Qiao Yuting: The Internal Logic of Military and Economics — Studying Mao Zedong's Military Economic Thought
Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought is his scientific understanding of the relationship between war and the economy, and between national defense construction and economic construction; it is also an important organic component of the scientific system of Mao Zedong Thought. Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought combined the basic principles of Marxism with China’s concrete realities, forming a Marxist military-economic theory with distinct Chinese characteristics through long-term practical exploration. Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought is rigorously structured and logically self-consistent, forming a relatively complete system characterized by distinct theoretical qualities such as scientific rigor, subjectivity, and practicality; it demonstrates the scientific nature and contemporary value of Marxist theory. Currently, our country is at a critical stage of comprehensively advancing the realization of Chinese-path modernization and marching toward the goal of basically achieving socialist modernization. The positions, viewpoints, and methods contained within Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought still hold important revelatory significance for the New Era and the new journey. They guide us in coordinately handling major relationships—such as those between development and security, a wealthy country and a strong military, and maintaining independence versus drawing on foreign experience—while strengthening strategic resolve, improving risk-response capabilities, and calmly facing major tests of "high winds and swift waves" or even "tempestuous storms" [1].
I. The General Logic of Mao Zedong’s Military-Economic Thought
Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought adheres to the basic Marxist positions, viewpoints, and methods, and gradually formed a scientific understanding of the dialectical relationship between the military and the economy through the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution and construction. The general logic of Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought is centrally reflected in the internal continuity and high degree of unity across three levels: the fundamental position, the main logical thread, and methodological principles.
(1) Fundamental Position: All military-economic activities must be based on the people, rely on the people, and serve the people
Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought consistently follows historical materialism, making it clear that all military-economic activities must be based on the people, rely on the people, and serve the people. This fundamental position runs through multiple aspects, including the theory of people's war, the building of the people's army, and the strategy and tactics of the people's army.
First, the nature of people's war dictates that military-economic activities must be based on the position of the people. Deep forces for victory in war reside among the masses; only through the mass line can the support of the masses be transformed into strategic resources for overcoming difficulties, and scattered economic and social forces be transformed into an integrated material force to support the war. Mao Zedong noted: "The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people." During the revolutionary war period, even under extremely arduous conditions, our Party consistently regarded improving the lives of the masses as an important task. When planning national development strategies, Mao Zedong placed the interests of the people first, proposing: "First is the common people (lǎobǎixìng), we cannot lose the people's hearts; second is fighting the war; third is famine." In 1966, he proposed "Prepare for war, prepare for famine, and do everything for the people," further clarifying that the ultimate goal of military and economic work lies in serving and benefiting the people.
Second, the nature and purpose of the people's army dictate that its military-economic practice must adhere to the people’s position. The people's army "has stood firmly with the Chinese people and served them whole-heartedly... not for the private interests of a few individuals or a narrow group, but for the interests of the broad masses and of the whole nation." This nature determines that the people's army is not only a fighting force but also a production team and a working team. While performing military tasks, economic measures such as land reform, the Great Production Movement [2], and "better troops and simpler administration" [3] consolidated the economic ties and political foundation upon which the military and the people shared "weal and woe," making the people's army a new type of revolutionary armed force distinct from old-style armies.
Third, the vitality of the people's army's strategy and tactics is rooted in the masses. Tactical forms such as ambush warfare, sabotage warfare, tunnel warfare, landmine warfare, and "sparrow warfare" [4] were formed and developed precisely in the practice of relying on the wisdom and strength of the masses. Mao Zedong profoundly pointed out: "Because our strategy and tactics are built on the foundation of people's war, no anti-people army can make use of our strategy and tactics." The creation and application of military strategy and tactics are inseparable from the deep social foundation provided by the masses.
(2) Main Logical Thread: The unity of opposites between the military and the economy
The main logical thread of Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought lies in the theoretical interpretation and practical application of the dialectical relationship of unity within the basic contradictory categories of the military and the economy. Starting from the positions of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, Mao Zedong profoundly expounded on the internal connections between the economic base and politics and the military: "Political and military power is for the purpose of overthrowing the forces that hinder the development of the productive forces; the purpose of overthrowing the forces that hinder the development of productive forces is to liberate the productive forces and develop the economy. The economy is the foundation of politics and the military; politics and the military are the superstructure. The foundation is the economy, and the fundamental goal is also to develop the economy." This thesis fundamentally reveals the historical mission of military struggle and its internal connection to economic development, clarifying that military activity is ultimately directed toward the liberation and development of social productive forces. The formation and employment of military power do not exist in isolation but take certain relations of production and socio-economic conditions as their premise and serve specific practical goals.
