolution reached an unprecedented height. After the establishment of the Cominform ^[25] in Europe in 1947, Stalin and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) envisioned the CPC spearheading the formation of an Asian Cominform to take on the role of leader of the international communist movement in Asia. In February 1949, during talks with Mao Zedong and others, Anastas Mikoyan proposed that "a Far Eastern Bureau of Communist Parties headed by the CPC should be established." The CPC did not immediately agree to this. In July 1949, Liu Shaoqi led a CPC delegation to visit the Soviet Union. During the meetings, Stalin fully affirmed the status and role of the Chinese Revolution in the entire international communist movement, stating that "the center of revolution has shifted from the West to the East, and it has now shifted to China and East Asia." He emphasized: "In the international revolutionary movement, both China and the Soviet Union should undertake more obligations, and there should be a certain division of labor—that is, cooperation through division of labor. It is hoped that China will henceforth take on more responsibility in assisting the national-democratic revolutionary movements in colonial, semi-colonial, and dependent countries, because the Chinese Revolution itself and its revolutionary experience will have a greater impact on them, and will be referenced and absorbed by them. The Soviet Union cannot play the same influence and role in this regard as China." Stalin's remarks indicated that the CPSU not only recognized the CPC's important position in the Asian revolution and the broader colonial/semi-colonial revolution but also hoped to formalize a division of labor in the international communist movement, creating two centers—one in the East and one in the West. Although the Asian Cominform was ultimately not established, the CPC gained a brand-new understanding of its own status and its positioning and responsibilities within the colonial and semi-colonial revolutions. Regarding this issue, Liu Shaoqi pointed out: "In addition to bearing the heavy leadership responsibility of economic recovery and increasing production domestically, the Chinese working class must internationally bear the heavy responsibility of assisting the working class and laboring people of various capitalist countries, especially the colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia and Australasia." Proceeding from this understanding, New China hosted the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries, participated in the formation of the Asian Liaison Bureau of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), established direct contacts with communist organizations in many countries, and provided significant aid to revolutions in several nations.

Simultaneously, under the guidance of Mao Zedong Thought, the CPC led the Chinese people through bloody battles to overthrow Kuomintang rule, win nationwide victory, and establish New China under the People's Democratic Dictatorship. The victory of the Chinese Revolution was the first successful instance in the colonial and semi-colonial world of a revolution led independently by a domestic Communist Party. Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, continued to advance the Sinicization of Marxism, further enriched Chinese revolutionary experience, developed Mao Zedong Thought, and proposed the General Line of the New Democratic Revolution. They elucidated the "Ten Major Military Principles" ^[26] and expounded upon a series of new "Chinese experiences" such as the theory, policy, and tactical thinking of the People's Democratic Dictatorship and the People's Democratic United Front, further enriching and developing the "Chinese theory" of Mao Zedong Thought. From November to December 1949, the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries was held in Beijing; this was the first large-scale international conference hosted by New China. At the meeting, Liu Shaoqi summarized the road of the Chinese Revolution into a four-part "formula": Party leadership, Party building, the united front, and armed struggle. This summarization was derived from the "Three Great Magic Weapons" ^[27] of the Chinese Revolution proposed by Mao Zedong in the Introducing "The Communist". The difference was that Liu Shaoqi split Party building into two parts—"Party leadership" and "Party building"—whereas in the Introducing "The Communist", both were integrated under "Party building." Concerning the road of the Chinese Revolution, Liu Shaoqi proposed that all countries should learn from China. He emphasized: "The great victory of the Chinese people is the best example for them," and "The road taken by the Chinese people to defeat imperialism and its lackeys and establish the People's Republic of China is the road that should be taken by the peoples of many colonial and semi-colonial countries to strive for national independence and people's democracy." Liu Shaoqi's summary of the four-part "formula" was a further refinement of "Chinese theory" by the CPC and an active, initiative-taking effort in international communication. Previously, although the CPC had proposed "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory," it had not taken the initiative to directly publicize or promote them to other countries. These new ideas had a significant impact on colonial and semi-colonial revolutions and even on the contemporary world. For example, in September 1949, the Communist Party of Thailand sent a telegram to Mao Zedong congratulating the founding of New China and stating: "The lessons of the experience of the Chinese Revolution are the lessons of the experience of our Thai revolution," and "The Communist Party of Thailand is determined to draw upon this precious experience of yours." The influence of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" on the world is profound and long-lasting; even in the 21st century, many countries and regions continue to study them.

In this stage, the CPC reached a new understanding of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory," beginning to view the summarization, generalization, and promotion of these concepts as a major international responsibility. The content of "Chinese theory" became richer, and the CPC further generalized it by proposing the road of the Chinese Revolution consisting of the four-part "formula." The dissemination channels for "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" developed further. On one hand, the direct links between communist organizations that began to form during the War of Resistance were strengthened. By the 1950s, Beijing had become a gathering place for representatives of all Asian Communist Parties except the Communist Party of India; "all Communist Parties in Asian countries requested advice and assistance from them." On the other hand, with the establishment of international organizations such as the Asian Liaison Bureau of the WFTU, "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" began to be disseminated through new international platforms following the dissolution of the Comintern.

Conclusion

The relevant explorations of the CPC during the New Democratic Revolution era hold important historical significance for our understanding of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" today.

First...