First, it follows the basic law that the economic base determines the superstructure, emphasizing that the economic base and socio-economic relations determine class positions and political attitudes. In Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society, Mao Zedong pointed out that the primary question of the revolution is to distinguish friends from enemies. During the New Democratic Revolution period, Mao Zedong profoundly analyzed the economic base of Chiang Kai-shek’s reactionary regime: "This monopoly capitalism, closely combined with foreign imperialism, the domestic landlord class, and old-type rich peasants, became comprador, feudal, state-monopoly capitalism. This is the economic base of Chiang Kai-shek’s reactionary regime." Based on this analysis, he proposed that the revolutionary task of opposing imperialism and feudalism must first destroy the feudal land system, carry out the land revolution, and achieve "land to the tiller," making the vast peasantry a solid pillar of the revolution. Early in the War of Liberation, facing a superficial disparity in economic strength between the Kuomintang and the Communists, Mao Zedong further pointed out that the Kuomintang regime relied on bureaucratic monopoly capital and extremely reactionary financial and economic policies, which would inevitably lead to economic collapse and social crisis. This profound grasp of the logic of the economic base allowed our Party to grasp the historical initiative in strategic judgment. After the founding of New China, Mao Zedong applied this theoretical logic to the practice of socialist transformation, proposing the General Line for the Transition Period [5], the core of which was to establish the dominant position of socialist public ownership in the national economy, making the socialist ownership of the means of production the economic base of the state and society.
Second, changes in the principal contradiction of society at different historical stages determine the primary-secondary pattern of the military-economic relationship and the practical emphasis, thereby influencing specific strategic deployments and policy orientations, embodying the organic unity of "the theory of two points" and "the theory of the priority point" [6]. During the years of revolutionary war, military struggle was the core method for resolving the principal contradiction of society, and economic construction had to revolve around the revolutionary war. Mao Zedong noted: "Revolutionary war is the central task of the moment; economic construction is for it, around it, and subordinate to it." At the same time, he criticized the view that economic construction should not be carried out in a war environment: "The opinion that economic construction should not be carried out under revolutionary war conditions is extremely erroneous." After the founding of New China, the principal contradiction of society changed, and national construction became the central task. Mao Zedong noted: "Only when economic construction develops faster can national defense construction make greater progress. We must strengthen national defense; therefore, we must first strengthen economic construction." Meanwhile, Mao Zedong flexibly adjusted economic policies and class strategies according to changes in the principal contradiction at different stages. For example, during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, national contradiction rose to be the principal contradiction of society, while domestic class contradiction occupied a secondary position. Therefore, regarding land policy, a reduction of rent and interest was implemented rather than a thorough land revolution; in labor-capital relations, on the one hand, workers were assisted so they would have work to do and food to eat, while on the other hand, a policy of developing industry was implemented so that national capital could obtain reasonable profits. This policy arrangement reflected the periodic adjustment of economic relations under the conditions of the United Front.
(3) Methodological Principles: Seek truth from facts, independence, and overall consideration
Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought constructed a scientific methodological system with seeking truth from facts as the theoretical cornerstone, independence as the principle of subjectivity, and overall consideration as the practical method. This methodological system not only provided cognitive tools for accurately grasping the principal contradiction at different historical stages but also provided a "bridge" connecting theory and practice for the victory of the Chinese revolution and construction.
Seeking truth from facts is the practical character of Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought. Mao Zedong repeatedly emphasized that the victory of the Chinese revolutionary struggle must rely on Chinese Communists' profound grasp of China's concrete realities. China was a large semi-colonial and semi-feudal country with extremely uneven political and economic development; this basic national condition fundamentally prescribed the strategic direction and military strategy of the Chinese revolution, determining that it could not copy the "city-center" model but had to take the unique path of "encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing power through armed force." Mao Zedong noted: "Agriculture and handicrafts account for about 90 percent... this is the economic expression of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal nature of old China; it is also the basic starting point for all problems during the period of the Chinese revolution and for a considerable period after victory." Starting precisely from this reality of a backward economic base, the CPC began its autonomous exploration of the path to revolution and construction. First, it formed a military and economic development path consistent with China's reality. Second, it used in-depth investigation and research as the premise for scientific decision-making. Mao Zedong emphasized: "No investigation, no right to speak" and "The same goes for the right to speak without a correct investigation." Military and economic decisions must be built upon a scientific analysis of class relations. Third, it adapted to local conditions with flexibility. During the New Democratic Revolution, Mao Zedong creatively proposed various wartime economic security methods based on the economic conditions and war environments of different regions. These measures were flexible decisions made based on the specific environment, reflecting the practical wisdom of grasping conditions, switching methods, and coordinating the military and the people amidst the complex movement of contradictions.
Independence embodies the principle of subjectivity in Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought and is the core of establishing the initiative for development within its methodological system. Mao Zedong noted: "On what basis should our policy rest? It should rest on our own strength, which is called self-reliance." Whether in the revolutionary war years—characterized by extreme scarcity of materials and being under strict blockades and "encirclement and suppression" [7]—or in the socialist revolution and construction period after the founding of New China—where everything was to be built from scratch—military and economic development had to take our own strength as the strategic basis, not pinning hopes on external forces, emphasizing that "both revolution and construction must rely on ourselves." At the same time, adhering to independence and self-reliance did not mean "closed-door" or isolated development; rather, it implemented the policy of "relying mainly on our own efforts while seeking external assistance as a supplement," critically learning from and drawing on all useful experiences. "Our policy is to learn from the strong points of all nations and all countries... we must learn with analysis and critique; we cannot learn blindly, copy everything, or apply things mechanically... We must seriously learn from the good experiences of foreign countries and also study their bad experiences... This is the case on the economic front, and it should be entirely the case on the military front as well."
Overall consideration is Mao Zedong’s specific method for handling such relationships as those between the military and the economy, the current and the long-term, and breakthroughs at key points versus overall balance. Its essence lies in reasonably catering to secondary aspects while grasping the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of the contradiction, so that various tasks form a pattern of synergistic advancement under an overall goal. Regarding the specific method of overall consideration, Mao Zedong used the vivid metaphor of "playing the piano." This metaphor profoundly reveals the rhythmic requirements for advancing work within a complex system: one must highlight the "main melody" while coordinating multiple voices; one must grasp the key links without losing sight of one for the sake of the other.
II. The Main Content of Mao Zedong’s Military-Economic Thought
Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought is based on the historical materialist view that the masses are the creators of history. It uses the positions, viewpoints, and methods of dialectical materialism to analyze and solve major problems in the process of the Chinese revolution and construction. According to the historical stages of Mao Zedong’s leadership, it can be broadly divided into war-economy thought during the New Democratic Revolution period and national defense-economy thought after the founding of the People's Republic of China.
(1) War-economy theory during the New Democratic Revolution period
During the New Democratic Revolution period, Mao Zedong primarily started from the dialectical relationship between war and the economy, systematically exploring the material conditions and development paths for the victory of the revolutionary war, forming an ideological system with the war economy as its core content.
First, scientific grasp of the dialectical relationship between war and the economy. War is not only a military and political contest but also an economic contest. Economic power is the material basis for waging war; without corresponding economic support, war is difficult to sustain or develop. Mao Zedong explicitly criticized the view that economic construction should not be carried out in a revolutionary war environment, pointing out:
“The view that economic construction should not be carried out in the environment of revolutionary war is extremely erroneous... Only by launching work on the economic front and developing the economy of the Red Areas can we provide the revolutionary war with a commensurate material basis and successfully launch our military offensives.” Guided by this thought, whether in the victories of the “Counter-Encirclement and Suppression” [8] campaigns during the Agrarian Revolution, or the victories in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation, none could have been achieved without the advancement of economic construction and fiscal safeguard work in the Base Areas. Mao Zedong pointed out that the unevenness of political and economic development inevitably leads to the unevenness of revolutionary development: “Victory in the revolution always begins first, develops first, and is won first in those places where the counter-revolutionary forces are relatively weak.” Therefore, the Chinese revolution could not mechanically copy the "urban-centered theory" [9]; it had to follow the road of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing political power by armed force. This strategic choice was rooted in China's specific economic structure and social conditions, rather than in subjective will.