The summary, generalization, and dissemination of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" was an inevitable rather than accidental process; one must take care to grasp its historical necessity. From a historical dimension, the Communist Party of China (CPC) began forming "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" on the basis of the Sinicization of Marxism from its very birth, using them to propel the development of world revolution. Surveying the history of the New Democratic Revolution period, the CPC’s exploration of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" runs through the entire era. From a practical dimension, the formation of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" was an objective necessity for the development of the international communist movement. Since revolutions in colonies and semi-colonies had long been excluded from the international communist movement, the Communist International (Comintern ^[28]) lacked relevant experience in conducting such revolutions when it began actively promoting them. Whether it was the communist organizations of various nation-states, including the CPC, or the Comintern itself, there was an urgent need for a set of practice-tested experience and theory; this was the practical impetus for the emergence of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory." The Comintern had a clear understanding of the importance of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory"; for instance, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern actively summarized and promoted Chinese experience, asserting that "the past experience of the Chinese revolution should undoubtedly be utilized by the revolutionary movements in India and other similar colonial countries." Furthermore, the victories of Vietnam’s struggles against French and American forces and Nepal’s democratic revolutionary movement, achieved on the basis of referencing Chinese experience, further proved the scientific nature and effectiveness of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" through practice. From a theoretical dimension, the formation of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" is an internal requirement of Marxist theory. Engels once pointed out that "Marx's whole world outlook is not a doctrine, but a method." Marxism emphasizes the unity of nationality and internationality, the unity of universality and particularity, and the unity of upholding the fundamentals and breaking new ground. It advocates achieving a high degree of unity between universal truths and the specific national conditions and diverse national practices of various countries, requiring the continuous advancement of theoretical development through rich practice. Although specific national conditions differ, colonies and semi-colonies—serving as sources of raw materials, commodity markets, and sites for capital export for imperialist powers—share commonalities in fundamental issues such as the nature, objects, goals, and driving forces of revolution. The "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" generated after the integration of the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific reality not only answered questions relevant to the Chinese revolution but also revealed the general laws for conducting revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries with conditions similar to China's. These achievements provided a practical reference for other countries and enriched and developed the ideological treasury of Marxism. On the new journey, we must use history to profoundly understand the importance and necessity of the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core proposing "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory," strengthening our confidence in our history and culture, and grasping historical initiative.

Secondly, the formation of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" was a long-term rather than a short-term process; one must take care to grasp the unity of continuity and stages. The CPC’s exploration of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" spanned the entire New Democratic Revolution period, yet it manifested different characteristics at different stages. During the embryonic stage, the CPC's exploration of "Chinese experience" was still an individual behavior. Its subjects were individual Party members in close contact with the Comintern, and these subjects did not yet have a conscious understanding of the process. During the initial stage, the CPC's exploration of "Chinese experience" evolved from individual behavior to organizational behavior. During the development stage, the CPC attained a more conscious understanding of "Chinese experience," and the content of "Chinese experience" shifted from applied innovation toward original innovation. During the mature stage, "Chinese experience" moved toward the theorized and systematized "Chinese theory," forming Sinicized Marxism—namely, Mao Zedong Thought. During the deepening stage, the content of "Chinese theory" was continuously enriched, and its attraction and influence were greatly enhanced. Furthermore, the CPC's consciousness in promoting the internationalization of "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" was further elevated. On the new journey, when we explore "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory," we must maintain continuity in the direction of development and core goals, while also adapting to time and local conditions ^[29] according to changes in the objective situation and specific tasks at different stages, properly handling the dialectical relationships between upholding the fundamentals and breaking new ground, inheritance and development, and quantitative and qualitative change.

Finally, "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" are both connected and distinct; one must take care to grasp the relationship between the two. "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory" are unified within the historical process of the CPC exploring and advancing the Sinicization and modernization of Marxism; the two constitute a relationship of source and stream, or root and crown. From the perspective of content composition, "Chinese experience" primarily consists of specific, scattered ideological insights and practical experiences, whereas "Chinese theory" is a systematized ideological system. As Mao Zedong stated: "Our opposition to subjectivism is for the purpose of raising theory, not lowering Marxism. We want to Marxist-ize the rich reality of the Chinese revolution." "Chinese experience" is the prerequisite and foundation for the formation of "Chinese theory," while "Chinese theory" is the basic direction and inevitable result of the development of "Chinese experience." From the perspective of the developmental process, the appearance of "Chinese experience" predated "Chinese theory," and "Chinese theory" is "Chinese experience" at its systematized and theorized stage. The CPC began exploring "Chinese experience" from the moment of its founding, and "Chinese experience" gradually gestated much of the content of "Chinese theory" during its development. However, it was not until the maturation of Mao Zedong Thought that "Chinese experience" truly developed into "Chinese theory." As stated in this article, during the Agrarian Revolutionary War period ^[30], Mao Zedong had already begun preliminary expositions on issues such as the path of the Chinese revolution, but the relevant understandings were not yet systematic and had not yet become the guiding ideology for the whole Party. Only during the period of the National War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression was the theory of the Chinese revolutionary path systematically expounded and incorporated into Mao Zedong Thought, becoming the guiding ideology for the whole Party. On the new journey, we must dig deep for "Chinese experience" within Chinese practice and temper "Chinese theory" upon Chinese experience, continuously advancing the Sinicization and modernization of Marxism, and leading the development of China and the world with "Chinese experience" and "Chinese theory."

Source: Marxism Studies (《马克思主义研究》), Issue 11, 2024. Editor: Huihui