Second, he proposed a series of principles and policies for Base Area construction centered on the Agrarian Revolution. Base Area construction is a vital component of Mao Zedong’s war economy thought. Mao pointed out that Base Areas are the most important factor in promoting the national revolutionary climax and the strategic foundation for seizing national victory. Revolutionary war must be built upon stable and sustainable economic development, and Base Area construction must center on the Agrarian Revolution. Only through the Agrarian Revolution—breaking the feudal land system and mobilizing the enthusiasm of the broad masses of peasants—could the Base Areas truly become a reliable rear for supporting the development of the revolutionary war.
In 1936, Mao Zedong noted: “Whoever wins the peasants will win China; whoever solves the land problem will win the peasants.” From “striking the local tyrants and distributing the land” to the “reduction of rent and interest” during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and then to the extensive land reform movement in the Liberated Areas during the War of Liberation, the Communist Party of China (CPC) gradually solved the land problem for peasants that had persisted for millennia. The transformation of the land tenure system not only changed the rural economic structure but was also transformed into powerful political mobilization capacity under wartime conditions, providing a steady stream of manpower, material, and financial resources for the revolution. The Agrarian Revolution thus became the core link in the war economy system, achieving the internal unity of economic transformation and military struggle.
Third, he clarified the economic tasks of the People’s Army and established corresponding economic institutions. The People’s Army had to shoulder three major tasks: fighting to eliminate the enemy, striking the local tyrants to raise funds, and doing mass work. Regarding institutional building, Mao placed economic democracy alongside political and military democracy, forming the “Three Great Democracies” [10] within the army.
“Concerning economic democracy, the representatives elected by the soldiers must be entitled to assist (but not overrule) the company officers in managing the company’s supplies and mess.” Economic democracy within the army was primarily reflected in the transparency of accounts, equality between officers and soldiers, democratic supervision, and participatory management. During the arduous years of the struggle in the Jinggang Mountains, the Red Army persisted in the system of open accounting: “The soldiers manage the mess and can still save a little for pocket money from the daily five cents allotted for oil, salt, firewood, and vegetables—this is called the ‘mess surplus’ (huǒshí wěizi), which amounts to about sixty or seventy wen per person per day. The soldiers are very satisfied with these methods.” Such institutional arrangements not only improved economic management within the army but, more importantly, enhanced the soldiers' sense of ownership and organizational identity.
Fourth, he systematically explored and formed multi-layered methods for wartime economic security. Mao Zedong proposed methods for securing the economy of the People’s Army during wartime, mainly including: raising funds by striking local tyrants; developing the economy to ensure supplies; the army engaging in production for self-reliance; and local replenishment by taking from the enemy. The emphasis on these methods shifted dynamically under different historical conditions. During the Jinggang Mountains period, as the economic foundation of the Base Area was weak, war expenditures relied mainly on ad-hoc fundraising. As the Base Areas expanded and political power construction matured, the fiscal and taxation system gradually became a vital source of wartime economic security, marking the gradual institutionalization of the revolutionary base economy. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, when the war entered a protracted stage and economic security issues became more prominent, Mao Zedong proposed that “developing the economy and ensuring supplies is the general policy for wartime economic and financial work.” He emphasized that developing the economy was not unconditional expansion, but must be based on specific conditions, seeking truth from facts to develop the public and private sectors to ensure the stability and sustainability of fiscal supply. In this stage, army self-sufficiency through production became an important supplementary method. During the War of Liberation, as the scale of war expanded and mobile operations became frequent, the security method shifted further toward frontline requisitioning. In his famous “Ten Major Military Principles,” Mao Zedong pointed out: “The source of our army’s manpower and material resources is mainly at the front.” This security method was both a proactive response to the changing balance of power between the enemy and ourselves and an economic support for the strategic principle of mobile warfare.
Fifth, he systematically expounded the theory of war economic mobilization. China's semi-colonial and semi-feudal economic and social structure determined that the Chinese revolutionary war would be long-term and complex. Mao Zedong realized deeply from the historical lessons of the Chinese revolution that mass mobilization is the fundamental guarantee for victory in revolutionary war, stating: “For the revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them.” On the level of political strategy, Mao Zedong, by implementing the Anti-Japanese National United Front, united and mobilized all forces that could be united, giving war mobilization a broad social basis. He noted: “Only by mobilizing the workers and peasants, who make up 90 percent of the population, can we defeat imperialism and feudalism.” At the institutional level, Mao creatively proposed a “mobilization-based” military service system. The practical effectiveness of war economic mobilization was most concentratedly manifested in the War of Liberation, particularly during the Huaihai Campaign [11]. During the Huaihai Campaign, our army mobilized 410,000 handcarts, 3,070 large carts, 250 motor vehicles, and 13,630 wooden boats, constructing an efficient transport system that achieved the logistics capability of “wherever the troops fight, the supplies are delivered.”
Sixth, he systematically deployed strategic arrangements for the transition from a wartime economy to a peacetime economy. After the victory of the “Three Great Campaigns” [12], the main forces of the Kuomintang (KMT) army were basically wiped out, and the victory of the national revolution was a foregone conclusion. Moving from a strategic height, Mao Zedong made systematic deployments for this historical turning point. He explicitly proposed that the focus of the Party’s work shift from the countryside to the cities, and from military struggle to economic construction. This shift marked the conversion of the logic of a war economy to the logic of a construction economy. To this, Mao Zedong pointed out: “The army is not only a fighting force, it is mainly a working force; all army cadres should learn how to take over and manage cities.” At the same time, Mao Zedong proposed the idea of moderately compressing military expenditures and adjusting the structure of resource allocation. This policy reflected the strategic consideration of investing more resources into economic recovery and construction by optimizing the fiscal expenditure structure after the war ended.
(II) The Theory of National Defense Economy after the Founding of New China After the founding of New China, national development entered a period of relatively peaceful construction, and the focus of Mao Zedong’s military economic thought shifted from wartime economic security to the coordinated development of economic construction and national defense construction. Under new historical conditions, how to coordinate development and security to realize the simultaneous improvement of economic strength and national defense capability became the core issue of the national defense economy.
First, he scientifically handled the relationship between economic construction and national defense construction. Mao Zedong explicitly pointed out that national defense construction is indispensable and must be strengthened. He further clarified the relationship between the two: “We must strengthen national defense, and for that reason, we must first of all strengthen economic construction.” “Only when economic construction develops faster can national defense construction make even greater progress.” At the institutional level, Mao proposed that national defense construction must be incorporated into the overall national construction plan for unified balance and comprehensive arrangement. He emphasized: “The military side should propose long-term and annual plans for national defense construction to be submitted to the State Planning Commission for unified balance and overall arrangement.” Regarding the fiscal structure, Mao advocated maintaining a reasonable proportion of military expenditure to avoid excessive crowding out of resources for economic development. He pointed out that the reliable way is to “lower military and administrative expenses to an appropriate proportion and increase expenses for economic construction,” so as to promote faster economic development and create a solid foundation for national defense construction.
Second, he integrated the modernization of national defense into the overall layout of national modernization. After the founding of New China, while planning the national development strategy, Mao Zedong gradually established national defense modernization as an important component of socialist modernization. In 1955, Mao Zedong noted: “We have entered a period, a new period in history, in which what we are doing, thinking about, and studying is socialist industrialization, socialist transformation, modern national defense, and we are beginning to delve into atomic energy.” Subsequently, Mao further proposed: “To build socialism, we originally required the modernization of industry, agriculture, and science and culture; now we must add the modernization of national defense.” Mao realized deeply that the realization of national defense modernization must be built upon a solid industrial foundation. He pointed out: “Without modern industry, how can there be modern national defense?” In 1964, Mao proposed the construction principle of “two fists and one backside” (liǎng gè quántóu, yī gè pìgu). He emphasized that in the layout of the national economy there are “two fists—agriculture and the defense industry, and one backside—basic industry; they must be positioned well.” When the “backside” is seated firmly, the “fists” thrown out will have strength. This vivid metaphor revealed the supporting role of basic industry in national modernization and national defense modernization, emphasizing that strategic capabilities must be enhanced by reinforcing the economic base.
Third, he constructed a war-preparedness economic system oriented toward strategic defense. In the 1960s, the international situation became increasingly complex and severe. In this context, Mao Zedong explicitly pointed out that the danger of imperialism launching a war still existed, and work must be deployed “based on the possibility of being attacked.” On August 12, 1964, Mao Zedong issued an instruction emphasizing the need to coordinate the economic layout from the height of national security. Subsequently, the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee held a special meeting to discuss the construction of the “Third Front” (Sānxiàn jiànshè) [13], deciding to concentrate forces on building the Third Front. The Third Front construction laid out a group of important industrial projects in the strategic depth of the inland regions, gradually forming a strategic rear of considerable scale. This layout was conducive to responding to war threats and promoted the balanced development of regional industry; it was a major measure combining development and security. As the Third Front construction unfolded, the state began to compile the Third Five-Year Plan with war preparedness as a major consideration. In 1965, Mao instructed that the plan must consider three factors: first, the people, so as not to lose their support; second, war; and third, natural disasters. Subsequently, Zhou Enlai summarized this instruction as “be prepared against war, be prepared against natural disasters, and do everything for the people” (bèi zhàn, bèi huāng, wèi rénmín), which Mao approved. Under the guidance of this thought, specific measures such as “dig deep tunnels, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony” were proposed, emphasizing that “we must be prepared both mentally and materially, so that when a sudden incident occurs, we will not be caught off guard.”
Fourth, he constructed an operating mechanism for the national defense economy that combined military and civilian use, and peacetime and wartime needs. In the process of promoting the modernization of national defense, Mao Zedong proposed the idea of combining the military with the civilian and combining peacetime with wartime. He emphasized that through institutional and technical arrangements, the organic connection between national defense construction and national economic construction should be achieved, enhancing the state’s ability to convert between peace and war status. In 1952, Mao pointed out that our national defense industry must learn “two sets of skills” to be “capable of both military and civilian production, combining the two.” In 1956, at the Supreme State Conference, Mao further emphasized that in the field of production, attention must be paid to dual-use capabilities—mastering both military and civilian production techniques and equipping two sets of production equipment—so that in peacetime they can be used for civilian production, and if war breaks out, they can be quickly converted to military production. Guided by this thought, the Second Ministry of Machine Building formulated a specific policy for the development of the defense industry, summarized as “combining peacetime and wartime, combining military and civilian, prioritizing the military, and embedding military potential in civilian capacity.” In addition, Mao highly valued the construction of the militia and reserve forces, proposing the idea of “turning the whole nation into soldiers” (quánmín jiē bīng), emphasizing that by vigorously establishing militia divisions, a broad basis for national defense mobilization would be formed.
III. The Contemporary Value of Mao Zedong’s Military Economic Thought Mao Zedong’s military economic thought, based on the theoretical foundation of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, applies fundamental principles such as the productive forces and relations of production, and the economic base and the superstructure. It systematically analyzes the internal links between war and the economy, and between national defense construction and economic construction. It played a major guiding role in the practice of the Chinese revolution and construction, driving the Party and the state to achieve historically significant accomplishments. This system of thought demonstrates distinct strategic foresight, holistic coordination, and practical creativity, exhibiting lasting theoretical vitality. The people-centered stance, systems thinking, dialectical reasoning, and practical methods contained within it not only played an important role during the periods of revolution and construction but also possess significant revelatory meaning for handling major relationships under the conditions of the New Era.
(I) Coordinating development and security, and scientifically planning major issues in the process of Chinese-path modernization
Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought takes the dialectical relationship between the productive forces and the relations of production, and between the economic base and the superstructure, as its primary theoretical thread, emphasizing the grasp of the inherent unity between development and security under different historical conditions. Chinese-path modernization is, in essence, a historic leap in the productive forces, but the development of productive forces must be realized under the prerequisite of security guarantees. Therefore, Mao Zedong's thoughts on coordinating economic construction with national defense construction hold significant enlightening significance for advancing Chinese-path modernization in the New Era. On one hand, it is necessary to remain highly vigilant against potential risks and strengthen security preparations through strategic foresight. Based on a sober judgment that the danger of imperialist aggression still existed, Mao Zedong proposed that "if we are prepared, the enemy may not come; if we are not prepared, the enemy likely will," and emphasized that "work should be deployed based on the starting point of the possibility of being attacked." This thought reflects a strategic mindset of pre-setting risks and "repairing the house before it rains" [14] during the development process. Currently, the international landscape is undergoing profound adjustments. Persisting in bottom-line thinking and strategic resolve, strengthening dual preparations on both material and spiritual levels, improving crisis management mechanisms, and enhancing the ability to prevent and respond to local conflicts are of great significance for ensuring that Chinese-path modernization moves forward steadily and reaches far. On the other hand, development and security must be coordinated at the strategic level, scientifically handling the relationship between Chinese-path modernization and the modernization of national defense and the armed forces. The modernization of national defense and the military is both an important component of the national modernization system and a crucial guarantee for national security. Chinese-path modernization persists in taking the path of peaceful development, but peaceful development does not mean abandoning security preparations; rather, it takes strong comprehensive national power and national defense capabilities as its strategic support. The modernization of national defense and the military must be incorporated into the overall layout of national modernization and advanced in a coordinated manner, ensuring that military capabilities match the country's developmental stage and strategic needs.
(2) Grounding development in the characteristics of key factors of production and improving the corresponding relations of production. Mao Zedong's military-economic thought closely integrated the historical materialist principle that the economic base determines the superstructure with the specific practice of the Chinese revolution and construction, unfolding theoretical and practical explorations around the core issue of the ownership of the means of production. Within Mao Zedong's military-economic thought, the ideological connotations of grasping key factors of production, reshaping interest structures, coalescing the power of the people, and serving the overall strategic situation possess enlightening significance. In different historical stages, the forms of key factors of production undergo changes, but constructing rational relations of production around core productive factors and mobilizing the initiative of the people always remains of great importance. Currently, against the backdrop of the rapid development of the digital economy, data has become an important factor of production driving economic and social development. Xi Jinping pointed out: "The construction of basic systems for data concerns the overall situation of national development and security... promoting the efficient circulation and use of data, empowering the real economy, coordinately advancing data property rights, circulation and trading, revenue distribution, and security governance, and accelerating the construction of a basic system of data institutions." Entering the New Era, adhering to the people-centered development philosophy requires following the laws of digital economic development, improving property rights systems, circulation and trading systems, revenue distribution systems, and security governance systems that are compatible with the characteristics of data factors. We must build a data system that can both promote the efficient utilization of data and safeguard national security and the interests of the people. Rationally allocating the returns of data factors and optimizing distribution mechanisms will allow the achievements of the digital economy to benefit all people more extensively and fairly, thereby fortifying the mass base in the digital age.
(3) Persisting in the holistic thinking of people's war to consolidate the foundation of strategic initiative in international competition. Mao Zedong always adhered to the materialist conception of history that the masses of the people are the creators of history, emphasizing that all military-economic activities must be based on the people, rely on the people, and serve the people. Currently, international competition has expanded from traditional military and political fields to multiple domains such as science and technology, trade, finance, industrial and supply chains, and cultural communication. While the forms of competition are more complex, their essence remains a contest of a country’s comprehensive strength and social cohesion—a comprehensive competition of institutional advantages, technological strength, and the winning or losing of the people's hearts. Therefore, transforming the holistic thinking of people's war into a mindset of "total mobilization" and "integral synergy" under New Era conditions is of great practical significance for winning the strategic initiative in international competition. Xi Jinping established "persisting in the supremacy of the people" as the fundamental value following for governance, emphasizing the need to grasp the new characteristics and requirements of people's war under new era conditions. He pointed out: "No matter how the situation develops, the 'magic weapon' of people's war can never be lost, but we must grasp the new characteristics and requirements of people's war under new era conditions, innovate content and methods, and give full play to the overall power of people's war." Entering the New Era, persisting in the holistic thinking of people's war means consolidating the foundation of military-government and military-civilian relations, improving the level of the national defense mobilization system and reserve forces, and integrating the creativity and wisdom of the masses into key areas such as technological innovation, industrial upgrading, financial security, and public opinion guidance. By enhancing social cohesion and institutional execution, and cultivating cross-domain, multi-level, and all-encompassing comprehensive response capabilities, the state can maintain strategic resolve and developmental resilience in a complex and volatile international environment.
(4) Deepening military-civilian integration and the combination of peacetime and wartime efforts to consolidate the foundation of national strategic capabilities. Mao Zedong proposed the ideas of combining the military with the civilian and combining peacetime with wartime, emphasizing the realization of bi-directional conversion between military and civilian resources through institutional and technical arrangements. This thought holds significant practical enlightenment for currently breaking the binary division between military and civilian sectors, integrating military and civilian resources, and sensitive-building an integrated national strategic system and capability. Entering the New Era, Xi Jinping pointed out: "The integrated development of military and civilian sectors is a move to prosper the country and a strategy to strengthen the army; we must form a deep development pattern of military-civilian integration characterized by all elements, multiple fields, and high efficiency, and build an integrated national strategic system and capability." First, we must promote integrated fusion in emerging fields. Under the backdrop of the new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation, new quality productive forces and "new quality combat capabilities" [15] possess inherent connections such as common technological origins, shared industrial roots, and a unified talent pool. By strengthening the military-civilian collaborative layout of the technological innovation system and promoting the bi-directional transformation of technological achievements between economic construction and national defense construction, technological advantages can be transformed into industrial and strategic advantages, providing continuous momentum for national modernization. Second, we must coordinate the construction of major national productive capacities with the layout of the national defense science, technology, and industry. At present, national strategic planning should consider the layout of major productive forces and the development of the national defense science and technology industry in a holistic manner. We should optimize the layout of core nodes such as key industrial and supply chains, energy guarantees, and logistics hubs in strategic hinterlands to enhance the system's ability to withstand shocks and respond to risks, achieving an organic combination of developmental layout and security needs. Third, we must strengthen the integrated coordination mechanism for peacetime and wartime. Necessary national defense functions should be preset within peacetime economic construction, improving the mobilization system and emergency conversion mechanisms. This ensures that the production system serves economic development in peacetime, converts rapidly to emergency support in states of exigency, and effectively supports national defense requirements under wartime conditions.
(5) Persisting in self-reliance as the primary factor and external assistance as auxiliary to consolidate the foundation of autonomous and controllable development. Mao Zedong proposed that "both revolution and construction must rely on ourselves," emphasizing that the victory of the Chinese revolution must be built upon a profound grasp of China's actual conditions. On one hand, persisting in independence and self-reliance is the fundamental requirement for firmly grasping the initiative in revolution and construction amidst various complex external environments. Entering the New Era, the pattern of international competition is undergoing profound adjustments, and the field of science and technology has become the core battlefield of major-power strategic maneuvering. Xi Jinping emphasized that high-level technological self-reliance and self-strengthening are of extreme importance for successfully walking the path of strengthening the army with Chinese characteristics and winning the initiative in strategic competition. He pointed out that technological self-reliance and self-strengthening are the fundamental forces supporting the overall situation of national development. "Key core technologies cannot be asked for, bought, or begged for." Therefore, in key fields and core technologies, we must persist in independent innovation and hold the initiative of development firmly in our own hands. On the other hand, persisting in self-reliance does not mean closed development, but rather actively striving for external resources under the prerequisite of maintaining subjectivity. Mao Zedong emphasized the need to study foreign experience critically, absorbing its strengths while remaining vigilant against its deficiencies. This principle provides important enlightenment for persisting in openness, inclusiveness, and cooperation in the New Era, and for promoting high-level opening up to the outside world. By actively integrating into the global innovation network and learning from world-class advanced technology and management experience, the country's overall innovation capacity and international competitiveness can be enhanced. External cooperation must take the maintenance of national sovereignty and developmental security as a prerequisite; it must oppose simple "copy-and-paste-ism" [16] and avoid mechanical imitation. Instead, we should persist in taking ourselves as the core and making things serve our purposes, achieving the deep fusion of external resources with our own capabilities through the path of introduction, digestion, absorption, and re-innovation.
About the Author: Qiao Yuting, Associate Professor and Master's Supervisor at the School of Basic Education for Military and Politics, National University of Defense Technology. Source: Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories, Issue 12, 2025. Editor: Huihui